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Résumé 
 
Cette thèse étudie la stabilité et l’instabilité politique des régimes hybrides. Elle pose la 
question suivante : dans quelles conditions l’autorité des élites au pouvoir est-elle reconnue ou 
contestée? Notre réponse s’articule en lien avec le caractère inclusif ou exclusif de la coalition 
dirigeante : c’est-à-dire, l’alliance stratégique des élites dirigeantes avec les groupes sociaux 
dominants. L’inclusion de ces derniers favorise le consentement et la stabilité; leur exclusion 
entraîne l’affrontement et l’instabilité politique. Sa composition dépend (i) du degré de 
violence organisée extra-légale et (ii) du degré de pénétration de l’État sur le territoire et dans 
l’économie. La première variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État 
(militaires) ou du régime (partis d’opposition) est dominant et influence les formes de 
communication politique avec les élites dirigeantes. La deuxième variable permet d’identifier 
quel groupe social au sein de l’État (fonctionnaires) ou de la société (chefs locaux) est 
dominant et oriente les rapports entre les régions et le pouvoir central. L’apport de la recherche 
est d’approfondir notre compréhension des institutions politiques dans les régimes hybrides en 
mettant l’accent sur l’identité des groupes sociaux dominants dans un contexte donné. La thèse 
propose un modèle simple, flexible et original permettant d’appréhender des relations causales 
autrement contre-intuitives. En ce sens, la stabilité politique est également possible dans un 
pays où l’État est faible et/ou aux prises avec des mouvements de rébellion; et l’instabilité 
dans un contexte inverse. Tout dépend de la composition de la coalition dirigeante. Afin 
d’illustrer les liens logiques formulés et d’exposer les nuances de notre théorie, nous 
employons une analyse historique comparative de la coalition dirigeante en Malaisie (1957-
2010), en Indonésie (1945-1998), au Sénégal (1960-2010) et au Paraguay (1945-2008). La 
principale conclusion est que les deux variables sont incontournables. L’une sans l’autre offre 
nécessairement une explication incomplète des alliances politiques qui forgent les conditions 
de stabilité et d'instabilité dans les régimes hybrides. 
 
 
Mots-clés : régime hybride, stabilité politique, instabilité politique, coalition dirigeante, 
militaires, partis d’opposition, fonctionnaires, chefs locaux, violence organisée extra-légale, 
pénétration de l’État.  
 vi  
 
Abstract 
 
The thesis studies stability and instability in hybrid regimes. The research question is: under 
which conditions the authority of the elites in power is recognized or contested? Our answer 
rests on the inclusive or exclusive dimension of the ruling coalition: that is, the strategic 
alliance between the ruling elites and dominant social groups. Inclusion favors consent and 
stability whereas exclusion favors contention and instability. The composition of the ruling 
coalition depends on (i) the degree of extra-legal organized violence and (ii) the degree of state 
penetration over the territory and in the economy. The first variable identifies which social 
group in the state (military officers) or in the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and 
influences the forms of political communication with the ruling elites. The second variable 
identifies which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is dominant 
and shapes the relation between regions and the center. The thesis contribution is to deepen 
our understanding of political institutions in hybrid regimes by focusing on the identity of 
dominant social groups according to a given context. It offers a simple, flexible and original 
model that allow us to grasp causal relations that would otherwise be counter-intuitive. Hence, 
political stability is also possible in a country where the state is weak and/or rebellion 
movements exist; and instability in the opposite context. It all comes down to the composition 
of the ruling coalition. In order to illustrate the line of reasoning and unfold the richness of our 
framework, a comparative historical analysis of the ruling coalition in Malaysia (1957-2010), 
Indonesia (1945-1998), Senegal (1960-2010) and Paraguay (1945-2008) is used. The main 
conclusion is that the two variables are key. One without the other necessarily amounts to an 
incomplete explanation of political alliances at stake when dealing with conditions of stability 
and instability in hybrid regimes.  
 
 
Key words: hybrid regime, political stability, political instability, ruling coalition, military 
officers, opposition parties, bureaucrats, local leaders, extra-legal organized violence, state 
penetration.  
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Introduction 
 
 
In Roman mythology, Janus is the God of transition with a double-faced head looking in 
opposite directions: one facing the past, the other facing the future. He is the Almighty sitting 
at the conjuncture of two antagonistic worlds: primitive and civilized, war-torn and peaceful. 
In a way, Janus is emblematic of hybrid regimes. They stand in a paradoxical state between 
outright dictatorship and full-fledged democracy. They navigate a vast gray zone of 
institutional ambiguities. This is the subject of our thesis.  
 
Why study hybrid regimes? Why should they attract our attention? Well, the magnitude of the 
phenomenon should convince us. In 2010, there were 53 hybrid regimes in the world (see 
appendix 1). Taken together, they regulate the life of roughly 1.4 billion people or 20% of the 
world population. They are present on every continent: from Latin America to Eurasia, the 
Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The states that they govern are by no means 
marginal. They are global economic hubs such as Singapore; major oil producers such as 
Venezuela, Kuwait and Nigeria; nuclear super-powers such as Pakistan; regional pivotal states 
such as Mexico, Turkey and Malaysia; and conflict-ridden countries such as Lebanon and 
Uganda1. Turning a blind eye to this reality is simply unacceptable from a scholarly and 
policy-making point of view.  
 
Why should we be interested in hybrid regime stability per se? After all, as Tocqueville (1835: 
289) asserted long ago, “the form of government that is usually termed mixed has always 
appeared to me a mere chimera… When a community actually has a mixed government – that 
is to say, when it is equally divided between adverse principles – it must either experience a 
revolution or fall into anarchy”. Indeed, conventional wisdom suggests: “the halfway house 
does not stand” (Huntington, 1991: 137). According to classic theories of political 
development, only established autocracies or consolidated democracies are worthy candidates 
for stability. Logically, this makes sense. Hybrid regimes afflicted by the schizophrenic pull of 
                                                 
1 Freedom House classified all these countries as partly free (hybrid) in 2010.  
 2  
institutions heading in opposition directions are bound to be unstable and in principle, their 
embedded contradictions can generate dysfunctional polities. As a consequence, they have 
been perceived as purely transitional and ephemeral in nature. To be sure, hybrid regimes are 
more likely to experience instability than autocratic or democratic regimes (Epstein et al., 
2006: 566). Nonetheless, from 1972 to 2010, 66 hybrid regimes have lasted at least 10 years; 
and 22 endured more than 20 years (see appendix 1). Thus, not all hybrid regimes are unstable. 
Why is it so? Clearly, there is enough unexplained variation to warrant the effort of reflecting 
on a genuine theory of hybrid regime stability.  
 
Questions about the standard dichotomous paradigm autocracy/democracy emerged at the end 
of the Cold War. For one, foreign policy circles were no longer exclusively concerned with 
traditional security imperatives. Democratic promotion initiatives were making their way on to 
the agendas of western powers (Carothers, 2007: 112-113). In the process, however, 
practitioners soon realized the limits of existing frameworks. In most cases, what they were 
experiencing on the ground could not fit in the democratic or dictatorship box. For two, in 
retrospective, the hope driving the so-called third wave of democratization that began in the 
1970s never materialized. In spite of the initial euphoria, this wave did not bring about 
electoral democracy in developing countries: that is to say, in short, a regime with frequent, 
fair, free and competitive elections. Among the 85 regimes that initiated a transition from 
either autocracy or some form of authoritarianism, only 30 became stable democracies 
(Geddes, 1999a: 115-116). Instead, it led to a proliferation of hybrid regimes: “authoritarian 
forms of multiparty electoral competition have increased during the third wave much more 
rapidly than democratic ones” (Diamond, 2002: 27). As a result, scholars were convinced that 
new analytical tools were needed. A research program was born.  
 
In historicizing the literature on hybrid regimes, five successive objectives come to light: 
concept formation, typology construction, causes of emergence, conditions of stability; and 
finally transition from hybridity. They form a logical sequence of scientific inquiry.  
 
Our thesis focuses on conditions of stability; yet, clarifications about definitions are necessary 
before addressing the object of our investigation. This is why we will examine definitions of 
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hybrid regimes in the literature review. In doing so, it will become evident that there are 
already sufficient authoritative contributions on concept formation and typology construction 
to provide a solid base for thinking about the next step. As to the causes of emergence and 
transition from hybridity, examining those at length would lead to an unnecessary digression 
from our exposé. We will therefore limit ourselves to the following quick overview; it should, 
we beleive, reinforce the relevance of focusing on the conditions of stability. 
 
From our standpoint, and as far as an exercise of generalization can go, existing explanations 
about the causes of emergence are persuasive enough. Above all, they stress the importance of 
international and regional context, past regimes and modes of transition. Multiple hypotheses 
have been formulated along those axes: for instance, hybrid regimes emerge through an 
interacting process between external democratic and internal autocratic forces, between past 
autocratic and new democratic institutions, between a democratic civil society and autocratic 
ruling elites (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 17-20; Merkel, 2004: 54; Morlino, 2009a: 288; Munck & 
Leff, 1997: 357). In addition to these generic patterns, actor-centered explanations related to 
incumbent skills in manipulating political institutions as well as contingent factors specific to 
country dynamics give a more complete picture of the phenomenon.  
 
Recently, the literature has started to examine the transition from hybrid regimes to democratic 
polities and hypotheses are again numerous. They deal mainly with the importance of 
opposition coalitions, repetitive experiences with democratic elections and intense links with 
western institutions (Howard & Roessler, 2006: 380; van de Walle, 2006: 84; Lindberg, 2006: 
2; Brownlee, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010: 44). Still, the results have been somewhat 
inconclusive (Epstein et al., 2006: 564). The reason for such state of affairs is simple. In order 
to fully grasp the meaning of these defining moments, we believe one should master the 
conditions for hybrid regime stability; a prerequisite that, as we will see, has not yet been met. 
We need to understand the dynamics prevailing in hybrid regimes before contemplating the 
teleological question. Indeed, institutional legacy almost inevitably comes to play in future 
institutional arrangements (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 56; Gunther et al., 1995: 399).  
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Henceforth, we will concentrate on the conditions of hybrid regime stability. There has been a 
burgeoning body of work on this subject since the beginning of the millennium. All in all, 
explanations converge on the presence of a dominant party as the necessary condition: one 
approach focuses on the economic instruments of power and the other on organizational 
capacities. Although they contribute to our understanding of the subject, we will demonstrate 
that they are nevertheless incomplete. The economic approach basically associates resource 
scarcity with instability and the ability to fuel patronage networks with stability (Magaloni, 
2006; Greene, 2007, 2010). More specifically, these networks are tied to the existence of 
geographically targeted government transfer programs and labor-intense parastatal companies. 
In the former, constituencies that support overwhelmingly the incumbent are rewarded with 
subsidies and the like, and in the latter, jobs and public contracts are dispensed to loyal 
supporters. Yet, some persistent hybrid regimes are found in very poor countries, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In these cases, large-scale institutional schemes aimed at buying-off the 
masses or at co-opting the bulk of elites are simply non-existent. Only a very small fraction 
can be spoiled. The organizational approach focuses on the existence of a well-oiled party 
machine and coercive apparatus (Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010). This approach has 
one major drawback. It uses similar variables to those found in the literature on autocratic 
stability. In doing so, it does not tell us what is special about hybrid regimes, let alone the 
dynamics prevailing in different hybrid regimes: that is to say in hegemonic authoritarian and 
competitive authoritarian regimes that we consider to be the two main types of hybrid regimes. 
Stated briefly, a hegemonic authoritarian regime is a regime with frequent national elections 
and universal suffrage, but where opposition parties are illegal; and/or the population does not 
directly elect the head of state; and/or electoral fraud is recurrent and extensive. A competitive 
authoritarian regime is characterized by free national elections with competition between 
parties, but competition is unfair mostly because state resources are used to partisan ends by 
the dominant party. These concepts will be the object of further explanations in Chapter One. 
Overall, the organizational approach lacks differentiation between hybrid regimes and this 
clarification is important because institutional variations among types of hybrid regimes shape 
the structure of opportunities for elites to find their way in or out of the locus of power.  
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Thus, our central research question is: under what conditions are hybrid regimes stable or 
unstable? And how these conditions vary depending on the type of hybrid regime and the level 
of economic development?  
 
There is also something more profound at stake here. An additional critic pertaining to both 
approaches points to the foundation for an alternative and convincing explanation. The 
economic and organization approaches tend to depict the political landscape of hybrid regimes 
in a dominant party context as relatively monolithic, as in autocratic regimes. All the attention 
is thus directed at the interests of ruling elites and unilateral coercive measures. At best, other 
political actors are treated as a passive and uniform group. This singular focus misses the 
essence of a hybrid regime: the coexistence of competing sources of authority in a non-
institutionalized party system (Schedler, 2006: 12). Indeed, conflict about the rules between 
different political actors is the hallmark of most hybrid regimes. A hybrid regime combines to 
various degrees democratic and autocratic institutions. In other words, the economic and 
organizational approaches remain evasive about the democratic input: that is, political 
pluralism and contestation. Who challenges the ruling elites, what are their interests and 
capacities, and how these considerations influence political interactions?  
 
To address these questions we develop a theory of hybrid regime stability based on political 
alliances. It starts with the following proposition: in hybrid regimes, elections fragment 
political allegiances, hence, ruling elites cannot govern alone. In order to preserve their 
position within the political regime, they need to co-opt representatives of social groups who 
negotiate their way in what we call the “ruling coalition”. In this sense, hybrid regime stability 
is intimately related to elite consent. At the same time, cooptation is not undifferentiated: 
social groups are not all equal. The trick is to know which ones are determinant in legitimizing 
the ruling elites’ hold on power. In this regard, we argue that four social groups dominate the 
political landscape in hybrid regimes: the military officers, the opposition parties, the state 
bureaucrats and the local leaders. Those are the ones that have the power to disrupt the normal 
functioning of government activities. A specific set of interests can be associated with each 
group. Most importantly, each has leverage against the ruling elites because it controls a 
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captive constituency. Thus, the crucial analytical element is whether the ruling coalition 
excludes or includes these four dominant social groups.  
 
Adding a level of complexity, the influence that these four dominant social groups have on the 
conduct of political affairs is a function of two variables: the degree of extra-legal organized 
violence and the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. These 
variables structure the patterns of authority in any modern society and as such should affect 
the configuration of the ruling coalition composition. The degree of extra-legal organized 
violence is determinant in identifying which social group in the state (military officers) or in 
the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and influences the forms of political 
communication with the ruling elites; and the degree of state penetration is determinant in 
identifying which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is 
dominant and shapes the relation between regions and the center. 
 
It is our contention that the degree of extra-legal organized violence is linked to political 
regimes and, in this case, types of hybrid regimes. Indeed, when the degree is high, it generally 
means that the political arena is located outside official institutions: a situation common to 
hegemonic authoritarian regimes that fosters the intervention of military officers in politics. 
When the degree is low, it indicates that most political actors agree to channel social demands 
through the party system: a situation common to competitive authoritarian regimes that confer 
to political parties the role of aggregating and articulating collective interests. As for the 
degree of state penetration, we link it to the level of economic development. A high degree 
implies the edification of an efficient civil administration and a state apparatus heavily 
involved in the process of industrialization. Upper-echelon state bureaucrats become the main 
architects of the country future and influential players in allocating resources as well as in 
coordinating and implementing policies across the territory. A low degree reflects predatory 
practices and underdevelopment, at least in the South. It echoes a weak state in which elites 
retreat to the capital and leave regions in a political vacuum. Local leaders fill the void and act 
as privileged intermediaries between the national institutions and the rural base. Consequently, 
the following two-by-two matrix schematically represents our framework of political alliances 
in hybrid regimes:  
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Figure 1 – Patterns of Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes 
 
Each box in this figure represents an ideal-type. In the upper-left quadrant, a low degree of 
extra-legal organized violence and high degree of state penetration empower opposition parties 
and state bureaucrats. This alliance is likely to be associated with a competitive authoritarian 
regime and a developing economy (case study: Malaysia). In the upper-right quadrant, a high 
degree of extra-legal organized violence and a high degree of state penetration empower 
military officers and state bureaucrats. This alliance is likely to be associated with a 
hegemonic authoritarian regime and a developing economy (case study: Indonesia). In the 
lower-left quadrant, a low degree of extra-legal organized violence and a low degree of state 
penetration empower opposition parties and local leaders. This alliance is likely to be 
associated with a competitive authoritarian regime and an underdeveloped economy (case 
study: Senegal). Finally, in the lower-right quadrant, a high degree of extra-legal organized 
violence and low degree of state penetration empower military officers and local leaders. This 
alliance is likely to be associated with a hegemonic authoritarian regime and an 
underdeveloped economy (case study: Paraguay).  
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These four quadrants lay out our hypotheses. They indicate the conditions under which a 
hybrid regime is more likely to be stable. They pinpoint which dominant social groups should 
be included in the ruling coalition according to a specific political and economic context. 
When the composition of a ruling coalition diverges from these ideal-types – i.e. incongruities 
between the composition of the ruling coalition and contextual elements – the disenfranchised 
dominant social groups will publicly contest the authority of the ruling elites and instability 
should be expected.  
 
To our knowledge, no research has systematically compared the composition of political 
alliances across various regions in a hybrid context. This is surprising given that it is a key 
research axis in the field of political development. The works of Barrington Moore (1968) as 
well as O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986) are classic examples. Far from being outdated, they 
have led to subsequent testing (see Mahoney, 2003: 140-141; Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; 
Snyder, 1992; Eisenstadt, 2000; McFaul 2002). Overall, the literature has explored the 
relevance of various social groups: i.e. entrepreneurs, civil servants, military and police 
officers, religious communities, journalists, monarchical families, peasants, workers, technical 
specialists, intellectuals, oppositions parties and so on (see Almond & Coleman, 1960: 562-
567; Huntington, 1970: 7; Linz, 1978: 27-38). Therefore, we do not pretend to (re) invent the 
wheel so to speak. Obviously, the aforementioned four dominant social groups are not a 
construction of our own. The innovative character of the theory we have developed over the 
last three years resides in the links we establish between four dominant social groups and two 
variables that, taken as a whole, could serve as a reliable analytical tool for a diagnostic of 
political stability or instability. Ultimately the main scientific contribution of our thesis is to 
offer an integrated framework based on the recognition of political pluralism, that 
distinguishes between the respective hybrid patterns prevailing in hegemonic authoritarian and 
competitive authoritarian regimes as well as in developing and underdeveloped economies.  
 
Our theory provides a roadmap for cross-national comparison, not a blueprint of actual 
dynamics. We identify the necessary social groups to include in the ruling coalition according 
to pre-established variables. Without these dominant social groups, instability is almost 
inevitable. That being said, the patterns of political alliances we identify may not be sufficient 
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in all cases. Depending on the idiographic dynamic of a country, additional social groups may 
also have a stabilizing effect. It is not either an all-or-nothing situation. Political alliances in 
hybrid regimes thrive on selective co-optation and contained inclusion. For instance, in a 
context where the opposition parties are a dominant social group, some opposition parties are 
obviously more important than others. It is the same with state bureaucrats, military officers 
and local leaders. The bottom line is that a social group is not a unified bloc. As a secondary 
analytical layer, we need to acknowledge political pluralism within each of them. In this 
regard, we will formulate general rules about which ones are strategic – hence should be 
included in the coalition in order to induce stability – but beyond these considerations, it 
becomes a country specific issue. Furthermore, we recognize that it is not always easy to 
determine the degree of extra-legal organized violence or state penetration as evidence 
sometimes suggests a median value at a given time. The design of our contextual variables 
serves to provide clarity: that is, creating an analytical contrast in order to construct ideal-
types. Afterward, it is a matter of detecting tendencies and candidly admitting that our 
framework yields mixed results in periods when the degree of extra-legal organized violence 
and/or state penetration falls in-between our dichotomous categories while being cogent when 
a clear assessment can be made.  
 
In regard to the scholastic boundaries of our reflection, we opt for historical institutionalism as 
a meta-theory. First, the keystone of our argument centers on the institutional locus of power 
in hybrid regimes: the ruling coalition. But the structure of opportunities and the distribution 
of resources within the ruling coalition are embedded in a broader institutional context that 
includes the types of hybrid regimes and the level of economic development. Second, we take 
history seriously and in most cases look back to Independence Day. We refrain from assessing 
events as they unravel or overestimating the importance of proximate causes. Regime stability 
is a macro-political phenomenon structured by slow-moving forces. Notwithstanding, far from 
being homeostatic, we consider history as a non-linear process, a diachronic process. 
Temporal sequencing is at the heart of our analysis: there are periods of remission and 
chocking points in each country-regime. And third, our framework offers a middle-range 
theory. We do not wish to present a new type of hybrid regime, a new classification, novel 
causes of hybrid regime emergence and conditions of stability all at once. Neither do we aim 
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at explaining political stability in autocratic, hybrid and democratic regimes simultaneously in 
a single framework. We are only concerned with a more concise research object: conditions 
for hybrid regime stability. 
 
Along those lines, our theory has fixed parameters in terms of temporal and spatial 
contingencies. First, the time period extends from 1945 to 2010. In regard to the starting date, 
we were guided by the fact that hybrid regimes refer to institutional arrangements that at the 
very least include frequent direct elections with universal suffrage. Before 1945, such 
prerequisites were an anomaly in most developing countries (Cowen & Laakso, 2002: 4; 
Hartlyn & Valenzuela, 1994: 132-135). Ultimately, the existence of this anomaly denotes a 
major change over time in what is meant by differences between political regimes; and the end 
of the Second World War with the seminal definition of Schumpeter (1942: 250) represents a 
turning point for that matter (Huntington, 1991: 6). We stop at 2010 in order to have sufficient 
documentation for the examination of our hypotheses while avoiding the risk of having to 
work on on-going events. Second, we exclude small states (population of less than a million) 
or city-states; whether because of their size or remoteness, they obey a different logic than the 
one of political regimes in larger states (Briguglio et al., 2008; Anckar, 2006; Suton, 2007). In 
these cases, our theory yields little analytical output. Also perhaps to state the obvious, hybrid 
regimes are found in non-western countries. Taking into account these two parameters, we 
have a total of about 60 cases of hybrid regimes (see appendix 1). 
 
Methodologically speaking, we employ a “middle-way” between large-N and single or binary 
case studies. In regard to large-N, problems of data accessibility and reliability as well as the 
exigencies of validation related to the nature of our theory – i.e. process-tracing of ruling 
coalition dynamics – prevent us from performing any statistical analysis. As for binary cases, 
considering our theory specification (four ideal-types), we need more than one or two cases to 
examine the inner working of our arguments.  
 
In terms of case selection, the method of most different systems design first dictates the choice 
of our countries. We choose this method because if our analytical framework explains diverse 
cases in terms of geographical location, political system, colonial history and cultural 
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background, it will increase its potential of inference to a larger population sample. 
Consequently, we made the choice of covering Latin America (Paraguay), sub-Saharan Africa 
(Senegal) and Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia). Senegal, Paraguay and Indonesia are 
presidential systems, while Malaysia is a parliamentary system2. Our cases should also witness 
different colonial history and access to independence at different times: Paraguay in 1811, 
Senegal in 1960, Malaysia in 1957 and Indonesia in 1945. Paraguay was a Spanish colony, 
Senegal a French one; Malaysia was a British colony and Indonesia a Dutch one. The 
population of Malaysia, Indonesia and Senegal is mostly Muslim, whereas in Paraguay 
inhabitants are essentially Christian. Their degree of fractionalization also varies: from a 
relative homogenous society in Paraguay to the more heterogeneous ones in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Senegal.  
 
Second, we were looking for crucial cases: that is, dominant party hybrid regimes that have 
experienced periods of instability. Indeed, comparisons that do not take into account rival 
explanations are of limited use in comparative politics. Although they all have their 
weaknesses, it is difficult to deny the ascendancy of the Colorado Party in Paraguay, the Parti 
Socialiste in Senegal, the United Malays National Organisation in Malaysia and the Golkar 
Party in Indonesia. Moreover, all of these countries have experienced at some point in their 
contemporary history significant periods of instability. For example, in Paraguay, the 1989 
coup ended the reign of Stroessner. In Senegal, the 1988 post-electoral riots threaten Diouf’s 
hold on power and forced the declaration of a state of emergency. In Malaysia, the Chinese-
Malay race riot of 1969 almost pushed the country into chaos. In Indonesia, the supposedly 
aborted coup in 1965 and the subsequent purges of communists by General Suharto 
traumatized the country for some times. These are only few examples. Many more political 
crises will be described in the empirical chapters.  
 
Third and finally, at the development stage, a plausibility probe strategy makes sense. It was 
important that our theory be able to illuminate classic cases of hybrid regimes. The Malaysian 
hybrid regime is one of the most studied nomothetic cases on the subject. For the others, 
                                                 
2 Over the period covered in the present study, the Senegalese, Paraguayan and Indonesian political systems 
changed on many occasions.  
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Paraguay was one of the most durable hybrid regimes in the world until 2008; Senegal was 
among the first competitive authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa; and the New Order in 
Indonesia under Suharto was an institutional novelty at that time and perhaps a prototypical 
example of a façade democracy (i.e. in this case a hegemonic authoritarian regime) with 
opposition parties created by the ruling elites and an all-powerful president elected by the 
legislative assembly. 
 
In our research we have asked big questions and worked hard to provide a parsimonious 
answer. We found it useful to support our theory with illustrative cases so that the nuances of 
our line of reasoning can be captured. We do not pretend that these cases are a representative 
sample of all hybrid regimes over the period covered; and we do not claim that our framework 
automatically applies to all hybrid regimes. The selection is not purely random; cases are 
chosen to reflect our hypotheses (one case study for each ideal-type). Yet, to prevent axiomatic 
theorizing, we devoted much attention to the research design. In this regard, we are confident 
that, with the three case selection strategies, the political history of Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Senegal and Paraguay will provide an empirical basis to gauge the relevance of our theory. 
The idea is not to ask if another case could have been selected, but if collectively the four 
cases satisfy our criteria.  
 
As for the type of information, the demonstration relies mostly on qualitative data. That being 
said, statistics on election results, socio-economic trends, etc, are added in support of our 
argument. Data collection is based on secondary sources: that is, transnational, international 
and national organizations as well as media and scholarly publications. Primary sources like 
participant observation, surveys or semi-structured interviews are sidelined for two reasons. 
For one, we firmly believe that enough information already exists in the specialized literature 
to provide a solid empirical basis to expose the inner working of our hypotheses. For two, 
given our sample size and case selection, fieldwork would involve significant resources and an 
overly time consuming effort.  
 
The presentation of country narrative follows the structured and focused method used in case 
studies (George & Bennett, 2004: 67). The method is structured insofar as the empirical 
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material in each case is gathered to answer the same generic questions. The method is focused 
in the sense that specific aspects of the political history in each country are examined based on 
the identification of a small number of variables and precise indicators. The intent is to 
standardize the way to report facts in order to compare findings not only within our sample, 
but also later on to the entire population understudy. 
 
Last but not least, we want to clearly state our research objectives. First, we aim at knowledge 
accumulation. We do not wish to (re) open debates about types of hybrid regimes or causes of 
emergence for instance. Furthermore, we do not deny the overall utility of existing approaches 
to hybrid regimes stability. We only point to their inability to interpret important variations in 
terms of types of hybrid regimes and levels of economic development. In other words, the 
present body of work on the subject traces the general contour of our understanding of hybrid 
regime stability, but we need to dig deeper in order to explain unresolved issues. Second, we 
choose the ambitious and rocky road of theory building; leaving the testing and validating 
phases for future research. We also depart from the attempt to iterate hypothesis testing or 
hypothesis (re) specification. For one, the testing of existing theories of hybrid regime stability 
is already well advanced (see appendix 2) and for two the modification of one variable would 
fall short of solving the problems we raise. Third, we want to produce meaningful 
generalizations. We were less interested in offering an exhaustive portrait of political 
dynamics in a country X than what different countries have in common. Still, the different 
layers of our theory provide enough analytical flexibility to integrate contrasting realities.  
 
The thesis is divided as follows. To set the record straight, the first chapter entitled “What We 
Know and What We Do not Know about Hybrid Regime Stability” opens with an overview of 
concepts and typologies of political regimes. It includes a brief definition of what a democratic 
and autocratic regime is, a synthesis of types of hybrid regimes diversity, shortcomings of 
existing typologies of hybrid regimes and the value-added of the dichotomous one we 
selected, which is based on two concepts: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive 
authoritarianism. These are mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive and empirically sound 
while being the object of a relative academic consensus. This is followed by a presentation of 
the economic and organizational approaches on hybrid regime stability. For the sake of 
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intelligibility, it is articulated around four pillars: that is to say, Magaloni (2006) and Greene 
(2007, 2010) for the economic approach; and Brownlee (2007) as well as Levitsky & Way 
(2010) for the organizational approach. These authors helpfully cover a large portion of the 
literature on hybrid regime stability, using similar definitions of hybrid regimes and 
articulating well-developed arguments. A critical assessment follows. It will demonstrate why 
explanations of autocratic and democratic stability are not a surrogate for a theory of hybrid 
regime stability and how existing theories of hybrid regime stability are incomplete. The 
analysis is connected to three sets of factors: electoral and party systems, economic 
development, and legitimacy. Obviously, conditions of stability are manifold3 but no 
explanations of political stability could be valid without references to these three core notions. 
They have the unique property of cutting across all types of regimes. The chapter closes with a 
discussion on the definition of hybrid regime stability. It calls for moving beyond a definition 
based on regime or government duration in order to add indicators that will help us to focus 
not only on the outcome but also on the process.  
 
The second chapter entitled “Explaining Stability and Instability in Dominant-Party Hybrid 
Regimes” represents the core of our thesis. It comprises three sections. The first will introduce 
the meta-theory of neo-institutionalism in approaches to hybrid regime stability. It will clearly 
spell-out our academic contribution, since all theories of hybrid regime stability can be 
associated to neo-institutionalism. We will also present the three main strands of neo-
institutionalism – historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological 
institutionalism – and examine why historical institutionalism is the best fit to think about 
hybrid regime stability. In the second section, we will articulate the specific meaning of the 
ruling coalition in hybrid regimes and its implication in terms of distribution of resources. We 
will develop the rational for choosing our two variables - the degree of extra-legal organized 
violence and state penetration – and the indicators to measure them. We will discuss the logic 
of our hypotheses, specify the interests of the four social dominant groups as well as the nature 
of leverage they have over the ruling elites. The last section will be dedicated to 
                                                 
3 For an extensive overview of explanatory factors of regime stability, see Teorell (2010), Bunce (2000), Beetham 
(1994), Hadenius (1992), Brooker (2000); and Linz (1975).  
 15  
methodological issues; namely the rationale behind our choices in terms of types of data, size 
of sample, selection of cases and how we will report facts.  
 
Following the above, we will turn to the empirical demonstration of our theoretical 
framework. The first two empirical chapters will address the political development of 
Malaysia and Indonesia. They will highlight from the start the difference between hegemonic 
authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes, while being both developing countries. 
The next two chapters will deepen our understanding of political dynamics in hegemonic 
authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes from the perspective of underdeveloped 
countries. They will look at Senegal and Paraguay. Each chapter is organized the same way. 
First, an event-analysis of political crises is presented with special attention to its ramification 
on the composition of the ruling coalition as a condition of stability. Second, the degree of 
extra-legal organized violence and state penetration as it relates to the types of hybrid regimes 
and levels of economic development are discussed to clarify specific issues evoked in the 
event-analysis. And third, a conclusion is reached as to the relevance of our framework for 
explaining the conditions of stability or instability in the country. 
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1 
 
What We Know and What We Do Not Know  
about Hybrid Regime Stability 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a literature review on hybrid regime stability. It is a 
relatively new corpus still in the making. Debates are numerous and conventions very few. 
Much remains to be done. In this sense, the study of hybrid regime stability is full of potential. 
It is only the beginning of an exciting and stimulating line of inquiry.  
 
Undertaking such an intellectual venture requires first a discussion on definitions of political 
regimes. The objective is to prevent any lost of meaning by the excessive use of a concept 
without determining its referent. The section starts with precisions about what a political 
regime is. Once this baseline is established, a distinction between democratic and autocratic 
regimes will be made using Dahl’s (1998: 85; 1971: 3) seminal contribution. Then, a 
nomenclature of types of hybrid regimes will be presented emphasizing two effervescent 
periods of concept formation. To make sense of this plethora of types, classification schemes 
will be addressed afterward. A special attention will be given to the one developed by 
Diamond (2002) and colleagues (Schedler, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002, 2010), and 
articulated around two concepts: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive 
authoritarianism.  
 
Next, theories of hybrid regimes stability will be introduced. This section aims at providing 
the reader with a state of the art on the subject. Theories of hybrid regime stability essentially 
hinge on the dominant party framework adopting either the economic or organizational 
approach. The main proponents of the economic approach are Magoloni (2006) and Greene 
(2007, 2010). The organizational approach rests on two bodies of work: Brownlee (2007) and 
Levitsky & Way (2010). Levitsky & Way (2010) add another component to their theory – 
namely, international factors – making their framework eclectic. These are the four pillars of 
the study on hybrid regime stability and it will be stated why it is so. For each author, the 
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research question, definition of stability, methodology and hypotheses will constitute the 
structure for dissecting their arguments and findings.  
 
A critical assessment closes the chapter. The idea is to pinpoint what the literature on hybrid 
regime stability says about the wider literature on regime stability and what research avenues 
the literature on hybrid regime stability has neglected. By doing so, it will allow the 
problematic of our thesis to stand out and impose itself. The assessment is constructed around 
three themes or sets of explanatory factors: electoral and party systems, economic 
development and legitimacy. The choice of focusing on these themes will be justified. Before 
pitching in with the crux of the assessment, we will tackle the question of international factors. 
It is a bit off subject, at least in terms of how it fits in our presentation; but we have no choice 
but to speak up given its preponderance in Levitsky & Way’s (2010) framework. The three 
aforementioned themes will allow us to praise the progress the subfield of hybrid regime 
stability has made so far and herald what lies ahead in terms of unresolved issues. Finally we 
will conclude the critical assessment by evoking drawbacks in the definition of stability itself.  
 
1.1.  Political Regimes: Concepts and Typologies  
 
Discussions on definitions can easily fall into a quagmire, especially when they relate to 
regime types. It can lead to endless debates. To be sure, there is an intrinsic value to these 
discussions. From time-to-time, there is a necessity to reflect on whether the meaning of a 
given concept corresponds to the evolving reality. But this is in itself a research object that is 
not part of our own thesis. We do not wish to open Pandora’s box but to clear the air so to 
speak. Given the institutional ambiguity characterizing hybrid regimes, this is easier said than 
done. One can always find a fact to argue that a regime is an autocracy or democracy, and not 
a hybrid regime. The key to overcome this obstacle is not to loose sight of the overall picture. 
A political regime being multidimensional by nature, we must be careful that all facts have 
been taken into account before making a judgment.  
 
For Easton (1965: 192), a regime “represents relatively stable expectations, depending on the 
system and its state of change, with regard to the range of matters that can be handled 
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politically, the rules or norms governing the way these matters are processed, and the position 
of those through whom binding action may be taken on these matters”. According to 
O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986: 73en), a political regime concerns “the ensemble of patterns, 
explicit or not, that determines the forms and channels of access to principal governmental 
positions, the characteristics of the actors who are admitted and excluded from such access, 
and the resources or strategies that they can use to gain access”. Although they intertwine, it is 
important not to conflate the regime, the state and the government.  
 
“A regime may be thought of as the formal and informal organization of the 
center of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime 
determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power 
deal with those who are not. Regimes are more permanent forms of political 
organization than specific governments, but they are typically less permanent 
than the state. The state, by contrast, is a (normally) more permanent structure of 
domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to 
administer a society and extract resources from it” (Fishman, 1990: 428). 
 
Hence, the state usually refers to a given territory and population organized under a single 
system of government internationally recognized and sovereign (Ethier, 2010a: 77). The 
public administration, both its civil and military components, constitutes its operational arm. 
As for the concept of government, it represents the apex of decision-making, which can take 
different forms depending on the type of regime (Hermet et al., 2005: 133). In short, the 
government exercises authority over the state and the regime constrains government activities. 
Obviously, the concept of political regime in the aforementioned definitions remains wide-
ranging. Let see how it should be interpreted.  
 
1.1.1. Democratic and Autocratic Regimes 
 
After the end of World War II and until the 1990s, the literature on political development in 
comparative politics was fixed on a dichotomy between democratic and autocratic regimes. 
According to Dahl (1998: 85), a democratic regime rests on the following institutions: elected 
officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; access to alternative sources 
of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship. They are an integral part of 
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his classic contestation/participation framework (Dahl, 1971: 3). The crux of contestation is 
the presence of a legal political opposition that has the right to compete against the ruling 
party and elites for elected positions. For political competition to be fair, freedom of 
expression and associational autonomy should be respected; as well, independent sources of 
information should be available to the general public. Participation, on the other hand, refers to 
popular sovereignty and the enlargement of citizenry through the elimination of exclusion 
criteria based on property, literacy, gender, race or ethnicity. 
 
This definition is a procedural definition not a substantive one. It is however more demanding 
than the minimal definition of Schumpeter (1942: 250) that directs attention solely to the 
existence of electoral procedures as an expression of the will of the people and a mean to 
realize the “common good”, and omits to include explicitly notions of civil liberties such as 
freedom of expression, assembly, association and religion. 
 
A substantive definition of democracy deals mostly with the content of public policies and 
examines whether these policies are in line with democratic ideals such as economic equality. 
This definition is problematic. First, political regime and economic policy are two separate 
concepts (Burton et al., 1992: 2). Economic equality is not the exclusive domain of 
democracy. Other types of regimes may promote it. Communist regimes are one example. In 
fact, authoritarian populists, democratic reformists and radical elites may all advocate 
redistributive policies (Asher, 1984: 14). Second, “in a democracy substantive compromises 
cannot be binding” (Przeworski, 1988: 64). Only procedures that obey to the universalistic 
principles of a modern democracy can be binding and, in order to be universalistic, these 
procedures have to leave the content of policies undetermined and open to debate. Economic 
equality is a matter of public policy. And public policies may change from one government to 
another, from one mandate to another, or from one country to another. It is not embedded in 
the democratic regime per se. Regime is about procedures, and policies about substance. 
Ultimately, the substantive definition is usually used for comparison between western 
consolidated democracies (liberal democracy), which is not the object of our research. Thus, in 
the present study, a democratic regime refers to an electoral democracy, to a definition based 
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on institutions and procedures. That being said, all consolidated democracies are electoral 
democracies, whereas all electoral democracies are not necessarily consolidated.  
 
For the purpose of comparison, an autocratic regime is defined in opposition to a democratic 
regime. It is one that satisfies none of the above criteria: there are no frequent elections; 
opposition parties are illegal; civic liberties and political rights are inexistent, bluntly and 
systematically violated; and state violence is manifest in the day-to-day life of citizens. 
Obviously, all autocratic regimes do not look alike. Most of all, they vary in terms of the 
degree of repression. In the case of totalitarian regimes incarnated by fascist Germany under 
Hitler, communist USSR under Stalin as well as China under Mao, a powerful ideology aims 
at radically transforming the society through indoctrination, propaganda and the physical 
elimination of non-adherents. They were involved in the large-scale annihilation of any form 
of dissent, real or perceived, with modern techniques. In a way, these cases represent the 
beginning and foundation of the study on autocratic regimes (see Friedrich & Brzezinski, 
1956). Other post-WW II versions of autocratic regimes use more targeted, punctual, less 
public means of repression. Our definition of an autocratic regime somewhat departs from 
Linz’s classic definition of authoritarianism. He defines an authoritarian regime as a “political 
system with limited, non-responsible political pluralism; without an elaborated and guiding 
ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without either extensive or intense political 
mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader, or, 
occasionally, a small group, exercises power from within formally ill-defined, but actually 
quite predictable limits” (Linz, 1970: 255). In an autocratic regime, limited political pluralism 
is absent and the government and the party if it exists are under the absolute control of one 
person. To somewhat cancel out the notion of “limited pluralism” in Linz’s definition of 
authoritarianism, the adjective “closed” is often adjunct to the concept in the literature on 
political development to symbolize its autocratic feature. The bottom line is that Linz’s 
definition will later serve as the cornerstone of the reflection on authoritarianism with 
“adjectives” (Mahoney, 2003: 158). It opens the door to concepts such as hegemonic and 
competitive authoritarianism, given the reconnaissance of some form of political contestation 
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and participation embedded in the definition4. Thus, in our thesis, the concept of an autocratic 
regime encompasses totalitarian as well as closed authoritarian regimes.  
 
These definitions are relatively straightforward. They represent the classic vision that the field 
of political development had for over half of a century. However, as decades passed, scholars 
realized that many autocratic leaders were introducing frequent elections with universal 
suffrage as well as authorizing opposition parties to compete for top positions. Still, they were 
not electoral democracies. Regrouping all non-democratic regimes under the label of 
autocratic regimes was more and more akin to concept stretching. Institutional forms of 
autocratic regimes multiplied and diversified to a point that it endangered the coherence of the 
category. Differences within the autocratic regime category were sometimes as important as 
differences between autocratic and democratic regimes (Kohli, 2003: 96; Geddes, 1999a: 121). 
New categories were therefore needed to describe such empirical novelty.  
 
1.1.2. Types of Hybrid Regimes 
 
A simple definition of hybrid regime can be summed up as a regime that combines, to 
different degrees, certain aspects of a democratic regime such as national elections with certain 
aspects of an autocratic regime such as state control of media outlets. Here, the concept of 
“hybrid regime” represents a class of phenomena that regroups all types of intermediary 
regimes. The conceptual frontier between an autocracy and a hybrid regime is as follows: the 
latter has frequent direct national elections with universal suffrage, while the former does not. 
In the autocratic category, we find the Middle East monarchies (e.g. Saudi Arabia), communist 
regimes (e.g. China) and military dictatorships (e.g. Myanmar, at least until 2010). Yet, many 
autocratic regimes hold some forms of direct elections, especially communist states such as 
North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. In these regimes, the systematic repression and 
indoctrination of the population, the presence of only a single candidate on the electoral list, 
                                                 
4 Linz’s justification behind the introduction of the concept of authoritarianism was the necessity to create a third 
category beside the existing totalitarian and democratic ones since too many regimes did not fit into either ones. 
According to Linz’s own words, his definition of authoritarianism corresponds to some form of hybrid regime 
(1970: 280); a hybrid regime that looks very much like a hegemonic authoritarian one as described in the next 
section. Today, authoritarianism is often used as a synonymous of non-democratic regimes that include autocratic 
and hybrid regimes.  
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the seldom occurrence of elections or the limited enfranchisement provides the basis for 
excluding them from the hybrid category. The distinction between a hybrid regime and 
democracy is even subtler: hybrid regimes hold frequent, free and competitive elections but 
with a constantly uneven playing field between the incumbent and the opposition. Foremost, it 
concerns the abuse of state resources for partisan ends by the ruling party and therefore the 
unfairness of party competition. This “unfair” character is subject to important variations 
between countries and the line between the two is foremost qualitative in nature and less a 
question of degree. It can easily fall into an idiosyncratic narrative. Nevertheless, the point is 
to demonstrate the systematic imbalance between the incumbent and possible contenders, 
whatever means are used to achieve that end; at least as far as an exercise of classification is 
concerned. 
 
In between autocratic and democratic regimes, there exists a wide diversity of institutional 
hybrid arrangements. In this regard, Collier & Levitsky (1997: 431) counted more than one 
hundred “diminished subtypes” and since then, many others have appeared in the literature. 
Historically, types of hybrid regimes can be regrouped in two categories. The first one is 
mostly associated with experts on Latin America and emerged in the 1990s with the so-called 
“democracy with adjectives” label. These types were created to reflect the fact that many Latin 
American regimes underwent a democratic transition following the demise of military regimes 
in the 1970s-80s, a transition that remained in some cases incomplete. Amongst others, we 
find dictablanda/democradura (Rouquié, 1975: 1077-1078; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 9), 
exclusionary democracy (Remmer, 1985: 69-70), tutelary democracy (Przeworski, 1988: 60-
61), protected democracy (Loveman, 1994: 111), delegative democracy (O’Donnell, 1994: 59-
60), oligarchy democracy (Hartlyn & Valenzuela, 1994: 99), limited democracy (Archer, 
1995: 166) and semi-democracy (Diamond et al., 1995: 8). By the end of the 1990s, a second 
generation of hybrid regime concepts emerged. They were less regionally based, echoing a 
more global approach. They were expressing the prevalence of hybrid regimes in all regions of 
the world and came into being after scholars had realized the persistence of authoritarian traits 
in many former Soviet republics and sub-Saharan African regimes that entered into a 
democratic transition in the 1990s. They are the following: illiberal democracy/liberal 
autocracy (Zakaria, 1997: 22-23), feckless pluralism/dominant-power politics (Carothers, 
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2002: 10-14), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002: 53), electoral 
authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002: 36-37, 41-46), and semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003: 
16-20)5. From this list, it is obvious that there is a wide diversity of hybrid regime concepts. 
Taken together, they offer a comprehensive portray of hybrid regimes and there is therefore no 
rational behind the continuous search and creation of new types.  
 
Yet, there is a considerable overlap between them. As a result, a country-regime can be often 
associated with more than one hybrid regime type. For instance, the Malaysian hybrid regime 
has been qualified as electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002: 49), a semi-democracy (Case, 
1996: 437, Gasiorowski, 1996: 481; Brooker, 2000: 260; Crouch, 1993: 153), semi-
authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003: 4), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 
318; Diamond, 2002: 31), or simply and more generally as a hybrid regime (Mauzy, 2006: 47) 
to mention a few. It goes without saying that from this vantage point, the edifice of knowledge 
accumulation on hybrid regimes looks like a vain intellectual enterprise. The multiplication of 
similar types, albeit different in some respects, produces confusion and seriously complicates 
any efforts to construct a coherent typology and to compare findings about conditions of 
hybrid regime stability. At the moment, concept formation related to hybrid regimes is best 
characterized as a tower of Babel to use Armony & Schamis’ (2005) analogy.  
 
It is true, hybrid regimes take various forms and the exact combination of democratic and 
autocratic institutional arrangements is often sui generis to each country. In this regard, the 
multiplication of hybrid regimes is a testimony of such diversity. Nonetheless, as Schedler 
(2002: 38) wrote, “where empirical reality is fuzzy, no amount of conceptual sophistication 
will allow us to draw clear and consensual lines between regime types. On the contrary, 
regime boundaries tend to be blurry and controversial to the extent that their constitutive 
norms are idealizations that admit varying degrees of realization in actual political practice”.  
 
Thus, the challenge is to find a typology that differentiates between various forms of hybrid 
regimes while remaining manageable. Indeed, the diversity of hybrid regimes is too great to 
                                                 
5 The above types are briefly defined in appendix 3. 
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regroup all of them in one category. It certainly hides distinct features that should matter in 
terms of our understanding of political dynamics in a given country. At the same time, these 
distinct features are only useful insofar as they simplify reality instead of increasing its 
opacity. At some point, multiplying types of hybrid regimes creates confusion and becomes 
unintelligible. A balance should be struck between these two considerations.  
 
1.1.3. Typologies of Hybrid Regimes 
 
Typology is a key analytical tool in comparative politics. It is an exercise of classification 
where different categories should be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (Mill, 
1858; Sartori, 1994: 22-23). It should identify clear-cut indicators and specify coding 
procedures. As the example of Malaysia illustrates, this exercise has proved itself to be quite a 
challenge for many working on hybrid regimes and in some cases have led to imbroglios.  
 
Although typologies of non-democratic regimes date back to the end of the 1960s, those that 
explicitly relate to hybrid regimes are relatively new. Hybrid regimes are non-democratic 
regimes, but non-democratic regimes also include autocratic regimes. Typologies of non-
democratic regimes abound6. They usually focus on one dimension. Finer (1962: 273), 
Schmitter (1976: 115), Perlmutter (1977: 9-17) and Nordlinger (1977: 11-19) propose 
different categories of military regimes; Tucker (1961: 281-282) and Huntington (1970: 10-
17) decorticate one-party regimes whereas Chehabi & Linz (1998: 10-23) put a premium on 
sultanistic (or personalistic) regime characteristics. Aside from these academic contributions, 
Finer (1970: chapter 12) elaborates a typology that includes totalitarian and dynastic regimes, 
façade-democracy, quasi-democracy and military regimes; and O’Donnell (1979: 110) 
proposes a typology based on the degree of political modernization (i.e. traditional, populist 
and bureaucratic authoritarianism). Although very rich and insightful, these typologies 
introduce analytical elements, such as economic development, that should be interpreted 
independently of the nature of any political regime. In other words, they leave the domain of 
                                                 
6 For an extensive overview of non-democratic regime typologies, see Brooker (2000) chapter one.  
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typology construction and enter the realm of theory building7, a point that will be raised below 
when discussing the typology of Hadenius & Teorell. Furthermore, Finer’s final classification 
ends-up with over a dozen of categories and O’Donnell’s bureaucratic authoritarian concept 
“came to describe almost any Latin American nondemocratic regime in the 1970s, whether 
populist and inclusionary as postrevolutionary Mexico, or elitist and exclusionary as Chile 
under Pinochet or Argentina under the military junta from 1976 to 1983” (Brachet-Marquez, 
2005: 468). Finally, Linz & Stepan (1996: 44-45) divide non-democratic regimes in four 
categories – i.e. totalitarian, post-totalitarian, authoritarian, and sultanistic regimes – whereas 
Geddes (1999b: 10-19) offers a synthesis of earlier works that regroup military, single-party 
and personalistic regimes. Yet, it is not all that clear where a hybrid regime fits in these 
typologies. Some types of non-democratic regimes can be associated with either an autocratic 
or a hybrid regime. For instance, in Geddes’ case, the single-party regime category includes 
the Communist Party in China (autocratic) as well as the Tanganyika African National Union 
(1961-1985) in Tanzania (hybrid). Personalistic regime was a defining feature of the autocratic 
regime under the late Kim Il-Sung in North Korea as well as of the more competitive regime 
of Malaysia under Mahathir. Military regime is a central characteristic of the closed 
authoritarian regime of the Myanmar junta as well as of the Paraguayan regime under 
Stroessner, which allowed some form of political opposition (after 1962).  
 
These contributions on different forms of non-democratic regimes cannot be tossed away as if 
they would belong to the ash of history; a tendency that we see too often in the subfield of 
hybrid regimes where research is presented as new without references to the classic literature 
on political development; especially the literature on authoritarianism of the 1970s. We 
believe this practice is detrimental to any attempt to defend the usefulness of research on 
hybrid regimes. Indeed we briefly go through some important studies on the subject that in a 
way represent the foundation of the reflection on types of non-democratic regimes, but in 
doing so we also highlight their limits based on specific criteria.  
 
                                                 
7 In Chapter Two, we will acknowledge the analytical utility of their work and integrate it into our theory.  
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Moreover, besides Schedler (2002) as well as Levitsky & Way (2002, 2010)8, some of the 
authors mentioned in the discussion on hybrid regime concepts formulate types based on a 
dichotomy, which methodologically speaking could serve as a basis for a typology on the 
subject. O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986: 9) propose the dictablanda/democratura distinction. 
Carothers (2002: 10-12) does the same with his “feckless pluralism” versus “dominant power 
politics” regimes. However, in each case, these concepts translate general observations and 
lack specific criteria that could allow us to make an informed judgment on regime 
classification. In this regard, the only exception from our hybrid regime enumeration is 
Zakaria (1997: 23) who creates two concepts “liberal autocracy” and “illiberal democracy” 
from the Freedom House Index that include two categories: civil liberties and political rights. 
Among the country-regimes designated as partly free, “illiberal democracy” is associated with 
a relatively lower civil liberty value compared to the political right category; while “liberal 
autocracy” is linked with a higher civil liberty value compared to the political rights category9. 
Yet, political rights and civil liberties often go hand in hand. The 1997 Freedom House Index 
identifies a total of 53 hybrid regimes10: 11 are illiberal democracies; 23 are liberal 
autocracies; and 19 have an equal value on political rights and civil liberties. Thus, 35% of 
hybrid regimes could not be labeled as liberal autocracy or illiberal democracy. It leaves a very 
large group of hybrid regimes unclassified. 
                                                 
8 Those authors in collaboration with Larry Diamond (ref. Thinking about Hybrid Regimes) contributed to a 
special issue of the Journal of Democracy (vol. 13, no. 2, 2002), in which they developed a typology of hybrid 
regimes. Their conceptual contribution to the literature on hybrid regime types is discussed in details below.  
9 According to Freedom House, political rights include: the electoral process; political pluralism and 
participation; and functioning of government. Civil liberties include: freedom of expression and belief; 
associational and organization rights; rule of law; and personal autonomy and individual rights. The lower the 
value, the more democratic the regime is; the higher the value, the more autocratic the regime is.  
10 OECD countries and small states with a population of less than one million are excluded.  
 27  
Table I – Typologies of Hybrid Regimes 
 
Typologies that explicitly examine hybrid regimes are from the following scholars: Diamond 
(2002: 29-33), Merkel (2004: 49-50), Hadenius & Teorell (2007: 146-149), Wigell (2008: 
243) and Morlino (2009a: 291-293). We adopt Diamond’s (2002) typology because others 
either (i) include types that are not mutually exclusive, which is often the manifestation of a 
typology based on more than one principle; (ii) refer to electoral democracies that are not yet 
consolidated, which is not our research object; or (iii) have not been the object of a relative 
academic consensus.  
 
The first point can be illustrated by examining Hadenius & Teorell’s typology. The military 
and monarchy regime types are at odds with the rest of their concepts, which rest on the 
number of parties within the party system: i.e. “one-party”, “no-party”, “dominant limited 
multiparty”, “non-dominant limited multiparty” and “democratic multiparty” regimes. Indeed, 
a military regime can be a dominant limited multiparty regime like in Indonesia or a one-party 
regime like in Cuba. This problem is evident in Hadenius & Teorell’s (2006: 11) earlier work 
Morlino 
(2009) Wigell (2008)
Hadenius & Teorell 
(2007)
Merkel 
(2004)
Diamond 
(2002)
Limited 
Democracy Autocracy Monarchy Regime
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Authoritarian 
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Authoritarian 
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Dominant Limited 
Multiparty Regime
Electoral 
Democracy
Nondominant Limited 
Multiparty Regime
Liberal 
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Democratic Multiparty 
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where they propose amongst others four categories of military regimes: “military no-party”, 
“military one-party”, “military multiparty” and “military traditional” categories. We find this 
same problem with the “monarchy” category. The idea here is when types are not mutually 
exclusive, it leads to their multiplication under mixed label categories; to a point that they end 
up being notably difficult to manage and operationalize. Furthermore, these mixed-labels are 
often symptomatic of a typology that enters the realm of theory building yet without an 
overarching framework. Indeed, different types obey to different logics or principles. For 
instance, “because most officers value the unity and capacity of the military institution more 
than they value holding office, they cling less tightly to power than do office holders in other 
forms of authoritarianism [i.e. one-party and personalistic regimes]” (Geddes, 1999b: 48). 
From this vantage point, the mixed label “military one-party” regime would be incoherent.  
 
The second point is manifest in Merkel’s typology based on defective democracies that 
encompass concepts associated with the “democracy with adjectives” label: i.e. “exclusive 
democracy”, “domain democracy”, “illiberal democracy” and “delegative democracy”. The 
title of the special issue of the journal “Democratization” – i.e. Consolidated & Defective 
Democracy – in which the author develops his typology suggests that these diminishing 
subtypes of democracies deal mostly with the problem of new democracies: that is to say, 
electoral democracies that remain fragile. For example, Merkel (2004: 51) had classified 
Brazil as an exclusionary democracy and Mexico as an illiberal democracy in 2002. In other 
words, it exposes the problem related to the quality of democracy and more generally to the 
substantive dimensions of democracies. Concepts of defective democracies seem to compare 
developing countries that made a democratic transition with western consolidated democracies 
standards. Wigell’s conceptualization manifests similar tendencies. His hybrid regime 
categories include some dimensions usually associated with a well-established democracy, 
such as the prevalence of democratic norms at every institutional level (local, regional, 
national) (Wigell, 2008: 241). This object of inquiry is different from the one we pursue; it is 
outside of our research agenda. Hybrid regimes are not electoral democracies; they are 
something less. This is why the present study opts for a typology based on “authoritarianism 
with adjectives”.  
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Morlino’s well-designed typology could have served as a basis to evaluate various types of 
hybrid regimes. He uses Ragin’s (2008) fuzzy set analysis method and a factor analysis to 
construct a typology of hybrid regimes based on three groups of indicators. The first set of 
indicators concerns the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, freedom of 
expression and beliefs, as well as freedom of association and organization. The second refers 
to rule of law, personal autonomy and individual freedom. The last set is limited to whether 
the state is functioning adequately. According to the author, indicators in each group are 
clustered together and are strongly connected, making each group analytically independent 
from each other. From these sets of indicators, Morlino (2009a: 291-293) associates three 
types of hybrid regimes: “limited democracies”, “democracy without state”, and “quasi-
democracies”. Each type shows an absence/weakness of at least one of the related group of 
indicators. The first set of indicators is linked to the concept of “limited democracies”. 
“Democracy without state” merges with the second and third group of indicators, while 
“quasi-democracies” represents a regime that has defects in all three groups of indicators. 
Although Morlino’s typology proves to be informative, it has not been yet the object of 
iterated validation and application.  
 
Figure 2 – Classification of Political Regimes 
 
 
The typology developed by Diamond (2002: 29-33), in collaboration with Schedler (2002: 41-
46) as well as Levitsky & Way (2002: 53-54), is increasingly becoming the standard-bearer in 
the subfield of hybrid regimes. It is essentially based on two types: hegemonic 
authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism. It is one that is similar to Dahl’s (1971: 7) 
framework of contestation and participation of which concepts of “inclusive hegemonies” and 
“competitive oligarchies” are an integral part. The same can be said about the visionary work 
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of Hermet in Elections Without Choice (1978: chapter 1) who has proposed two categories – 
i.e. “one-party elections” and “semi-competitive elections” – to describe political development 
in the Third World. It also recaptures Banks & Textor’s (1963: 87) classification: (i) where 
opposition parties are organized freely and have an innate capacity to compete (i.e. 
democracy); (ii) where opposition parties are organized freely but some have limited capacity 
to compete (i.e. competitive authoritarianism); (iii) where political parties are legalized but are 
in effect located outside the party system (i.e. hegemonic authoritarianism); and (iv) where 
opposition parties are banned (autocracy). Thus, although the typology developed by Diamond 
and colleagues is relatively new, it hinges on a solid conceptual basis.  
 
Diamond (2002: 25) identifies three types of hybrid regimes: “hegemonic electoral 
authoritarian” regimes (or hegemonic authoritarianism), “competitive electoral authoritarian” 
regimes (or competitive authoritarianism) and a residual category called “ambiguous” regimes. 
To identify hybrid regimes, Diamond (2002: 32) first uses the Freedom House Index where a 
regime with a score from 4.0 to 6.0 on the combined seven-point scale is considered hybrid. 
However, as Ottaway (2003: 8) notes, “attempts to classify hybrid regimes on a continuum, 
ranging from those that are closer to authoritarianism to those that are closer to democracy, 
have greater rigor and are more satisfactory in theory, but they tend to break down in the 
application”. We do not wish to enter the debate about using a given dataset on political 
institutions over another11, or about the validity of ordinal versus nominal measurement. The 
point here is to acknowledge that these may be useful in differentiating between autocratic, 
hybrid and democratic regimes – although in some instance like in any large-N cross-national 
classification, measurement error is always possible – while having limited utility in terms of 
determining whether the hybrid regime type is hegemonic authoritarianism or competitive 
authoritarianism. To distinguish between hegemonic authoritarian and competitive 
authoritarian regimes, Diamond (2002: 29) uses three additional indicators: “(i) the percentage 
of legislative seats held by the ruling party, (ii) the percentage of the votes won by the ruling 
party presidential candidate, and (iii) the years the incumbent ruler has continuously been in 
                                                 
11 Beside Freedom House, there exist many datasets on political institutions: see Worldwide Governance 
Indicators Project (Kaufmann et al., 2007); Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001); Regime Change 
(Gasiorowski, 1996), Democracy and Development (Przeworski et al., 2000); Polyarchy Index (Vanhanen; 
2000); and Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2010).  
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power”. With respect to the longevity criterion, Diamond associates long tenure with a 
hegemonic authoritarian regime. However, the time length in office is not specific to any 
hybrid regime type (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007: 145; Chehabi & Linz, 1998: 9). Indeed, some 
heads of state in competitive authoritarian regimes, such as Khama in Botswana, Senghor in 
Senegal or Biya in Cameroon, have remained in power for a while. Otherwise, for the author, 
when the ruling party or incumbent wins more than 75% of the popular vote for the executive 
position, it is considered a hegemonic authoritarian regime. Although leaders in hegemonic 
authoritarian regimes like in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan win 
elections with percentage close to 100%, it happens also in competitive authoritarian regimes 
such as Côte d’Ivoire where Henri Konan Bédié won with more than 90% of the vote in the 
1995 presidential election, while loosing the next election to Laurent Gbagbo. The point is 
only that more than one election should be factored in when making a judgment on the 
significance of electoral results for presidential candidates. Finally, the meaning of percentage 
in seats is equivocal. Indeed, in almost all hybrid regimes, whether it is a hegemonic 
authoritarian or competitive authoritarian regime, the ruling party usually has at least the two-
third majority necessary to amend the Constitution; a strategic and indispensable advantage.  
 
While taken separately, these indicators are limited in terms of distinguishing between 
hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism, together they nevertheless point 
to a crucial difference between the two: the relative balance of power between the incumbent 
and the opposition. According to Schedler (2002: 47), in “competitive EA [i.e. electoral 
authoritarian] regimes authoritarian rulers are insecure; in hegemonic EA regimes they are 
invincible. In the former, the electoral arena is a genuine battleground in the struggle for 
power; in the latter, it is little more than a theatrical setting for the self-representation and self-
reproduction of power”. Thus in the scale of abstraction, electoral authoritarianism is a higher 
concept that regroups hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism; to us, it is 
synonymous of hybrid regime. Overall, Schedler uses the same criteria as those of Diamond 
(2002: 29). Yet, given the aforementioned, the operationalization is still problematic. We need 
to look for additional indicators. It will, amongst others, help to eliminate Diamond’s residual 
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category (ambiguous regimes) by classifying the country-regime within this category in the 
other two as well as increase our confidence in the overall classification.  
 
Levitsky & Way (2002: 54) advance that competitive authoritarianism is different from 
“regimes in which electoral institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation for power 
(such as Egypt, Singapore, and Uzbekistan in the 1990s)”: that is, hegemonic authoritarianism 
regime. They provide precise measurements to distinguish between the two. For Levitsky & 
Way (2010: 7), hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism hold frequent 
national elections; the former impedes the legalization of opposition parties while the latter 
authorizes it. Evidently, most of today’s hybrid regimes have national elections with some 
form of political competition, leaving the hegemonic authoritarianism category almost empty. 
Thus they add three additional criteria to exclude cases from the competitive authoritarian 
category.  
 
First, “a hybrid regime that holds elections and has some form of competitive 
party system but whereas non-elected officials retain considerable power, such 
as (a) those in which the most important executive office is not elected (e.g. 
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco); (b) regimes in which top executive 
positions are filled via elections but the authority of elected governments is 
seriously constrained by the military or other non-elected bodies (e.g. 
Guatemala, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey in the early 1990s); and (c) 
competitive regimes under foreign occupation (e.g. Lebanon in the early 
1990s)” (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 32).  
 
Second, a hybrid regime in which “parties or candidates are routinely excluded, either 
formally or effectively, from competing in elections for the national executive” falls into the 
hegemonic authoritarian category (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 33); this is the case when 
opposition parties are systematically denied the right to run political campaigns (open electoral 
offices, recruit candidates or organize party meetings). Third, a hybrid regime in which 
electoral fraud is so systematic that results do not reflect voter preferences cannot be 
considered a competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 33)12.  
                                                 
12 Given the general absence of independent surveys on voter preferences in hybrid regimes, observing opposition 
electoral victories at lower levels (e.g. city, regional, etc.) could indicate that ruling elites are willing to respect 
election results and thus will not engage in massive electoral manipulation. 
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In some cases, the fine line between autocratic regimes and hegemonic authoritarian regimes is 
far from being obvious; and the same can be said about the line between competitive 
authoritarian and democratic regimes. Nevertheless, the line exists: differences between these 
types reflect differences in the form of political competition. China and Indonesia (before 
1998) as well as Malaysia and Japan are examples pertaining respectively to each category. 
Lumping together China and Indonesia (before 1998) or Malaysia and Japan in the same 
category prevents us from knowing what is at stake: that is to say how power is distributed and 
organized in a political community. The difference between autocratic and hegemonic 
authoritarian regimes concerns first the presence of elections but many autocratic regimes have 
elections. So we felt the need to look for explicit additional information before making a 
judgment call about classification. The difference between hegemonic and competitive 
authoritarian regimes deals foremost with the presence of opposition parties. Again, although 
it is a characteristic of competitive authoritarian regimes, these political actors can sometimes 
emerge in hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Here, the concept declination brought forth by 
Diamond (2002) and Schedler (2002), as well as the contribution of Levitsky & Way (2002, 
2010), was accurate enough to guide our classification of hybrid regimes. It was also 
appropriate to establish the differences between competitive authoritarian and democratic 
regimes.  
 
No typology is perfect. However, the typology we choose has the advantage of being 
grounded in solid research at the origin of most contemporary work on political regimes and 
more and more contemporary scholars working on hybrid regimes are adopting it. For 
instance, we have evoked the affinities of Diamond’s typology with Dahl’s (1971) one and, as 
we will see in the next section, Diamond’s typology allows the comparison of results between 
theories of hybrid regime stability.  
 
1.2.  Approaches to Hybrid Regime Stability  
 
The literature on hybrid regime stability has been flourishing since the 2000s (see appendix 2). 
We will refrain from presenting every scholarly work on the subject and rather focus on few 
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authors clustered around two general approaches: the economic (Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 
2006) and the organizational approach (Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010). Four reasons 
justify this choice. First, the authors selected expose a large variety of arguments and as such 
they offer a comprehensive panorama of lines of research on hybrid regime stability. Second, 
they integrate into their framework arguments found in most researches on the subject. 
Presenting the entire corpus would be therefore redundant. Third, with some variants, they use 
similar definitions of types of hybrid regimes; hence facilitating the comparison of their 
findings and the accumulation of knowledge. Fourth, they have developed sophisticated and 
methodologically well-grounded theories. In a way, they represent the four pillars and 
foundation of our current understanding of hybrid regime stability13. They are a reference on 
the subject and any study that excludes them should be deemed scanty.  
 
Before we examine the economic and the organizational approaches, we wish to make a 
general observation. Causes of regime emergence and conditions of regime stability are 
analytically different notions (Gunther et al., 1995: 3): if both are conflated, it creates 
confusion on what is explained. This problem is exemplified by modernization theories, which 
remain evasive about the nature of the predicted outcome (i.e. democratic emergence or 
democratic stability). They simply contend that a correlation exists between economic 
development and democracy. Yet, recent researches on the subject demonstrate that economic 
development is weakly correlated to the emergence of democracy, but above a certain 
threshold is highly significant in regard to democratic stability (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997: 
165). That being said, it is important not to exaggerate the distinction. Decisions and events 
during transition may have an impact in the consolidation phase (Karl & Schmitter, 1991: 280-
281, Munck & Leff, 1997: 345). The bottom line is that lumping together both notions is 
inimical to the coherence of the theory and leave unspecified the parameters under which it 
applies. Moreover, while the notion of “cause” is used to discuss hybrid regime emergence, 
the notion of “condition” is more appropriate when dealing with hybrid regime stability. The 
difference is more than a semantic one. Regime emergence is usually apprehended in a 
relatively short time period. As such, the action/reaction chain of events can be more easily 
                                                 
13 For instance, Greene (2007) and Magaloni (2006) have won the best book award in the Comparative 
Democratization section of the American Political Science Association in 2008 and 2007 respectively. 
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observed. As time elapses between two phenomena, causality is harder to prove. On one hand, 
intervening factors come to play and make the relation spurious. On the other, iterated 
interactions between the independent (X) and dependent (Y) variables become almost 
inevitable. X influences Y, and Y influences X, ad continuum. Ergo, the direction of causality 
is blurred by time. The notion of condition recognizes such interaction. Its nature is more 
functional than “genetic” as it is for the causes of emergence (Rustow, 1970: 341).  
 
1.2.1. The Economic Approach 
 
The economic approach focuses on why and how a ruling party wins repeatedly elections for 
an extended period of time in a context of limited multiparty competition. Electoral 
clientelism, patronage and rent-seeking behavior form the basis of the argument. Magaloni 
(2006) in Voting for Autocracy is mostly concerned with the mass voters’ behavior, while 
Greene (2007) in Why Dominant Parties Lose provides a general framework of elite 
motivations. Both allegorize the inner logic of their theory using formal modeling and test its 
significance based on the analytic narrative of the Mexican case during the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) era (1928-2000), which includes regressions using sub-
national statistics. Since Mexico under the PRI was holding frequent elections with universal 
suffrage and opposition parties were legal, it is fair to say that their inquiry is about the study 
of dynamics in competitive authoritarianism14.  
 
Magaloni (2006: 20) defends the idea that the hegemony of the ruling party depends on the 
massive support it gets which in turn is related to “(a) long-term economic growth; (b) vote 
buying and the distribution of government transfers through… a punishment regime or the 
autocrat’s threat to exclude opposition voters and politicians from the party’s spoils system; 
and (c) electoral fraud and force”. According to the author, economic crises may destabilize 
the regime only when successive inflationist crises or prolonged economic stagnation occurs. 
It is the historical economic performance of the government that influences voting behavior, 
not the immediate situation. In other words, voters may forgive a government for a 
                                                 
14 Greene (2007) briefly extends his argument to Italy, Japan, Malaysia and Taiwan at the end of his book; all 
dominant party regimes, but belonging to different types of regimes.  
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momentarily economic downturn as long as it does not last too long or repeat itself over time. 
As for the punishment measures the ruling party could use to prevent instability, “vote buying 
works better when people’s votes can be observed”: that is, in rural electoral districts where 
citizens vote in mass for the same party whereas in urban areas voting patterns are more 
fragmented (Magaloni, 2006: 67, chapter 4). It enables elites to target rewards, which makes it 
more cost effective. Moreover, the level of material rewards needed to gather support 
increases when the ideological distance between citizens and the ruling party looms large and 
when citizens moved beyond the survival mode (Magaloni, 2006: 69-70, 81). Hence, the 
ruling party abstains from buying out anti-regime supporters and wealthy individuals. 
Economic incentives are simply not enough to constrain them. Magaloni further specifies her 
theory and adds what she calls the entry-deterrence strategy:  
 
“First, the party will react in an unforgiving fashion toward defectors by 
withdrawing funds from those municipalities that elect opposition 
representatives. Second, the ruling party will disproportionately invest in its 
supporters who can more credibly threaten to exit, rather than its most loyal 
followers, who are likely to support the party regardless” (2006: 124).  
 
She also found by examining budget cycles that governmental spoils where especially evident 
before general election rather than after. Electoral fraud and the use of force are also an 
integral part of the punishment regime; without them, the ruling party’s threat to retaliate may 
not be credible enough to deter voters from joining the opposition. More important, electoral 
fraud and use of force act as the last resort to control electoral outcome if there is a possibility 
for the opposition to win. And in Magaloni’s (2006: 229) theory, if electoral results are not 
contested by most of the major opposition parties, the armed forces will always join and 
support the regime. The author asserts that mass mobilization denouncing electoral 
irregularities is unlikely “when electoral fraud is not common knowledge, because the ruling 
party will deceive moderate voters into believing the elections were clean, even if there was 
fraud” (Magaloni, 2006: 237). When the Electoral Commission is independent and 
transparent, and electoral irregularities publicly denounced, the opposition usually unites in a 
common cause aiming at toppling the party in power.  
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A key analytical element in Magaloni’s theory is that mass support for the dominant party is 
conditional to an “image of invincibility” (2006: 52). High voter turnout and wins by huge 
margins as well as pompous electoral campaigns send the signal of a moribund opposition. As 
such, it raises substantially the cost of voting and defecting to the opposition. The fact that the 
opposition has never governed means uncertainty about how it will govern: “voters might be 
more tolerant of economic crises in situations where opponents possess no record in 
government” (Magaloni, 2006: 61). Furthermore, while politically united against the 
government, the opposition parties are usually divided in terms of economic policies. These 
divisions hinder their chance of winning elections against the ruling party. In one phrase, the 
author suggests that ruling elites will remain in power as long as it fosters long-term economic 
growth, which provides the resources to co-opt large segment of voters (Magaloni, 2006: 73). 
 
Greene’s theory concentrates on the incumbent’s superiority in terms of resources and its 
concomitant ability to raise the cost of participation in the party system for the opposition 
(Greene, 2007: 5). The incumbent’s edge concerns its capacity to deviate state resources for 
partisan ends. Foremost, it depends on the state ability to control economic activities, mainly 
through public ownership of large companies (Greene, 2007: 33). Money in itself is 
meaningless. What matters is how the ruling party can divert, regulate and target capital flows 
in order to tilt the electoral balance in its favor. Most of all, it concerns employment 
opportunities in state-owned enterprises. An economy dominated by the state provides ample 
means for the ruling elites to buy-off the loyalty of political and economic elites. It enables 
them to dispense jobs to the medium and higher strata of society. Furthermore, the 
omnipresence of the state also implies a certain form of individual economic dependence. 
There are very few options available to the labor force in the private sector. The state is the 
main avenue for social mobility. Hence, it increases the bargaining power of the power-
holders. Securing personal income in the public administration becomes a matter of survival 
for many citizens. A hybrid regime sustains itself by making individual economic security 
conditional to the support of the ruling party. In this context, blunt repression is less effective 
than economic instruments of coercion. The mere threat of losing a job or a business license is 
enough to provoke self-censorship among citizens tempted to denounce state abuse of power. 
And without economic autonomy, democracy is an empty shell; citizens will be highly 
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reluctant to defend their rights fearing state retaliation. As for the opposition, challengers face 
an opportunity cost by brushing aside the material benefits associated with accepting dominant 
party bribes and cooptation tactics. However, by refusing such benefits, they impose on 
themselves another cost: systematic harassment that can go from legal actions, imprisonment, 
torture and even death. In the end, only parties that defend specific issues are allowed, given 
that they do not directly threaten the dominant party. Opposition parties remain small and 
unable to compete with the dominant party at the polls. The winner is known before Election 
Day due to the uneven playing field between the incumbent and the opposition. In this context, 
there is no need for extensive electoral fraud.  
 
According to Greene, state retreat from the economy means hybrid regime instability. Greene 
(2010) later examines the statistical significance of his theory with seven competitive 
authoritarian regimes (Malaysia, Mexico, Senegal, Singapore, Taiwan, Gambia and Botswana) 
between 1961 and 2008, and the results corroborate his initial findings. In a hybrid regime, the 
dominant party survives as long as “politicize public resources” are the main game in town 
(2010: 808, 820-822). This line of reasoning rests on the premise that the government can use 
state resources for partisan ends with impunity, to the detriment of the public goods. In order 
to do so, state-owned companies' operations are secretive and opaque. Separation of powers is 
minimal or non-existent. For instance, the packing of oversight and steering committees with 
government sympathizers render the entire process a pure formality. In sum, accountability 
and transparency are highly problematic. With little constraints, the incumbent has the latitude 
to plunge into public funds and manage it in a discretionary fashion. In short, “the political 
economy of single-party dominance consists of a large state and a politically quiescent public 
bureaucracy” (Greene, 2010: 828).  
 
1.2.2. The Organizational Approach 
 
The other major line of inquiry on hybrid regime stability stresses the importance of a well-
functioning ruling party and an effective coercive apparatus. The question remains the same as 
for the economic approach: how the dominant party wins elections over and over again? 
Hence, stability is defined in terms of government continuity and instability means the ruling 
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party electoral defeat. The approach focuses mostly on elite unity. Brownlee (2007) in 
Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization is especially concerned with the inner-working 
of the ruling party, while Levitsky & Way (2010) in Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid 
Regimes After the Cold War devote much attention to the ruling party capacities as well as 
those of the security and police forces. The latter also add international factors. The 
methodology differs from the one used by the proponents of the economic approach. Brownlee 
(2007) conducted fieldwork and interviews. He used the cases of Egypt, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Iran to illustrate his argument. He classifies these regimes as “autocracy with elections” 
and makes no clear distinction between hybrid regime types. The historic period starts as early 
as 1950s in some cases. Levitsky & Way’s (2010) demonstration is substantial. It is a large-N 
qualitative study. It covers 35 competitive authoritarian regimes from of all regions of the 
globe after the end of the Cold War.  
 
Brownlee (2007) contends that a well-structured and institutionalized party participates in 
asserting domination over competing political forces and mitigates centrifugal force from 
within. Case in point: 
 
“The National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt and UMNO in Malaysia 
brought elite cohesion within the regime and electoral control in the public 
arena… On the alternative path trod by Iran and the Philippines, elite rivalries 
were not contained within a party and instead escalated into open factionalism” 
(Brownlee, 2007: 13, 14).  
 
Brownlee analyzes the impact of elite confrontation, party competition and more generally 
political institutions from a historical perspective of three processes. First, regime formation is 
a defining moment when rules are created in the context of a relative institutional vacuum. The 
general contour of how elites will interact is at the heart of the contention. In many ways, new 
institutions affect the distribution of power within society and as such, it generates conflicts 
between various political groups. The key is “whether elites decisively resolve their core 
conflicts during the period of regime formation” (Brownlee, 2007: 37). At the onset, conflict 
resolution follows largely a pattern of attrition: that is, the capacity of a political organization 
to eliminate other potential rivals and assert its authority over various social forces. 
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Unresolved conflicts tend to perpetuate themselves. Henceforth, political instability will be a 
recurrent feature. In the course of intense struggle for power, the capacity of political 
organizations is related to their strategic posture – i.e. coercive means - but also to their ability 
to forge alliances in order to gather momentum for their quest of institutional control. Political 
parties manage these alliances: they channel resources, coordinate actions and mobilize 
support. Ultimately, regime formation is a period marked by a confrontation between political 
organizations in the making.  
 
Second, during the phase of regime consolidation, “the act of governing raises new challenges 
and prompts leaders to broaden their initial clique” (Brownlee, 2007: 37). As the coalition 
grows larger and disparate, the locus of conflict is less between parties and more among elites 
within the party, especially the ruling party. At that stage, the main challenge for the ruling 
elites is to contain the ambitions of the ranks and files. Once nomination procedures are 
instated, professional advancement is no longer a function of arbitrary decisions and, as such, 
individuals do not fear to loose their position overnight. The time horizon of elites expands 
and their expectations change: they have now strong incentives in conforming to the rules and 
stay loyal to the ruling party. Their future is less uncertain and much more predictable. “By 
offering a sustainable system for members to settle disputes and exert influence, ruling parties 
generate and maintain a cohesive leadership cadre” (Brownlee, 2007: 39). These procedures 
are there to make sure that “no faction will indefinitely trump the others, and thus the 
organization’s decisions will, over time, reflect its composition” (Brownlee, 2007: 39) 
Therefore, in a regime where no party is endowed with such institutional strength, elite 
factionalism will be endemic. 
 
Third, regime breakdown concerns party disintegration. History is far from being linear and no 
party is exempt from falling into decay. The question becomes why ruling elites would 
voluntary dissolve their organization? The author gives the following answer.  
 
“Rulers may subsequently deactivate existing party institutions for fear that 
rivals will take hold of them… They then narrow their coalitions along strict 
ideological or personal lines, marginalizing other figures in the ruling cadre…. 
Such actions have the unintended consequence of hastening the outcome they 
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are meant to prevent: rulers who seek to consolidate their authority instead 
disperse it” (Brownlee, 2007: 37).  
 
The incumbent’s growing insecurity in regard to the potential challenge of his rule by elite 
rivals through extra-legal means is the driving force behind the institutional dismantling of a 
party. And the greater the challenge gets, the more the head of state relapses into whimsical 
behavior. As a consequence, elites defect in greater numbers since they have no interest in 
keeping the status quo. Overall, a quid pro quo often sets itself: when the incumbent fears to 
be toppled, political elites worry that their time as influent actor of the decision-making 
process might be over (Brownlee, 2007: 41).   
 
In sum, Brownlee explores the “life cycle” of the dominant party in hybrid regimes. He 
highlights the difficulty of monopolizing top positions within the political regime for a long 
period when no clear victory emerges from initial conflicts. Later, animosity between political 
elites is inevitable. Yet, elites’ rife is less probative than how political antagonism is 
overcome: within the rules or with violence. According to the author, while force is often 
central in claiming authority at the beginning when rules are generally absent, untamed 
violence needs to be replaced by institutions capable of mediating elite conflicts as time goes 
by. Otherwise, it is a recipe for instability.  
 
Levitsky & Way (2010) confront the problem from another angle. They do not wish to unravel 
various institutional processes or mechanisms, but aim at variable specifications in explaining 
outcomes. Furthermore, as we will see, they provide a comprehensive framework insofar as it 
includes variables of a different nature. Overall, the authors profess that their theory predicts 
the political trajectory in 80% of cases (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 341-342). 
 
Rich details are provided, more than in any other authors presented so far, of what constitutes 
the object of their inquiry: that is, competitive authoritarian regime. They present a thorough 
examination of how to distinguish between various forms of hybrid regimes15. They explicitly 
specify the meaning of stability and instability: governments that stay in power for at least 
                                                 
15 See the previous section on hybrid regime typologies. 
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three consecutive terms or inversely where at least one turnover occurs, but the regime does 
not democratize (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 368-369). The term government refers to the 
incumbent and/or ruling party. Levitsky & Way (2010: 20-23) envision three possible 
outcomes: (1) stable authoritarianism, (2) unstable authoritarianism and (3) democracy. 
Democracy is defined as a government turnover followed by tree consecutive terms where 
elections were free, fair and competitive. The 1990-1995 period serves to evaluate the type of 
hybrid regimes and the 1996-2008 period to measure whether the regime is stable or not; and 
in the case of instability whether it engages in the process of democratization or not.  
 
They develop a two-step argument. International factors carry out the first cut and internal 
factors complement the analysis. Levitsky & Way (2010) allege that a competitive 
authoritarian regime with low linkages with the West has a higher probability of remaining 
stable, especially if a black knight supports it: that is, a powerful authoritarian counter-
hegemonic force such as China. Linkages are defined as economic (trade), social (international 
traveling of people), communication (international telephone calls and Internet) and 
intergovernmental (membership of regional organizations) ties between a hybrid and a 
democratic regime. Basically, low linkages mean an absence of external socialization to 
democratic rules. The stability of a hybrid regime also depends on international leverage. For 
the authors, this variable reduces itself to the size of a hybrid regime economy in terms of 
GDP, the presence of significant oil and gas reserves, nuclear weapon grade capacity, or 
competing security issues as well as the support of a black knight. These features are said to 
allow hybrid regimes to be independent and to isolate themselves from western external 
pressures. Of all the cases the authors examine, only Mexico, Taiwan and Russia are tagged 
“low leverage”: that is, relatively independent from external pressures. Hence, Levitsky & 
Way (2010: 52) come to the conclusion that it has no independent effect on the outcome: 
without high linkage, high leverage is more or less inconsequential.  
  
As for internal factors, Levitsky & Way focus on organizational capacities of the ruling party 
and the coercive apparatus. The organizational strength of the ruling party is defined by the 
geographical extension and societal penetration of the party as well as by the unity between its 
members and discipline of lower-level elites generated by shared-beliefs (historic, ethnic, 
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ideological) (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 60-61, 377-378). These non-material factors allow the 
ruling party to face adversity during hard times, especially during economic turmoil. The state 
coercive capacity corresponds to the presence of a “large, well-trained, and well-equipped 
internal security apparatus with an effective presence across the national territory” (Levitsky & 
Way, 2010: 376). The authors also take into account the cohesion of the security apparatus; a 
by-product of “large-scale external war; or intense and enduring military competition or threat; 
or successful revolutionary or anticolonial struggle” (Levitsky & Way, 2010, 376). The 
assumption here is that the coercive capacity is under the exclusive control of the ruling party. 
The security apparatus is not an instrument of the state. It is in effect the repressive branch of 
the dominant party. Levitsky & Way (2010: 26) recognize the importance of opposition unity 
and its impact on hybrid regime stability but, for them, opposition cohesion is meaningless 
when ruling elites are united. In the end, a ruling party that is able to reduce the political, 
economical, technological and social exchange with the West while increasing the complexity, 
specialization and effectiveness of its organization is more likely to preserve its dominant 
position within the national party system for a long time.  
 
As we have seen, Greene, Magaloni, Brownlee as well as Levitsky & Way are from our 
perspective the key theoreticians of hybrid regime stability. Although in the case of the 
eclectic framework of Levitsky & Way, the classification is somewhat problematic, they 
themselves state: “our approach to incumbent power is organizational” (2010: 56). It is 
important here to emphasize that both approaches put a premium on one single institution as 
the guarantor of stability: the ruling party. In doing so, they want to explain what makes a 
ruling party dominant. 
 
1.3. A Critical Assessment 
 
Any critical assessment of the literature on hybrid regime should start with how it relates to 
the preexisting literature on democratic and autocratic stability. Only then, we can obviate the 
temptation of presenting something as new when it is not and, most importantly, posit that 
hybrid regimes are analytically different from other types of regimes. It is an exercise of 
differentiation, which is fundamental to any claim of knowledge accumulation. In this regard, 
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we will concentrate on three themes: (1) the electoral and party systems, (2) economic 
development and (3) legitimacy. As mentioned in the introduction, conditions of regime 
stability are numerous. We choose to focus on these three themes because they are central to 
any explanation of stability. They examine the political, economic and cultural dimensions, 
providing an exhaustive overview of the issue from different angles. Also, these themes cut 
across all regime types; allowing meaningful comparisons with the economic and 
organizational approaches to hybrid regime stability.  
 
Before moving on with our critical assessment, we need to clarify one point from the start: 
how international factors connect to the literature on regime stability. Levitsky & Way (2010) 
frame international institutions in a post-Cold War environment and focus on their 
democratization effect. In this regard, we believe that dynamics come down to geographic 
proximity of hybrid regimes to Western countries. Mexico and the Caribbean countries are 
neighbors of the United States, whereas Eastern and Southern European countries fall under 
the umbrella of the European Union. Of course, there are exceptions. Nicaragua (1990 
transition), Guyana (1992 transition) and Taiwan (1996 transition) may be three of them16. 
Still, in the first two cases, the regime was crisis-ridden. Therefore, we assume that with the 
exception of those regimes geographically close to the West, international links with western 
institutions have a limited impact on the democratization of hybrid regimes.  
 
That being said, we are interested in hybrid regime stability and instability per se. Asking why 
a hybrid regime is unstable is not the same as asking why it moves to a democratic regime. In 
the case of instability, we leave the direction of change unspecified. Ultimately, we think 
meshing together the question of democratic transition of hybrid regimes and hybrid regime 
stability/instability within a single framework increases significantly the complexity of the 
analysis. Most of all, it runs the risk of opening doors without closing them. For instance, how 
the national context influences the democratic transition of hybrid regimes remains ambiguous 
in Levitsky & Way’s theory. To be sure, their theory is eclectic, not syncretic. The problem is 
not so much about underlying contradictions than about asking too much of a single theory. 
                                                 
16 See Levitsky & Way’s (2010: 375) list of high linkage countries.  
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There is always a trade-off. A general theory of hybrid regimes will surely lack precision in 
regard to certain dynamics, precisions that nevertheless may be crucial in evaluating the 
validity and utility of the theory. A choice has to be made. Our research focuses on the hybrid 
regime dynamics themselves rather than on trying to understand why a hybrid regime makes a 
transition to democracy.  
 
Whether the object is stability/instability or democratization, international factors cannot be 
denied. In the ubiquitous world we live in, very few states are isolated from outside forces. 
Yet, we argue that for the majority of hybrid regimes, the explanation should be found within 
national boundaries. As Schmitter (2001: 47) stressed, “the impact of the international context 
is normally mediated through national or sub-national actors and processes”. Domestic 
dynamics should be the core of any model of political stability, the starting point of the 
analysis. It should be the prism through which we see the influence of external factors.  
   
From now on, in our critic of the organizational approach that includes amongst others 
Levitsky & Way’s theory, we will disregard international institutions and concentrate on 
domestic factors of regime stability. 
 
1.3.1. Electoral and Party Systems 
 
The stability of democracy is often associated with various institutional designs. For instance, 
many studies have examined whether a presidential or a parliamentary system, a proportional 
representation or first-past-the-post voting system is more conducive to stability (Duverger, 
1972: 23-32; Linz, 1990). Before addressing these issues, others point to the necessity of 
considering if the party system is an institution in the first place (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995: 
3; Huntington, 1968: 13-23, 1965: 397-461); the absence of such a condition would of course 
entertains instability in a democratic regime.  
 
In the case of hybrid regimes, theories on stability have acknowledged the frequency with 
which the ruling elites alter the electoral and party systems. According to Levitsky & Way 
(2010: 79): 
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“Institutionalist analyses hinge on the assumption that formal institutions are 
(1) regularly enforced, and (2) minimally stable. In other words, they take for 
granted that parchment rules actually constrain actors in practice. Although 
these assumptions hold up relatively well in the advanced industrialized 
democracies, they travel less well to other parts of the world. Indeed, a striking 
characteristic of many competitive authoritarian regimes is the extent of sheer 
institutional weakness. In most competitive authoritarian regimes, formal 
institutions are highly unstable”.   
 
Institutional instability is a deliberate and survival strategy of ruling elites in hybrid regimes 
(Schedler, 2002: 42-45). For instance, the UMNO changed the Malaysian Constitution 46 
times in 40 years (Funston, 2001: 171). As counter-intuitive as it sounds, hybrid regime 
stability resides in institutional volatility or, put differently, on the degree to which ruling 
elites can manipulate institutions and impose new ones in order to win elections. And studying 
the various legal arrangements of electoral and party systems brings little insight into the 
problem at hand. Of course, some electoral or party systems may favor the ruling party (e.g. 
the gerrymandering of the electoral map), but what matters most is the fact that any given 
electoral or party system can be modified in order to suit the interests of the ruling elites 
depending on the context. Therefore with few exceptions, the literature on hybrid regime 
stability stays away from explanations based on different electoral and party institutional 
arrangements17. That being said, it is important not to exaggerate the degree of institutional 
volatility. It is not a constant. It is a periodic feature. Part of the effort in unraveling the 
dynamics of hybrid regimes is to identify in which conditions institutional instability occurs.  
 
Sheltering against the potential volatility of the electoral and party systems, the elites find 
refuge in the ruling coalition apprehended as an amalgam of factions under the auspices of the 
ruling party18. This is another important contribution of the literature on hybrid regime 
stability, especially in Brownlee’s (2007) theory. Briefly, outside the dominant party, the 
incumbent acts unilaterally. Opposition figures feel the Damocles’ sword over their head. 
Inside, there is a sense of predictability. It is a community into which consensus is formed by 
                                                 
17 To our knowledge, the only analysis that deals explicitly with this issue in a hybrid context is Croissant (2003). 
18 The ruling coalition is usually synonymous of dominant party in the literature on hybrid regime stability.  
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iterated interactions, diverse experience and common perception about how conflict should be 
mediated through non-violent and legal expression; there is a commitment to collective 
objectives. Elites mutually agree to behave in accordance with prescribed norms of conduct. 
There is a shared understanding and recognition of the reputation and interests of each actor. 
In a nutshell, the ruling coalition is the only political institution that does not fall prey to 
arbitrariness of power-holders. Thus, when dealing with hybrid regimes, it is important to 
locate the domain that is subject to institutional volatility and not extend what we find to the 
entire political institutional architecture.  
 
That being said, the organizational approach has one significant hurdle: the rational used to 
explain hybrid regime stability is very close to the one evoke in the larger literature on 
political development to explain the stability of single-party autocratic regimes. Indeed, 
theoretically, scholars have long ago asserted the importance of a strong party in relation to 
autocratic stability. In this regard, Huntington’s book (1968) entitled Political Order in 
Changing Societies serves as a reference on the subject19. Overall, it stresses the importance of 
the institutionalization of the ruling party as a determinant of autocratic regime stability. More 
recently, Linz (2000: 40; 52-64) has underlined the centrality of the political party and 
coercive apparatus in maintaining totalitarian regimes. Thus, in using similar factors, the 
organizational approach does not clearly specify the differences between single-party 
autocratic regime stability and dominant-party hybrid regime stability. The point here is that 
the literature on hybrid regime stability has to position itself in relation to the literature on 
autocratic regimes if it wishes to contribute to the development of the subfield on hybrid 
regimes and accumulate knowledge (Snyder, 2006: 227). Empirically, most of modern 
autocratic communist regimes have been highly durable for reasons raised by the 
organizational approach. China under the Chinese Communist Party, Cuba under the Cuban 
Communist Party, North Korea under the Korea Workers’ Party and Laos under the Lao 
People’ Revolutionary Party are prime examples. 
 
                                                 
19 See also Huntington & Moore (1970). Their edited book includes all cases of one-party in non-democratic 
regimes. Yet, the strongest one-party regimes are autocratic ones (ref : Hitler’s Germany, China and the Soviet 
Union).     
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It is our contention that all non-democratic regimes do not have the exact same configuration 
of conditions of stability. In fact, these various configurations are intimately tied to an 
institutional context: that is, the nature of non-democratic regimes. For instance, Hadenius & 
Teorell (2007: 150) estimate that the average life span of one-party autocratic regimes is 17.8 
years, whereas in the case of a dominant limited multiparty system – i.e. competitive 
authoritarian regimes – it is almost 10 years. Magaloni’s (2008: 21) findings largely validate 
these results. Hence, the relevance of a dominant party appears to be more significant in an 
autocratic than in a hybrid regime and in the latter case additional factors should intervene. 
Not all non-democratic regimes look alike and institutional differences should have an impact 
on the dynamics at play.  
 
Furthermore, differences between types of hybrid regimes matter, especially in regard to the 
introduction of frequent national elections with universal suffrage and the legalization of 
opposition parties. Indeed, various authors highlight the importance of elections or legislatures 
in hybrid regimes while evoking arguments similar to the economic and organizational 
approaches, such as patronage and rule-based mechanisms20. Therefore, it is not so much the 
particular form of electoral and party systems that should be factored in, but the mere fact that 
elections and/or party competition do exist and contribute to shape the structure of 
opportunities in which elites find their way in or out of the locus of power.  
 
At the same time, the aforementioned authors analyze the presence of elections or the 
legalization of opposition parties from a highly aggregated perspective: that is, they are 
measuring their impact on hybrid regime duration21. Hence, they want to know if one type of 
hybrid regime is more stable than another. This is not entirely satisfying. Explaining the 
political dynamics prevailing in each type of hybrid regime involves understanding why a 
given type of hybrid regime will experience period of stability and instability or why a given 
type of hybrid regime in one country is more stable than the same type in another country. 
And these temporal and spatial variations still elude us.  
                                                 
20 See Boix & Svolik (2010), Magaloni (2008), Gandhi (2008), Blaydes (2008), Gandhi & Przeworski (2006), 
and Lust-Okar (2006). 
21 See also Brownlee (2009) and Hadenius & Teorell (2007). 
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To our knowledge, no research has systematically compared hegemonic authoritarian and 
competitive authoritarian regimes across various historical contexts and integrated them into a 
unified and coherent framework. Greene (2007), Magaloni (2006) as well as Levitsky & Way 
(2010) zoom in only on competitive authoritarian regimes, whereas Brownlee (2007) makes 
no distinction between types of hybrid regimes. While it is true that the competitive 
authoritarian regimes represent the bulk of non-democratic regimes since the end of the Cold 
War (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007: 149-150), hegemonic authoritarianism cannot be framed as a 
marginal phenomenon. Diamond (2002: 11-12; 28-29) shows that the proportions of 
hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes were roughly equal, and 
among hegemonic authoritarian regimes some are strategic countries such as Egypt, Pakistan 
and Angola. From a geopolitical standpoint, these are pivotal countries and regional powers, 
and their political stability is intimately associated with their type of regime. Moreover, in 
recent years, we have witnessed a potential resurgence of hegemonic authoritarian regimes 
especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. All of this suggests the worthy scholarly effort to 
explore how the dynamics of hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism 
differ from each other22.  
 
In parallel, an additional remark is worth stressing. In a regime where at least one well-
functioning party is absent, instability is endemic and it becomes impossible to qualify the 
regime itself23. As Morlino (2009a: 277) stresses: “in order to have something that may be 
labelled as a regime we need at least minimal stabilization… Otherwise, we ‘pick up fireflies 
for lanterns’ by confusing a temporary changing situation with a more stabilized one whatever 
the reasons might be”. In this regard, how can we determine the basic structure of authority in 
                                                 
22 It is worth noting that Levitsky & Way (2010: 343) provide some insights about possible explanations of the 
conditions of stability in hegemonic authoritarian regimes at the end of their book by briefly stating that “our 
theory appears to perform well even if we expand the sample to include less competitive regimes” (i.e. 
hegemonic authoritarianism). However, if Levitsky & Way recognize the possibility that hegemonic 
authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism stability could operate under similar conditions, the logical 
conclusion is that we still do not know the specific dynamics at play into each type of hybrid regime.  
23 Of course, there are exceptions; the case of Bangladesh is one. Yet, as a general rule, the presence of a 
dominant party is a sine qua non condition to pass the minimum threshold in terms of duration to evaluate the 
type of hybrid regime. The only systematic outlier to this pattern appears to be the hybrid regimes in the Middle 
East where the monarchial regent acts as a surrogate to the dominant party, such as in Jordan, Kuwait, and 
Morocco.  
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Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, Congo-Brazzaville and Afghanistan to name a few? As evidence, a 
hybrid regime with no dominant party lasts a little more than five years (Hadenius & Teorell, 
2007: 150). The absence of a dominant party in non-democratic regimes is either conducive to 
a transitional regime, which is already adequately explained by classic theories of political 
development, or a failed state in which power is located outside political institutions such as in 
rogue military factions, rebel groups or powerful families. But it is an entire different subject 
than ours. It is therefore obvious that we have to concentrate on the behavior of the dominant 
party as a class of phenomenon. Dominant parties do exist in established democracies: in Italy 
(Christian Democratic Party: 1945-1981), Japan (Liberal Democratic Party: 1955-1989), Israel 
(Mapai-Israel Labor Party: 1948-1977) and Sweden (Social Democratic Party: 1932-1976) 
(Pempel, 1990: 4). Yet, contra to Friedman & Wong (2008) who study adaptive strategies of 
the dominant party in a variety of regime types, we only focus on hybrid regimes because the 
institutional context poses quite a different and specific set of challenges to the ruling elites. 
From our perspective, comparing Japan, Malaysia and China for instance, yields few insights 
in understanding hybrid regime stability and instability.  
 
Finally, in the organizational approach, the dominant party variable alone is excessively static. 
It has a bias toward stability. It is too macro to take into account political change. As Levitsky 
& Way (2010: 73) recognize, “powerful coercive and party structures rarely emerge or 
disappear overnight, and they are almost never the product of short-term crafting or 
institutional design”. From this vantage point, the focus is on elements of continuity. It fails to 
anticipate historical events such as the transformation of one-party systems in sub-Saharan 
Africa to multiparty competition in the 1990s. Indeed, “until they were challenged and began 
to fall, one-party states in Africa were viewed by many scholars as fairly resilient; there were 
few predictions that Africa would experience much of the political revolution that rocked 
Latin America” (Herbst, 1994: 186). In other words, the organizational approach provides very 
few systematic explanations as why instability may occur in a dominant party hybrid regime. 
Our exegesis is to give equal weight to both elements of continuity and discontinuity, stability 
and instability. After all, they are two sides of the same coin.  
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In sum, the institutionalization of a dominant party is a condition of stability in both autocratic 
and hybrid regimes. The institutionalization of electoral and party systems is a condition of 
stability in a democratic regime. The organizational approach and to a lesser degree the 
economic approach highlight this distinction. Yet, we argue that the analytical difference 
between one-party autocratic and dominant-party hybrid regime dynamics as well as between 
hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes are not clearly spell out in the 
existing literature on hybrid regime stability. Furthermore, instability in dominant party hybrid 
regimes is still an obscure phenomenon in the organizational approach. Therefore, in order to 
expand our appreciation of hybrid regime dynamics we should ask: what are the patterns of 
stability and instability in hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes 
where at least one party is organizationally strong?  
 
1.3.2. Economic Development 
 
From political institutions, we now move to economic factors: an everlasting object of 
contention among scholars concerned with political development. Indeed, since the inception 
of modernization theories, democratic stability has been linked to economic development and 
its corollary: industrialization, urbanization, education, communication media and economic 
growth (Lipset, 1959: 75-85; Lerner, 1958: 54-64). Most of all, economic development 
transforms the class structure. It contributes to the emergence of a middle-class where 
individuals with crosscutting interests and upward social mobility opportunities are gradually 
exposed to diverse interests and cultivate moderate political opinion (Lipset, 1959: 83-84). It 
supports the rise of the bourgeoisie and reduces the influence of powerful landlords as well as 
the prevalence of the peasantry as a dominant social group who tends to favor tradition over 
modernity (Moore, 1968: 418-427). It empowers the working-class by increasing its 
membership and organizational capabilities through labor unions, which defend the rights of 
the mass and therefore downplay the influence of elites within the political regime, making 
democracy more inclusive instead of exclusive (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 8, 59). More 
generally, economic development fosters the dissemination of economic and organizational 
resources within society and by ricochet favors a more equal distribution of power within the 
political regime (Vanhanen, 1997: 42-54). In addition, the economic performance of the 
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government is related to the stability of a democratic regime. Prolonged economic contraction, 
inflation crisis, increased unemployment, disruption in food distribution and basic government 
services are detrimental to the general social peace, can ignite violent upheavals and provoke a 
democratic breakdown (Almond & Mundt, 1973: 628; Lipset, 1959: 89; Linz, 1978: 21, 54).  
 
As history demonstrates, the stability of other types of regimes can also be explained by 
sustained economic development. In this regard, the economic approach (Greene, 2007) 
formulates an interesting argument. In hybrid regimes, economic development contributes to 
stability only if it rests on a large public sector. In a nutshell, state intervention in the economy 
is a mean to control society. The economy is dominated by parastatal enterprises and 
interference with market forces are designed to serve foremost the interests of the ruling party. 
Commerce chambers, trade unions, professional associations and a like are in one way or 
another cushioned by the ruling elites. In comparison, economic development is conducive to 
democratic stability mainly insofar as it promotes the active participation of autonomous 
economic actors in the private sector. As for economic performance, hybrid regimes are also 
vulnerable. Foremost, economic decline means resource scarcity and the inability to spoil the 
mass of followers with social and economic benefits. However according to Magaloni (2006), 
the population of hybrid regimes appears to be more tolerant than the one in democratic 
regimes because of the absence of a proven track record from the opposition who never ruled 
before.  
 
Similar patterns can easily be traced in autocratic regimes, especially in communist states. 
Thus, as it is the case for the organizational approach, the defenders of the economic approach 
are not able to distinguish between the dynamics found in autocratic versus hybrid regimes as 
well as in different types of hybrid regimes. Furthermore, the economic approach leaves open 
two unresolved issues. First, why a dominant party in a hybrid regime would remain in power 
while undergoing a privatization process? Second, why a dominant party in a hybrid regime 
would remain in power in a context of underdevelopment? These questions are crucial because 
it concerns large numbers of hybrid regimes. Indeed, many hybrid regimes are underdeveloped 
countries. If we compound various indicators, about 40% of hybrid regimes in 2010 can be 
considered underdeveloped (see appendix 4). By underdeveloped, we mean a country in which 
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the industrial base is embryonic or atrophied, and the economy is mostly dependent on the 
agricultural sector where exports are based on a single or few commodities. Following the 
structural adjustment programs (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
adoption of neoliberal policies worldwide by national leaders, most southern countries 
underwent massive sell out of public assets and a state retreat of the economy. In both cases, 
many dominant parties in hybrid regimes remained in power despite structural obstacles.  
 
Let us first address the case of hybrid regime stability in underdeveloped countries. The 
economic approach contends that stability depends on an oversized coalition: that is, the 
ability of the ruling party to gather wide support among the elite and the population. When 
resources dry out in the course of a prolonged economic recession, instability will emerge. The 
argument rests essentially on the case of Mexico. The country is an emerging economy in its 
own rights. It is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) since 1994. It was surely one of the most developed economies among hybrid 
regimes before the PRI defeat in 2000. Is this case representative of other hybrid regimes? Can 
we compare Mexico with let say Senegal? Do the ruling elites in these countries have the same 
economic resources at their disposal? It is hard to answer by the affirmative. The ability of 
state-owned companies to provide secure jobs to the middle and upper classes as well as the 
capacity of the government to distribute widely economic advantages to loyal supporters is 
fairly limited in underdeveloped countries. Massive co-optation is simply not possible. At the 
same time, many dominant party regimes in underdeveloped countries, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, stayed in power for decades while domestic resources for co-option were 
scarce and social policies almost inexistent (Cowen, 2002: 18-20). The People’s Revolutionary 
Party of Benin (1972-1991), the FRELIMO in Mozambique (1975-today) or the UPRONA in 
Burundi (1966-1993) are few examples. The bottom line is that before considering the impact 
of economic decline, we should look at the level of economic development.  
 
Even Levitsky & Way’s (2010) rational for stability in underdeveloped countries is not 
entirely convincing. They stress succinctly that non-material factors, such as nationalism and 
ethnicity, provide the basis for unity in case of economic scarcity (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 65). 
However, as the authors acknowledge, nationalist ideology, especially when it revolves around 
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anti-colonial and anti-imperial stances, may have a limited time span: “violent struggles most 
effectively generate cohesion while the revolutionary generation is alive. Subsequent 
generations are likely to lack sufficient legitimacy to impose unity in crisis, and they often 
have less experience with high-intensity coercion” (Levitsky & Way, 2010: 363). Ideology 
usually involves a critique of past institutions and since younger generations have no real 
recollection of this past, it tends to loose meaning and its symbolic power as generations 
succeed each other (Huntington: 1970: 13-14). Moreover, given that ethnic homogeneity is a 
rare phenomenon in non-western countries, exclusive politics may galvanize the solidarity of 
members within an organization but in the process it antagonizes individuals from other 
organizations. It tends to lead to civil war, not political stability (Byman & Van Evera, 1998: 
39-41). Ultimately, material and non-material factors in economic and organizational 
approaches do not illuminate how hybrid regime dynamics in developing and underdeveloped 
countries differ.  
 
In line with modernization theories, democracy can emerge in low-income economies but 
could easily relapse in face of unforeseen disruptive events (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997: 
165, 177). To be sure, there are cases of stable democratic polity in poor countries. Benin after 
1991 is an example. But they are the exception. In hybrid regimes, cases of stable polity in 
underdeveloped countries are not an anomaly; they are a common feature. The point here is 
that stability of hybrid regimes in underdeveloped countries goes against the very logic of 
modernization theories; and theories of hybrid regime stability are ill equipped to explain such 
phenomenon. Why do we find stable hybrid regimes in underdeveloped countries and how to 
integrate such considerations into an overall analytical framework of hybrid regime stability 
that also includes developing economies? These questions remain unanswered. 
 
As for the privatization process, Greene (2007: 33) posits that the main threat to a dominant-
party regime is the retreat of the state from the economy. Selling state companies to private 
interests is akin to surrender power to the uncertainty of free, fair and competitive elections. 
Because privatization in Greene’s theory involves the emergence of independent economic 
actors and most of all curtails the ability of the ruling elites to distribute rewards, the 
cost/benefit ratio of supporting the opposition decreases. Thus, the latter has suddenly a 
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legitimate chance of winning elections. This framework assumes that privatization is a 
transparent process, and the attribution of state assets goes to the highest private bidder 
regardless of its connection with the regime. According to liberal economic theories, this is 
how privatization should be conducted.  
 
In fact, many non-western countries have deviated from this ideal. Case in point is the Russian 
shock therapy orchestrated by Yegor Gaidar, where individuals close to Yelstin’s inner circle 
became oligarchs almost overnight by acquiring state assets at under market value (Hoffman, 
2002; Handelman, 1995). Van de Walle (2001: 178-182) has also observed the same problem 
in sub-Saharan Africa where economic liberalization was often partial and unregulated, 
promoting corruption and clientelism. According to Zinecker (2009: 303-304), deregulation 
promoted by the IMF and World Bank in developing countries fostered rent-seeking behavior. 
In this context, privatization in itself can be a major source of patronage. Property may change 
hands and in nature but abides within the same circle of elites; an exchange with little 
transparency to show for. There are various ways to implement the privatization process. 
Some may be conducive to stability, others to instability.  
 
Equally important, we argue, is which public asset is sold. It is probably not a coincidence if 
Diamond (2002) opens his seminal article called Thinking about Hybrid Regimes with the 
example of Russia, Indonesia, Ukraine, Nigeria, Turkey and Venezuela as typical hybrid 
regimes. Among these cases, only Ukraine and Turkey are not major world oil or gas 
exporters/producers. The case of petro-states illustrates the fact that the ruling elites can sell 
public enterprises operating in low valued-added product markets to the highest bidder. 
However, rules change when it concerns state companies generating a large share of national 
income or political capital. What matters is not the control of the economy per se by the state, 
but the state control of strategic sectors generating substantial rents that have extensive 
ramifications in all sectors of the economy. Without these rents, the ruling party is no longer 
able to co-opt opponents and instability ensues (Ross, 2001: 333-334; Wantchekon, 2002: 10; 
Robinson et al, 2006: 450). Privatization of strategic sectors is conceivable, but it should be 
partial. For instance, the state can surrender the management function to private investors and 
integrate them to the property structure while keeping an ownership majority. Thus, the ruling 
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elites will be more reluctant to sell on the open market all its shares in state media companies, 
steal or car factories, oil companies and so on.  
 
To link the problem related to the privatization process with the one related to 
underdevelopment, we wonder what the state has to sell in poor countries. Hence, what is the 
impact of privatization when the state has very few assets? In underdeveloped countries, large-
scale state-owned enterprises are – when they do exist – rare. Most public jobs are within 
ministries and are not well paid. In other words, the destabilizing effect of privatization should 
be more visible in developing countries.  
 
To recapitulate, the economic approach does not infirm modernization theories but specifies 
the conditions under which economic development and economic growth foster stability in a 
hybrid regime context. Still, we know little about differences between non-democratic regimes 
and between types of hybrid regimes, and more central to our reflection here, the analytical 
toolbox of both the organizational and economic approach ends up empty when it deals with 
hybrid regime stability in underdeveloped countries; a rather frequent phenomenon. The 
economic constraint in these countries is much more acute compare to a richer country such as 
Mexico, forcing the ruling elites to be highly selective in the choice of who they bribe or spoil. 
Also, the economic approach tends to overestimate the significance of the privatization 
argument. For one, privatization can be a source of patronage. For two, strategic sectors 
continue to be protected by the state. It all comes down to a crucial question: how conditions 
of stability in hybrid regimes vary according to different levels of economic development?  
 
1.3.3. Legitimacy  
 
Legitimacy is a core notion within the literature on democratic regime stability. Yet, 
“legitimacy is a mushy concept that political analyst do well to avoid” (Huntington, 1991: 46). 
In this regard, Lipset’s (1959: 86) distinction between effectiveness and legitimacy is a 
starting point:  
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“By effectiveness is meant the actual performance of a political system, the 
extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the 
expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful 
groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces. 
Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain 
the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper 
ones for the society”.  
 
In parallel, Easton (1975: 437) advances the notion of diffuse versus specific support:  
 
“Some types of evaluations are closely related to what the political authorities 
do and how they do it. Others are more fundamental in character because they 
are directed to basic aspects of the system. They represent more enduring bonds 
and thereby make it possible for members to oppose the incumbents of offices 
and yet retain respect for the offices themselves, for the way in which they are 
ordered, and for the community of which they are a part. The distinction of 
roughly this sort I have called specific against diffuse support”.  
 
Linz (1978: 18) proposes the following definition: “democratic legitimacy is based on the 
belief that for that particular country at that particular historical juncture no other type of 
regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals”. The author differentiates 
legitimacy from efficacy and effectiveness: efficacy referring “to the capacity of a regime to 
find solutions to the basic problems facing any political system that are perceived as more 
satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens” while “effectiveness is the capacity actually 
to implement the policies formulated, with the desired results” (Linz, 1978: 18, 22). For 
Przeworski (1986: 56), “what matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of 
this particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives”. 
Similarly, “a regime is legitimate when its people believe it is the most appropriate form of 
government for their country – better than any alternative they can imagine – and therefore 
that it has the moral right to make laws, collect taxes, direct resources, and command 
obedience” (Diamond, 2008: 88).  
 
From these definitions, legitimacy is still a rather vague notion; especially if we want to look 
at how it applies to autocratic and hybrid regimes. In this regard, approaches to hybrid regime 
stability are of no help. They do not explicitly integrate the notion of legitimacy in their 
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framework. If it is true that the notion is sometimes mentioned, it is without any clear 
references to what legitimacy actually means in a hybrid context and what are the empirical 
declinations. To delineate the differences between regime types, we compare them along four 
axes: (i) legitimacy and effectiveness, (ii) regime and government, (iii) attitudes and 
behaviors, as well as (iv) mass and elites. As it will soon be evident, these objects of 
comparison intertwined with each other. And it is only in relation to each other that we can 
better grasp the meaning of legitimacy in hybrid regimes. 
 
First, legitimacy is fundamental to any reflection on hybrid regime because it is frequently 
contested. If legitimacy is associated with the absence of political alternative, than legitimacy 
in hybrid regimes is problematic. Indeed, “disloyal” parties and anti-regime social movements 
almost invariably exist. They promote and defend political alternatives aiming at transforming 
radically the regime whether in line with democratic ideals or authoritarian imperatives. From 
indigenous leaders, to religious zealots and liberal reformists many contest the legitimacy of 
the regime in place and do it on a regular basis. A significant proportion of citizens casts their 
votes in support or joins the ranks of disenfranchised political organizations. Of course, not all 
opposition parties and social movements embody a political alternative, yet many actually do.  
 
For democratic and autocratic regimes, legitimacy is still important, but it is somewhat latent 
or forcedly dormant depending on the context24. Instead, all eyes are on state effectiveness. In 
a stable democracy, as the authoritarian past fades away, regime legitimacy is taken for 
granted; it is no longer a critical issue and popular discontent is directed toward state 
ineffectiveness (Morlino, 1998: 32-33)25. In a stable autocratic regime, political alternative is 
generally absent by default. State repression is so systematic that opposition leaders calling for 
a regime change are in effect muted and dissolved. In very few instances, protest may be 
                                                 
24 All types of regimes need legitimacy and public support of the regime confers legitimacy. Public support can 
be voluntary as in democracies or coerced as in autocracies (Diamond, 2008: 89; Beetham, 1991: 90-94). Yet, the 
distinction between coerced and voluntary support of the regime is an assumption. Empirically, it is far from 
being crystal clear since it deals with individual intentions and not all are equally subject to indoctrination.  
25 By this, we do not imply that a crisis of legitimacy is not conceivable in a consolidated democracy. As Morlino 
(2009b: 211) asserts, political apathy found in old democracies are symptomatic of a delegitimation process. We 
only want to stress that legitimacy crises are more frequent and acute in hybrid regimes compared to other types 
of regimes.  
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tolerated insofar as it concerns economic conditions in its broader sense but not political 
rights. Thus, contention in autocratic regimes appears to be less about regime legitimacy than 
state effectiveness (or “performance” legitimacy).  
 
The point here is that while the literature on hybrid regimes generally neglects the question of 
legitimacy, its relevance for hybrid regimes is undeniable; it makes the omission even more 
questionable. More than for any other types of regimes, legitimacy should be at the core of 
academic research on hybrid regime stability. Of course, some anti-regime opposition parties 
in new democracies may contest the legitimacy of the regime, and evaluating the regime 
legitimacy is particularly important to know whether a democratic regime is consolidated or 
not. Yet, contra to democratic regimes, in hybrid regimes, many opposition groups continue to 
contest the legitimacy of the regime long ago after it emerged. Its persistence is at the crux of 
why it is so central to our understanding of political dynamics in hybrid regimes. Still, we do 
not pretend that hybrid regimes are in a protracted and everlasting crisis of legitimacy. There 
are quiet and turbulent periods. This variation should be central to the study of hybrid regime 
dynamics. Moreover, the focus on legitimacy does not imply that state effectiveness is 
irrelevant in hybrid regimes. As it was discussed in addressing the theme of economic 
development, bad performance may very well precipitate the fall of the regime, but it usually 
takes a prolonged recession or successive crises for public policies to become a potential 
ticking bomb26.  
 
Second, in a hybrid regime, the regime and the government are two concepts that often 
overlap. At the beginning of Chapter One, we said that the regime refers to the rules and 
procedures that determine the access to power and constrain the government. However, in the 
section on electoral and party systems, we also agree with the economic and organizational 
approaches that in hybrid regimes the government alters some of the rules of the game 
according to its own interests; shaping in a way the regime so that at the end the government 
and the regime are difficult to distinguish. In a stable democracy, when citizens do not agree 
with a government policy, they nevertheless respect the way it is chosen. These are two 
                                                 
26 As Magaloni (2006: 61) eloquently demonstrates with the case of Mexico, voters are surprisingly indulgent in a 
context of poor economic performance. For a similar argument, see Manzetti & Wilson (2007). 
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separate issues. Governments succeed one another, but the regime lasts. In a hybrid regime, 
such safety valves do not function: alternation of power from one party to another is a rare 
phenomenon. Thus, disapproval of the government could also mean doubts about the regime 
legitimacy (Alagappa, 1995: 27). Obviously, it is important not to exaggerate the argument 
since there is still a difference between the regime and the government. The government in 
hybrid regimes may shape the electoral and party systems, but the basic institutional 
architecture may remain intact: that is, the presence of frequent elections with universal 
suffrage or, depending on the type, the presence of a legal opposition. What we want to 
highlight is that contestation of the government in hybrid regimes has great implications; it is 
as important as a legitimacy crisis of the regime in a democracy.  
 
Third, in hybrid and autocratic regimes, the evaluation of citizen attitudes is highly 
problematic. Mass surveys are notoriously difficult to conduct and interpret (Magaloni, 2006: 
13; Goode, 2010). Authorities may intervene in the sampling selection process; exert pressures 
on the subjects themselves to respond according to a predetermined discourse, and/or pre-
approve the questionnaire to be distributed while censoring some questions. In fact, this is one 
of the main reasons why academics are reluctant to address the question of legitimacy in non-
democratic regimes. Indeed, mass survey on citizen political attitudes in hybrid regimes is 
embryonic. For instance, the Asian Barometer has just finished the first survey on Malaysia. 
Thus, historic comparison is not possible. The World Values Survey goes back to the end of 
the Cold War depending on the country, which is still a relatively short period of time to study 
the stability of hybrid regimes. Yet, attitudes (or beliefs) are only one facet of legitimacy; the 
other is behavior (or consent). While the former is about intention, the latter is about action, 
which is more readily observable even in autocratic and hybrid regimes.  
 
Fourth, it is worth asking if citizen attitudes are essential to our understanding. Could elite 
attitudes or behaviors serve instead as a sound empirical basis for the study of legitimacy in 
the context of hybrid regimes? In a democratic regime, elites and the mass interact and 
ultimately citizen attitudes determine the level of legitimacy a democratic regime has. Politics 
in hybrid regimes is not a one-way street like in autocratic regimes, but it remains mostly a 
top-down affair. The assumption here is that:  
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“As the elite groups have greater control over power resources and are more 
engaged in the political process, shared norms and consent among elite are more 
important than among the general public. And groups that have an effective 
capacity for articulating and mobilization are even more crucial because of their 
multiplier effect” (Alagappa, 1995: 28).  
 
Mass mobilization does occur in hybrid regimes, but it tends to be orchestrated by political 
elites at different levels (national, regional, local). In the end, elites are the pivotal actor of a 
legitimacy crisis and in that context the study of mass attitudes is not as consequential as it is 
in democratic regimes. The mass as an actor is relevant, but only at the periphery, as a factor 
of second importance. Without elite support, mass mobilization is less likely to have an impact 
on government activities whereas elite discontent without mass support can have nonetheless 
serious consequences. We will expand our reflection on this matter in the next chapter. 
Furthermore, elites are by nature geared toward action. They have to choose side all the time: 
for or against a given law, for or against a given political organization. In turn, these choices 
reveal their intent. Better, elite’s attitudes measured in terms of public declarations can be 
misleading: “between simple declarations and the actions there is a world of difference… If 
not for other reasons, this alone would be sufficient to justify an analysis of the behaviour” 
(Morlino, 1998: 318). Rhetoric is frequent in politics. From this vantage point, what matters is 
what political elites do and less what they say or think.  
 
In brief, legitimacy is empirically an intractable notion in non-democratic regimes because the 
object of legitimacy is ubiquitous and citizen attitudes are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, 
albeit risky in terms of research design validity, it should not prevent us from probing its 
significance with regard to hybrid regime dynamics. We argue that it is an essential feature of 
hybrid regimes more than of any other type of regime given the sustained presence of a 
political alternative whether within the party system or in civil society. In a hybrid regime, 
legitimacy is contested, whereas in an autocratic regime it is repressed and in a democratic 
regime it is mostly resolved. As for measurement problems, they are somehow by-passed 
given that the focus in hybrid regimes should be most of all on elite behavior and less on 
citizen attitudes as it is the case in democratic regimes. Our decision to focus on elite behavior 
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as an indicator of regime legitimacy is not a pure arbitrary choice; it rests on logical 
arguments. Legitimacy is about the right to rule; and in hybrid regimes, this right finds its 
source mostly in elite consent of the government authority.   
 
No doubt, legitimacy is a thorny notion in a comparative perspective. Most of all, there is the 
inherent danger of falling into tautological explanations where stability is both defined and 
explained by legitimacy. Part of the difficulty of untangling the notion of legitimacy is a 
function of its all-encompassing referent. Indeed, the confusion emanates from the multi-
dimensional and interactive characters of legitimacy. Along those lines, the consent of the 
governed (behavior) defines legitimacy and the extension of shared norms and values among 
the population (attitudes) explains legitimacy (Levi et al., 2009; Beetham, 1991: 13-16). In 
other words, the respect of rules (behavior) depends on whether an individual believes in those 
rules (attitudes). We previously argued that consent of the governed in hybrid regimes is about 
elite behavior. As we will see shortly, indicators of stability are intimately related to the 
consent by the elites. Although stability and elite consent may be positing as analytically 
different notions, this distinction tends to breakdown in the variable specification phase as the 
same indicators are used to measure both. After all, what is a coup d’État by military officers 
or a boycott of election results by the opposition if it is not a sign of elite discontent? 
Furthermore, we have already established that elite attitudes (i.e. shared norms and values) are 
misleading giving the rhetorical nature of political discourse. Thus, there is a missing link: 
what are the conditions for political elites to express consent and support the regime, the 
government or the dominant party leaders? The answer to this question will find its way 
through the development of our theoretical framework in the next chapter. Ultimately, the 
study of stability is the study of legitimacy.  
 
1.3.4. A Definition of Hybrid Regime Stability 
 
In continuity with the preceding comments, the chapter closes with a discussion on the 
definition of hybrid regime stability and its empirical manifestation. In this regard, political 
stability is a trite concept and it should be problematized, especially when dealing with hybrid 
regimes. The intrinsic institutional volatility of hybrid regimes raised in the opening of our 
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critical assessment has implications not only in terms of explanatory factors (i.e. the impact of 
electoral and party systems) but also for the conceptualization of stability. Indeed, how to 
understand hybrid regime stability in a context of institutional volatility? To obviate this 
conundrum, the economic and organization approaches define hybrid regime stability as 
government durability: that is, whether the dominant-party wins elections after elections or 
loose. We find this definition unsatisfactory and call for the necessity to broaden its meaning.  
  
Political stability sometimes refers to the absence of armed conflicts that extend from mass 
unrest and street riots to civil wars (see Kaufmann et al., 2008). A definition of stability based 
on such indicators shifts the research question to the causes of social violence. In this case, the 
object of stability or instability is exogenous to the political regime. We are interested in what 
is stable or unstable within the system, not outside of it. Although we do not deny possible 
connections between social violence and instability of the political regime, in our mind they 
are two analytical separate objects. The principle of covariance is not automatic. Case in point, 
India is regularly victim of rural insurrections, terrorist attacks and so on while its polity is 
rather stable. 
 
Stability also refers to the basic structure of authority (regime): that is, the constitutive nature 
of access to power. For instance, when frequent elections are introduced or cancelled, or 
opposition parties are legalized or outlawed, a change of regime is assumed and associated 
with instability. The benchmark is the core principles surrounding the incumbent selection. 
The high volatility of institutional arrangements in hybrid regimes is in effect at a lower level. 
For instance, in the Bangladesh hybrid regime, the system of government alternated between a 
presidential, a parliamentary and an interim system eight times since 1984 while maintaining 
multiparty elections all along. It is the distinction between holding frequent elections versus 
modifying regularly electoral laws, between formally recognizing opposition parties versus 
altering the requisites to be formally recognized. Hence, it is important not to extrapolate the 
manipulation by the ruling elites of the electoral and party systems to the overall structure of 
authority.   
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Obviously, regime change is an indicator of instability. Yet, it is incomplete. First, regime 
change often implies a teleological process whereas a regime may experience instability while 
remaining hybrid. The basic structure of authority may be suspended or briefly interrupted. 
And since we are not trying to explain the transition from hybridity, we have no reason to limit 
ourselves to such definition. On the contrary, in doing so, many and perhaps significant events 
are ignored. This brings us to the second problem. A definition of stability based on regime 
change involves a threshold so high for instability to be detected that it becomes almost a non-
event. Indeed, since for reasons already mentioned, we exclude cases of failed states or 
transitional regimes that have experienced repeated regime changes in a short lapse of time, 
regime change is otherwise more often than not reduced to a single moment. And 
understanding instability in a country based on one event is a rather tenuous empirical 
validation. Circumstances can be exponential and produce idiographic statements. 
Alternatively, causal relations can always be spurious. In other words, counterfactual cases are 
missing. The problem of stability and instability should be framed as an iterated diachronic 
process. Third, the meaning of a regime change or its implication for the distribution of power 
within the country is not always explicit or constant in hybrid regimes. Very often it is the 
same government who stays in power after the legalization of opposition parties, like in Kenya 
under the presidency of Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) and his party KANU who survived a 
democratic transition in 1991-1992. Moi was not the only one. In many sub-Saharan African 
countries, the same pattern has been observed (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997: 197).  
 
It follows that hybrid regime stability would be defined in terms of government time tenure in 
office. When a party wins election after election, it equates to stability; and when it falls 
victim of a turnover, it means instability. Still with no further details, such definition evades 
crucial analytical problems. First, it concentrates on the outcome and neglects the processes, as 
with a definition based on regime change. Elections are held every five years or so and in the 
interval, the radar screen is on “off” as if stability or instability would be a spontaneous, all of 
a sudden phenomenon. It leaves a large number of events between elections out of the 
equation and, in doing so, it does not offer in a systematic way any response to which events 
are meaningful; and those events can possibly explain ex ante the outcome of elections. 
Observers interpret ex post the meaning of events case by case without any guiding principles. 
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Even more troublesome, instability is reduced to a single snapshot: the ruling party’s electoral 
defeat. Second, what if the same leader or party remains in power, but cabinets succeed each 
other in a short time period? Is it a sign of instability? What if the dominant party looses its 
two-third majority necessary in order to amend the Constitution, but is still the winner of the 
election? Is it a forerunner of instability? Third, sometimes government turnover does not alter 
the fundamental political dynamics like in Sri Lanka where the United National Party lost the 
incumbency in 1994 while the regime maintained its hybridity (partly free) until 2010 
according to Freedom House. In other words, such definition lacks precisions and leaves too 
much discretion to the subjective judgment of scholars.  
 
Therefore, none of the definitions presented so far injects sufficient variations in the 
phenomenon to be explained to start thinking about the conditions of stability and instability in 
hybrid regimes. For instance, what the 2000 electoral defeat of the Parti Socialiste in Senegal 
over the long time opposition figure Abdoulaye Wade tells us about instability and the 
political history of the country if the former stayed in power for over 40 years? Variation is 
central from a methodological point of view. Without it, the validity of concomitant relations 
is difficult to assess. Furthermore, intuitively there is something odd about the proposition that 
a relatively extended period of time is the sign of monolithic tendencies. It raises the 
possibility that the research object is ill defined: that is to say, it is homeostatic and does not 
enable us to dissect real-world events. 
 
In our research, stability is associated with an absence of conflict about the rules of the game 
(Boudon & Bourricaud, 2004: 92; Sartori, 1987: 224-226; Ake, 1975: 273). In comparison, 
conflicts within the rules are ones that emerge within a specific set of institutions where all 
actors had previously agreed upon the rules and procedures that govern their interaction and 
were committed to full respect of their implementation. Conflicts about the rules are a zero-
sum game; conflicts within the rules are closer to a positive-sum game (Boudon & Bourricaud, 
2004: 92). Conflicts between political parties over policies are conflicts within the rules; 
conflicts between political parties over electoral reforms are conflict about the rules. The first 
are the expression of a stable political regime that can live and even improve out of both 
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consensus and dissenting opinions, within an agreed framework. The second is a clear signal 
that instability is at the door, calling for a change. 
 
Stability is also extrapolated to a given period until a political crisis erupts. Here, “[stability] 
and crisis are conceived of as processes. In this way they can be analyzed diachronically” 
(Morlino, 1998: 17). Ergo, we refrain from using a definition of stability based on the capacity 
of the system to solve crises. A regime experiences periods of stability and instability. It is 
temporally contingent. Qualifying a hybrid regime as stable or unstable without specifying the 
period could be misleading.  
 
Political crises have various manifestations. Chief among them is the momentarily paralysis of 
the main government organs. This is the highest level of instability. Indicators of such level of 
instability are a coup d’État, a state of emergency, the imposition of martial law, a massive 
public boycott of election results by disenfranchise elites or a combination of these. It can also 
be an alteration in the powers entrusted to the executive, the legislative and the judicial 
pertaining to a regime change or a change of leadership. With medium level of instability, 
institutions can still function but are significantly obstructed by either elite divisions within the 
dominant party, frequent cabinet changes, the assassination or kidnapping of ruling elites, the 
lost of the two-third majority by the ruling party, a long-term general strike of major sectors of 
the public administration called by opposition leaders, or disagreement among political elites 
over the nomination of an individual to a key position within the ruling party or in the cabinet. 
At a lower level, instability deals with local and isolated disruptions of the political 
institutions, low voter turnout and electoral volatility. Taken together, these indicators can tell 
if there is instability in a hybrid regime. Evidently, one crisis can feed another. A general 
strike or an electoral boycott can lead to a state of emergency. In this sense, the actors of 
instability in hybrid regimes are usually political elites that disobey the rules dictated by the 
leaders of the ruling party. Instability is not merely public protest.  
 
Standard definitions of hybrid regime stability either focus on the regime duration or the ruling 
party longevity. In this regard, in many hybrid regimes, the basic structure of authority and the 
ascendance of the ruling party tend not to change much; they almost look like a static object. 
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This is somewhat ironic given that formal institutions in hybrid regimes are often considered 
to be inherently volatile. It points to the necessity of recognizing that not all hybrid regimes 
are unstable and in doing so of asking which formal institutions are unstable or stable. We 
defend the idea that the definition of hybrid regime stability should be broadened to take into 
account conflicts about the rules of the game in order to better capture challenges to the 
authority of ruling elites. In fact, not including these challenges in the analysis would dismiss 
the very nature of hybrid regimes.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The concept of hybrid regime pushes the boundaries of intelligibility. Its embedded 
contradictions and its institutional volatility make conceptual frontiers far from being 
impermeable and traditional ways of framing problems are suddenly inadequate. Nothing is 
black or white; everything is in shades of gray.  
 
Nevertheless, obstacles can be overcome and rigor is possible even in the foggy zone of hybrid 
regimes. Various hybrid regime types have been presented together with a working typology; 
one that is based on mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories. It includes two 
key concepts: hegemonic authoritarian regime and competitive authoritarian regime. These 
have the unique advantage of dealing explicitely with hybrid regimes and have been the object 
of a relative consensus among the academic community; allowing more easily to compare 
research results in the subfield.  
 
We have outlined the economic and organizational approaches. No doubt, they can serve as a 
sound foundation for our understanding of hybrid regime stability. Amongst others, they 
underline the centrality of the dominant party in explaining hybrid regime stability. Belonging 
to the economic approach, Magaloni (2006) centers on the necessity of buying off large 
segment of society: that is, allocating grants and similar forms of public spending in exchange 
of votes. When the country is in deep recession, instability is on the horizon. Also, Greene 
(2007, 2010) stresses the importance of co-opting elites by attributing jobs in state-owned 
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companies to devoted followers. When the state retreats, notably in the case of privatization 
programs, instability is expected. In the former, stability is linked to resource endowment and 
redistributive capacities of the state; in the latter, stability is linked to the state control of 
economic flows. As for the organizational approach, Brownlee (2007) advocates the 
determinant role of rules governing the interactions between political elites, especially those 
related to promotion and succession, in assuring the survival of the ruling party. Instability is 
provoked by the non-respect of rules and arbitrarily decisions of power-holders. Levitsky & 
Way (2010) zoom-in on capacities: that is, when the ruling party and the internal security 
apparatus penetrate the entire territory and benefit from shared beliefs (ideological, ethnic, 
historic), stability is more likely. In the absence of a dominant party and coercive apparatus, 
instability should be expected. They also include international factors: that is linkages with the 
West and leverages understood as structural weaknesses in the internationals system.  
 
We began the critical assessment by mentioning why we exclude international factors from the 
analysis. We advanced that these factors in Levitsky & Way’s framework deals with 
democratic transition of hybrid regimes, are limited to geographic proximity with the West, 
and in the end are mediated by domestic ones. Once this issue was addressed, we argued that 
additional research was needed to formulate a genuine theory of hybrid regime stability that 
takes into account the specificity of hegemonic authoritarian and competitive authoritarian 
regimes, and the dynamics prevailing in both developing and underdeveloped economies. We 
contended that the factors presented in the organizational and by the same token the economic 
approach are an integral part of the literature on autocratic stability or empirically can be 
found in autocratic regimes. Henceforth, we still do not know exactly what is special about 
hybrid regimes and what dynamics are prevailing in different types of hybrid regimes. 
Furthermore, we find it difficult to agree that differences between developing and 
underdeveloped economies are trivial since structural resource constraints should affect the 
ruling elites strategy of co-optation. We have emphasized the neglect of legitimacy in the 
literature on hybrid regimes and specified its meaning in the context of our research object: 
that is, the elite consent of the government authority as a constitutive element of stability. 
Hence, explaining stability in hybrid regimes involves elucidating why political elites will 
support or not the government. In parallel, we have stressed the necessity of including 
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indicators in the definition of hybrid regime stability that would allow for the systematic 
observation of processes and not only of outcomes. In the next chapter, we will present our 
theory on hybrid regime stability as a framework to resolve the problems we identified. The 
challenge will be to answer the numerous questions raised in our critical assessment and 
integrate our hypotheses into a coherent framework.  
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2 
 
Explaining Stability and Instability  
in Dominant-Party Hybrid Regimes 
 
 
The previous chapter sets the record straight on an emerging but burgeoning literature. It 
offers a synthesis of what we know so far on hybrid regime stability; as well as what we do not 
know and need to know. Although the existence of a dominant party is a prerequisite for 
stability in hybrid regimes, it does not cover the ground when trying to capture the conditions 
of stability. A convincing explanation is still missing. Our understanding of hybrid regime 
stability is incomplete because no systematic research has gone beyond the dominant party to 
apprehend a richer and more representative spectrum of political interractions. No systematic 
research has explored how different types of hybrid regimes and levels of economic 
development affect conditions of stability. Furthermore, our grasp of the phenomenon is 
limited because too much attention is attributed to electoral outcomes, and not enough on 
process and political conflict broadly defined. One has to remember that stability refers here to 
the normal conduct of political affairs and instability to the paralysis or dysfunction of the 
government. It finds its expression in elite support of the government or its disaffection. 
Consequently, the central question is: under which conditions the political elites will consent 
to devolve authority to the government in a dominant party hybrid regime and how these 
conditions change over time depending on the type of hybrid regime and level of economic 
development?  
 
The present chapter articulates our answer. It starts at the highest level of abstraction and 
gradually moves down to concrete considerations. It is divided in three sections.  
 
The first section addresses the general contour of our reflection. It anchors our framework in 
neo-institutionalism. It explains why we use this meta-theory, how it is linked to the economic 
and organizational approaches that also construct their explanation based on neo-
institutionalism and how our own approach of political dynamics in hybrid regimes differs. 
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Various strands of neo-institutionalism will be presented with a special attention to historical 
institutionalism. In elaborating what historical institutionalism brings to the table, the focus 
will be on how it is especially suited to capture the diachronic process associated with periods 
of stability and instability. 
 
The second section details our theory of political alliances. It aims at solving the problems we 
find in the literature while providing a coherent and unified framework to explain patterns of 
stability and instability in hybrid regimes. It outlines the master notion of ruling coalition and 
the specificity of the hybrid regime institutional context compared to democratic and 
autocratic regimes and follows with the development at length of the main theoretical 
components including their connections to each other. To help apprehending the logic of our 
argumentation, a schematic representation of conditions of stability opens the section. It takes 
the form of a matrix that pinpoints which alliance in hybrid regimes is conducive to stability 
according a specific political and economic environment. With this roadmap in mind, we will 
elaborate on the two independent variables – i.e. degree of extra-legal organized violence and 
degree of state penetration – and on how they help us identify the dominant social groups that 
will prevail depending on the type of hybrid regime and level of economic development. In the 
process, we will specify the interests of four dominant social groups – i.e. military officers, 
opposition parties, state bureaucrats and local leaders – and elaborate on the leverage they 
have over the ruling elites. This will allow us to discuss strategies that the ruling elites should 
pursue to have legitimacy and foster stability.  
 
Last but not least, the chapter ends with comments about methodological issues. The objective 
is to detail our vision of the junction between theory and reality in order to make the research 
design explicit. It discusses the types of data used, the sample size requested to validate our 
claims and the way we will report the empirical findings. Afterward, the three case selection 
strategies will be displayed: that is, the method of most different systems design, crucial cases 
and plausibility probes. In the process, the temporal and spatial parameters will be raised.  
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2.1. A General Framework: Neo-Institutionalism in Comparative Politics 
 
Our approach is molded in the fold of neo-institutionalism27. In comparative politics, it is the 
authoritative canvas used to apprehend various research objects. It defends the simple idea that 
institutions matter: that is, it has explanatory powers. It serves as the basis to understand any 
political phenomenon because institutions mediate exogenous forces. It is the prism through 
which dynamics of conflicts found their true meaning. Without it, it is akin to reduce the 
human world to physic laws.  
 
2.1.1. Neo-Institutionalism in Approaches to Hybrid Regime Stability 
 
Approaches of hybrid regime stability suggest that the dominant party structures the political 
opportunities for elites or political groups inside and outside this single institution. It defines 
the interests, preferences and strategies of all actors. Our theory also centers on an institution, 
but a polymorph one: the ruling coalition. In this sense, we are all inspired by the new 
institutionalism.  
 
That being said, we were intrigued by the monolithic account of political conflicts offered by 
existing explanations, as if all actors would look alike. Intuitively, we were worried that some 
important analytical elements could be missing and convinced that interests of political actors 
are not uniform. We thought the problem of hybrid regime stability needed to be addressed 
from another angle: that is, political pluralism. Thus, instead of obscuring the identity of 
actors, it is our contention to acknowledge their diversity28. Obviously, the ambition is not to 
cover the entire spectrum, a world of infinite possibilities. Rather, we are concerned with 
dominant social groups.  
                                                 
27 It is worth specifying that neo-institutionalism – and its variants – is a meta-theory. It does not produce testable 
hypotheses, nor does it entail a single explanation of a given dynamic. Rather, “meta-theories suggest orientating 
concepts, target certain kinds of variables as important, and point to styles of research and explanation” 
(Mahoney, 2003: 136). It belongs to a higher degree of abstraction, one closer to epistemology and less to 
ontology per se. At the same time, we do not wish to enter the debate about the philosophy of science, as it would 
unduly divert attention from the object of our research. The purpose of this section is only to situate the reader as 
where we stand in terms of how we intend to tackle the problem at hand. 
28 Approaches of hybrid regime stability sometimes speak of such diversity in their respective narrative while 
treating it as an idiosyncratic feature external to their overall theory. 
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Furthermore, we were uncomfortable with the idea that power-holders in hybrid regimes could 
impose their view on all social groups. The economic and organizational approaches give the 
impression that all actors are passive, at the mercy of the ruling elites. Our reading of political 
dynamics in hybrid regimes is different. We assert that the ruling elites in hybrid regimes 
could not govern alone. There is no monopoly of power; leaders of the ruling party need allies 
to preserve their privileged position within the party system. And repression cannot be 
sufficient to co-opt potential allies; responsiveness to some of their political demands are 
equally important.  
 
To our knowledge, very few researches if any have explored and compared systematically 
political alliances in a cross-national setting in various hybrid contexts. They leave the identity 
of political allies undetermined and evidently the impact of such considerations on strategies 
of co-optation and hybrid regime stability unexplored. We examine such avenue; it is one of 
our main contributions.  
 
Indeed, the dominant party framework hides various forms of political pluralism (Wiseman, 
1993: 339-440). As such, it misses the essence of hybrid regimes: institutional reforms are an 
object of conflict between competing political groups (Schedler, 2006: 12). And its one-sided 
interpretation of a hybrid regime is even iffier. A hybrid regime is a regime that manifests 
various combinations of autocratic and democratic institutional arrangements. A balance 
between political control (repression) and political participation (responsiveness) characterizes 
its inner-working. The organizational approach appears to be skewed toward autocratic traits 
and does not highlight how the democratic aspect relates to their theory; why certain political 
groups challenge the ruling elites, why they contest its authority. All are depicted as 
submissive to the ruling elites will. Even if the proponents of the economic approach introduce 
more explicitly democratic traits into their framework, especially Magaloni (2006), voters are 
said to have no incentives to vote for other contenders than the ruler. It is at odds with the fact 
that citizens would side with opposition parties or support political organizations that may 
decide to join or not the ruling elites. The point is that dimensions related to the dominant 
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party as an institution are central to our understanding of hybrid regime stability, but an 
explanation limited to the dominant party the way it is framed is incomplete. 
 
The absence in the study of hybrid regime stability of a framework positioning political 
alliances as a key determinant with an emphasis on the identity of dominant social groups 
puzzled us given that it is one of the central analytical problems the field of political 
development tries to deal with. It has led to fruitful research programs in democratization 
studies. For instance, one of the greatest contributions of Barrington Moore (1968) was to 
highlight the determinant impact of class coalition on the social origins of dictatorship and 
democracy. Following his footsteps, eminent scholars such as Skocpol (1979), Huber & 
Stephens (1995) and Valenzuela (2001) have examined various patterns of class alliances29. 
On another front, O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986) argue that the alliance of soft-liner 
(reformists) elites with some factions of the military have contributed to the emergence of a 
transition from authoritarianism. It resulted in a series of iterated testing: Snyder (1992), 
Bratton & van de Walle (1997), Eisenstadt (2000) and McFaul (2002) are few examples. 
Although these examples address different research questions, they paragon an essential 
similarity: politics is rarely if ever a one-man show. Anyone who wants to remain in power or 
induce political change needs to forge alliances and the end result depends on the composition 
of these alliances. Ultimately, instability occurs when certain social groups are excluded from 
the system of representation or are denied any entry; hence, logically stability depends on the 
inclusive character of that system (Lipset, 1959: 87-88; Huntington, 1965: 414). In a hybrid 
regime, not all have the same impact. The challenge is to identify which ones are strategic and 
why. 
 
Thereupon, we do not pretend to (re) invent the wheel. The social groups we identify are not a 
construction of our own. For instance, Almond & Coleman (1960: 562-567) recognize the 
relevance of the executive, the bureaucracy, the army, religious organizations, the dominant-
party and the press in relation to the political dynamics in developing countries. Similarly, 
Huntington (1970: 7) dresses a list of pertinent actors in authoritarian regimes that includes the 
                                                 
29 Mahoney (2003: 140-141) establishes a list of all relevant academic works in regard to the testing of Moore’s 
hypotheses.  
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political leaders, church, the monarchy, state administration, police, military, national 
assemblies, local government bodies, associations, peasants, workers, managers, technical 
specialist and intellectuals. Linz’s (1978: 27-38) work revolves around the notion of loyal, 
semi-loyal and disloyal oppositions. Furthermore, the classic literature on the bureaucratic 
authoritarian state (Collier, 1979) that focuses on the alliance between high-ranking military 
officers and capitalist technocrats offers valuable insights and is no stranger, as we will see, to 
one pattern of alliances found in hybrid regimes – that is, hegemonic authoritarian regimes in a 
developing economy – but it is not the only one.  
 
The originality of our theory is based on the selection of the dominant social groups that are 
critical to stability, as well as on the choice of variables and various links we make in regard to 
the hybrid context within a unified analytical framework. As we know of, no theory is 
exclusively constructed around our four dominant social groups apprehended as a whole and 
articulated with the intent to explain variation between hegemonic authoritarian and 
competitive authoritarian regimes as well as developing and underdeveloped economies.  
 
That being said, our focus on conflict dynamics between various social groups in different 
institutional context is coherent with one kind of neo-institutionalism: historical 
institutionalism. Indeed, “by taking the goals, strategies, and preferences as something to be 
explained, historical institutionalists show that, unless something is known about the context, 
broad assumptions about "self-interested behavior" are empty” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 9). 
Yet, historical institutionalism is more than a willingness to recognize contrasting realities in 
hybrid regimes. 
 
2.1.2. Historical Institutionalism and Hybrid Regime Stability 
 
Hall & Taylor (1996) propose three types of neo-institutionalism: historical institutionalism, 
rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The first one qualifies 
institutions as an object of conflict where the balance of power between different actors is 
asymmetrical and it is concerned with institutional trajectories (e.g. Skocpol, 1979). The 
second centers on a cost/benefits analysis and concentrates particularly on problems of 
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collective actions and how actors with conflicting interests can cooperate in order to achieve 
their goals in a context of incomplete information (e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). The 
third looks at institutions as a normative enterprise that creates meanings and symbols to guide 
actor’s behavior in defending its interests (e.g. McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001).  
 
However, it is not always possible to identify which type of neo-institutionalism one belong to 
given the eclecticism prevailing in the field of comparative politics (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 955-
956). For instance, Karl (1997: 10) proposes a structured contingency approach:  
 
“It unites structural and choice-based approaches by claiming that prior 
interactions of structure and agency create the institutional legacy that 
constraints choice down the road… it problematizes the nature of choice, the 
identities of actors making such choices, and the way their preferences are 
formed within specific structures of incentives”.  
 
Bates et al. (1998: 10) contend: “our approach is narrative; it pays close attention to stories, 
accounts, and context. It is analytic in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning, 
which facilitate both exposition and explanation”. Yet, the focal point of such convergence is 
historical institutionalism, which is recognized as a vehicle for integrating various ideas from 
all strands of neo-institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938, 957). The bottom line is that no 
approach is perfectly hermetic. The core of our approach is historical institutionalism but may 
borrow from time to time, at the periphery, notions from other types of neo-institutionalism. 
 
Ultimately, we side with the proponents of historical institutionalism because of the nature of 
the problems we are concerned with. Indeed, hybrid regime stability is about long-term 
processes, critical junctures and middle-range theories. Let see more in details the logic behind 
the intimate relation between the twos.  
 
Historical institutionalism privileges the study of long-term temporal framing. Power 
configurations are embedded in social, economic, political and cultural structures. Stability is a 
by-product of such structures. They are slow moving, self-reinforcing and ubiquitous in 
nature. The implications are straightforward: historical patterns can only be assessed with the 
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passage of time. A short period is analogue to tunnel vision. It hides certain dynamics and 
reveals others that only give a partial picture of the situation (Pierson, 2003: 178-180). To 
illustrate our point, the case of the end of the Cold War as a watershed event is instructive. For 
instance, how can a study examining the hybrid regime in Malaysia begin in 1990 when the 
regime emerged in 1957 and has persisted since then? The analytical object of regime stability 
deals with macro-processes that span over a long period. Ultimately, a short time period can be 
used to study causes of regime emergence. For conditions of stability, a longer time period is 
prescribed. Otherwise, it creates an artificial and arbitrary disruption in historical continuity.  
 
Far from being homeostatic, historical institutionalism recognizes the importance of critical 
junctures or defining political moments. On one hand, structural factors inject a certain dose of 
immobility in the analysis. The intent is not to freeze time so to speak but to determine 
institutional constraints at certain times. As such, patterns are detectable. Past institutions 
endure because very few political groups are powerful enough to create alone entirely new 
institutions (Kohli, 2004: 411). New institutions are expansive and disruptive. They create 
confusion, frustration and uncertainty. On the other, the human world is not predetermined. 
Political trajectories are not linear. At some point in history, institutions, especially in non-
western countries, are contested when past compromises no longer reflect the reality in terms 
of balance of power between competing political groups. They become an object of conflict, of 
a political crisis. These critical junctures are the moment of institutional reforms. New rules 
are established, some of them may have unintended consequences in the long term. For 
instance, the exclusion and marginalization of a particular political group may have the 
immediate effect of consolidating the power of the rulers, but of eventually leading to its 
demise. Furthermore, a critical juncture may take place in what seems to be at first glance an 
insignificant event. But the addition of small events can end up having a significant impact 
(Pierson, 2003: 181-182). From this perspective, the electoral defeat of a dominant party may 
be the by-product of a succession of prior political crises. In short, longue durée, to paraphrase 
Braudel’s expression, relates to stability, and critical junctures to instability. Both notions are 
essential for apprehending the chronology of events as they unfold. Historical institutionalism 
is about temporal sequencing.  
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Third, since the inception of structural functionalism by Talcott Parsons, political science has 
gradually abandon the ideal of natural science: the formulation of one general theory. The 
social world is too heterogeneous to be reduced to simple universal laws, like the law of 
gravity. At the same time, if one does not want to be contented with particularistic findings, 
the only alternative is to isolate an object, such as political regime, economic structure, or war. 
Then, a partial explanation is given in the sense that a theory will never cover all facets of, for 
instance, a political regime. In regard to our research object, we had to choose and define such 
partial explanation from concept formation, typology construction and identification of causes 
of emergence or conditions of stability. Finally, a type of regime had to be selected. For 
instance, the conditions of stability in hybrid regimes do not explain stability in autocratic or 
democratic regimes. A theory that tries to handle altogether these issues will most likely be 
syncretic. A middle-range theory recognizes that each case is not unique, but all cases are not 
all alike. It is not about universalistic validity but about a framework of cross-national 
comparison. Not all events can be explained with the same rational: patterns of stability and 
instability will be in some cases evident while in others, inexistent or ambiguous. As Thelen & 
Steinmo assert (1992: 3), “institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole 
cause of outcomes”. Although theory should have a predictive capacity, it should in no way 
imply that history is pre-determined, events are ineluctable, and social life has a natural order 
and an inherent progressive dimension. We stand by such intellectual endeavor.  
 
Rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism turn out to be ill equipped to 
ground our hypotheses. Rational choice institutionalism tends to treat the interests of 
individuals as universal and a-temporal, leaving out the identity of each actor and the effect of 
time. It provides little insight on how to parcel out history in a way that acknowledges non-
linear processes. As for sociological institutionalism, it tends to concentrate on a single or few 
events in a short period. It hinges too much on the specificity of each case and has limited 
generalization capabilities, at least in terms of identifying patterns of political alliances.  
 
That being said, we recognize that we somewhat depart from traditional approaches of 
historical institutionalism given that our intent is not to demonstrate in detail the process of 
institution-building and how this process has consequences for future institutional 
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development. Still, our concerns about context and the challenge of capturing systematically 
the evolution of the ruling coalition and political pluralism are coherent with historical 
institutionalism. It implies first looking into the past. Indeed, we start the analysis in most 
cases at Independence Day. Second, it entails to carve time, to divide into two periods: 
persistence and change of the ruling coalition. Third, unexpected dynamics are always 
possible and sometimes the exact empirical manifestation of our variables may be ambiguous. 
By analogy, our theory is a roadmap for comparison, not a blueprint of actual events. In this 
sense, the nature of our problem and the way we frame our answer are embedded in historical 
institutionalism. One final word, most researches that are interested in studying political 
alliances and regime stability can be associated to historical institutionalism. Moore (1968), 
O’Donnell (1979), Skocpol (1979) Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Tilly (2007) are few 
examples. Hence, we walk in the footstep of a long tradition in the field of political 
development.  
 
2.2. A Theory of Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes 
 
It is our strong conviction that the authenticity of hybrid regimes compared to other types of 
regimes resides in the coexistence of competing sources of authority in a non-institutionalized 
party system. Hence, hybrid regime stability is intimately related to the ability of the ruling 
elites to maintain a political alliance, labeled a ruling coalition. Foremost, the ruling elites 
should ally with “dominant groups that have the power to sanction legitimate order” 
(Alagappa, 1995: 15). It constitutes the core of our theory of political alliances to explain the 
stability or instability of hybrid regimes. 
 
2.2.1. The Ruling Coalition 
 
The hybrid overall institutional context shapes the structure of opportunities in a unique way. 
It calls for a genuine theory of hybrid regimes, one that differs from autocratic and democratic 
regimes. In hybrid regimes, the political landscape is fragmented yet contained. No one has a 
monopoly over collective representation while allegiance is somewhat adamant. As a result, 
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the maintenance of a ruling coalition composed of political groups backed by captive 
constituencies is the optimal strategy.  
 
To dissipate any ambiguity, the ruling coalition is a collection of political organizations united 
in the pursuit of a common objective and committed to the rules and norms governing intra 
elite interactions, including nomination procedures as well as the distribution and access of 
resources. The leaders of the dominant party head the ruling coalition. These leaders are the 
incumbent and its inner circle of advisers. They epitomize the ruling elites. They are “persons 
who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national 
political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Burton et al. 1992: 8). These elites constitute 
the core and the others within the ruling coalition the peripheral actors. Peripheral actors are 
the dominant social groups in the ruling coalition.  
 
In an autocratic regime, there is usually a single source of authority. In a one-party autocratic 
regime, the adherence to the official party ideology is mandatory for everyone. Any derogation 
is amenable and punished severely. Dissent voices are muted and defiant organizations quickly 
dismantled. Notwithstanding, popular mobilization is considerable but it is strictly 
orchestrated to galvanize the public in favor of the incumbency. The mass is undifferentiated. 
Otherwise, systematic state repression is effectively closing off political space. Furthermore in 
the absence of direct and frequent elections, the official party is a hermetic institution. It is 
basically a loose constellation of more or so free-floating opportunistic politicians. They have 
no ties to a given constituency. They defend their own interests and those of the party. In 
principle, they are only accountable to the ruling elites. Therefore, in a one-party autocratic 
regime, the political support is confined to party members dependent on a small circle of high-
ranking party officials. The political regime is monolithic and static.  
 
In a hybrid regime, political liberalization injects dynamism. Suddenly, new political groups 
emerge with conflicting demands. It segments the population based on occupation, ethnicity, 
religion, ideology, etc. Political alternatives are created and challenge to a certain degree the 
ruling elites hold on power. Authority is contested. Even in hegemonic authoritarian regimes, 
dominant parties “have been created by fusing a variety of groups with different ideological 
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traditions and varying social bases, not by completely suborning some elements to one 
dominant force” (Linz, 1970: 265). On one hand, the ruling elites surely cannot legitimately 
pretend to embody and appeal to the entire spectrum of all social cleavages. Henceforth, 
forging a multi-cleavages coalition becomes paramount. It incites the ruling elites to enlarge 
the circle of “trustees” if they want to preserve their commanding position. On the other, 
unlike democratic regimes, the political regime is restricted: its access is often a privilege, not 
a right. Most political organizations stay at the margin. And political intervention to favor or 
deny admission of certain groups is frequent. Even once these groups are duly accredited, the 
ruling elites usually keep veto power for themselves. Legislative and judiciary bodies are often 
just a little more than rubber-stamp institutions. In other words, political competition in hybrid 
regimes is about selective co-optation and contained inclusion. The ruling elites cannot govern 
alone; they would not have the legitimacy to do so. But they do not want to rule and compete 
with everyone.  
 
The institutionalization of a ruling coalition becomes an attractive option. It substitutes itself 
to an overall weak party system. It expands access to state resources without broadening it to 
empower all potential competitors. It manages the diversity of political affiliation. Yet, like 
any institutions, it needs a minimum of constancy in its membership. The alliance should not 
be ephemeral: an ad hoc pact of convenience. It should form a political bloc. That being said, 
regardless of the rules not all have the same status within it. A nucleus composed of staunch 
allies represents the locus of institutional power and negotiation, compromise as well as 
sometimes coercion characterize their interaction. Others are subject to unilateral decisions by 
the ruling elites and may enter or exit the ruling coalition without any dire consequences for 
power-holders. In a way, a stable hybrid regime is characterized by the institutionalization of a 
ruling coalition in an inchoate party system. It is the legitimate center of power. It is an 
institution, the most important one in a hybrid regime. In other words, although the party 
system may be weak, some political organizations within it may have considerable authority.  
 
In parallel, the inception of elections in hybrid regimes breaks elite solidarity by tying each of 
them to a given constituency apprehended not only as an electoral district but also more 
broadly as electoral groups or loyal supporters. It gives to a certain degree a voice to ordinary 
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citizens. This holds true even if elections are not competitive. For instance, in a one-party 
hybrid regime, direct elections can participate in ousting representatives favored by the ruling 
elites: as it was the case in Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone (Hayward, 1987: 16). 
In other words, elections introduce flexibility in allegiance even if there is technically no 
choice between political parties. Nevertheless, the articulation and aggregation of interests is 
not a carbon copy of western democracies. Lincoln’s maxim  – the government of the people, 
by the people, for the people – is for the most part a mirage in a hybrid context. The ruling 
elites control the choice available to voters and manipulate incentives in a way to induce 
heavily the outcome in favor of their preferred one. As Jayasuriya & Rodan (2007: 781) said,  
 
“Non-democratic notions of representation are not driven by any acceptance of 
the need for authorization by those being represented, nor are the represented 
intended to be self-constituting and able to hold decision-makers to account. 
Instead, representation is intended to effect a process of structuring political 
participation that bypasses or controls intermediary organizations, with the 
intention of exerting a high degree of control over what conflicts are permissible 
or not in politics”.  
 
Political participation derives from the structure of elite representation within the system. Most 
of all, although political elites have to defend the interest of their constituency, the latter are 
largely captive: that is, some political groups have the quasi-monopoly of representation over 
a given constituency. In such a case, there is little competition between political groups, at 
least within the coalition, for the same constituency. This rigidity in affiliation is mostly a 
function of history in many non-western countries whereas identity evolves but very slowly in 
a highly stratified society. We will further develop this point when addressing the 
particularities of our four dominant social groups in the next section.  
 
In turn, the capacity of the peripheral actors to obtain concessions from the ruling elites is 
intimately related to the size and resources of their constituency. It is the main source of 
leverage against the ruling elites. It prevents or limits state repression directed at both elites 
and constituencies (Crone, 1988: 257; Remmer, 1985: 74). A social group is dominant 
foremost because it has followers. They can mobilize and deliver the vote. They can reach out 
to some electoral segments in ways that the ruling elites cannot. The hold on power of the 
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latter is conditional amongst others to winning elections, which necessitates moving beyond 
their immediate partisan base and expanding their electoral support. In this sense, the ruling 
coalition includes political groups with captive constituencies. And only political groups 
gravitating within the ruling coalition are able to uphold some demands from their respective 
constituency.  
 
Therefore, the relation between the ruling elites and the peripheral actors within the ruling 
coalition is one of interdependence marked by asymmetry. Peripheral actors heading large 
constituencies induce the ruling elites to make compromises, devolve power and (re) distribute 
resources instead of acting unilaterally like in an autocratic regime. The ruling elites do not act 
in isolation, but in interaction with other political groups. Still, the ruling elites are the 
gatekeepers of the political regime and who ever threaten their position shall be victim of 
political exclusion. 
 
One central issue to political development is what resources each actor possesses (Haggard & 
Kaufmann, 1997: 266). Although the ruling elites in hybrid regimes have an overwhelming 
advantage in terms of economic and organizational resources, other actors should not be 
neglected when they have captive constituencies. The larger it is, the more leverage they have 
against the ruling elites. Obviously, nothing is fixed in stone. Political affiliation in hybrid 
regimes is not almost inert like in an autocratic regime. The changing patterns depend largely 
on the complex superimposition of cleavages – whether in terms of class, ethnicity, religion or 
territory – and societal changes. Societal change is an inherent feature in all countries, except 
maybe in those isolated micro-island states of the Pacific. The political regime is confronted 
with new demands and new political forces to reckon with. The stability of the regime thus 
depends mainly on its capacity to timely absorb these groups whenever their presence 
becomes relevant for the survival of the regime. In other words, in order to stay in power, the 
ruling elites have to incorporate a variety of political groups as the society transforms itself 
overtime. In principle, the ruling elites can adapt to a changing context by altering the 
composition of the ruling coalition.  
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Now that we have briefly established the distinctiveness of the hybrid regime institutional 
context compared to autocratic and democratic regimes - i.e. unlike an autocratic regime, it has 
competing sources of authority and unlike a democratic regime, it has an overly weak party 
system and captive constituencies - we will focus solely on hybrid regime dynamics. Our 
theory is not one about regime stability; it is about hybrid regime stability. We do not wish to 
explain and compare the stability in autocracies and democracies, but in hegemonic 
authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes at different levels of economic 
development. 
 
2.2.2. Dominant Social Groups 
 
According to our theory, the precise composition of the ruling coalition operates under two 
conditions that constitute the two independent structural variables of our analytical framework: 
the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state penetration over the 
territory and in the economy. They have the advert effect of empowering certain social groups 
at the expense of others and as such, they are the cornerstone of authority like in any modern 
society: that is, the capacity to exert influence and the right to exercise power. The degree of 
extra-legal organized violence is determinant in identifying whom amongst the peripheral 
actors within the state or the regime is the competing figure of authority to the ruling elites. 
The degree of state penetration is determinant in identifying who is responsible within the 
state or society for connecting various levels of authority, especially between the center and 
regions. Hence, they should affect the configuration of the ruling coalition composition. A 
high degree of extra-legal organized violence permeates the politicization of military officers 
and a low degree favors the preponderance of opposition parties as a counter-weight to the 
ruling elites. A high level of state penetration is concomitant with the ascendancy of state 
bureaucrats and a low one with local leaders as the main relay between levels of authority. 
Thereafter, a simple two-dimensional matrix provides the roadmap to analyze patterns of 
political alliances and by ricochet stability and instability in hybrid regimes. 
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Figure 3 – Patterns of Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes 
 
The left side is typical of competitive authoritarian regimes; the upper-left box being linked to 
developing countries and the lower-left box to underdeveloped countries. The right side is 
usually the arrangement found in hegemonic authoritarian regimes; the upper-right box 
representing an alliance common in developing countries and the lower-right box an alliance 
typical of underdeveloped countries.  
 
These political groups are essential. Other political groups may join the ruling coalition, but it 
then becomes contingent to the specificity of each country. Moreover, rarely if ever the ruling 
elites will exclude all military officers, opposition parties, state bureaucrats or local leaders at 
once from the ruling coalition. Instability is generated by the exclusion of some factions or 
parties belonging to these groups, according to a precise political and economic context. The 
identification of dominant social groups serves a higher function: i.e. where should we look 
first to understand stability and instability in hybrid regimes. This is important to remember. 
Along those lines, one needs to acknowledge that this analytical device is an ideal-type 
representation. In reality, conceptual frontiers may be weakened when confronted with in-
between cases. Finally, when the military is the dominant social group, the ruling coalition is 
merely reduced to an amalgam of factions within the ruling party; and when the opposition 
parties are the dominant social group, the ruling coalition takes the form of a multiparty 
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alliance. Bureaucrats are political insiders within the ruling coalition, whereas local leaders are 
political outsiders. Hence, the ruling coalition is a polymorph institution. In our theory, the 
forms of the ruling coalition have no analytical power per se. They are descriptive in nature. 
Their purpose is to clarify and not necessarily explain the patterns of elites’ interactions. 
 
In order to ground our reflection in solid foundation, numerous references to academic 
specialists on any of our four dominant social groups will be made. We do not pretend to be 
expert on each of them, let alone even on one of them. There is already sufficient knowledge 
accumulated on the behavior and interests of each group. Again, our contribution rests on the 
various links we make to hybrid regime stability and how we integrate disparate findings in a 
single and coherent theory.  
 
2.2.2.1. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence 
 
The first key factor in observing patterns of coalition composition and predicting hybrid 
regime stability or instability is the degree of extra-legal organized violence. A high degree 
signifies that political conflict is deregulated and subversive. There is no abdication of any 
rules; only brute force counts. As if the government would be almost in a perpetual state of 
siege. It provides incentives for the military officers to intervene in politics and, given their 
corporate interests, tends to correlate with hegemonic authoritarianism in which the form of 
ruling coalition is usually confined to the ruling party. A low degree implies that social 
demands are channeled through the party system; it bestows a central role to political parties, a 
context that equates to a competitive authoritarian regime and fosters the formation of a 
multiparty coalition. There is some form of shared understanding about the conduct of 
political affairs. Let us decorticate this chain of reasoning.  
 
First things first, the degree of extra-legal organized violence refers to the strategic threats the 
ruling elites face. We exclude considerations related to non-political forms of violence such as 
criminal activities. The degree is estimated according to its duration and intensity; sporadic 
guerrilla attacks do not have the same meaning as sustained armed conflicts. Also, geographic 
extension and location are factored in. There is a difference between social violence in one city 
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versus in many across the country, as well as between raging turbulence in a big city versus in 
a small rural municipality. Last but not least, both internal and external violence should be 
considered; external source deals with the presence of an insecure regional hegemony and 
transnational terrorism. Therefore, a high degree of extra-legal organized violence corresponds 
to a sustained civil war geographically spread out or an international war involving the entire 
society. A low degree involves punctual and isolated civil unrest or latent inter-state military 
confrontation.  
 
Military Officers 
 
Extra-legal organized violence deals directly with the corporate interests of military officers30. 
So, it is not surprising if we see this factor influencing their presence within the ruling 
coalition as peripheral actors. Indeed, as long as they perceive that the regime is threatened, 
they feel as their duties to interfere with the decision-making process. It is the “manifest 
destiny” of soldiers to intervene and save the nation when the government is weak and fails to 
provide order (Finer, 1988: 32-35). Hence, when the national interest is at stake, military 
officers will be active players in politics to make sure adequate steps are taken and will tend to 
present a united front (Chalmers, 1977: 33). Consequently, military officers do not fallback 
into the barracks but it is not because they like party politics. They do not. “Military officers 
view political parties as undesirable agents of disunity” (Nordlinger, 1977: 56, 58). As such, 
they refrain from engaging in negotiations, deliberations and compromises with political 
parties with the purpose of building an alliance. This is why they are mostly associated with 
hegemonic authoritarian regimes.  
 
A high degree of extra-legal organized violence translates the atomization of the party system. 
Opposition parties are illegal or mere puppets of the ruling elites. Choices are so limited that 
large segments of the population have no voice even if elections liberalize the regime and 
signal to the embryonic opposition movement the possibility, real or perceived, of expressing 
their grievances. Without formal institutions to channel such grievances, opposition 
                                                 
30 Military officers as a social group refer to all military personnel with no a priori about the rank.  
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movements are systematically pushed into street politics (Przeworski, 1988: 73), a situation 
typical of hegemonic authoritarian regimes. The political arena is located outside the party 
system, which fosters social agitation and incites military officers to intervene and ensure 
order. Since opposition parties are inexistent or anemic, authority is highly centralized within 
the ruling party. Consequently, in a hegemonic authoritarian regime, pluralism is about 
political factions within the ruling party; one of these factions would be the military officer. In 
this context, the ruling coalition is mainly inner-looking. 
 
It is important to notice that a stable hegemonic authoritarian regime is not a military regime 
even if it is often created by and made of military officers. The National Council (1972-1978) 
during the Marcos’ era in the Philippines and other forms of military institutions are on the 
contrary a source of instability. Indeed, military officers are concerned with their corporate 
interests, not in governing a country. They do not seek ultimate political power: they “see 
themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power” (Finer, 1988: 
22). In many ways, the military recognizes that “in order to remain in power (i.e., to preserve 
its capacity to intervene in matters of importance to itself), it will have to get out of power 
(i.e., remove itself from direct responsibility for governing)” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 
35). They perceive themselves as “moderator” and “guardian” of existing institutions 
(Nordlinger, 1977: 25). Ultimately, a threat to the regime does not constitute a basis for 
holding power; it is functionally limited to protecting the regime and the citizens (Rouquié, 
1986: 111). In stable hegemonic authoritarian regimes, military institutions are not a long-term 
solution; eventually power should be transferred to civilian institutions like an executive office 
or the national assembly. In this way, it is important not to associate hegemonic authoritarian 
regimes with military regimes. As Brooker (2000: 100) sums up, “these distinctly less-than-
military regimes are often better viewed in relation to democracy or semidemocracy than to 
military dictatorship”.  
 
In a democratic regime or a competitive authoritarian regime, the military force follows the 
“liberal model” which implies that officer corps are depoliticized and subordinated to civilian 
controls, whereas in autocratic regimes, it falls under the “penetration model” where political 
conformity is maintained by a pervasive ideology and soldiers act as propagandists 
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(Nordlinger, 1977: 11-19). In hegemonic authoritarianism, the military force although 
functional in nature is politicized and organized under a national banner so that its corporate 
interests can be represented within the ruling coalition. Officers want to preserve this strategic 
position within the political regime because they want to contain civilian abuse of power in 
regard to what they consider their exclusive domains: namely how to intervene in armed 
conflicts; how as well as who should be nominated for promotions; and in some cases, when 
lower-class interests are threatened or economic assets of the military are ceased or reduced 
(Nordlinger, 1977: chapter 2). A politicized military corps signals that its support is not 
unconditional. Its members want to remain politically independent on certain issues.  
 
They are able to do so foremost because they have the monopoly on arms, or at least a decisive 
strategic advantage compared to other coercive apparatus like security forces or policemen 
(Finer, 1962: 10). Their potential and actual force is unmatched. It can quickly be deployed 
anywhere on the territory and rapidly control or at least contain an explosive situation. Its 
mere loud and visible presence on the ground inspires fear. Without the army on their side, no 
political group would survive for long. Indeed, “a united officer corps is virtually always 
capable of maintaining a civilian government in office” (Nordlinger 1977: 5). When the level 
of extra-legal organized violence is high, the ruling elites therefore have to include the military 
in the ruling coalition. And if military officers are divided, the ruling elites should seek to ally 
with the strongest element – i.e. those who command the most effective coercive unit and 
respect among the population – within the military establishment. Otherwise it runs the risk of 
being victim of a coup d’État. This is the most drastic option. Military officers can also shift 
their support to legislative branches, notably the opposition, or to the judiciary. They might 
also foster divisions within the executive by siding with other peripheral actors unsatisfied 
with the status quo. They can give implicit approval to civil unrest or general strike by 
adopting a posture of non-intervention. They can even dispute the government authority in 
secluded areas. Furthermore, the monopoly of arms means that ultimately the army is the only 
figure of authority able to impose order; a function that confers to military officers almost 
instant deference among the population victim of abuse or who fears for its own security.  
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In addition, the military has “a highly emotionalized symbolic status” associated to the virtues 
attributed to the group – i.e. “bravery, discipline, obedience, self-abnegation, poverty, 
patriotism” – which “at most time and in most countries are esteemed and cherished” (Finer: 
1962: 10). Officers are often adulated for their historic exploits such as heroic victories in 
international wars or war of Independence. However, it is important not to exaggerate their 
influence in society (see Nordlinger, 1977: chapter 2). First, most of the time, the ranks and 
files are composed of one communal group, which helps maintaining cohesion but contributes 
to antagonize others. Second, military officers come mostly from the middle-class and as such 
they often defend their interests; their greatest influence is therefore within this group. Third, 
historic exploits resonate foremost within the generation who actually lived during these 
tumultuous events. Fourth, military officers loose their moral halo when they intervene with 
brutal force against the general population, especially if it is frequent and relatively recent in 
time, or when they seize power and intend to establish themselves as rulers. In this sense, 
military officers have captive constituencies; they have a reservoir of support in society.  
 
As already said but worth repeating, it is hard to delineate cause from effect when studying 
conditions of stability. At what point does a high degree of extra-legal organized violence 
beget the presence of the military in politics and structure the polity as a hegemonic 
authoritarian regime? Or at what point does the presence of the military in a hegemonic 
authoritarian regime cause a high degree of extra-legal organized violence because it blocks 
entry into the party system? If it is difficult to assess with certainty, there is no doubt that 
mutual interaction and self-reinforcing effects can be observed. What is important to note is 
that there is an intimate connection between all these dimensions that forms a coherent, we 
argue, line of reasoning.  
 
Opposition Parties 
 
A low degree of extra-legal organized violence in hybrid regimes usually implies the presence 
of party competition, which is only possible when the military officers fall back into the 
barracks and behave like in a liberal model. “The channeling of opposition into the electoral 
arena served the authoritarian incumbent by getting strikers, students, and other potentially 
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disruptive trouble makers off the regime’s back, and out of the unpredictable realm of street 
demonstrations and picket lines and into the highly regulated realm of campaigns and 
elections” (Eisenstadt, 2000: 15). The party system becomes the point of convergence of social 
demands and most political actors express adherence to the precedence of rule over violence. 
Yet, loyalty to the political regime is not blindly taken for granted since not all parties have 
influence, even benign, over the decision-making process. Traditionally, a loyal opposition is 
understood in reference to the overall party system (Linz, 1978: 16). Here, a loyal opposition 
is one not necessarily loyal to the party system, but loyal to the ruling coalition, somewhat a 
kind of semi-loyal opposition.  
 
When the degree of extra-legal organized violence is low, opposition parties usually do exist 
and compete, albeit unfairly, with the ruling party for votes; a situation defined as a 
competitive authoritarian regime. The political arena moves into legislative institutions. Actors 
refrain from using force to achieve their goal and recognize that elections are the only 
legitimate mean to access power. Opposition parties act as a safety valve to prevent social 
bottlenecks. In general, politicians agree that collective demands need to be channeled through 
formal institutions, although the exact nature of these institutions remains an object of intense 
conflict. 
 
The introduction of real party competition produces a certain fragmentation of the votes along 
party lines. Coalition building becomes a strategy of electoral containment to reduce the 
uncertainty associated with the prospect of a competitive election and control the results that 
come out of the process. Therefore, the ruling coalition takes an outward-shape. Instead of 
intra-party, it is inter-party dynamics that become predominant. Indeed, intra-party dynamics 
are still important since the ruling party heads the coalition; it is the conductor so to speak. But 
increased attention is being given to inter-party interactions since the ruling coalition is the 
only arena where dissent voices can be heard... behind closed doors. Excluding all opposition 
parties from it is akin to reduce dissent to silence. It cannot last long.  
 
At the same time, not all opposition parties are welcomed in the ruling coalition. This brings 
us to a central issue: opposition parties are not one unified bloc. They are differentiated based 
 92  
on their interests, programmatic stances and affiliations. Interests vary according to whether 
opposition parties are transition-seeking, patronage-seeking or adopting anti-regime stance.  
 
“Transition-seeking parties [are] willing to legitimize the system by 
participating in institutions agreed upon by the authoritarians, but only to the 
end of reforming them from within. Patronage-seeking opposition parties [are] 
willing to play by authoritarian rules, with the eventual but distant objective of 
liberalizing the electoral system, but obtaining offices, public financing, and 
other resources in the meantime, in exchange for loyally fronting opposition 
candidates to make the regime look competitive. Anti-regime [are] hard-line 
opposition which refuses to even participate in authoritarian institutions and 
seeks instead to undermine them, usually via protest mobilization” (Eisenstadt, 
2000: 8).  
 
Usually patronage-seeking parties will bandwagon with the ruling coalition and adopt a work-
from-within strategy. Some transition-seeking parties may decide to momentarily side with the 
ruling coalition and later breakout from the coalition in order to accumulate power today and 
fight tomorrow. Yet, in doing so, it could run the risk of alienating its own constituency. It is 
the same with anti-regime parties. Also, it is not because an opposition party could rebel 
against the ruling party that the latter will try to co-opt it. The ruling elites will cooperate with 
patronage-seeking and moderate transition-seeking parties, but repress and more likely ban 
anti-regime parties because they pose a direct threat to their hold on power. The party system 
in a competitive authoritarian regime is composed of a nucleus, the ruling party, an inner ring, 
the patronage-seeking parties within the coalition, and an outer ring composed of transition-
seeking and anti-regime parties. In this system, patronage-seeking parties are still pivotal 
actors. For instance, they may decide to join an opposition coalition if they judge that their 
interest is best served. They can represent a credible threat by defecting from the ruling 
coalition and joining the opposition to challenge the control by the ruling coalition of 
legislative institutions. They can organize an electoral boycott or call for a general strike. In an 
autocratic regime, opposition parties are inexistent, and in hegemonic authoritarian regimes 
they are all by force patronage-seeking parties when they are legalized. In a democratic 
regime, such categories are largely irrelevant and political parties are classified based on the 
ideological spectrum.  
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This brings us to a second important analytical element. Patronage-seeking parties are usually 
ideologically located at the margin, but not at the extreme-right or left. Because it needs to 
attract the maximum of voters as well as some competing opposition parties and act as a 
centripetal force in the party system in order to form a ruling coalition, the ruling party is a 
centrist party; a catchall party. This position gives it programmatic flexibility. Depending on 
the context, it can promote nationalist or internationalist policies, social security or free-
market mechanisms, etc. Hence, its political platform is pragmatic and less ideological in 
nature. If the ruling party would be located in the extreme-right of the ideological spectrum for 
instance, such strategy would be difficult to implement and the formation of a ruling coalition 
unlikely or ephemeral. Thus the ruling party will tend to perceive as an enemy, any political 
parties that try to occupy the same position within the ideological spectrum and will therefore 
not include a competing centrist party within the ruling coalition. Opposition parties that are 
“niche party” while defending programmatic policies that are not too extreme are prime 
candidates as a worthy ruling coalition partner.  
 
Finally, party differentiation in a non-western party system is not confined to the traditional 
right-left polarization. As Ottaway (2003: 167) points out: “in most countries, the language of 
economic polarization (urban/rural; rich and poor in urban area) has fallen out of fashion, 
while the languages of ethnic and religious polarization and of nationalism are on the 
ascendancy”. Indeed, cleavages are often extended to or dominated by a division based on 
affiliation such as ethnicity, religion, regionalism, clan, family, etc. These cleavages are 
vertically integrated. For instance, a cleavage between Catholic and Muslim people will most 
likely lead to one moderate party representing each group not two. Moreover, rarely a Catholic 
will side with a Muslim party or vice-versa. As such, they have captive constituencies that 
give them leverage against the ruling elites. Communal affiliations often involve strong 
emotional attachment that provides almost unconditional and instant political support. 
 
So far, we have established the link between the degree of extra-legal organized violence and 
the importance of military officers or opposition parties, and how it corresponds to hegemonic 
authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes dynamics. It contributes to clarify 
differences between types of hybrid regimes; an exercise generally neglected by the 
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organizational and economic approaches. Respectively, military officers and opposition parties 
are not passive, ready to be co-opted at any price by the ruling elites. They negotiate their way 
in as a faction of the ruling party or a party within the ruling coalition. The military are able to 
do so given their monopoly of arms and emblematic position in society, especially within 
middle-class and the dominant communal group. Opposition parties are attractive for the 
ruling elites if they are patronage-seeking, ideologically located on the margin, and could 
count on a significant captive constituency based on ethnic, religious or regional affiliation. 
The military can always threaten to foment a coup d’État and patronage parties to defect to the 
opposition. If we only look at economic and organizational resources, especially in 
competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties would appear weak. But if we add the 
notion of captive constituencies, they are suddenly significant adversaries for the ruling elites.  
 
2.2.2.2. The Degree of State Penetration 
 
The second critical factor when analyzing patterns of political alliances in hybrid regimes is 
the degree of state penetration. A high degree confers to state bureaucrats a significant role in 
socio-economical interactions and is usually associated with developing economy in non-
western countries, whereas a low degree basically decentralizes by default state functions to 
local authorities and are evidently a characteristic of an underdeveloped economy. The rational 
behind such line of reasoning is that the state presence in the economy fosters economic 
development in most southern countries, which is usually supported by a well-functioning 
administrative apparatus31. And “the particular structure of the political economy… influences 
the nature and expression of social conflict and this, in turn, shapes the operation of political 
institutions” (Jayasuriya & Rodan, 2007: 776). Neither is tied to any specific types of hybrid 
regimes. In both cases, the dominant peripheral actors – state bureaucrats and local leaders – 
are usually factions of the ruling party. Yet, state bureaucrats are considered as political 
insiders, whereas local leaders are political outsiders.  
 
                                                 
31 There exists a vast literature linking state presence in the economy and economic development. See Johnson 
(1982), Evans (1989), Woo-Coming (1999), Chang (2002) and Kohli (2004).  
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The degree of state penetration is defined along two axes: (i) the administrative extension of 
state presence across the territory and (ii) the centralization of economic functions (i.e. 
economic extension). Administrative extension designates the geographical dispersion of state 
representatives and adequate infrastructures in most parts of the country in the field of order 
and security, tax collection, health, education, transport, telecommunication, etc. The 
centralization of the economic functions deals with the intervention of the state in the 
economy. Key indicators are the existence of economic plans designed to industrialize the 
country and state investment in the economy. As asserted in our critical assessment, state 
ownership is mostly relevant in sectors generating substantial rents and in labor-intensive 
industries. State ownership of an oil company or of a car manufacturer are good examples. 
State-directed strategies are evident when there is a relative continuity in state economic 
policies, a clear and detailed model of development and a commitment to a single objective: 
increase the nation industrial capacity. Therefore, what matters is more how the state 
intervenes in the economy, and less whether or not it does. High state penetration is akin to the 
monopoly of state companies in various industrial sectors and significant interactions between 
the central government and its subunits. Low state penetration is a situation prevailing when 
peripheral regions have little contact with the capital and state involvement in the economy is 
limited to functions of resource allocation (or consumption) to the detriment of productive 
ones.  
 
State Bureaucrats 
 
When state penetration is high, the presence of state bureaucrats can be felt all across the 
national territory. They benefit from a hierarchical, professional, specialized and autonomous 
civil administration. By autonomous, we mean not dependent on one or few non-political 
actors. They invest all spheres of society; foremost the economic sphere. They are the 
architects of prosperity and basically determine who gets what. It can therefore be expected 
that the ruling elites who alienate the bureaucracy play a dangerous game. State bureaucrats 
are an indispensable relay for the central government, one that maintains cohesion and 
effectiveness within the entire administration. This characterization is the prototype of a strong 
state that fosters economic development.  
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More specifically, state bureaucrats are usually not confined to the government buildings in 
the capital. Their reach penetrates reclusive villages and is apparent in terms of offices, 
personnel and the provision of services to local communities. Still, one should not confuse this 
dispersion with uncoordinated actions. Indeed, decision-making is nevertheless centralized. 
The highest echelon of the administration orchestrates all tasks related to the elaboration of 
strategies and planning. Local representatives implement decisions taken at the top and 
sometimes provide feedback. And the central government will refrain from devolving power 
to local government. For instance, they will not allow local officials to perceive their own 
taxes. State bureaucrats are competent individuals. The civil administration often recruits the 
best minds and the most experienced candidates. They are not selected solely based on their 
personal connection with high-place individuals, but mostly on their skills. They are educated. 
They accomplish a wide variety of functions according to well-specified divisions of labor 
(Kohli, 2004: 395, 489). Finally, they are relatively autonomous from political and economic 
actors. Interference is not totally absent, but overall they have the flexibility to formulate 
strategies and elaborate plans independently from outside influence once the designated 
officials have provided the short, medium and long-term state objectives. Evidently, this is the 
weberian ideal-type of a rational-legal bureaucracy.  
 
However, state bureaucrats in hybrid regimes are far more proactive than this depiction 
presages. Indeed, they are economic actors in their own right. In this regard, we should 
distinguish between the economic dynamics prevailing in countries such as Japan and South 
Korea from the ones of developing economies in most other non-western countries. In Japan 
and South Korea, there exists an intimate relation between public and private actors in their 
joint effort to pursue economic growth and industrialization expansion (Johnson, 1982; Evans 
1989). It is the state that defines economic priorities and directs which economic sector should 
be developed (Kohli, 2004). Yet, the model is based on private oligopolies and domestic 
investments. Large private conglomerates like the Chaebols in South Korea or the Keiretsu in 
Japan are prime examples.  
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Developing economies in non-western countries are characterized by the heavy presence of 
state-owned companies and international credit. The important point here for our 
argumentation is that these features have the effect of marginalizing the national bourgeoisie 
and labor in society (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009; O’Donnell, 1977: 65, 68). Labor unions are 
reduced to corporatist representation within the confine of limited actions dictated by the 
ruling elites. The latter determine which union is allowed, who can be considered a member of 
a given union, in which sectors the union can operate, etc. Also, the government usually 
represents the sole source of revenue for these associations, interferes in leadership 
nomination, and basically calls the shots within the organization (Collier & Collier, 1977: 
493). As for the bourgeoisie, some individuals may have an influence on the ruling elites, but 
it is particularistic and informal in nature. It is the privilege of very few wealthy entrepreneurs. 
Otherwise, as collective actors organize under a single banner or within representative 
associations, they are generally speaking powerless. The vast majority are small businesses 
totally dependent on the state. Thus, the bourgeoisie and unions are not major actors in 
society. As such, their inclusion in the ruling coalition is not essential: that is, they are 
dependent to a point that they have little leverage over the ruling elites. Hence, public 
economic actors fill the power vacuum left by the weakening of leading entrepreneurs and 
labor representatives. We assist to the formation of a “state bourgeoisie: functionary-
businessmen who remove diverse productive activities from private capital, absorb an 
important portion of accumulation, and together contribute so that the state grows more than 
would have been necessary in strictly economic terms” (O’Donnell, 1977: 62). The upper-
management of state-owned companies as well as the one of related ministries become major 
players in society. Overall, they lead the diversification of the economic structure. It is not 
analogous to developed economies, but it can in no way be associated to an atrophied 
industrial base and the mono-exportation of a single agricultural commodity produced with 
low technological inputs as in underdeveloped countries.  
 
Given their individualistic nature and usually as members of the ruling elites, upper echelon 
state bureaucrats occupy a special place in the ruling coalition compared to the first two 
political groups previously discussed. In this sense, they are political insiders. Foremost, they 
pose a threat to the incumbent. Indeed, they occasionally challenge the incumbent in intra-
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party elections and create serious elite’s division within the ruling coalition. Often supported 
by an opposition coalition, they may run against the incumbent in national elections for the 
position of head of state and contribute to the lost by the ruling coalition of the two-third 
majority. They might even call for a national boycott of elections in the case of suspected 
electoral fraud. Hence, the ruling party needs to manage conflicts between the incumbent and 
the upper-echelon state bureaucrats in order to avoid a political crisis.  
 
The credibility of state bureaucrats’ defiance of the incumbent’s decisions is attributed mostly 
to the ascendancy the former has on the domestic market. Upper echelon state bureaucrats 
oversight most strategic sectors. Through the attribution of licenses, permits, subsidiaries, 
social security benefits and the imposition of personal and corporate incomes, sale and trade 
taxes, as well as price-fixer of basic commodities, they organize who gets what in society, 
especially in the context of an omnipresence of parastatal giant companies in labor intensive 
industries. In this way, a vast network of economic actors is at their mercy. It allows them to 
grant economic benefits to some clienteles in exchange of political support. If it is true that 
ultimately, the ruling elites are responsible for designing the overall national economic plan, 
nevertheless “state bureaucracy have a profound influence on policy making, not only at 
administrative levels but also through providing expert, well-informed policy advice to the 
political decision-makers” (Brooker, 2000: 181). They retain some form of discretionary 
power. In fact, “each bureaucratic unit possesses a certain volume of power resources, which 
may be composed of coercion, information, legitimacy, and economic goods” (Oszlak, 2005: 
497). These powers are concentrated in ministries or departments such Finance, Commerce 
and Industry32. Their position within the public administration allows them to build mass 
support on a personal basis independently, to a certain degree, of the incumbent or the party 
they represent. For heads of state-owned companies, it is the size of the rent and the opacity of 
accounting procedures in these units that provide flexibility to dispense favors, even 
sometimes acting as a commercial bank of some sort by lending huge sums of money at 
preferential rates. Furthermore, whether through vertical or horizontal integration, sub-
contracting or externalities, they can extend their tentacles and exert their domination over 
                                                 
32 As ministers, state bureaucrats are elected officials in a parliamentary system. In a presidential system, the head 
of state nominates them in cabinet positions.  
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many sectors of the economy. In sum, these administrative units are key because they are the 
gatekeepers of most economic flows and owners of most economic outputs; and elites who 
head these units are expected to assert their supremacy over significant segments of society.  
 
Of course, fearing that one may accumulate too much power if staying too long in a neuralgic 
administrative unit, the incumbent may decide to adopt a musical chair tactic or simply fire a 
given individual that becomes exceedingly greedy. However, turnovers are easier to do at 
lower levels in the state bureaucracy; and at that level it is usually the responsibility of the 
upper echelon bureaucrats to nominate subalterns. At the top, if the bureaucracy is to be 
effective, it needs to hire competent individuals. These individuals are not easily replaceable, 
especially if ceaseless replacement becomes a habit. In fact, such behavior is more 
symptomatic of underdeveloped countries.  
 
Local Leaders 
 
When the degree of state penetration is low, state bureaucrats are invisible in the periphery. 
They are the anti-thesis of Weber’s conception of an effective state. They function in an 
inchoate organizational structure; they are hired based on loyalty and their job attribution is 
often ill-defined; they are mere pawns of a higher power structure. In other words, the state is 
weak. Overall, state bureaucrats behave as kleptocrats in a predatory fashion. The economy is 
abandoned to the unforgiving market forces and informal practices, which tend to have 
disastrous consequences including maintaining low economic productivity and a general state 
of decrepitude in the country. Economic plans may exist, but the strategy changes frequently 
with no real commitment to long-term industrialization objectives. In this context, local 
leaders fill the power vacuum in isolated regions. They are the unavoidable intermediary 
between the central government and the periphery. Without their collective support, the ruling 
elites will lack political support in rural areas; potentially pooling only in urban constituencies 
where the small middle-class is usually highly critical of government actions. Defection of 
local leaders therefore brings the ruling elites one step closer to the lost of their legitimacy and 
their demise.   
 
 100  
State bureaucrats in underdeveloped countries are mostly concentrated in the capital. They 
have little contact with rural communities. Their physical presence is at best punctual and 
temporary. They provide no public service whether it is in terms of public health, tax 
collection, security, infrastructure, etc. In fact, regions are virtually cut-off from the center and 
as such rural inhabitants do not feel any bonds with the national party system. To make it 
worst, the bureaucratic decision-making process is chaotic and various ministries and subunits 
work in isolation with one another. There is no overarching hierarchy and any clear integrated 
policy direction. They perform little productive functions and what is expected from them in 
terms of objectives and results is hazy. Many end up performing similar and rudimentary 
tasks. Duplication of positions is common. Finally, state bureaucrats are the coquetry of well-
connected individuals. They are often hired not for their competence but for there almost total 
abdication to a “patron”. They receive a salary, sometimes a significant one, in exchange of 
loyalty. Overall, state bureaucrats obey to entrenched interests whether they are the ones of a 
politician, a military general, a foreign investor, a national banker, etc. Outside influence is 
pervasive and constant.  
 
Still, even more probative is the predatory behavior of civil servants. Public funds are used for 
private gain and an extreme accumulation of wealth by public office holders is a common 
feature (Mbaku & Ihonvbere, 2006: 12). This highlights the blurry line between formal and 
informal practices. If public funds are not embezzled for private use, they are rarely invested 
in value-added social overhead capital. Instead, state money is dilapidated in an ostensive 
fashion in, for instance, a grandiose memorial, luxury public buildings or a sudden and 
excessive raise of civil servant salaries (Kohli, 2004: 399). In this sense, as in developing 
countries, the size of public sector in terms of the number of employees is often substantial. 
More than the sheer number, it is their action that is revealing. As with developing countries, 
state-owned enterprises may be omnipresent in the economy, but operations are limited to 
commercial tax of primary commodity exportation and various custom duties. Under 
production sharing agreements covering the most lucrative sectors of production, state 
bureaucrats bestow licenses and permits, negotiate extractive rights but have little control over 
the management and investment strategies. Often, these state-owned companies are empty 
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shell with few assets or productive activities. This gloomy picture has been described in details 
in Bayart’s (2009) seminal book The State in Africa: the Politic of the Belly.  
 
If state bureaucrats are not the key players, it is the same with economic domestic private 
actors. The division of labor and the structure of the economy are often dominated by the 
primary sector and controlled by international firms who provide the capital, technology and 
specialized labor. There are little positive spillovers in the domestic economy. Capital flight is 
endemic and as a consequence, reinvestment is highly problematic. The absorptive capacity of 
technological imports by labor is very limited. In brief, the domestic economy is too small and 
feeble for the domestic bourgeoisie to be an active participant in politics. Labor work is so 
precarious and rudimentary that it prevents extensive unionization on a national scale. 
Although the size of the labor force could invest them with some power, the level of poverty is 
so high that economic survival tends to prime over economic emancipation. In other words, 
bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and workers have very little influence. 
 
Facing such vacuity, the presumption found in the literature is the absence of authority. This is 
where local leaders fill the void, especially in rural areas that are outside the reach of the state. 
These leaders occupy multiple functions. They are often simultaneously mayor, judge, banker, 
landowner, trading broker and spiritual guide in a small community. As such, they act as an 
unavoidable relay between the centre and their community. For example, the agricultural 
production of local farmers is sold in a nearby village to a single broker with a monopoly on 
local transactions, the local leader. They provide orders. More importantly, local communities 
are constructed around tradition, rites and symbols. Each community works as a normative 
microcosm with its own code. Social networks are limited to personal contacts, informal and 
live exchanges on one-on-one basis. There exist among individuals a sentiment of obligation, 
of mutual solidarity toward the community and its respective leader. For all these reasons, 
villagers and peasants are captive constituencies.  
 
Yet, a local leader by itself has little leverage over the ruling elites. Indeed, the small size of 
local leaders’ constituencies gives the ruling elites few incentives to co-opt them. Two 
conditions could change significantly their status and power in relation with the ruling elites: if 
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they regroup under a single banner or if by any chance there are lucrative natural resources on 
their territory. In the latter case, control of these resources alters the balance of power. The 
region becomes strategic given the wealth it could generate. Furthermore, with high returns, 
one or a coalition of local leaders can expand their influence to other territories; each time 
increasing their capacity to mobilize more and more political support. Local leaders 
controlling a region that is crossed by a major commercial route can also expect substantial 
returns. In this context, local leaders have significant leverage over the ruling elites. Moving 
on with a project without the approval of the local leaders is perilous. Sabotage, mutiny, route 
blocking, kidnapping are all possible actions and common events around exploitation sites in 
non-western countries, especially in underdeveloped countries. In either case, the defection of 
local leaders may have grave consequences for the ruling coalition. Their action can range 
from electoral boycott followed by a state of emergency to the toppling of the ruling elites and 
lower voter turnout accompanied by the lost of two-third majority.  
 
Coalitions including local leaders are an effective strategy for pursuing goals of targeting 
specific as well as merging different constituencies into a centralized hierarchy in the absence 
of state presence in the periphery (Bayart, 2009: 164; Brynen, 1995: 25; O’Donnell, 1977: 66; 
Eisenstadt, 1973: 24, 29; Khan, 2005; Baldwin, 2011). At the same time, local leaders are 
often not part of the ruling party per se. They may administer the local committee of the 
dominant party, act as an elected delegate under the banner of the dominant party and be the 
main representative of the civil service. They may be members of the ruling party, but in an 
instrumental function. They are less adherent, and more sorts of sympathizers: that is, they 
offer their support to the ruling party but in an opportunistic way. They will more likely play 
parties against each other in order to receive the best payoff. They are political brokers. Given 
that a local leader is the exclusive interlocutor of a given community: “in the same way that 
the patron chooses his voters, he also chooses the candidates or party to which he will deliver 
the bloc vote at his disposal. Usually, following some hard bargaining, the patron delivers his 
fiefdom’s votes to the party that offers the most” (Rouquié, 1978: 30). Some may have great 
ambitions, but most of them remain in their stronghold. They are not directly and actively 
involved in national politics, for instance as a presidential candidate, unless their interests are 
threatened by the central government. There are political outsiders.  
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Political interactions between the ruling elites and local leaders are best described as 
clientelistic: that is, “the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state and 
in the society. In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all 
decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994: 458). 
“The client buys protection, first, against the exigencies of markets or nature; second, against 
the arbitrariness or weakness of the centre, or against the demands of other strong people or 
groups” (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984: 214).  
 
Nuances are essential. First, clientelistic exchanges are manifest in all non-western countries, 
but significantly different depending on the state penetration in society. In a weak state, 
clientelistic networks are a generalized pattern of exchanges between patrons and clients and 
not a simple addition to or a parallel dimension of the overall institutional framework as in the 
case in stronger bureaucratic states (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984: chapter 5). It is a way of life, 
the only way. There is no option, no readily alternative. It functions along the idea of patron-
brokerage, not organization-brokerage: the former is independent while the latter is related to 
the center of power and its entities such as the public administration, political parties, trade 
unions, etc. In countries where the state is present in every corner of society, a local official 
may bribe citizens as part of his party strategy to win political support. For instance, it may 
take the form of subsidies to build an irrigation system for farmers. Clientelistic relations are 
therefore in a sense more or so formal, explicit, universalistic and dispersed in nature. In weak 
states, clientelistic relations are informal, implicit, particularistic and geographically 
concentrated. It is about a favor given to a specific individual often in a context of a verbal 
agreement. It is a sold vote. “The vote is a commodity of exchange with no political meaning 
for the person who has it in his possession. It is precisely a question of an economic valuable 
given for a political right” (Rouquié, 1978: 24). In stronger states, it is a gregarious vote. “The 
gregarious vote is collective and passive. Groups of voters are organized to ballot. They are 
transported, lodged, fed, entertained and may even receive small presents” (Rouquié, 1978: 
25).  
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Second, state penetration may be problematic in both underdeveloped and developing 
economies. It has to do with geography and demography. Some regions are physically cut-off 
from the rest of the country. Dense tropical forests and river networks, archipelagic 
morphology, vast deserts or high peak mountains insulate these regions. Combined with low 
population density, it increases significantly the cost of linking them with the center (Herbst, 
2000: 11-12). The economy of scale is simply not there to allow for state projection over the 
entire territory. Overall, citizens of these regions have less contact with outsiders and local 
leaders would influence sub-national political dynamics regardless of the level of economic 
development. Still in developing country, their role in national politics should be marginal 
compared to other dominant social groups or to the situation prevailing in underdeveloped 
countries.   
 
Third, since the advent of neo-liberal policies in the 1990s, the state control of economic 
functions has been greatly reduced. Yet, especially in Asia, the state continues to exercise 
significant influence in the economy through various regulatory powers and public investment 
schemes; and the stalwart administrative infrastructure still functions properly (Rodan & 
Jayasuriya, 2009). In Latin America, the retreat of the state gave additional powers to sub-
national units: over centralization followed by a chaotic and massive decentralization process 
left many regions with no administrative services (Cornelius, 2000; Yashar, 1999; O’Donnell, 
1993). In this context, local civil society took the relay. If anything, local leaders should exert 
in this context increasing influence over politics in hybrid regimes. Furthermore, lately, there 
has been somewhat of a resurgence of state intervention in the economy in non-western 
countries, with China serving as a model to emulate. Henceforth, the dichotomy between the 
power dynamics of state bureaucrats and local leaders remains relevant.  
 
The introduction of local leaders within the general framework of the ruling coalition connects 
sub-national politics with national politics. In the process, it fills a gap left by the economic 
and organizational approaches. In the organizational approach, low state penetration is 
detrimental to stability. It is akin to unstructured patterns of political participation; to random 
and chaotic interactions as if only the formal institutions of the state can maintain stability. We 
contend that in the absence of such presence, local leaders act as surrogates and are the focal 
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point of informal institutional networks that can be guarantors of stability if local leaders are 
included in a given ruling coalition. In other words, a weak state does not necessarily imply 
instability within the ruling coalition. In the economic approach, underdeveloped countries are 
associated with instability because they have little to co-opt elites with. It does not make a 
difference between various form of patronage: the sold vote (individual) and the gregarious 
vote (organizational). In this sense, local leaders often exchange political support for economic 
autonomy over the territory they control and not necessarily material incentives. They want to 
be masters of their own domain. In any cases, they have leverage because they reign over 
captive constituencies. The bottom line is “a territorially disaggregated, geographically 
nuanced perspective on political regimes, one that captures variations in the reach of the 
central state as well as in the forms of rule at the subnational level, would strengthen our 
understanding of contemporary nondemocratic politics” (Snyder, 2006: 229). Indeed, it did.  
 
The four dominant social groups are ideal-types or analytical tools to simplify the complexity 
of social interactions in hybrid regimes. We generally frame the dominant social groups as 
relatively cohesive. Yet, the dynamics of inclusion or exclusion of dominant social groups 
frequently start with divisions within each group. Discords between military officers are often 
related to the decision to intervene or not in politics, and if necessary how to intervene. 
Members of an opposition party may engage in intense debates about the necessity to reform 
the regime from within or from outside the ruling coalition. Bureaucratic infighting between 
ministries over a given policy or major tensions between local leaders for control of a given 
territory is also common. As we already said but cannot insist enough, the point here is that 
instability is not the by-product of a total exclusion of one or another of our four dominant 
social groups. Within each dominant social group there are factions or parties with greater 
resources compared to their respective counterpart: not all have the same status. When these 
powerful actors within each dominant social group are excluded from the ruling coalition 
instability is more likely. Further, in reality, there is sometimes an overlap between the four 
dominant social groups. For instance, a military officer can be a state bureaucrat or a local 
leader, or vice-versa. In this case, their position within the ruling coalition is reinforced. Also, 
our four social dominant groups may have economic interests in the private sector. In this 
context, the bourgeoisie is important only insofar as it is mainly composed of one of our 
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dominant social groups. Alternatively, there is sometimes a close interaction between 
dominant social groups. Upper echelon state bureaucrats of a state-owned company operating, 
in a natural resources sector, work in connivance with local leaders overseeing the territory 
where the extraction site is located. Nevertheless, depending on the degree of state penetration, 
these interactions are characterized by a dimension of authority that favor one or another.  
 
To recapitulate, in hybrid regimes, elections open the political regime and have the advert 
effect of fragmenting people allegiances whereas many constituencies are captive of dominant 
social groups. Hence, ruling elites cannot govern alone. They have to forge alliances to 
maintain the stability of the regime. Captive constituency means something different for each 
of our four political groups: for the military, it is mostly about coercion; for opposition parties 
it is about identity; for the bureaucrats it is about economic dependence and for local leaders it 
is often a mix of all the above. The stability of hybrid regimes depends on the dynamic of 
inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition. The composition of the ruling coalition is 
determined by the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state penetration. 
These two variables allow us to understand why military officers and opposition parties are 
linked to a specific type of hybrid regime and why state bureaucrats and local leaders are 
linked to a specific level of economic development.  
 
The degree of extra-legal organized violence and state penetration are posited as independent 
from each other. There is enough variation to have confidence in such an assumption. That 
being said, our two main variables are not necessarily constant in time. Some countries 
experience periodic outbreaks of civil conflict whereas others are basically always in a state of 
siege or absolved of any disruptive violent events and direct threat. In some countries, state 
penetration change significantly whereas in others, it remains problematic or unproblematic. 
Therefore, a country can move from one ideal-type to another and not necessarily in an orderly 
sequence.  
 
 
 
 
 107  
2.3. The Methodological Choices 
 
We have asked big questions and worked hard to provide a parsimonious answer. To prevent 
axiomatic theorizing, we devote much attention to the research design. As Geddes (2003: 4) 
eloquently summarizes:  
 
“To be successful, social science must steer a careful course between the Scylla 
of lovely but untested theory and Charybdis, the maelstrom of information 
unstructured by theory… Much of the field of comparative politics has failed to 
keep to this difficult course, veering instead from one catastrophic extreme to 
the other. The result is a modest accumulation of theoretical knowledge in many 
parts of the field”. 
 
Our choices of methods in terms of data collection, sample size, case selection and the angle 
through which each case has been investigated are shaped by the research objectives – i.e. 
knowledge accumulation, theory building and generalizations – presented in the thesis 
introduction, as well as the problematic and hypotheses.  
 
2.3.1.  Types of Data, Sample Size and Empirical Recording 
 
There are two types of data: quantitative and qualitative33. We use a mix of both in our 
demonstration. Quantitative information on regime types and state penetration is collected 
from transnational, international or national organizations. Still, either because they offer an 
incomplete picture or because they are not available, these sources are complemented by 
qualitative data from national or local newspapers and scholarly publications. The chronicle of 
political crises is solely qualitative in nature because coalition dynamics do not lend 
themselves easily to any quantification and because, to our knowledge, no open-source dataset 
                                                 
33 From our standpoint, formal model and mathematic equation are not related to external validation. It is a 
method of internal validation that is most relevant when the research object has no empirical manifestation. A 
classic example is a nuclear war. Formal models are in this case a valuable methodological alternative. Many 
studies on hybrid regimes use formal modeling, - e.g. Gandhi & Przeworksi (2006), Magaloni (2008) or Boix & 
Svolik (2010). However, it tends to treat actors as having uniformed interests, with perfect information and equal 
resources in a two-players game. From our standpoint, these limitations are method-driven. Since hybrid regime 
dynamics involve a plurality of actors defending different types of interests, a formal model would reify a logic 
that alters reality instead of reflecting it in a best possible way. 
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exists on the subject. Primary qualitative sources like participant observation, surveys or semi-
structured interviews are not used. First, given the intrusive nature of hybrid regimes in society 
and our conspicuous political research object, participant observation and surveys are 
problematic. Authorization to observe elite interaction within the ruling coalition is unlikely to 
be granted and authorities would likely interfere with survey questions and distribution. Semi-
structured interviews would be conceivable but given our resource constraints, the selection 
would be limited to one or two cases; it would prevent us from exposing the full extension of 
our four ideal-types. Also, since we go far back in time, interviews are most likely to yield 
information about recent events leaving a large period uncovered. Furthermore, we firmly 
believe there is already sufficient knowledge on each country not warrant a fact-finding 
mission. We want foremost to integrate and connect vast and disparate country specific 
findings into a coherent framework. 
 
We settle for a “middle-way” between large-N and single or binary case studies. On one hand, 
large-N analyses are frequent in comparative politics and in the field of political development. 
Researches on hybrid regimes are no exception34. Problems of data accessibility and reliability 
as well as the methodological exigencies related to the nature of our theory – i.e. process 
tracing of ruling coalition dynamics – prevent us from basing our demonstration on a large-N 
statistical analysis and performing any regressions. On the other hand, single case study is also 
very common in the literature on hybrid regimes35. Yet, again, given our research objectives 
and theory specifications, we need more than one or two cases to examine the inner working 
of our arguments. Furthermore, we were not motivated by the fact that existing theories did 
not explain a specific case, but by general problems find in the literature on hybrid regime 
stability and the search of recurring patterns in diverse parts of the world. Therefore, our 
sample size looks for the equilibrium between two traditional extremes36.  
 
                                                 
34 See Hadenius & Teorell (2006, 2007), Brownlee (2009), Howard & Roessler (2006), Greene (2010), Davenport 
(2000), Lindberg (2006), Engberg & Ersson (1999), Alexander (2004), Gates et al. (2006). 
35 See amongst others Abente-Brun (2009); Langston (2006), Ekman (2009), Way (2006), Karl (1987), Zinecker 
(2009) and McMann (2006). 
36 The use of middle-way is also frequent in the literature on hybrid regimes. See Ottaway (2003), van de Walle 
(2006), Case (1996a) and Alexander (2008).  
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It is closely associated with the structured and focused method. It essentially articulates how to 
report facts. It is developed by George & Bennett (2004: 67):  
 
“The method is structured in that the researcher writes general questions that 
reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case 
under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic 
comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is 
focused in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases 
examined”.  
 
Indeed, each empirical chapter is constructed to answer the same generic questions. The 
identification of a small number of variables and precise indicators give focus to the research. 
It does not expand further the historical account of each country selected37. We are not looking 
for rich details like in a descriptive single case study but still, our hypotheses are more refine 
than those found in quantitative researches. The structured and focused method allows the 
tracing-process of our specific research object: that is, the event-history analysis of the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of the ruling coalition. In this way, we can examine the 
conjecture of pre-established conditions of stability and its significance. Furthermore, it 
produces comparable findings since it is based on standardized comparisons, predefined and 
specific observable implications.  
 
2.3.2. Case Selection 
 
Case selection is a determinant step in any research design. Here, the question is not why a 
case is more relevant than another. Our research objective is to produce generalizations. 
Hence, to select cases by a process of elimination is incoherent. In principle, our analytical 
framework should be relevant to the entire population of hybrid regimes for the time period 
covered. This is true except for two types of countries that have been excluded from our 
investigation. First, city-states such as Singapore as well as microstates such as the small 
islands of the Pacific Ocean are beyond the scope of our framework. Whether it is because of 
                                                 
37 The comparison is not based on a myriad of factors associated with the specificity of a given country as in 
configurative-idiographic case studies; or on the testing of all relevant factors identified by the literature as in 
cross-national statistical analysis.  
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their remoteness (Anckar, 2006), problem of economy of scale (Briguglio et al., 2008) or 
intimate proximity between rulers and citizens (Suton, 1987), these regimes tend to behave 
somewhat differently than political regimes in larger states (Rokkan, 1968; Samy et al. 2008). 
Second, as already mentioned in Chapter One, our analytical framework should be relevant 
only to hybrid regimes not geographically closed to Western Europe or North America. The 
proximity of hybrid regimes to these regions could hypothetically transform the nature of the 
analytical framework from an endogenous to an exogenous explanation. Taking into account 
these two constraints, our analytical framework can be applied to about 60 hybrid regimes that 
have existed since 1945 (see appendix 1)38. With these general clarifications in mind, we 
selected Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay based on four criteria.  
 
First, to answer our research question we needed case with variations in terms of levels of 
economic development and types of hybrid regimes. Senegal and Paraguay are considered 
underdeveloped countries, while Malaysia and Indonesia are developing economies. 
Obviously, economic development is not necessarily stagnant. For instance, Indonesia started 
as an agrarian economy and gradually diversified over the years. Since it requires a detailed 
examination of the economic system, the argument behind such classification will be 
presented in the empirical chapters. Also, we opted for two hegemonic authoritarian regimes 
(Paraguay and Indonesia) and two competitive authoritarian regimes (Senegal and Malaysia). 
This classification rests on the longer period of hybridity in each country. Ditto, the definitive 
attribution of hybrid regime types will be exposed in chapters dedicated to each country. We 
recognize that few regimes stay the same over many decades. For example, Senegal was a de 
facto one-party regime between 1967 and 1976. We will acknowledge this non-linear process 
of political and economic development into our country narrative. And such changes will 
allow us to better understand the process of recomposition of the ruling coalition by examining 
variations within a single country.  
 
                                                 
38 It should be noted that the time period in appendix 1 starts in 1972 because it is when Freedom House began 
evaluating political regimes. In our own analysis, we start in 1945 for reasons evoke in the methodological 
section.   
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That being said, we are especially interested in hybrid periods. This period has to be at least 10 
years long. Ultimately, the 10 years benchmark is a convention. It is the threshold used by 
eminent scholars such as Morlino (2009a: 283). A country that experiences ceaseless regime 
change is referred to as unstable regime per se or failed state, not unstable hybrid regime. 
These cases are not part of our population and our analytical framework yields little insight in 
regard to their behavior. The Paraguayan hybrid regime dates back to the Stroessner’s coup 
(1954) and lived until 2008. The Senegalese hybrid regime began in 1960 and survived until 
today (2010). The Malaysian hybrid regime took form in the 1970s and remains so. Finally, 
the Indonesian hybrid regime emerged after the 1965 abortive coup and has hold up until the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997.  
 
This point brings us to the time period of our inquiry. It starts with the year 1945 or the date of 
Independence and ends with the last hybrid period or 2010. In regard to the starting date, 
hybrid regimes refer to institutional arrangements that at the very least include frequent direct 
elections with universal suffrage. Before 1945, such prerequisites were an anomaly in most 
developing countries (Cowen & Laakso, 2002: 4; Hartlyn & Valenzuela, 1994: 132-135). 
Ultimately, the existence of this anomaly denotes the changing meaning of political regimes 
over time and the end of WW II with the seminal definition of Schumpeter (1942: 250) 
represents a turning point for that matter (Huntington, 1991: 6). We stop at 2010 in order to 
have sufficient documentation for the examination of our hypotheses and prevent working on 
on-going events.  
 
Second, cases have to manifest a different contextual environment in terms of (a) geographical 
location, (b) system of government, (c) colonial history and (d) cultural background. This 
diversity will provide an interesting empirical basis to illustrate the declinaison of our theory 
in various settings. It will also highlight the prospect that it might turn out to be useful in 
explaining the dynamics of many other hybrid regimes. It was important to verify if patterns 
could be found in different regions host of many hybrid regimes. As such, Latin America 
(Paraguay), sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal) and Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia) are 
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represented39. The selected cases should represent different systems of government. Senegal, 
Paraguay and Indonesia are presidential systems, while Malaysia is a parliamentary system. 
Our cases should also witness different colonial history and access to independence at 
different times: Paraguay in 1811, Senegal in 1960, Malaysia in 1957 and Indonesia in 1945. 
Paraguay was a Spanish colony, Senegal a French one; Malaysia was a British colony and 
Indonesia a Dutch one. The population of Malaysia, Indonesia and Senegal is mostly Muslim, 
whereas in Paraguay inhabitants are essentially Christian. Their degree of fractionalization 
also varies: from the highly homogenous society in Paraguay to the more heterogeneous ones 
in Malaysia, Indonesia and Senegal.  
 
Third, we were looking for crucial cases that challenge theoretical approaches of hybrid 
regime stability. Comparisons that do not take into account rival explanations are of limited 
use in comparative politics. In other words, we were first looking for cases where a dominant 
party ruled for an extended period, but had experienced political crises. Although they all have 
their weaknesses, it is difficult to deny the ascendance of the Colorado Party in Paraguay, the 
Union progressiste sénégalaise (UPS) later transformed into the Parti socialiste (PS), the 
UMNO in Malaysia and the Golkar Party in Indonesia. Moreover, all of these countries have 
experienced at some point in their history more than one period of instability in a hybrid 
context. For example, in Paraguay, the 1989 coup put an end to the Stroessner’s era. In 
Senegal, the 1988 post-electoral riots threaten the Diouf’s regime. In Malaysia, the Chinese-
Malay race riot of 1969 galvanized the country. In Indonesia, the supposedly aborted coup in 
1965 and the subsequent purges of communists by General Suharto left the country under 
trauma for a while. These are only few examples; many others will be presented in each 
country narrative. Crucial cases rest also on the idea that any analysis that excludes certain 
dynamics found in one country is incomplete insofar as these dynamics cannot be labeled as 
deviant. As it will become evident in the chapters to come, the formulation of statements of 
cross-national regularities that disregard the role of opposition parties in Malaysia, military 
officers in Indonesia and Paraguay or local leaders in Senegal will fall short of a reliable 
                                                 
39 In the Middle East and North Africa, very few hybrid regimes can satisfy to the third criteria given that 
monarchical family not dominant-party are the most frequent regent. Further, in the post-Soviet space, hybrid 
regimes have not last long enough to be able to observe structural patterns.  
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theory. Indeed, rigorous idiographic studies on these countries devote much attention to these 
social groups. The intent is to bridge the rich literature on single case study that often follows 
an inductive chain of inquiry in which facts speak for themselves with the deductive nature of 
a pre-established framework that often evades the inescapable reality of a given country. 
 
Fourth, logically we lean toward the plausibility probes selection strategy (Eckstein, 1975: 
108-120; Lijphart, 1971: 691-692). If our theory could explain classic cases of hybrid regimes 
at the development stage, it is most likely that it will be able to provide insights on other more 
ambiguous cases of hybrid regimes. It would justify the worthy academic effort to move to the 
theory-testing phase40. The Malaysian hybrid regime is a reference and probably the most 
studied nomothetic case on the subject. The other authoritative case is Mexico. Despite its 
relevance, the Mexican regime is outside of our population sample since it is geographically in 
the backyard of the United States; its patterns of stability and instability may be related to 
exogenous factors. Otherwise, Paraguay was one the most durable hybrid regimes in the 
world; one that last about fifty years. Senegal was among the first competitive authoritarian 
regimes in sub-Saharan Africa; and Indonesia under Suharto was the prototypical example of a 
façade democracy (hegemonic authoritarian regime) with opposition parties created by the 
ruling elites and an almighty president elected by the legislative assembly. Ultimately, 
plausible probes and crucial cases strategies are particularly suited for the study of complex 
macropolitical phenomena such as problems of regime stability (Eckstein, 1975: 111, 121).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We believe this chapter has offered an answer to our initial question about the conditions 
under which the political elites will consent to devolve authority to the government in a 
dominant party hybrid regime and therefore maintain stability and how these conditions will 
change depending on the type of hybrid regime and level of economic development.  
                                                 
40 Although they ask the same questions, use the same theory and select among the same population of cases, 
theory building and theory testing are two distinct phases in the logic of inquiry. And at this stage, choosing hard, 
deviant or ambiguous cases that could possibly contradict our theory all the way down would be 
counterproductive. 
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In doing so, we made explicit the general canvas into which our reflection is embedded: that is 
to say, neo-intuitionalism. Although it is now clear that the economic and organizational 
approaches also subscribe to this meta-theory, our comprehension of dynamics in hybrid 
regimes is diametrically different. The economic and organizational approaches depict a 
relatively monolithic environment. They offer no way of apprehending political pluralism, 
which is an obvious fact of political life in hybrid regimes, and knowing the identity of who 
challenge the ruling elites. They frame political conflicts mostly as unidirectional. According 
to these approaches, the ruling elites impose their view and all other actors are passive. The 
very nature of a hybrid regime combines as we have seen autocratic and democratic 
institutions. Since the economic and organizational approaches focus on autocratic traits, we 
had to undertake the analysis of conditions of stability in hybrid regimes from the democratic 
angle. We think it better reflects the political reality, which is characterized by competing 
sources of authority in a non-institutionalized party system. This intellectual enterprise is 
coherent with the other choice we made of framing our theory within historical 
institutionalism, one of the three strands of neo-institutionalism: the other two being rational 
choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. Furthermore, historical 
institutionalism insists on macro-processes, critical junctures and middle-range theories, all of 
which is especially appropriate to examine the question of political stability.  
 
The core of this chapter was the presentation of our genuine theory of political alliances as a 
condition of stability in a hybrid context. It stressed the diversity and rigidity of political 
allegiances but also the importance of forging alliances with dominant social groups in order 
to govern legitimately and maintain stability of the regime. For that purpose, we have 
introduced the concept of a “ruling coalition”. The crucial analytical element here is the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of stakeholders in an out of the ruling coalition. In other 
words, stability in hybrid regimes depends on the existence and composition of a ruling 
coalition. In this regard, we have identified four dominant social groups that we believe to be 
key ones in hybrid regimes. They are the military officers, the opposition parties, the state 
bureaucrats and the local leaders. As we have shown, the significance of each group and the 
configuration of political alliances is a function of two structural factors that we use as our key 
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independent variables: (1) the degree of extra-legal organized violence (i.e. low or high); and 
(2) the degree of state penetration (i.e. low or high). They connect the dots between specific 
social groups and the political and economic context. The first variable provides a rational as 
why military officers are the dominant social group actor in hegemonic authoritarian regimes 
where its value is high and why opposition parties are linked to competitive authoritarian 
regimes where its value is low; whereas the second establishes the reason why state 
bureaucrats are dominant in developing economies where the value is high and local leaders 
prevail in underdeveloped economies where the value is low. In a nutshell, this is our theory 
and we hope it will contribute to a better understanding of conditions of stability in hybrid 
regimes. 
 
Finally, the methodological choices were addressed. We developed an argumentation in 
regards to sample size and type of data, as well as to the way we intend to present our 
empirical findings and case selection strategies. It is based on our research objectives 
mentioned in the introduction (i.e. knowledge accumulation, theory development and 
meaningful generalizations), as well as on the specification of our theory (i.e. four ideal-
types). We opted for the cases of Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay. Together, they 
offer substantial materials to expose the richness of our theory.  
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3 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
Malaysia is a Southeast Asian country composed of two bodies of land - Peninsular Malaysia 
(West) and Malaysian Borneo (East) – separated by the South China Sea. A former British 
colony, the country gained Independence in 1957. It is ethnically diverse. In 2004, the total 
population of Malaysia was 29 millions. Malays were representing 50.4%, Chinese 23.7%, 
Indigenous people 11% and Indians 7.1%. The majority are Muslims (60.2%), but Buddhist 
(19.2%), Christian (9.1%), and Hindu (6.3%) are also significant religious groups41. The 
parliamentary system follows the Westminster model and includes the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. 
 
The Malaysian ruling elites have remained in power for almost half a century under a 
democratic regime (1957-1969) and a competitive authoritarian regime (1969-2010). The 
cornerstone of their success has resided in their capacity to build alliances with appropriate 
political forces in the country. Indeed, the dominant party UMNO has orchestrated and 
maintained a ruling coalition – Barisan Nasional (BN)42 – encompassing over the years and 
until now a wide range of political interests. As such, it could legitimately claim to represent 
the dominant segments of the Malaysian society. Yet, by no means was the Malaysian hybrid 
regime stable all along. It has witnessed political crises of different levels of intensity and 
most of them were related to the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within the ruling 
coalition.  
 
When looking at the first variable, i.e. the degree of organized violence, it has been overall 
quite low but especially noticeable after the end of the Konfrontasi43 period with Indonesia in 
1966. According to our framework, we should therefore observe a pattern where opposition 
                                                 
41 The data are from the CIA World Factbook 2012. 
42 From 1957 to 1973, it was named the Alliance.  
43 The Konfrontasi refers to the military conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia (1962-1966).  
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parties are invested with powers to challenge the authority of the ruling elites and, as a 
dominant group, prime candidates for inclusion within the ruling coalition. The stabilizing 
effect of party co-optation dynamics in Malaysia should be especially evident under the 
competitive authoritarian regime. As to the second variable, state penetration has varied across 
the territory over the years but generally speaking, the state and by ricochet the ruling elites 
have exercised substantive control over local politics and economics. Malaysia moved from an 
agricultural production based economy to a manufacturing hub and in the process, the 
government created a myriad of state-owned companies operating in a quasi-monopolistic 
market. Therefore, the growing influence of state bureaucrats as a dominant group in national 
politics should be evident.  
 
3.1.  The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1957-
2010) 
 
The chronological narrative of political crises that follows will illustrate two points. First, the 
centrality of opposition parties in hybrid regime stability does not reduce itself to the decision 
of the ruling elites to include them or not; it also implies a decision on which one to include. It 
is therefore fair to say that the reason why the UMNO stayed in power for so long is in large 
part due to the formation and maintenance of an inter-party coalition. Instances of instability 
have been a function of the difficulty of choosing the right combination of parties at a given 
time in the Malaysian context, given the heterogeneity of the political landscape and socio-
economic change. Indeed, the mere impossibility of satisfying simultaneously the interests of 
the Chinese community, an eclectic group of believers, and the Islamist movement extolling 
the formation of a theocratic state, has proved to be a significant source of instability in 
Malaysia. Ethnic and Islam politics in the present case were not easy to reconcile in one 
coherent institution: that is, the ruling coalition. Second, minor events can cumulate and have a 
profound effect on the political dynamics in a more or so distant future. Here, the state of 
emergency in the Malaysian Federal State of Kelantan in 1977-78 was no stranger to the BN 
electoral rout in 2008. It brought Islam politics at the front stage of national politics and forced 
the ruling elites to position themselves in the debate on the separation between religion and the 
state.  
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Few words first on the so-called founding Merdeka Constitution are essential because it 
defines the distribution of power between competing ethnic groups that has persisted until 
today. When the British returned to their former colony after Japan surrender in 1945, they 
pushed for the Malayan Union. Amongst others, it would have had granted citizenship to all 
inhabitants living in the country irrespective of their ethnic origin. Outraged, the Malay 
community organized itself and formed the UMNO to defend Malay’s control over the party 
system. At the same time, Chinese, Indians and a limited number of Malays formed the All 
Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) and the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA) to 
promote a non-communal alternative formulated in the People’s Constitutional Proposals. To 
make sure their voice would be heard, they staged on October 20th (1947) a general strike. 
The British automatically perceived this coalition as radical and made the choice to deal with 
the more moderate UMNO elites (Weiss, 2006: 72). Yet, the British were against the 
institutionalization of a dominant party based on the supremacy of one ethnic group (Crouch, 
1996: 17). In response to such concern, an influent UMNO leader, Onn bin Jaafar, defected 
from the party and decided to create the multiethnic Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) in 
1951 to contest the Kuala Lumpur municipal election of 1952, which was in effect a ground 
test for an eventual general election. To counter Onn’s defiance, the UMNO formed an 
electoral pact with the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and won 9 of the 12 seats. The 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) joined the rank in 1954. The “Merdeka” Constitution 
(1957) was born out of this alliance: a form of elite pact, foremost between Malays and 
Chinese, in which various economic and political concessions were formally agreed upon44.  
  
Quickly, the significance of this alliance was going to be tested. In July 1958, the MCA 
president Lim Chong Eu contested the inclusive character of the bargain. He was complaining 
about the unbalanced partnership in effect overly in favor of the UMNO. He demanded equal 
power, protection of cultural institutions and the right to compete in all electoral districts with 
a Chinese majority (Lee Seng Hock, 2011). Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman responded 
                                                 
44 According to Case (1995: 79), “this document parceled out most state positions and power to UMNO leaders 
while preventing them from intruding in Chinese business dealings. As a formula for legitimatization, the 
"bargain" was oligarchic and communalist”. 
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swiftly. He threatened to exclude the MCA from the coalition in preparation of the upcoming 
election if Lim Chong Eu did not retract himself. In July 1959, with the support of the MCA 
pro-UMNO faction headed by Tan Siew Sin, party members voted against Lim’s political 
agenda. Lim resigned and later formed the opposition party Gerakan; Tan Siew Sin was 
nominated to the position of Finance Minister (1959-1974).  
 
The intensity of this crisis was medium. The fact that elite division did not concern the 
dominant party but a peripheral one was reducing the scope. Nevertheless, it was a clear signal 
to all political actors that there was a hierarchy within the ruling coalition: the UMNO reigns 
at the top and who ever publicly contest this prerogative shall face dire consequences. Yet, the 
fact that the majority of MCA members decided to preserve the status quo shows the 
importance they were giving to their inclusion in the Alliance regardless, to a certain degree, 
of the power devolve to them. Although ultimately, loyalty was rewarded – as the attribution 
of the prestigious position of Finance Minister to a MCA leader displays – the original 
reaction of the ruling elites was clearly directed toward the overly open challenge made by a 
MCA faction. It is only once the dust had settled down that the nomination of Tan Siew Sin as 
Minister of Finance was interpreted as the recognition by the ruling elites of the importance of 
MCA consent for the legitimacy of the Alliance and UMNO supremacy. Finally, although Lim 
was temporally sidelined for his audacity, his party (Gerakan) will be later included in a new 
ruling coalition. It is a testimony that the ruling elites were acknowledging Lim’s ascendancy 
over a specific constituency that UMNO had little influence or control over.   
 
Again, the tense relationship between Malays and Chinese within the coalition was in full 
display in the events surrounding Singapore’s expulsion from the Malaysian Federation it had 
joined in 1963. Prior to that political move, the People’s Action Party (PAP), which was 
founded by former Kuomintang party members, was governing without opposition in the city-
state. Yet following the merger, the UMNO decided to enlist candidates in the 1963 Singapore 
elections while the PAP invested the electoral scene in the Malaya mainland for the 1964 
general elections. They were challenging the authority of each other in their respective 
electoral stronghold. In May 1965, the PAP formed an opposition coalition called the 
Malaysian Solidarity Convention. “Although the Malaysian Solidarity Convention claimed to 
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be non communal, right-wing UMNO leaders saw it as a Chinese plot to take over control of 
Malaysia” (US Library of Congress, Singapore, 2012). Worth noting, punctual racial 
confrontation between Malays and Chinese also occurred in Singapore at that time. 
Eventually, Prime Minister Tunku decided to ban the PAP and expelled Singapore from the 
Malaysian Federation in August 1965 (Milne & Mauzy, 1980: 139).  
 
By definition, fragmentation of the national territory is a high intensity crisis. Yet, it appeared 
not to be the case here. Originally, the PAP leader, Lee Kuan Yew, “convinced Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, of the urgency of proceeding with a political merger” 
(Leifer, 1995: 98). It was one to welcome Singapore in the Malaysian party system not in the 
ruling coalition. As such, it is revealing how the crisis was peacefully resolved. Rarely 
secession goes so smoothly. It reinforces the point that exclusion from the party system is not 
as significant as exclusion from the ruling coalition in terms of hybrid regime instability. 
Furthermore, ultimately the PAP tentative to form an all-Chinese coalition across the 
Malaysian Federation would have had reduced the influence of the MCA in society and 
altogether threatened the Alliance legitimacy as a representative of major ethnic groups in the 
country; not to say potentially the supremacy of UMNO. Therefore, the exclusion of the PAP 
had the advert effect of reinforcing the necessity of including the MCA as the main 
representative of the Chinese community. It contributed to consolidate the ruling coalition.  
 
In September 1966, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, the founder of the Sarawak National Party 
(SNAP) and Chief Minister of Sarawak, a state of the island of Borneo that joined the 
Malaysian Federation in 1963, received a vote of no confidence from the state legislators. A 
staunch defender of greater regional autonomy, he refused to resign (Boon, 2002: 60). The 
Governor of Sarawak dismissed him and Tawi Sli was appointed. Stephen sued the Governor 
and the court judged the Governor’s decision illegal. As a result of the constitutional crisis, 
Prime Minister Tunku declared a state of emergency in Sarawak and eventually Tawi Sli was 
reinstated.  
 
Given its sub-national dimension, the intensity of this crisis was low. It was the first of a series 
of events (Kelantan in 1977-78 and Sabah in 1986) that shows the resonance of local politics 
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in national affairs. The central government actively interfered at lower levels to enforce the 
nomination of pro-Alliance sympathizers. Yet, even if the Chief Minister Stephen lost his 
position because of his challenge to the authority of the Alliance, his party SNAP was 
nevertheless later included in the new BN ruling coalition. This decision from the ruling elites 
was a tentative to broaden the coalition’s political spectrum and to reach out for segments of 
the indigenous communities that were dominating the isolated Borneo federal states (Zakaria, 
1989: 366).  
 
The next crisis shook the country to its foundation. In the 1969 national election, the Alliance 
gained just the sufficient seats to control the House of Representatives and registered less than 
50% of the vote. On May 11-12, the pro-Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) and 
Gerakan organized various public manifestations in the capital to celebrate their historic 
performance at the polls and were met with equivalent pro-Malay rallies; it led to the infamous 
race riot of May 13th (1969) when about 200 people died and 400 were injured as a result of 
the clash. The state of emergency was immediately declared and maintained for 21 months; 
the Parliament was suspended and replaced by the National Operations Council. The exit 
strategy included the introduction of the national ideology Rukunegara45, a model of economic 
development “the New Economic Policy” and an enlarged ruling coalition. Gerakan and the 
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) joined in 1972, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) was 
integrated in 1973, and four other minor parties (Sarawak United People’s Party or SUPP, 
Parti Pesaka Bumiputra or PPB, and USNO from Sabah) were also included. The offer was 
extended to the DAP who refused to join the rank of the newly formed coalition called 
Barisan Nasional (BN), which was officially registered as a political organization in 1974 
(www.bn.org.my).  
 
With the Reformasi movement starting in 1998, the race riot of 1969 was the most serious 
crisis of legitimacy the regime faced. Its intensity was evidently high. It was a sort of wake-up 
call for the ruling elites. It was first a protest from the Alliance constituencies against the 
relative disconnectedness of its political leaders from their reality; but above all, it was a 
                                                 
45 The state ideology consisted of five principles: (i) belief in one God; (ii) loyalty to the king and country; (iii) 
supremacy of the Constitution; (iv) rule of law; and (v) courtesy and morality.  
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protest against the Malays’ deteriorating economic situation. It was a signal that political elites 
should never be free-floating, overly non-responsive to the grievances of their constituency. 
Second, it was a manifestation of the exclusive character of political forces represented in the 
Alliance. The three original parties were simply not able to appeal to large segments of the 
population, which tends to confirm the existence of captive constituencies typical of hybrid 
regimes. Consequently, according to Means (1991: 28), “a major effort was made to 
incorporate the more accommodating of the opposition parties into a broader coalition. In this 
way, criticism could be channeled and contained within the structure of intra-coalition 
discussions and bargaining, without involvement of public mobilization and acrimonious 
public debate”. In sum, the origin of the traumatizing events of May 1969 was a sentiment of 
exclusion and the remedy a movement toward inclusion. The extension of the new coalition 
could have threatened its cohesion. Yet, its unity was preserved under the prerogative of ethnic 
harmony between Malays, Chinese, Indians and Indigenes.  
 
During the 1975 UMNO general assembly, three factions clashed and engaged in a bitter fight 
that was transgressing the traditional procedures for succession of the deputy prime minister. 
For one, Prime Minister Abdul Razak Hussein (1970-76) named its preferred choice and 
implicitly forced the hand of the delegates; and for two, Prime Minister Hussein Onn, who 
succeeded Razak after he had suddenly died of leukemia, chose a younger candidate, 
Mahathir, over senior ones (Case, 1995: 98). Some UMNO elites were arrested under the 
Internal Security Act (Crouch, 1996: 98). This medium intensity crisis is the only event in 
Malaysian contemporary political history that falls definitely outside of our framework. It 
deals mostly with nomination procedures and not with the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion 
of dominant social groups. Overall, it was a minor incident although the circumstances 
contributed to the rise of Mahathir to the incumbency, the Malaysian head of state with the 
longest tenure.  
 
In 1977-78, PAS members of the Kelantan’s assembly introduced a motion of no confidence 
directed at the Chief Minister, Mohamed Nasir. UMNO and MCA members rejected the 
motion and protested by leaving the assembly. Nasir called for the dissolution of the assembly 
and his supporters gathered in the streets where violence and looting erupted. Prime Minister 
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Hussein Onn imposed a curfew and declared the state of emergency. It is worth noting that the 
agreement leading to the inclusion of PAS within the ruling coalition was that the Kelantan 
state would remain a PAS stronghold and some PAS leaders would be nominated to various 
cabinet and federal positions: for instance Asri Muda was appointed Land Development 
Minister (Means, 1991: 29-30). In declaring a state of emergency and intervening into state 
politics to decide what should happen next, the national ruling elites broke in effect the pact. 
“PAS members who held office in the BN government, resigned their positions but also 
explained that PAS would remain in the BN. The wish of PAS leaders to remain in the BN 
was quickly foreclosed when the BN Council met to expel all members who had voted against 
the Kelantan emergency Bill” (Means, 1991: 63). In the end, PAS lost control of the state in 
the 1978 elections to the benefit of the ruling coalition. 
 
The intensity of the 1977 crisis in Kelantan was low to medium. Although the state of 
emergency is a highly disruptive event, it was in this case limited to one federal state. 
Regardless of how isolated the event was it triggered a significant fracture between Muslims 
in Malaysian politics that has lasted till today. It pinpoints to hurdles associated with the 
reconciliation of the BN secular mandatory stance, purposely chosen to accommodate the 
diverse ethnic groups, with the fact that most Malays are devout Muslims. Ultimately, PAS 
insubordination and confrontational actions led to its disenfranchisement. It simply did not fit 
with the moderate politics of BN. Yet, the exclusion of PAS from the ruling coalition opened a 
breach in the BN legitimate claim of being representative of all Malaysians.  
 
The Memali incident in November 1985 raised the animosity between the BN and the PAS to 
an entirely new level. Located in the northern state of Kedah, the small village was the home 
of former PAS leader, Ibrahim Mahmud, who was accused by the central authorities of 
fostering civil unrest (Means, 1991: 128). Ibrahim Mahmud resisted to his arrest and refused 
to surrender. Thereafter, the Prime Minister ordered the police to storm the village and some 
twenty people died (Case, 1995: 75). “PAS Vice-President Ustaz Abdul Hadi Awang… issued 
a fatwa (Islamic edict) stating that to oppose the government is to conduct jihad (holy war) and 
to die for the cause is mati syahid (martyr’s death)” (Means, 1991: 129). For any Muslim, such 
edict is a serious declaration, at least heavily charge symbolically.  
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The Memali crisis was low in intensity again because restricted to one remote small area. Still, 
it was also a manifestation of an emerging malaise in regard to the rise of Islam politics among 
the ruling elites. Facing an utterly defiance, it was unusual for the ruling elites not to ban 
automatically the anti-regime PAS. Probably, the ruling elites did not want to be portrayed as 
anti-Muslim by declaring illegal the only Islamic party in the country. Thus, they opted for 
tolerance. More importantly, with the exclusion of PAS, BN would have lacked any Muslim 
figure of authority. It was at that time that Anwar Ibrahim entered into national politics and 
was propelled by Prime Minister Mahathir to the higher spheres of UMNO party leadership 
relatively quickly. Indeed Anwar, a close associate of Ibrahim Mahmud, gathered significant 
support among Muslim civil society organizations; especially from Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia (ABIM), a youth Muslim organization he created in 1972 when he was a student 
(Kingsbury, 2001: 278). Noteworthy, as in the cases of Lim in 1958 and Stephen in 1966, 
Anwar was first considered a nuisance. Indeed, he was accused in 1974 of instigating 
disorders as a student activist fighting against rural poverty in Baling (Kedang) and jailed 
without trial in the Kanunting Detention Center. Nonetheless, Mahathir’s action was 
expressing an evident political calculation: without Anwar, the BN would have had a shallow 
legitimacy among religious Muslims. The Memali crisis also marked the radicalization of the 
PAS, which was favoring the BN. As long as the BN could depict the PAS as an extremist 
organization, the ruling elites were in good position to play on the fear of other ethnic groups 
that it would seize power and to discredit it as a credible political alternative.  
 
From March to May 1986, the federal state of Sabah experienced various riots mostly 
concentrated in the capital Kota Kinabalu dominated by the Kadazan ethnic group. The riots 
were mainly a reaction to the 1985 state election. The Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), a pro 
Catholic party, defeated the Berjaya, a BN partner. It degenerated into street protests of the 
minority Muslim Malays, bomb explosions and life threat to the PBS leader (Crossette, 1987). 
PBS was included in the BN a year later and a snap election was held in 4-5 May 1986 
confirming PBS victory. PBS eventually left the ruling coalition in 1990 and as a 
consequence, the government decided to cut off its support provoking sufficient defection to 
force its demise (Case, 1995: 77). In 1994, PBS was no longer active.  
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The Sabah crisis was of low intensity but reflected again the uneasy position of BN toward 
Islam politics. Rather than responding with force to Muslims protests, it instead lent its 
support to the Kadazan and its party (PBS) given the predominance of the ethnic group in the 
federal state. According to Case (1995: 77),  
 
“Kadazan grievances arose over UMNO’s refusal to allow Sabah a state university 
or local television station, to increase Sabah's share of local oil revenues or the 
proportion of Sabahans working in local branches of federal agencies, or to stem 
the flow of Muslim migrants from the Philippines. This resentment was more 
generally expressed as indignation over UMNO’s dismissal of the Twenty Points, 
a series of assurances offered to Sabah when it joined Malaysia in 1963”. 
 
As an expression of good faith and of its willingness to accommodate regional demands, the 
BN included the PBS in 1987. And its departure from the ruling coalition three years later, as 
well as eventually its demise, shows the strategic relevance for any political organization to be 
incorporated within the ruling coalition.  
 
In October 1987, the MCA, the DAP and Gerakan exceptionally joined forces and mobilized 
in street protests against the appointment, by the Government, to the Country Chinese schools, 
of over a hundred Chinese educated in non-Mandarin schools. Crouch reports (1996: 109):  
 
“A deranged Malay soldier went on a shooting spree in the Chow Kit area of 
Kuala Lumpur, not far from where the 13 May rioting had begun in 1969…. 
Several people were hit by bullets, and one – a Malay- was killed before the 
soldier surrendered… Although the incident was unrelated to political 
developments, it had an electrifying impact; and people in Kuala Lumpur began to 
stock food”.  
 
The UMNO youth wing was going to respond and intended to organize a massive 
manifestation in Kuala Lumpur. On the order of Mahathir, Operation Lalang (1987) was put in 
motion to prevent further escalation. Hundred were arrested under the Internal Security Act, 
many of whom where politicians from all sides (Funston, 2001: 164).  
 
The intensity of this crisis was medium as it involved elite division; namely the MCA and 
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Gerakan tactical refusal of the BN decision. It demonstrates the ambiguous link between elites 
and the mass in hybrid regimes. This crisis was a clear sign of an attack on Chinese entrenched 
interests. Political parties from all sides united to protest against what was perceived as a 
violation of their cultural freedom. It epitomizes the connection between elected officials and 
constituencies. In this sense, for the MCA and Gerakan, being in the ruling coalition meant 
striking a balance between the ruling elite’s interests and those of their constituencies. They 
did not kneel unconditionally to the ruling elites; sometimes, they were contesting their 
unilateral actions. It is a probative example that the MCA and Gerakan were not entirely 
dependent on the UMNO and that the nature of their relationship was one of asymmetrical 
interdependence. This event shows that “MCA and Gerakan elites thus not only exist, but are 
able to extract significant material benefits for themselves and enough symbolic policy outputs 
for their constituents that they can claim with some credibility that Barisan is concerned with 
the well-being of all ethnic communities” (Case, 1996b: 149-150). 
 
A year later, a serious constitutional crisis was going to prevent the ruling elites from 
governing. It came as a fight between the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
PETRONAS (the national oil company), former Finance Minister as well as Trade and 
Industry Minister, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, and the Prime Minister Mahathir for the top 
position in the UMNO. It moved to a standoff and led literately to a fracture of UMNO 
between Team A (Mahathir) and Team B (Razaleigh). Team A defeated Team B in UMNO 
general elections. Razaleigh contested the results on a charge of electoral fraud. He brought 
the case to court and Mahathir eventually removed Salleh Abas, the Lord President of the 
Supreme Court, from his position (Kingsbury, 2001: 280). Razaleigh left the UMNO and 
created a new opposition party Semangat 46 which rapidly forged two alliances: one called 
Gagasan Rakyat that was including the DAP and the Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM); and the 
other named Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah that included the PAS. These coalitions however 
quickly dissolved.  
 
The intensity of the 1988 constitutional crisis was high. For a brief period, the ruling party was 
paralyzed and thereafter the powers entrusted in the judicial altered. It symbolized the entrance 
of state bureaucrats in politics and its independent power base. To be sure, the state 
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bureaucracy had always been an integral part of the UMNO partisan base and most UMNO 
leaders began their career as bureaucrats. Yet, it was the first time that a high-ranking official 
was openly challenging the Prime Minister. What was before decided by consensus, was now 
subject to an intense electoral competition. The state bureaucracy was no longer a monolithic 
bloc, a passive actor. Some factions began to question the authority of the Mahathir’s 
administration and to denounce its growing interference in their internal affairs. Furthermore, 
the demise of Semangat 46 was, as in other instances, another evidence of where the locus of 
power is located in a hybrid regime. Most of all, Razaleigh’s failure found its source in his 
inability to forge a single alliance with the DAP and the PAS, a similar problem against which 
BN elites were also confronted. Finally, loosing Razaleigh was a blow of the BN against the 
PAS. Indeed, Razaleigh – a native from Kelantan – was initially the BN solution to capture the 
state constituencies and diminish PAS influence (Tan & Vasil, 1984: 45). When Razaleigh left 
the BN, the door was open for the PAS to return. Indeed, the PAS thereafter recaptured the 
state position. The move also allowed the PAS to regain some form of political capital that it 
had lost after the Memali crisis.  
 
In 1998, the popular Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, was dismissed, expelled from the 
dominant party and arrested on charges of corruption and sodomy. Although the circumstances 
surrounding his expulsion remain unclear, it was becoming more and more evident that Anwar 
was mounting a challenge to Mahathir for the UMNO presidency. In the subsequent months, 
thousands of people had gathered in the streets to signal their discontent (Freedman, 2006: 
110-111). It eventually led to the creation of the Reformasi movement. It formed an electoral 
pact under the unofficial banner of the Alternative Front in the 2004 general elections and later 
under the People’s Front in 2008. The latter included the three main opposition parties: the 
PKR (People Justice Party), DAP and PAS. It succeeded in the 2008 general elections to 
prevent, for the first time since Independence, the ruling coalition from winning the two-third 
majority necessary to amend the constitution. As a result, the then Prime Minister Abdullah 
Ahmad Badawi, who was elected as UMNO president partly for his Islamic background, 
stepped down and was replaced by the Deputy Prime Minister Najib (Mauzy & Barter, 2008: 
223).  
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We are dealing here with two consecutive crises: the first one was of medium intensity given 
the elite division within the dominant party that came with it; but it led to another crisis of 
medium intensity, albeit a more serious one, with the lost of the two-third majority by the BN 
in 2008. Without the control of the legislative body, the ruling elites were no longer able to 
alter the political regime in order to manage the electoral outcome. As in the case of 
Razaleigh, Anwar had great influence over the bureaucracy: “Through the bureaucracy and 
key public corporations, Anwar built long networks of trusted ABIM associates” (Case, 1994: 
923; Case, 2001: 50). His exclusion meant the lost of some segments of the bureaucracy. 
Being a powerful and charismatic figure, Anwar’s exclusion triggered the second most 
significant crisis of legitimacy for the BN, one that was reflected in the lost of many votes, and 
also the lost of the Selangor federal state, the most prosperous state of Malaysia surrounding 
the special district of the capital Kuala Lumpur, in the 2008 elections. In a way, it is not at all 
clear what and who the BN represents anymore. It has entered a sort of crisis of identity that 
does not bode well for the prospect of stability in Malaysia. As of today, confrontational ethnic 
and religious rhetoric as well as massive public demonstrations have increased significantly 
and are now a common feature (Chin & Huat, 2009: 78-81). Even if Prime Minister Najib has 
made great efforts to recapture the Malay vote and to extend a friendly hand to non-Malay 
representatives, the once prevailing national harmony is falling apart and tensions within and 
between parties have led to a fragmented and highly unpredictable political landscape (Chin, 
2010).   
 
The BN was kind of a party system within a party system. Being excluded from or included in, 
largely determined the faith of a given political organization. But each time such event was 
occurring, it generated political crises of various intensities. Overall, resisting to the 
temptation of riding alone has prevented the UMNO from falling out of fashion all along. It 
can still legitimately claim to represent dominant social groups. Yet, the BN quest for the 
consent of elites has been a constant preoccupation during the social transformations of the 
last decades. It is indeed the context into which BN found itself after the 2008 elections. 
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3.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence 
 
Compared to other countries in the region and despite what we described in the previous 
section, Malaysia was an oasis of tranquility. Hence, we were expecting political parties to be 
at the forefront of politics and channeling social demands through the party system. Our study 
of the events – especially before Razaleigh’s departure – confirms it. But further analysis 
about constituencies and voting patterns was needed in order for us to validate the claim that 
the ruling elites of the UMNO had to forge alliances and develop coalition-building strategies 
in the context of a competitive authoritarian regime.  
 
Except for the pre-independence guerrilla war against the Malayan National Liberation Army 
(MNLA), the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), commonly called the 
Malayan Emergency (1948-60) when approximately 10,000 people were killed, Malaysia has 
experienced low level of extra-legal organized violence with zero battle-related deaths since 
the 1970s (Harff & Gurr, 2004: 67; World Development Indicators, 2011). And this conflict 
was for the most part confined to the rural areas of the northern region of the Malayan 
peninsula. Following the liberal model of a professional officer corps (Jeshurun, 1975: 1-2), 
the national army did in no time invest the political scene or threaten to do so. The only 
exception was during the state of emergency in 1969-71 where the UMNO suspended the 
Parliament and created the National Operations Council into which the armed forces were 
given some form of political power. Overall, civilians have always remained in control of 
political institutions meaning therefore that the political parties were, through the period 
studied, the locus of authority. One clear supporting evidence is the way Singapore seceded 
without bloodshed or military intervention.  
 
3.2.1.  Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies  
 
In Chapter Two, we formulate a secondary hypothesis to the effect that the dominant party 
should be located at the center of the ideological spectrum in order to act as a centripetal force. 
According to Mauzy (2006: 63, 60), “the UMNO-led regime has skillfully positioned itself in 
the political center of the ethnic and religious divide to such an extent that it is perceived as 
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indispensable for political stability”. The coalition BN led by the UMNO has included mostly 
moderate parties since 1974 (Crouch, 1996: 34)46. Before that date, the ruling coalition was 
only composed of the UMNO, the MCA and the MIC. As for the PAS and the DAP, they have 
been basically the heart and soul of the Malaysian opposition since Independence. The PAS 
has traditionally promoted the installment of an Islamic State while the DAP has been in favor 
of a regime change, a democratic one, and social equality (Gomez, 1998: 248-249). The latter 
has been one with the most critical voices in Malaysia. The PKR, the latest party formed in the 
context of the 2008 elections, was like the DAP, an anti-regime party. It was not only aiming 
at defeating the BN at the polls but also at changing significantly the way the political game is 
played. Furthermore, its leaders wanted to occupy the ideological centre and were therefore 
directly challenging the UMNO. Taking into consideration the strong anti-regime orientation 
of the PAS, DAP and PKR, they were excluded from the ruling coalition. The MCP was the 
only anti-systemic party with advocating revolutionary means of political expression. It was 
responsible for the communist insurgency and was banned in 1966. Thus, the unique position 
occupied by the BN has had the strategic advantage of being able to absorb new political 
parties therefore extending its legitimacy to constituencies beyond the UMNO direct appeal to 
certain segments of the Malaysian community.  
 
Almost all parties have been associated with a given ethnic group, a religious community or 
socio-economic groups; and in some instances cleavages overlap. As a background check, the 
Malays have been the dominant ethnic group, while the rest of the population is of Chinese, 
Indigenous or Indians descent. Traditionally, Malays have been located in rural areas, while 
Chinese have been concentrated mainly in urban areas. Indians have been dispersed all over 
the territories and Indigenes are gathered in Borneo. In terms of religion, Malays have been 
mostly Sunni Muslim, Indians affiliated to Hinduism and the Chinese a multi-confessional 
ethnic group. The most densely populated areas were the industrial Selangor federal state and 
the special district of Kuala Lumpur. In this context, the UMNO originally mustered much of 
its popular support among rural teachers while expanding its reach to a newly formed urban 
and Muslim middle-class not necessarily attracted by a particular Islamic project. The MCA 
                                                 
46 i.e. the MCA, MIC, Gerakan, PPP, PBB, SUPP, SNAP, PBS, LDP, PBRS, UPKO, SPDP and PRS. 
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has been representing mostly the Chinese bourgeoisie, while Gerakan has embodied overtimes 
members of the Chinese working class with strong affiliation with trade unions (Gomez, 1998: 
247). The MIC has integrated ethnic Indians from all horizons. The PPP is essentially active in 
the federal state of Perak and appeals to urban Chinese (Gomez, 1998: 235-236). The PBB has 
been mostly influential in Sarawak federal state and heads the “Barisan Tiga (tripartite front) 
compromising other Sarawak-based Barisan Nasional components members, i.e., the Chinese-
based Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) and the Iban-based Sarawak National Party 
(SNAP)” (Gomez, 1998: 236). In Sabah, the other Borneo federal state, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) has been working on mobilizing the Chinese community in the region 
while the United Sabah People’s Party (PBRS) and the United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun 
Murut (UPKO) have been defending the interests of the Kadazan ethnic group. Although this 
mosaic of parties could look impressive, the opposition has been in reality composed mainly 
of the DAP, PAS and PKR. The DAP partisan base was built along crosscutting socio-
economic affiliations of pro-democratic individuals, mostly Chinese. The PAS was “a 
breakaway UMNO faction… primarily rural teachers, some of whom were also associated 
with UMNO” (Gomez, 1998: 239). Its stronghold has been in Kelantan, Terengganu and 
Kedah. The PKR was Anwar’s wife political party and had been operating as a hub for the 
civil society. There was also the All-Malaysian Indian Progressive Front (IPF), which was a 
by-product of elite division within the MIC and as such had covered the same constituencies. 
It was not associated to the opposition given that it tried to join the BN and worked closely 
with it in elections (Gomez, 1998: 239).  
 
From this brief description, it is evident that there is little competition between parties for the 
same constituencies besides between the UMNO and the PAS. Vertical affiliations combined 
with competitive elections forced the ruling elites to work actively toward coalition building in 
order to remain in power. In Malaysia, constituencies have been relatively captive (Crouch, 
1996: 33). It is interesting to note that the Malaysian Electoral Commission did not 
disaggregate the electoral results of each party member of the BN until 1995. Nevertheless, 
two patterns emerge. First, the vote percentage of the BN after its expansion jumped from 
44.8% in 1969 to 60.8% in 1974. Second, in 1995 when the BN obtained the highest vote 
percentage since 1959, the UMNO won 89 seats over 192; less than the majority. Hence, 
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without its coalition partners it would have meant having to form a minority government 
therefore greatly reducing its prestige, power and ability to shape political institutions 
according to its interests. Although the UMNO had the economic and organizational resources 
to govern alone, the electoral game was preventing it to do so: “the exigencies of electoral 
politics provided the immediate incentive for UMNO to come to an arrangement with a non-
Malay party” (Crouch, 1996: 17). Furthermore, given the aforementioned, the UMNO could 
not pretend to represent all dominant forces within society. Its appeal to non-Malays was 
limited: that is, to the Chinese, the Indians, but also the Indigenes of Borneo. Therefore, 
whoever was able to mobilize and organize the vote of these constituencies had leverage over 
the dominant party. And this leverage came with benefits. Indeed, “the parties with greatest 
access to funds are those from the Barisan Nasional; most of these parties, including the MIC 
and the Gerakan, have had access to funds on a regular basis from corporate figures and 
business entities” (Gomez, 1998: 259).  
 
3.2.2. Types of Regimes 
 
At this stage, we wish to make the following comments about the exact nature of the electoral 
game as it relates to the type of hybrid regime: that is, on the competitive authoritarian 
character of the Malaysian regime. The political regime has gone through two phases: a 
democratic (1957-1969) and a hybrid one (1969-2010). Yet, we are reticent to classify 
Malaysia as an authentic democratic regime during the first period. At best, it was an 
ambiguous regime given its consociational traits and the presence of autocratic instruments of 
power. It denotes the difficulty to differentiate between a democratic and a competitive 
authoritarian regime. Indeed, the “unfair” competition found in a competitive authoritarian 
regime is subject to interpretation on a case-by-case basis. It enters the foggy zone of hybrid 
regimes. Over the years, the numerous amendments to the Constitution and the behavior of the 
ruling elites have clearly pushed the regime in the direction of a competitive authoritarian 
regime.  
 
In the first decade, national elections with universal suffrage were held within every five years 
as prescribed by the Constitution. Electoral fraud was generally absent and electoral results 
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were respected by elites and accepted by citizens. Opposition parties were legal and barriers to 
entry into the party system were minimum. Freedom of association and assembly were 
genuine and the freedom of the press was guaranteed by a wide diversity of private media 
outlets relatively independent from the state. It represents the democratic apogee of the 
Malaysian contemporary history (Teik, 1997: 47; Zakaria, 1989: 353).  
 
Although it surely is the most democratic period, we are skeptic about its genuine democratic 
credentials. First, the famous adage – one person, one vote – had no bearing in Malaysia. 
Indeed, the Constitution was reflecting an elite accommodation between various ethnic groups 
that was conferring to the Malays supremacy over the party system. The gerrymandering of 
the electoral map was heavily skewed in favor of the rural areas predominantly populated by 
the Malays. According to Crouch (1996: 58):  
 
“The 1957 Constitution had accepted the principle that there should be some 
weight in favour of the rural areas because of size and difficulties of 
communication compared to urban constituencies. But it had limited the disparity 
to no more than 15 percent from the size of the average constituency. A 
constitutional amendment in 1962, however, allowed rural constituencies to have 
as little as half the voters in urban constituencies; and in 1973 the restriction on the 
extent of disparity between constituencies was abolished altogether”. 
 
As a result in 1959 and 1964, the Alliance won 51.8% and 58.5% of the vote while obtaining 
71.2% and 85.6% of the seats respectively; a difference of approximately 20% (see table 3.1. 
below). 
 
How can a political regime be called democratic when electoral outcomes are so distorted? 
Ultimately, it comes down to whether a consociational democracy is a democratic regime at 
all. Without solving this complex issue, we argue that consociational democracy should be 
understood within the specific institutional context of non-western countries. “Consociational 
democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented 
political culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart, 1969: 216). It empowers ethnic groups 
through the institutional guarantee of the protection of their basic rights in matters of 
education, religion, and culture, etc. Such guarantees usually involve a written agreement and 
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some form of power sharing. The problem is that consociational democracy reinforces ethnic 
cleavages by institutionalizing them, especially in non-western countries, instead of favoring 
crosscutting interests that is traditionally associated with democracy (Roeder & Rothchild, 
2005: 320, 323). It favors polarization over moderation and tolerance. Originally, Lijphart 
(1968) formulated his theory based on the case of Netherlands and later, tested it with others 
European countries in Democracy in Plural Societies (1977) to then expend it to developing 
ones such as Lebanon and Indonesia. It bears the question if comparison between western 
European countries and countries in the South can yield any significant results. For instance, 
the historical context of Netherlands and Indonesia are so different that focusing on repeating 
patterns can be hazardous. This is when the introduction of Lustick’s (1979: 330-332) control 
version of consociationalism becomes relevant. It is more closely adapted to the reality of 
many developing countries. It stresses the domination of a group-specific ideology, the 
absence of bargaining between political groups and the general disconnect between elites and 
the people they represent. In other words, consociationalism becomes a coercive instrument 
for a powerful ethnic group and as such it can no longer be associated with a democracy. 
Without necessarily contending that Malaysia falls under this “dark” version of 
consociationalism – there is room for gradation47 – it nevertheless attracts the attention to 
which institutional context embeds consociationalism. It is not because a regime institutes a 
form of consociationalism that it is necessarily democratic. Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland 
and Austria had democratic institutions into which consociationalism features were integrated.  
 
This brings us to the second reason why Malaysia could hardly be considered a democratic 
regime. During this period (1957-69), the government had the power and the right to intervene 
in an authoritarian fashion. Chief among them were (i) the Emergency Regulations Ordinance 
(1948)48 that basically denied the habeas corpus, albeit not for an indefinite time, to any 
citizen who poses a threat to the national security and (ii) the Sedition Act (1948) that 
prohibited any widespread contestation of the government or the civil administration as well as 
comments prompting communal strifes (Funston, 2001: 178).  
                                                 
47 Case (1996b: 148-150) develops a convincing argument about the discrepancies between the Lustick’s control 
model and the Malaysian consociationalism regime.  
48 It was later renamed the Internal Security Act (1960). 
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These laws obviously hampered seriously the civil liberties and political rights of Malaysian 
citizens and elites. One could argue that the fact they were not widely used was a testimony of 
the regime democratic tendencies. However, it can also be argued that the general restraint of 
the ruling elites in terms of repression was simply the manifestation of self-censorship by the 
population. The bottom line is that in any electoral democracy those laws would not be 
present. It devolves considerable discretionary powers to the government.  
 
Third and evenly problematic was the concentration of power in the Office of the Prime 
Minister. Amongst others, we find the Human Right Commission, the Anti-Corruption 
Agency, the Attorney General and the Election Commission. Consequently, the effective 
separation of powers, mostly between the judicial and executive, is in doubt. Moreover, the 
Prime Minister was also the de facto Minister of Home Affairs who overheads amongst others 
all police and security forces as well as the registrar of societies. It questions foremost the 
limited accountability and transparency of the government at that time. Under the direct 
supervision of the Prime Minister, the independence of the Electoral Commission is seriously 
in doubt. We do not find such concentration of power in a democratic regime. Therefore, 
given the consociationalism nature of the Malaysian electoral system combined with the 
existence of authoritarian instruments of repression and the concentration of power in the 
hands of the Prime Minister, we are encouraged to frame this period as a “dormant” period of 
competitive authoritarianism. The democratic benevolent attitude of the Malaysian ruling 
elites could have easily changed if stability and security would have been at stake (Lipset, 
1998: 123). 
 
As one key example, the 1969 race riot had convinced them that a more firm hand was needed. 
Since the enlargement of the ruling coalition was formalized in 1974, Freedom House then 
classified the Malaysian regime as hybrid (partly free)49. Indeed, authoritarian traits were in 
full display. Under the Internal Security Act, over ten thousand people had been arrested, and 
                                                 
49 Freedom House’s rating began in 1972. It catalogued the Malaysian regime as free for only two years: 1972 
and 1973. This assessment was obviously preliminary since those were the first years following the end of the 
state of emergency and the exact architecture of the regime to come was still in motion.   
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a number of laws and amendments were passed to further curtail political activities (Funston, 
2001:177-178). National media outlets were controlled for the most part by the ruling elites 
(Kingsbury, 2001: 281). When PETRONAS was created under the auspices of the Prime 
Minister, it provided almost unlimited funds to use for partisan ends. The time period of 
electoral campaigns was shortened. In the 2004 elections, the electoral campaign officially 
lasted only eight days (Mauzy & Barter, 2008: 214).  
 
Yet, it was certainly not a hegemonic authoritarian regime. Over time, national electoral 
results have clearly confirmed the competitive nature of the political regime. The BN has 
never won more than 65% of the votes, while the opposition has won from time to time 
elections at provincial level: it was for instance the case in Kelantan, Terengganu, Penang, 
Sabah and lately in the prosperous Selangor province. It shows that electoral fraud was not a 
common practice and that the percentage of votes was reflecting citizens’ preferences. 
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Table II – Electoral Results in Malaysia (Legislative) 
 
Year Political Party Votes % Seats %
1955 Alliance (AL) 818,013 81.7 51 98.1
Parti Negara (PN) 78,909 7.9 0 0
Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) 40,667 4.1 1 1.9
Others 63,938 6.4 0 0
Total 1,001,527 100.1 52 100
Participation Rate (82.8%)
1959 AL 800,944 51.8 74 71.2
PAS 329,070 21.3 13 12.5
Socialist Front (SF) 199,688 12.9 8 7.7
People's Progressive Party (PPP) 97,391 6.3 4 3.8
PN 32,578 2.1 1 1
Others 87,598 5.7 4 3.9
Total 1,547,269 100.1 104 100.1
Participation Rate (73.3%)
1964 AL 1,204,340 58.5 89 85.6
SF 330,898 16.1 2 1.9
PAS 301,187 14.6 9 8.7
United Democratic Party (UDP) 88,223 4.3 1 1
PPP 69,898 3.4 2 1.9
People's Action Party (PAP) 42,130 2 1 1
Others 20,828 1.1 0 0
Total 2,057,504 100 104 100.1
Participation Rate (78.9%)
1969 AL 1,063,238 44.8 77 53.5
PAS 495,641 20.9 12 8.3
Democratic Action Party (DAP) 286,606 12.1 13 9
Gerakan 178,971 7.5 8 5.6
PPP 80,756 3.4 4 2.8
Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) 71,293 3 5 3.5
Sarawak National Party (SNAP) 64,593 2.7 9 6.3
United Sabah National Organization (USNO) 31,947 1.3 13 9
Parti Pesaka Sarawak (PESAKA) 30,765 1.3 2 1.4
Parti Rakyat (PR) 25,785 1.1 0 0
Others 43,518 1.9 1 0.7
Total 2,373,113 100 144 100.1
Participation Rate (73.6%)
1974 Barisan Nasional (BN) 1,287,400 60.8 135 87.7
DAP 387,845 18.3 9 5.8
SNAP 117,566 5.6 9 5.8
Parti Keadilan Masyarat Malaysia (PEKEMAS) 105,718 5 1 0.6
Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM) 84,206 4 0 0
Others 134,181 6.4 0 0
Total 2,116,916 100.1 154 99.9
Participation Rate (55.6%)
1978 BN 1,987,907 57.2 131 84.4
DAP 664,433 19.1 16 10.4
PAS 537,720 15.5 5 3.2
Others 283,370 8.1 2 1.9
Total 3,473,430 99.9 154 99.9
Participation Rate (75.3%)
 138  
 
1982 BN 2,522,079 60.5 132 85.7
DAP 815,473 19.6 9 5.8
PAS 602,530 14.5 5 3.2
Others 225,615 5.4 8 5.2
Total 4,165,697 100 154 99.9
Participation Rate (74.4%)
1986 BN 2,649,263 57.3 148 83.6
DAP 968,009 21.0 24 13.6
PAS 718,891 15.6 1 0.6
Others 283,598 6.2 4 2.3
Total 4,619,761 100.1 177 100.1
Participation Rate (68.1%)
1990 BN 2,985,392 53.4 127 70.6
DAP 985,228 17.6 20 11.1
Parti Semangat '46 (S46) 826,398 14.8 8 4.4
PAS 391,813 7 7 3.9
Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) 128,260 2.3 14 7.8
Others 276,136 4.9 4 2.2
Total 5,593,227 100 180 100
Participation Rate (72.6%)
1995 BN 3,881,214 65.2 162 84.4
DAP 712,175 12 9 4.7
S46 616,589 10.4 6 3.1
PAS 430,098 7.2 7 3.6
PBS 198,594 3.3 8 4.2
Others 118,025 2 0 0
Total 5,956,695 100.1 192 100
Participation Rate (68.3%)
1999 BN 3,762,556 56.6 148 75.6
PAS 996,437 15 27 13.5
DAP 848,040 12.7 10 5.7
Keadilan 767,969 11.5 5 2.6
PBS 143,338 2.2 3 1.6
Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) 68,990 1 0 0
Others 64,507 1 0 0
Total 6,651,837 100 193 99
Participation Rate (71.1%)
2004 BN 4,420,452 63.9 198 90.4
Alternative Front 1,668,998 24.1 8 3.7
DAP 687,340 9.9 12 5.5
Others 139,438 2.1 1 0.5
Total 6,916,228 100 219 100.1
Participation Rate (73.9%)
2008 BN 4,082,411 50.3 140 63.1
People's Front 3,796,464 46.8 82 36.9
Others 65,399 0.8 0 0
Total 7,944,274 97.9 222 100
Participation Rate (75.9%)
Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the 
category "Others". Also, for legislative elections, independents are included in this category. 
Data Source: Tan (2001); Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assitance; Inter-Parliamentary Union.
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Based on our definition, Malaysia was a competitive authoritarian regime from 1969 to 2010, 
and a democratic yet ambiguous regime between 1957 and 1969. It was a competitive 
authoritarian in a making that was close to an electoral democracy between 1957-69; while 
manifesting an overall institutional design that we usually do not find in electoral democracies. 
Consequently, the relevance of our framework for that period should be ambiguous as well. 
On one side, the electoral gains of the opposition parties Gerakan and DAP in 1969 reflect the 
volatility of the constituencies and defection of voters from the Alliance during that period. It 
tends to show the absence of institutional constraints on voter’s preference typical of hybrid 
regimes. Constituencies were not as clearly defined as later on. Given its embryonic 
dimension, the possibility of crosscutting allegiances cannot be denied and as such the 
competitive nature of the electoral game may correspond more closely to an electoral 
democracy. On the other side, the behavior of the ruling elites in the 1958 MCA, 1965 
Singapore and 1966 Sarawak crises are signs of their ambition to control the political outcome 
unilaterally, which is what is found in hybrid regimes. The UMNO ultimatum against the 
Lim’s MCA leadership, the relative nimbly ease with which the ruling elites expelled 
Singapore and the non recognition of the judiciary decision in the case of the Stephen’s 
dismiss are eloquent evidences of institutional constraints that were not being formed to 
dictate the future rules of the game. After 1969, the picture becomes limpid, notably with the 
frequent use of the Internal Security Act in line with a more repressive regime. Elections in a 
context of captive constituencies provide incentives for the ruling elites to forge alliances. 
Hence as the narrative demonstrates, an essential ingredient of instability came from the 
exclusion of some opposition parties and stability in the inclusion of others in the ruling 
coalition. Other than economic and organizational, the capacity of the ruling elites to include 
various political groups was essentially related to its central position in the ideological 
spectrum. And providing this capacity to form and manage an effective coalition would exist, 
the contextual environment being one where the degree of violence was very low, the 
institutional framework gradually established itself as the one of a competitive authoritarian 
regime. 
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3.3. The Degree of State Penetration 
 
The Malaysian regime has been resting on a strong state, with a civil administration among the 
most effective in the region and extended over the entire territory. The state has been directing 
the economic orientation and the model of development. It has been in control of key assets 
generating substantial rents. Therefore, state bureaucrats should have been active players in 
politics over the period covered by our analysis. The events surrounding the defection of 
Razaleigh and the expulsion of Anwar from the UMNO tend to confirm such expectation. Yet, 
the narrative of the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion of dominant social groups presented 
at the beginning of the chapter depicts an interesting trajectory. State bureaucrats have 
gradually overshadowed patronage-seeking opposition parties as a determining actor of 
political dynamics. The history of state building in Malaysia provides an answer as why it is 
so. The ruling elites tried to weaken the bureaucracy precisely when it was reaching its peak. 
In the process, they encountered influent state bureaucrats – i.e. Razaleigh and Anwar – that 
over the years had built up an independent power base.   
 
3.3.1. The Administrative Extension 
 
During the colonial era, civil administration in Malaysia was for the most part responsible for 
law and order as well as tax collection. In the 1950s, government revenue mostly came from 
tax on international transactions; where as income tax on individuals and corporate entities 
equated to 20% (Markandan, 1960: 50). However, with accession to Independence, the 
situation gradually changed and by the 1990s, income tax represented roughly 50% of total 
taxes (World Development Indicators, 2012). To reach these levels, the bureaucracy had to 
deploy many agents and establish operational offices across the territory. Along those lines, 
“public sector employment (excluding military and police personnel) increased from 139,476 
persons in 1970 to 521,818 persons in 1983” (Teik, 1997: 55). Although the compilation of 
quantitative data on transport and telecommunication networks started only in the 1980s and 
1990s, to give a general idea, at that time it was comparable to the level found in South Korea 
which was already considered an emerging economy (World Development Indicators, 2012).  
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After the Esman-Montgomery report (1966), the bureaucracy underwent significant changes. 
The Development Administrative Unit (DAU) was set up, followed in 1977 by the Malaysian 
Administrative Modernization and Manpower Planning Unit (MAMPU). These programs 
were designed to increase the capacity of the civil administration to act upon social demands 
and the effectiveness of its inner-working. It laid-out its ambition to recruit highly qualified 
individuals and elaborate modern organizational charts. In order to increase the accountability 
and efficacy of the public administration, many mechanisms were introduced over the years, 
such the Operations Room technique and the Client Charter (Ahmad, 1997: 64, 72). Thus, it 
eventually led to the conclusion that “the Malaysian bureaucracy is one of the most effective 
in Southeast Asia” and has been often cited as a model for developing countries (Neher & 
Marlay, 1995: 109; Gomez & Sundaram, 1999: 98). 
 
That being said, the morphology of the Malaysian territory has created a natural barrier to 
administrative extension. Indeed, the country is divided in two by the South China Sea: The 
Malay Peninsula (West) and the Borneo Island (East). There is somewhat a fracture within 
Malaysia. On the West side, the central government has been omnipresent; on the East side it 
has been less cogent. The capital and most economic centers have been located in the Malay 
Peninsula. The Borneo Island has been rural, home of many illegal workers and covered by 
rainforest. By comparison, the population density in Borneo average 32 inhabitants per square 
km whereas it is 385 in the Malay Peninsula (Government of Malaysia, 2012). Furthermore, 
the Kelantan federal state on the Malay Peninsula is basically surrounded by the Titiwangsa 
Mountains. Thus, it is not a coincidence if local politics in these regions have found their way 
at the national level over the years. Indeed, the events in Sarawak (1966), Kelantan (1977) and 
Sabah (1986) illustrate it. The influence of the PAS in Kelantan was no stranger to the 
presence of Ulama – local clerics teaching Muslim edicts that have represented the main 
strength of the party organizational capacity – in many regions, notably in those where the 
state was less present (Shiozaki, 2000: 102; Gomez, 1998: 249). It has also provided a rational 
for why the ruling coalition had included relatively small and marginal regional parties 
confined to the Sarawak and Sabah states. Again the narrative of those three events clearly 
delineates the degree of autonomy of local leaders. In no way the central government had lost 
control over those regions; it was always able to impose its prerogatives. If anything, the state 
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presence in local communities was assured via KEMAS (Rural and Regional Development 
Ministry) with about 14,000 representatives dispersed all over the country (Funston, 2001: 
175).  
 
3.3.2. The Economic Extension 
 
On the economic front, Malaysia experienced significant transformation in half a century. We 
can trace three phases of state intervention into the Malaysian economy. The first phase (1957-
1969) was one of a laissez-faire policy. The role of the state was limited to a regulatory 
function. The economy was primarily based on agriculture and natural resources such as oil, 
tin and timber. Thus, the role of state bureaucrats in politics was relatively marginal at that 
time.  
 
The second phase (1970-1980) came into being with the New Economic Policy, which later 
became the National Development Policy. The objectives were to foster economic 
development and equality, mostly for Malays. It aimed at positioning the country as a 
manufacturing hub, especially in small electronic equipment (Funston, 2001: 170). As part of 
its grand strategy, the government took over many foreign or Chinese private companies 
through trust agencies such as Khazanah Nasional Bhd, Permodalan Nasional Bhd and 
Perbadanan Nasional Bhd. It created a myriad of state-owned companies: “the number of 
public agencies rose from 22 in 1960 to 109 in 1970 to 656 in 1980” (Teik, 1997: 55). As a 
result, the government became an active player in almost all sectors of the economy: energy 
(e.g. PETRONAS), transport (e.g. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation Berhad), 
financial services (e.g. Malayan Banking) and media (e.g. Bernama). In each of these sectors, 
state-owned companies were occupying a dominant position in the market. The government 
even invested at the beginning of the 1980s in heavy industries, notably in the creation of the 
national car company Proton. It gave rise to a middle-class, a state middle-class. And one of 
the main architects of Malaysian economic statism was Razaleigh himself.   
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Table III – Malaysian State Investment in the Economy  
 
The last phase was marked by the 1980s worldwide economic recession. In order to create a 
more investor friendly environment, the Malaysia Incorporated Policy (1983) was launched. It 
was designed to foster public and private partnerships and stimulate entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, the government undertook a privatization program that reduced the size of the 
public administration and its presence in the economy; a situation reflected in the decreasing 
share of state investments in the 1990s. It had two advert effects. First, it created a hostile 
bureaucracy protesting against the violation of its entrenched interests. Its bitterness was 
mostly directed toward Prime Minister Mahathir given its personal style of ruling. According 
to Case, (2001: 50), “anecdotal accounts suggest that the country’s Malay civil servants—
dependent on government largesse and thus normally a potent UMNO constituency—came to 
view Mahathir as repugnant”. Prime Minister Mahathir recognized it and took many steps to 
reassert its control:  
 
“During the 1980s it became increasingly common for civil servants to contest 
positions in UMNO and other government parties, but by the late 1980s the 
government felt compelled to take action against flagrant breaches of 
regulations… The change in policy took place in the context of the UMNO split 
when many civil servants in UMNO may have sympathized with the prime 
minister’s opponents” (Crouch, 1996: 272).  
General gov't 
consumption (% 
total 
consumption) 
Gov't enterprises 
and investment 
(% of gross 
investment)
1970 21.4 32.3
1975 23.9 37.6
1980 24.6 37.3
1985 22.7 46.8
1990 21.0 33.8
1995 20.9 28.4
2000 20.1 47.0
2005 22.9 49.9
2009 22.1 52.4
Data Source: Economic Freedom in the World, 2012
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Hence, when Razaleigh challenged Mahathir in 1988, the former could find support among an 
important UMNO faction consisting of disillusioned state bureaucrats. Furthermore, as former 
Minister of Trade and Industry he had “wide discretionary powers over licensing, ownership 
structure, ethnic employment pattern, product distribution quotas, local content and even 
product pricing” (Teik, 1997: 56; Crouch, 1996: 117). Second, it later gave an opportunity to 
the then Minister of Finance (1991-93) and Deputy Prime Minister (1993-1998) Anwar 
Ibrahim to spread its tentacles not only in the bureaucracy but also in the private sector. 
Whereas the disenfranchised bureaucrats were loosely organized in the 1980s, it was not the 
same in 1990s. Through its ABIM affiliates, Anwar infiltrated the bureaucracy (Case, 1994: 
923). As such, ABIM was in the position to coordinate political action and mobilize the 
constituency. Moreover, Anwar was popular among small and medium companies for its 
willingness to promote transparency (Gomez & Sundaram, 1999: 124-125). At last but no 
least, the Minister of Finance had various opportunities for patronage activities, especially 
during the privatization phase of the 1980s-90s (Case, 1994: 924; Gomez, 1998: 128).  
 
Overall, Malaysia is a developing economy. As expressed in the document “Vision 2020”, its 
leaders even aimed at making it a developed country by then with such project as the creation 
of a technological pole labeled the “Multimedia Super Corridor”. Whereas the majority of the 
population was living in rural areas in the 1960s, five decades later, almost 75% have now 
been living in urban areas. The mortality rate declined significantly over the same period to 
reach numbers comparable to developed nations. The structure of the economy shifted from 
the agricultural sector to more capital and technological intensive activities such as the 
manufacturing and industrial sectors.  
 
Table IV – Malaysia Socio-Economic Modernization 
Indicator Name 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Urban population (% of total) 26.60 33.50 42.00 49.80 62.00 72.20
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 97.00 55.10 31.10 17.90 10.60 6.30
School enrollment, primary (% gross) n.d. 88.71 92.65 92.44 97.03 n.d.
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 34.32 29.44 22.61 15.22 8.60 9.52*
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 8.05 12.44 21.55 24.22 30.86 25.48*
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 19.40 27.39 41.04 42.20 48.32 44.27*
* 2009 value
Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012
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Figure 4 – Natural Resources Rent in Malaysia 
 
 
Yet, labor union and the bourgeoisie have been all along dependent on the state. Originally, 
unions were somewhat influential. They were capable of mobilizing the working-class as the 
1969 electoral gains of Gerakan demonstrated (Gomez, 1998: 247). After the race riot, the 
ruling elites used the Trade Union Ordinance (1959) to bring all labor activities firmly under 
the control of the government and included Gerakan in the coalition. As for the bourgeoisie, it 
was first mostly composed of ethnic Chinese during the Alliance period. And this was the 
moment when it could pretend to have some form of autonomy: “UMNO leaders, granting in 
the manner of the sultan in council the state licenses and contracts that sustained Chinese 
businesses, received campaign contributions, secret funds, and memberships on the boards of 
Chinese-owned companies. Top Chinese businessmen, in turn, were given a political voice 
through the MCA in the governing Alliance” (Case, 1995: 79, 89). The New Economic Policy 
reduced the economic power of Chinese businessmen and created a state bourgeoisie with the 
multiplication of parastatal companies. Even after the privatization process, among the top ten 
publicly listed companies on the Bursa Malaysia in 2000, the government had majority 
ownership in six of them (Gomez, 2005). If anything, the share of state investment has 
increased significantly in the past decade. Overall, “Malay businesspeople were not 
entrepreneurs who set up new enterprises but clients of politicians who were given business 
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opportunities as rewards for political support” (Crouch, 1993: 146). Furthermore, natural 
resources rent, especially oil rent from PETRONAS, continued to fuel the state treasury and 
provided a source of patronage with billions of off-budget dollars. Which brings us to the 
question of clientelistic network in developing countries.  
 
Money politics was an inescapable fact in the country. It reached scandalous proportions with 
the bail out of Konsortium Perkapalan Bhd (KPB) by PETRONAS. Indeed, KPB was owned 
by the son of Prime Minister Mahathir, who had been controlling effectively PETRONAS. 
Slater (2003: 92) reports: “When the bailout went through, one UMNO official lamented: I 
thought such things could only happen in Indonesia or some African countries”. However, this 
event did not reflect the nature of patronage networks in Malaysia. They were diffused and 
generally speaking oriented toward the provision of public goods and less toward private 
ostentatious consumption. The government “has taken care to supplement its appeals with 
steady flows of patronage, usually in the form of state contracts, licenses, and development 
grants” in exchange for political support (Case, 1994: 917). They were part of a larger 
development scheme – i.e. New Economic Policy – orchestrated by elites located in the 
capital; and for the most part, evidences have shown their effectiveness (see table IV).  
 
In sum, a closer look at state penetration in Malaysia provides a more fine-grained analysis of 
the dynamic of exclusion and inclusion presented earlier in the chapter. It contributes to 
understand why some local politics played a role in some instances and why state bureaucrats 
only became active later on. The fact that the two high profile ruling elites – i.e. Razaleigh and 
Anwar – wielded significant power independently of the incumbent and the party they were 
associated with, and that this power was partly the by-product of their ascent on the public 
administration, allowed them to become leaders of a dominant social group to be wooed and to 
play a major role in the political outcome. Indeed, they were source of instability as the events 
in 1988, 1998 and 2008 demonstrate.  
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Conclusion 
 
During the period covered by our study, the cornerstone of hybrid regime stability in Malaysia 
resided in the formation of a ruling coalition – i.e. BN – headed by the UMNO that was 
encompassing key opposition parties and state bureaucrats. Most political crises during the 
country contemporary history can be traced in the dynamics of inclusion or exclusion of these 
two dominant social groups in the context of a competitive authoritarian regime and a 
developing economy. As such, our expectations and actual outcomes converge; it confirms the 
utility and validity of our framework. Indeed, it is conformed to a situation characterized by a 
low level of extra-legal organized violence and high state penetration. 
  
Furthermore, our two variables not only mark out which actors should attract our attention but 
also deepen our understanding of the sequence of political crises and the behavior of the ruling 
elites. More precisely, in looking at the degree of extra-legal organized violence and detailing 
the importance of opposition parties and their respective captive constituency, it became 
apparent that antagonistic cleavages were threatening the stability of the Malaysian hybrid 
regime. The difficulty of integrating pro-Chinese and pro-Islamic parties – notably the MCA 
and PAS – in the ruling coalition proved to be a significant conundrum for the ruling elites and 
a recurrent source of instability. As for the state penetration variable, it explains why 
Razaleigh and Anwar were able to mount a challenge against the ruling elites and why state 
bureaucrats became prominent actors in the 1980s and later on.  
 
Figure 5 – Malaysia Timeline 
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Finally, the case of Malaysia reveals two interesting features. First, the ruling elites used 
different techniques to co-opt different clienteles. When they were reaching-out to ethnic 
groups by co-opting opposition parties, their appeals to the Muslim communities were more 
personalized: that is, they were looking to co-opt individuals who had good credentials among 
the Muslim community. As mentioned previously, this is partly why Mahathir lured Anwar 
within its inner-circle. Hence, the ruling elites appear to have traditionally managed 
antagonistic cleavages by developing mechanisms of co-optation based on various institutional 
levels. Second, many political crises occurred outside Kuala Lumpur. National parties 
interfered in local politics on many occasions and seem to have used this arena as a proxy of 
their rivalry. In a way, it may have prevented a more direct confrontation and possibly the 
replication of a highly destabilizing situation similar to the infamous race riot of 1969 that 
inflamed the capital. 
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4 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
Indonesia is an archipelago of over 6,000 inhabited islands (13,000 total) that are home of 
more than 300 ethnic groups speaking over 500 native languages, with a population of 
approximately 250 millions, where most are either Javanese (40.6%) or Sundanese (15%) and 
of Muslim faith (86.1%)50. It came into being in a dreadful conflict with its former colonial 
master, the Dutch. A de facto independent country in 1945, Indonesia could not live in peace. 
Netherlands fought to reverse what it considered to be an ignominy. Armed confrontation in 
which Muslim parties as well as local military commanders played a large role, coupled with a 
succession of diplomatic negotiations, eventually led to the recognition of sovereign Indonesia 
in 1949 and the formation of a unitary state under a parliamentary system in 195051. The 
system of government has changed over time but it is essentially today presidential with a 
lower house called the House of Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) and an 
upper house called the People’s Consultative Assembly or the Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat (MPR).  
 
Following the still mysterious 1965 abortive coup52, General Suharto became president of 
Indonesia. Suharto’s fiat was based on a strong ruling party (Golkar). He reigned over the 
country in the context of a hegemonic authoritarian regime (1965-1998) and developing 
economy53. However, political crises erupted on many occasions. Chief among them was the 
creation of the so-called Petition of Fifty (1980) uniting elites of various professions to contest 
                                                 
50 The data are from the CIA World Factbook 2012. 
51 The Dutch had a preference for a federal state based on a parliamentary system while the Indonesian 
nationalists led by Sukarno were on the side of a unitary state based on a presidential system. The end result was 
thus a compromise. For a detailed chronicle of the events leading to the Indonesian Independence, see US Library 
of Congress, Indonesia (2012).  
52 Various interpretations exist over the actual events that led to the coup and the extent of the Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia or PKI) involvement in it. See Roosa (2006); Crouch (1978: chapters 
4-6), and US Library of Congress, Indonesia (2012).  
53 From 1945 to 1957, Indonesia was a democratic regime; and from 1958 to 1965 it was an autocratic regime 
(see section 4.2.2.).  
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Suharto’s authority. Contemporary Indonesia was a hotbed of extra-legal organized violence 
marked by numerous rural insurrections. Very few regions were spared of any bloodshed and 
the state did not experience civil peace for very long. In that context, we would expect the 
military to be a dominant social group and stability intimately related to its inclusion in the 
ruling coalition. Furthermore, we should be in a position to observe that stability of a ruling 
coalition that includes the military is embedded in a hegemonic authoritarian regime. Given 
the topography of the country, state penetration has always been a challenge. Yet, under the 
New Order, very few regions could escape the central authority in Jakarta and the government 
was the spearhead of economic modernization. Therefore, expectations are that the influence 
of state bureaucrats over national politics will become more and more apparent.  
 
4.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1945-1998) 
 
The event-history analysis of political crises in Indonesia reveals foremost the centrality of 
military and Islamic organizations. Initially sidelined during the 1950s, the increased presence 
of military officers (ABRI) in legislative bodies and the bureaucracy as well as in the economy 
from 1960s to 1970s, and their gradual exclusion later is an inescapable fact of Indonesian 
politics. It was the military’s decision to cooperate or not with the ruling elites that would 
determine the faith of the ruling coalition stability. Yet, the military was not a monolithic bloc. 
Competing interests within its ranks – mostly between the Red/White faction (secular 
nationalists such as Moerdani) and the Green faction (Islamic moderates such as Sudharmono) 
– affected the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition. Thus, it was not 
only a question of if the military was included or not in the ruling coalition, but also which 
military factions were. Islamic parties – especially the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Masyumi – 
were originally major actors both in the party system and the state bureaucracy, mostly in the 
Ministry of Religion54. For reasons that will be evoked, Sukarno later banned Masyumi. 
During Suharto’s New Order, the NU was forced to merge with other parties to form a 
somewhat decorative Muslim coalition called the United Development Party (UDP). By the 
mid-1980s, supported by the long time NU president Abdurrahman Wahid, the Indonesian 
                                                 
54 See section 4.3.1. 
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Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) headed by Habibie took the relay and invested the 
state bureaucracy as well as the armed forces (ref: Green faction)55. This introductory 
overview of political dynamics in Indonesia provides a glimpse of the wide-diversity of social 
forces as well as of the overlap of their functional representation and changing nature over 
time. As a remainder, the objective of all country narrative is not to offer a complete 
explanation of their political history but to examine the empirical manifestation of our 
hypotheses. Thereupon, here is the chronicle of political crises in Indonesia.  
 
In 1947, the Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir was already forming a third cabinet when Tan 
Malaka, a leader of the Indonesian revolution extolling communism, helped by high profile 
politicians and military officers, kidnapped Sjahrir and three ministers and declared the 
installment of the Supreme Political Council (Kahin, 1952: 189; Jhaveri, 1975: 105). A 
staunch nationalist, Malaka, was displeased with the conciliatory tone of the ruling elites and 
the resulting Linggadjati Agreement (1946) with the Dutch, and acted upon it. Basically, this 
agreement was attributing the primacy of the Dutch Queen over Indonesian politics. Sukarno 
ordered the arrest of rebels and Sjahrir was reinstated in his function. It is now known as the 
“July Third Affair”. Following this event, it became apparent that the agreement did not have 
the support of many Indonesian elites. The Dutch cancelled the agreement and initiated the 
military intervention “Operation Product” to impose their solution.  
 
This was a medium to high intensity crisis given the direct attack on the authority of the 
government. It involved military officers in a plot to kidnap the Prime Minister. Although how 
high in the military ranks the conspiracy winded up remains unclear, it appears that many 
generals, notably Sudirman and Sudarsono, decided to choose sides instead of remaining 
neutral (Anderson, 2006: 394-397). It was the start of military involvement in national politics. 
That being said, the crisis took place at a time when Indonesia was not officially an 
independent state therefore falling outside of our analytical framework. If we nevertheless 
                                                 
55 Islamic organizations were also not a monolithic bloc. For instance, the leader of the Muhammadiyah (1995-
2000), Amien Rais – former member of Masyumi – left the ICMI in 1997 and joined the Reformasi movement 
that toppled Suharto. 
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include it in the narrative, it is because we consider it as indicative of the embryonic 
disposition of the military to intervene in domestic politics. 
 
In September 1948, Communist splinter parties violently took control of the local government 
in Madiun and self-proclaimed the town in East Java a Soviet Republic. The event was a 
resent against the Sukarno-Hatta government who, on the advise of military officers, was 
suspected of masterminding putative actions aiming at disarming local communist groups 
(Kingsbury, 2001: 364). For the military, the Communist takeover in Madiun was akin to 
treachery during a time of war when all Indonesians should have been united to fight a 
common foreign enemy (Kingsbury, 2001: 364). Although the revolt was not formally 
sanctioned by the PKI, ideological affinities forced it to support the initiative (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2012). The republican army rapidly intervened and squashed the rebellion.  
 
The crisis was low in intensity since it dealt with local politics. Yet, the connection with 
national politics should not be underestimated since it was implicitly championed by the PKI 
who successfully started to undermine Sukarno’s authority and the prominence of the 
Indonesian National Party (PNI). It epitomizes a nascent qualm between the Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (ABRI) and the PKI that will culminate in the 1965 Communist purge. 
The crux of the contention was a power struggle between the military headquarters working to 
assert their authority over the territory and the PKI growing influence in the countryside, 
especially among peasants. The feud was about the exclusion of local leaders from politics and 
the centralization of authority in Jakarta. Furthermore, the fact that Madiun was located near 
the capital was a direct affront to the military status as protector of the state. As with the July 
Third Affair, the Madiun Affair occurred while Indonesia was fighting for its independence. It 
adds to the event-history analysis as a contextual function: namely, the origin of the animosity 
between ABRI and the PKI.  
 
On 17 October 1952, a small number of officers led by Army Chief of Staff General Nasution 
pushed in Parliament for the dissolution of the assembly and the shake up of military hierarchy 
(Vatikiotis, 1993: 67). Nasution wanted to modernize the Indonesian army. Amongst others, 
he was advocating the demobilization of over 200,000 men recruited to fight the Independence 
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War, mostly from PETA56 (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Supported by local 
military commanders dispersed across the territory, many political parties with strong roots in 
rural areas worked actively to block the military headquarter initiative. They called for the 
resignation of Nasution. Sukarno landed his support to the civil institutions and refused to 
dissolve the legislative while proceeding to a significant turnover of high-raking military 
officials; General Nasution was forced to resign from his position as Army Chief of Staff.  
 
The crisis was medium in intensity. It centered on elite division, mostly between political 
parties and the military establishment. A reminiscence of the Madiun Affair, it was the 
alliance between local leaders and the government, as well as more generally with political 
parties against their corporate interests – i.e. the monopoly of legitimate violence – that 
irritated the military leadership. Sukarno’s unwillingness to approve military modernization 
and his subsequent shake up of the military command, were bold moves. Slowly but surely 
high-ranking officers were developing resentment against political elites, and especially 
against Sukarno. The military’s dismay was amplified by the inability of the ruling elites to 
form a functional coalition. In fact, from 1950 to 1957, coalition cabinet rose and fell at a fast 
pace57. Before 1957, Sukarno was envisioning the composition of the cabinet as representative 
of all major political forces in the country and, on many occasions, he forced the Prime 
Minister to select candidates from the entire ideological spectrum (Jhaveri, 1975: 118). This 
was Sukarno’s conception of a ruling coalition during the parliamentary era. There was no 
dominant party and a plethora of Muslim, socialist and nationalist parties were aggressively 
defending their entrenched interests. For instance, in the 1955 first general elections since 
Independence, eighteen parties obtained at least one seat in Parliament. The military officers 
perceived themselves as the only alternative to disorder. Yet, Sukarno continued to keep them 
at distance. He was all too aware of the danger to attribute greater power to the military.  
 
                                                 
56 Pembela Tanah Air or Defenders of the Homeland (PETA) was an army of volunteers set up by the Japanese 
during the occupation.  
57 Here are the successive cabinets from 1950 to 1957: Hatta’s cabinet (January 1948 – January 1950), Halim’s 
cabinet (January 1950 – September 1950), Natsin’s cabinet (September 1950 – April 1951), Wirjosandjojo’s 
cabinet (April 1951 – April 1952) Wilopo’s cabinet (April 1952 – July 1953), Sastroamidjojo’s cabinet (July 
1953 – August 1955), Harahap’s cabinet (August 1955 – March 1956) and again the Sastroamidjojo’s cabinet 
(March 1956 – April 1957). 
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After few years in exile, Nasution, given its popularity among high-ranking officials, was 
reappointed for the second time as Army Chief of Staff. Facing increased mutiny within local 
military commanders, he issued an order in 1955 calling for the systematic relocation of 
regional military leaders (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Headed by General 
Lubis, diverse regional military units gathered in Jakarta in November 1956. Lubis was 
ambitious: he wanted to overthrow political and military elites starting at the top, with the 
intention of dismissing Nasution from his position of Army Chief of Staff and dissolving the 
cabinet (Feith, 2007: 505). In the end, Lubis’ challenge failed. Yet, in the following months, 
military commanders in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Malaku regions toppled local governments and 
established the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) - Universal 
Struggle Charter (Permesta). Their grievances were wide ranging: disregard by the central 
government of local demands, ineffective bureaucracy crippled by corruption, as well as a 
benevolent attitude of the national elites toward the PKI (Kingsbury, 2001: 367). The 
movement was defeated, albeit sporadic clashes lasted for few more years (Crouch, 1978: 33).  
 
The failed coup in the capital and the bloodless coup in the regions were together a high 
intensity crisis. The country was on the verge of falling apart. In the end, the central 
government reasserted its authority; Masyumi and PSI were banned. Sukarno and the military 
headquarters drew closer – probably by necessity more than by choice – and local military 
leaders who obtained momentarily Sukarno’s support in 1952 were once again overly defiant. 
Ultimately, crises from 1950 to 1957 illustrate the fluidity of alliance politics in Indonesia 
during that period. Former enemies became allies and former allies became enemies 
depending on the issue at stake. In this context, the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion within 
the ruling coalition are difficult to interpret since the existence of a ruling coalition per se is 
problematic. In fact, it would be fair to say that during that period of high instability, there 
were a series of ad hoc coalitions but no such thing as a ruling coalition. 
 
In March 1957, Sukarno declared martial law after the resignation of the Sastroamidjojo’s 
cabinet. Martial law put an end to the parliamentary system and signaled the return to the 1945 
Constitution attributing strong executive power to President Sukarno. In 1960, a new 
legislature called the “National Front” was formed with the aim of mobilizing all political 
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actors: political parties, civil society and the armed forces. “One hundred fifty-four of its 238 
seats were given to representatives of "functional groups", including the military, which 
became known as Golkar…. As many as 25 percent of the seats were allocated for the PKI” 
(US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). The martial law officially ended in 1963, albeit it 
continued under a modified form with the conclusion of the West Irian campaign against 
Malaysia (Crouch, 1978: 34, 54).  
 
The crisis was paramount as it transformed the regime itself. The former strategy of alliance 
politics based on a coalition of political parties loosely integrated was history. The formula 
proved to be ineffective, leading to a succession of ephemeral coalitions. The National Front 
became an all-inclusive coalition in which the military and, after 1963, the PKI were at the 
forefront. Sukarno’s rational was simple: military political power was necessarily growing 
with the declaration of martial law and the PKI emerged as the strongest contender of 
institutions dominated by the military. Yet, the inclusion of the military and the PKI – two 
rival groups that despised each other – in the same coalition was a risky strategy that could not 
last long.  
 
In 1965, in a bizarre and still mysterious twist of events, a series of generals were killed or 
kidnapped by a group of conspirators called the 30th September Movement. The authorities 
suspected an attempted coup d’État against Sukarno and accused the Communists to be behind 
the plot. According to the Indonesian fact-finding Commission, from 250,000 to 500,000 
people were killed in the PKI purge (Crouch, 1978: 155). The annihilation of PKI supporters 
left President Sukarno alone with no political alternative to the army leadership. His capacity 
to reduce the army’s influence was close to nil. Eventually, Sukarno had no choice but to 
surrender. In 1966, he resigned and handed over his power to the new leader, General Suharto, 
who was duly appointed by the MPR as the second president of the republic in March 1968 
(Crouch, 1978: 220)58.  
 
                                                 
58 The other legislative body is the DPR. All its members are elected. In principle, the DPR main functions are to 
vote and ratify laws as well as to oversight government activities. The MPR includes DPR members, and 
nominated representatives of functional groups and regional administrations. The MPR is responsible for electing 
the President, drafting main policy guidelines and amending the constitution.  
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The crisis was a critical juncture and therefore of high intensity. It transformed Indonesian 
politics at its core. The New Order authority was going to center on the military and the 
bureaucracy, the basis of Suharto’s elite support. These groups will definitely displace 
political parties and local leaders as dominant social groups henceforth witnessing a major 
change in the distribution of power. The military officers will control and leave their imprint 
on every administrative and political institution at all levels: national, provincial, district and 
local. And they will become a major economic actor penetrating the economic sphere both 
private and public. Non-military state bureaucrats will have a decisive role later on in the 
1980s-90s as a counter-force to military hegemony. For the first time since Independence, a 
well-structured ruling coalition was formed: the political party Golkar. It will become the 
institutional locus that binds various politic groups. And thanks also to sustained economic 
development and political order, Golkar will win all legislative elections until 1998. That 
being said, by the mid-1980s, Suharto’s decision to exclude the Red/White military faction 
from the ruling coalition was containing germs of instability for the next decade to come. 
 
Just after the 1973 first national election of the DPR since 1955, pressure from below 
culminated in the 1974 Malari Affair. It was triggered by the visit in Jakarta of the Japanese 
Prime Minister Tanaka. Public grievances were mainly about foreign capital domination over 
the national economy. It subsequently expanded to the resent against growing economic 
inequalities. Led by the student movement at the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), mass 
mobilization inflamed the streets. Protesters demanded the ousting of Suharto and a radical 
transformation of the political and economic systems59. It degenerated into rioting and looting. 
The demonstrators were hardly repressed, few were killed, the government closed numerous 
media and universities fell under the direct supervision of the military (Aspinall, 2005: 24). 
These events came in fact as an escalation following another crisis: few months before, 
outraged Muslim parties went awry furious against a marriage bill initiated by the government 
that would have superseded Islamic laws (Liddle, 1978: 185). Eventually a compromise was 
reached.  
 
                                                 
59 The so-called “White book of the 1978 Students’ Struggle”. 
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These crises were medium insofar as the decision to repress or not students and to accept or 
not Islamic demands were indeed divisive issues within the ruling coalition. Most of all, they 
created a malaise within the military who was a dominant force in the ruling coalition. It 
shows that the military cohesion was nevertheless precarious (Crouch, 1978: 316). It illustrates 
that the ruling coalition did not evolve in isolation from outside pressures. Yet, Suharto’s 
ruling coalition stood firm. The fact that these were the only events that threatened the 
functioning of the government over the 1970s confirms the general consent and acquiescence 
of key peripheral actors, at least until the 1980s. With the communist threat long gone, the 
issue of Islam politics will then recapture the center stage as the decisive cleavage in society 
and challenge the unity of the ruling coalition.  
 
In March 1980, Suharto spoke in front of ABRI commanders and questioned indirectly their 
allegiance to the state ideology, Pancasila (Vatikiotis, 1993: 141)60. Thereafter, fifty public 
figures including senior retired generals, notably “the father of the army” General Nasution, 
former governors, mayors, prime ministers, ministers and religious leaders signed a petition 
denouncing Suharto’s reification of all criticisms directed at him as if it would equate with the 
abnegation of Pancasila (Aspinall, 2005: 61). Their public protest came with a steep price. 
Suharto constrained their activity on all fronts. They lost their job, access to bank credit, 
business licenses, right to travel abroad and permission to express themselves in media outlets 
(Neher & Marlay, 1995: 85; Vatikiotis, 1993: 141). Nevertheless, the group continued to meet 
informally over the years. 
 
The intensity of the crisis was medium. The Petition of the Fifty was the first unified 
opposition front against Suharto from within the ruling coalition. The fulcrum of the crisis was 
the growing exclusion of a dominant social group, especially retired generals, from the ruling 
coalition. It was a direct challenge to Suharto’s command. Indeed, the Petition of the Fifty 
“retained considerable moral authority and were widely respected in the broader public” 
(Aspinall, 2005: 67). Consequently, “Suharto’s popularity among the elite was in slow but 
perceptible decline, senior military figures, both active and retired, had begun working quietly 
                                                 
60 Pancasila is the Indonesian official state ideology. It rests on five pillars: belief in one God, humanitarianism, 
national unity, Indonesian-style democracy and social justice. 
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to seek his removal” (Vatikiotis, 1993: 69). The fact that the group was not officially banned 
but systematically harassed is a testimony of its importance. Suharto knew the danger of 
transforming these elites into political martyrs. Nevertheless, he was loosing elites’ support. In 
search of an alternative, he will turn to the moderate Muslim community that had a well-
developed organization capable of mobilizing mass support (Aspinall, 2005: 38)61. 
 
The first clear sign of such a tendency was the election of General Sudharmono, a Muslim, as 
Suharto’s vice-president in 1987. ABRI leadership did not approve Suharto’s choice, 
especially the Moerdani’s faction62. As chairman of Golkar (1983-1988), Sudharmono had 
worked to make the party less dependent on ABRI (Aspinall, 2005: 33). In 1988, Moerdani 
succeeded in discharging Sudharmono and nominating Wahono as Golkar chairman 
(Vatikiotis, 1993: 87, 160). It backfired in November 1991 after the Dili massacre in East 
Timor where ABRI troops shot into the crowd. For the first time, high-ranking military 
officers were blamed and held accountable for their action: “two dismissed senior officers 
were both Christians and regarded as being aligned with Moerdani” (Honna, 2003:14). 
 
The crises were medium in intensity. It reflected again the division within the ruling coalition; 
most of all the rivalry between the nationalist secular high-ranking officials and the 
increasingly Islamic penetration of the Indonesian bureaucracy and army through the network 
of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). Suharto actively orchestrated 
the marginalization of the secular and nationalist Red/White faction, while attributing to key 
Islamic leaders from ICMI not only positions in the cabinet and civil administration but also in 
ABRI (Kingsbury, 2001: 374; Bertrand, 2004: 84-88): it became the so-called Green faction. 
As further evidence, the Catholic dominated Centre of Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), a research center associated to Moerdani and close to the government, fell out of favor 
to the benefit of the Muslim dominated Centre for Information and Development Studies 
                                                 
61 Muslim groups and parties originally helped Suharto in establishing the New Order by playing a key role in 
eliminating the Communist sympathizers. However, this was an ad hoc alliance. Suharto rapidly changed his 
position and started to repress Muslim organizations to make sure they would remain inactive as a political group 
(Bertrand, 2004: 40). Regardless, Muslim organizations continued to act as the backbone of civil society in 
Indonesia.  
62 General L.B. Moerdani was a Christian, ABRI Commander-in-Chief (1983-1988) and the second most 
powerful man in Indonesia behind Suharto at that time.  
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(CIDES) (Bertrand, 2004: 89). Moreover, in 1994, ABRI intelligence agency (BAIS) created 
by Moerdani was dissolved (Honna, 2003: 20). “The new policy exacerbated tension in the 
ruling elite. It especially alienated Moerdani’s supporters in ABRI, who considered that 
vigilance against political Islam was central to security policy” (Aspinall, 2005: 41). Yet again 
in 1993, ABRI succeeded in electing General Sutrisno as vice-president instead of Suharto’s 
choice, Habibie (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002: 37)63. Suharto reigned at the top of Indonesian 
politics, but he was not free to behave independently of alliance politics reality. The fact that 
he accepted Sutrisno’s election, reached out to moderate Muslims in order to extend his 
political support and adjusted to the defection or expulsion of military factions from the ruling 
coalition corroborates such premises. But at the end, the exclusion of the strong Red/White 
faction from the ruling coalition to the benefit of the ICMI network generated instability.  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, student protests became a regular feature, partly because of the 
willingness of ABRI not to use violence against them (Vatikiotis, 1993: 143; Aspinall, 2005: 
35). Similarly, labor strikes were more and more frequent, especially in the industrial city of 
Medan; and peasants were mobilizing in West Java and Madura (Pabottingi, 1995: 251-252). 
The country was in ebullition. In December 1993, Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of 
Sukarno, won the PDI election. “This was despite Suharto’s best attempts to have her election 
thwarted, but she was successful because of the support she received from senior members of 
ABRI’s Red and White group” (Kingsbury, 2001; 378). In July 1996, the ruling elites tried to 
oust the opposition leader with no success. The country was ripped for a revolution. The Asian 
economic crisis and the subsequent downfall of the rupiah triggered an inflationary spiral that 
added fuel to the fire. And following the recommendation the IMF, “the removal of energy 
and food subsidies in May 1998 sparked widespread chaos in Indonesia” (Smith, 2001:86). 
The student movement hit the street in mass across the country and was rapidly joined by all 
segments of society notably the influential Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, and the 
PDI. Initially, the government responded with brutal violence. Instead of diffusing the 
situation, the crackdown galvanized it. On May 18th, “Golkar chairperson and DPR Speaker 
Harmoko called on the President to step down … Habibie himself approached Suharto and 
                                                 
63 However, “in 1993 Suharto named his longtime information minister, Harmoko, to succeed Wahono and 
become Golkar’s first-ever civilian general chairman” (Malley, 1999: 89). 
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advised him to step aside… [few days later] fourteen cabinet ministers informed the President 
that they would not be willing to serve in his reshuffled cabinet” (Aspinall, 2005: 234-235). 
Suharto finally resigned on May 21st 1998.  
 
This series of crises were obviously high in intensity and represented the fatal blow to the New 
Order. When the Red/White faction represented by General Wiranto refused to act against the 
demonstrators, the ICMI soon left the sinking ship: Suharto was isolated (Funston, 2001: 79). 
“It was at this juncture, when Suharto finally lost the backing of his closest allies, and military 
leaders signaled that they could not ensure order, that he realized he had to step down” 
(Freedman, 2006: 96). In other words, the mobilization came from below, but it succeeded 
only insofar as the military decided not to intervene. It was Suharto’s ultimate sentence for the 
exclusion of the Red/White faction from the ruling coalition.  
 
The above event-history analysis demonstrates foremost the central role of the military 
through ABRI and indeed the rise of high-level state bureaucrats associated to ICMI. The 
power in Indonesia was concentrated in the presidency, but ABRI, and to a lesser degree, the 
ICMI were far from spectators. It reflects asymmetrical interdependence between actors. “In 
Indonesia, even an incumbent president’s power must be backed by at least a minimal 
consensus among the military and bureaucratic elite” (Jackson, 1978: 6). And these elites were 
not muted and subjugated: they were pressuring the ruling elites. None could be framed has 
monolithic as both institutions reflected the division within society: most of all the 
secular/religious cleavage. Furthermore, the narrative reveals that the rivalry was not only on 
one side, between the military and political parties and on the other, between state bureaucrats 
and local leaders, but also between social groups on each side. The ICMI and ABRI were 
penetrating both the military and the state bureaucracy; each was representing in a way two 
dominant social groups. In this context, it points to the difficulty associated with incorporating 
simultaneously the ICMI and ABRI in the ruling coalition. Ultimately, the gradual exclusion 
of ABRI (i.e. its main faction, the Red/White) as a political and bureaucratic force from the 
ruling coalition hampered seriously in the long term the normal functioning of the 
government.  
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4.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence 
 
In Indonesia, the use of extra-legal means of political expression has been the norm over time. 
In such context, we would expect that the military would be the cornerstone of authority since 
it is the only social group capable of coping systematically with such challenge. The above 
narrative tends to corroborate such statement. Yet, the centrality of the military should be 
further explored not only in terms of its corporate interests and constituencies but also to 
validate if its inclusion in the coalition coincides with a hegemonic authoritarian regime.  
 
The country has a long history of violence and its people have seen their share of blood. 
Indeed, from the War of Independence to secession conflicts and the Communist purge, the 
death toll has reached macabre proportion. On Java and Sumatra Islands, the Indonesian 
People’s Army was up against the Dutch and British until 1949. The confrontation took mostly 
the form of guerrilla warfare and claimed thousand of lives. In the 1950s, the Islamic 
movement, Darul Islam, calling for the installment of a theocracy, took the arms in West Java, 
South Sulawesi and Aceh. From 1963 to 1966, low intensity conflicts erupted in North Borneo 
between Malaysia and Indonesia. The 1965 repression of communists had no cause to be 
envious of Stalin brutality. Later, civil wars raged in West Papua (1965-84), East Timor 
(1975-98) and Aceh (1990-2005) involving various autonomous and secessionist movements. 
Moreover, street protests in urban areas were frequent and often degenerated into riots, and in 
rural areas peasants and landholders often were solving their conflicts with violence (Aspinall, 
2005: 250; Crouch, 1978: 21; Jackson, 1978: 40). In brief, the country was the theatre of high 
degree of extra-legal organized violence and civil unrest. 
 
4.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies 
 
From 1950 to 1965, the military’s role in politics evolved as its organizational capacity 
increased. The War of Independence had an inherent political dimension for the military. They 
were the spearhead of an emancipation project that would shape the future institutions. But it 
was foremost about fighting a foreign enemy, not siding with a given domestic political group. 
Furthermore, until the mid-1950s, the Indonesian armed forces were a collection of relatively 
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autonomous units spread over the archipelagic territory. Their operations lacked a clear chain 
of command and tactics were based on guerrilla warfare. In this regard, the events surrounding 
the PRRI (1956) show that even if the military was gradually included in the President’s close 
political circle, the fact that they did not have control over their subunits prevented them from 
playing a stabilizing force. They were not in a position to influence political outcomes on the 
national scene precisely because their organization was centrifugal.  
 
Yet, the military forces were already benefiting from an aura of legitimacy among the general 
population as the liberator from the foreign troops of occupation. Interesting enough, given its 
grassroots organizational structure during that period, “the army’s ethnic representation fairly 
reflected the ethnic composition of the country, and its ideological orientation was strongly 
Islamic” (Pabottingi, 1995: 244). In a way, regional military commanders were part of the 
local fabric and as such were able to attract sympathy among the public. But with the 
radicalization of Islam politics, notably the Darul Islam revolt, its composition was skewed 
toward Javanese (Pabottingi, 1995: 244). This shift highlights the cleavage between devoted 
abangan Muslims in Java and santry Muslims in outer islands. Santry is based on “pure” 
interpretation of Islam while abangan integrates various traditions found in Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Animist religions. Furthermore, in Java itself, the santry/abangan fracture, as 
well as the modernist/traditionalist cleavage among santry was also visible (Liddle, 1978: 
1989-190). They were structuring political affiliations to the point “there was virtually no 
partisan competition” (Liddle, 1978: 190). The abangan Javanese was demographically the 
dominant group; and the armed forces reflected such distribution of power. Ultimately, the 
dissociation of the military from Islam politics coincided with the military shake up of 1952, 
which in principle was supposed to allow Sukarno to place abangan Javanese loyalists in key 
military positions (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). 
 
As already mentioned, General Nasution was determined to transform the Indonesian armed 
forces into a professional corps. In doing so, he was threatening not only the well-entrenched 
interests of local military commanders, but also the ones of political parties who started to 
worry about the emergence of an effective and independent instrument of coercion. The 
decision of political parties to deny General Nasution the authorization to proceed with the 
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modernization of the armed forces gave rise to a reflection among high-ranking officers about 
their role in politics as an institution, and incited them to articulate a common policy (Crouch, 
1978: 31). Military unity and political action became a necessity. The civil government 
weakened by factionalism and cabinet instability proved to be unable to lead the country. 
Disorder was breading on every corner. The military had an additional incentive to intervene. 
The decisive military victories in crushing insurrections across the territory in the 1950s were 
giving them some momentum and prestige. It was the only actor capable of providing security 
to the common people. Nevertheless, they were lacking influence over politicians and, overall, 
dependent on civil institutions.  
 
With the declaration of martial law in 1957, the military became an indispensable ally for 
Sukarno to assert his authority over a nation ready to explode. It was the opportunity for ABRI 
to push its way into politics. Under the instigation of General Nasution, the moral and legal 
basis for such intrusion was introduced in 1958 under the concept of the “Middle Way”, 
“according to which the army would neither seek to take over the government nor remain 
politically inactive. Instead the military claimed the right to continuous representation in the 
government, legislature, and administration” (Crouch 1978: 24). Later, the “Middle Way” was 
expanded under the label dwifungsi (or dual function): the military was becoming both a 
protector of the state and a socio-economic agent of change. It was ratified by the legislative 
and given force of a law64; “constitutionally legitimizing what had been military ideology” 
(US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Thereafter, the armed forces were consolidating 
their authority. For instance, “in Sukarno’s cabinet, representation of the armed forces jumped 
from two ministers to eleven” (Pabottingi, 1995: 244). The military also enhanced its prestige 
with the victory in West Irian and the containment of local rebellions in the 1960s. Regardless 
of the military ascendance in politics, it is important to keep in mind that “the army leaders 
recognized that Sukarno’s authority as president gave the regime an aura of legitimacy it 
would not have without him. They knew that he had the support of most of the political 
parties” (Crouch, 1978: 46). In other words, the military was content with being a peripheral 
actor within the ruling coalition rather than directly seizing power.   
                                                 
64 Law No20/1982. 
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At the same time, Sukarno wanted to contain the growing power of the military. He opted for 
the most potent political organization: the PKI, which was building an extensive network 
capable of mobilizing thousands of supporters all over the country. Indeed, the PKI ironically 
benefited from martial law. Instead of allocating resources to win elections or pass bills, it 
channeled all its efforts in building an organizational capacity especially with the development 
of local branches (Rocamora, 1973: 145). In other words, by canceling elections, Sukarno 
participated in strengthening the organizational structure of political parties. The PKI 
benefited the most because it was already present in the countryside where it was winning the 
heart and mind of the population to the detriment of local military commanders; the army and 
secular nationalists were concentrated in urban areas (Crouch, 1978: 248). Furthermore, in the 
process, PKI leaders “mobilize popular support in the takeovers of both foreign property and 
surplus land” (Crouch, 1978: 78). In fact, the PKI acted as a surrogate of the civil 
administration in rural areas, notably by enforcing the implementation of Sukarno’s land 
reforms (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). In terms of capacity, and with a 
membership of over two millions individuals, only the PKI could contain military ambitions 
(US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). In the absolute, a coalition merging the two had 
the potential for fostering elite’s consent of Sukarno’s authority.  
 
Yet, Sukarno’s strategy to ally with the PKI had the advert effect of reinforcing the military 
temptation to intervene in politics, especially when the PKI tried to outstrip the military 
prerogative in regard to the monopoly of legitimate violence. Already betrayed by the Madiun 
Affair in January 1965, the military was outraged by the PKI leaders' proposition to arm and 
train workers and peasants. Their intent was to form a fifth force composed of peasants, armed 
by China, that would evade the control of the military establishment and act directly in support 
of the army, navy, air force and police (Crouch, 1978: 82-90; Neher & Marlay, 1995: 78). The 
proposition also included the implementation of an advisory board within each of the four 
branches of the armed forces, composed of civil representatives. The ABRI-PKI coalition built 
by Sukarno was precarious since each was suspicious of the intention of the other and tended 
to see conflicts as a zero-sum game. In other words, ABRI was not willing to cooperate with a 
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political party so hostile to its corporate interests. It is in this context that the 1965 coup 
occurred, leading to the departure of Sukarno and take over of General Suharto in 1966.  
 
During fifteen years, political parties – mostly Muslims and socialists/communists – stood in 
the way of military corporate interests on several occasions. The cumulating effect reached its 
apex in 1965. As these challenges occurred, the military gradually transformed itself into a 
more or less cohesive force to reckon with. From the coup and until 1998, they will 
overshadow political parties as the central figure of authority in national institutions. Political 
parties survived the New Order, but the government kept their activities on a tight grip through 
various means, mostly financial and nomination controls (Santoso, 1997: 30). The entire 
opposition was in effect co-opted and “associated with ideological obfuscation rather than 
ideological differentiation from the regime” (Aspinall, 2005: 257). Furthermore, the new 1971 
electoral system consisting of a proportional and a list system “caused the alienation of MPs 
from their constituencies” (Santoso, 1997:  28). Many MPs were parachuted into an alien 
constituency. For opposition leaders, “selection by the president is more important in creating 
power than a mass following” (Jackson, 1978; 32). Thus, as the military grew stronger, 
political parties grew weaker.  
 
Military officers started to occupy key functions in the government and civil administration. 
“By the late 1970s, half the cabinet and over two-thirds of the regional governorships were 
military appointees. At the district level, 56 per cent of district officers were military men. In 
the bureaucracy, 78 per cent of director-generals and 84 per cent of ministerial secretaries 
were Abri appointees” (Vatikiotis, 1993: 70-71). For many observers, popular support of the 
regime was largely attributed to the role of military officers (US Library of Congress, 
Indonesia, 2012). According to Santoso (1997: 36-37), “it is also a fact that in daily life, ABRI 
members are respected and trusted by the public formally and informally. Many from the 
lower rungs have been chosen voluntarily by the public as village headmen or chairmen of 
social and sports organizations”. In fact, according to General Wahono, the basis of ABRI 
involvement in politics lays on its public support (Honna, 2003: 37). 
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Through its ABRI Masuk Desa program (ABRI go to villages), it connected directly with the 
people. “The Indonesian army was, in a sense, a people’s army” (Crouch, 1978: 36). Although 
by law, military officers were not allowed to vote in general elections, they nevertheless had 
captive constituencies. As additional evidence, the 1987 general election was a testimony of 
their ability to attract voters. “ABRI for the first time decided to lend tacit support to one of 
the two minority parties, the Christian-backed Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). ABRI-
organized PDI rallies in Jakarta resulted in spectacular electoral gains for the party in the 
capital” (Vatikiotis, 1993: 77-78).  
 
In the 1980s, military status within the ruling coalition began to wane. For instance, “only four 
ministers in the 1988 and two in the 1993 cabinet were active duty officers, and the number 
declined further in the 1993 cabinet” compared to eleven in the 1980s (Vatikiotis 1993: 25; 61; 
140). This decline coincided with ABRI factionalism. In many ways, the division was a 
reflection of social cleavage (Liddle, 1978: 182). It was a political microcosm of social change 
that was including different constituencies. The armed forces had been traditionally dominated 
by abangan Javanese and Christians: that is the secular and nationalist Red/White faction. Yet, 
the society was evolving and its Islamization more and more apparent though less radical 
compared to the Darul Islam era. In the 1970-80s, ICMI moderate leaders started to exert 
influence in their community (Bertrand, 2004: 85). In parallel, the armed forces underwent a 
major personnel turnover. The old guard who orchestrated the National Revolution retired and 
a younger generation took over, many of them being proud Muslims. The rise of Generals 
Feisal Tanjung, Hartono and Syarwan Hamid at the top of ABRI chain of command is a clear 
example of such tendency (Honna, 2003: 30-31). The Green faction emerged and grew closer 
to Suharto to the detriment of the Red/White faction. The rift between Suharto and Moerdani, 
largely a by-product of the criticism of the latter on Suharto’s family business operations, and 
the ruthless repression in Tanjung Priok65 convinced Islamic leaders that only Suharto could 
check the vile ambition of non-Muslims (Vatikiotis, 1993: 163). This is why they landed their 
                                                 
65 Moerdani was responsible amongst others for the September 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre, where soldiers 
shotted at the mob killing hundred Muslims who demanded the release of four Mosque caretakers arrested few 
days before (Bertrand, 2004: 77). 
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support to the President even if he was the main culprit of Islamic repression back in the old 
days. At the same time, Bertrand argues (2004: 87),  
 
“A continued marginalization of Islamic groups, and relative favoritism of 
Christians and abangan, would have required increasing amounts of societal 
repression, as the pressures for more political involvement among Muslims had 
been on the rise… When Muslim organizations began to adopt more 
accommodationist strategies and became less threatening to the New Order’s rule, 
there were few arguments left to resist a greater inclusion of Muslims”. 
 
Regardless of this division within ABRI and of the rise of Islamic influence through ICMI, 
ABRI’s support was essential to the Suharto regime because it was, according to Habibie 
himself, “a biding force… [that] hold together the various elements and factions within 
Golkar” (Honna, 2003: 30). Habibie’s tentative rapprochement in 1993 with the Petition of the 
Fifty is indicative of such statement66. Golkar was not an ordinary political party. Its initial 
function was to provide organizational capacities in the fight against communism (Juoro, 
1998: 197). Once the domestic enemy was eliminated, Suharto reshaped the organization into 
an electoral machine. And at all times, ABRI was an integral part of its inner-working; to a 
point that there was a considerable overlap between Golkar and ABRI membership. Golkar 
was more a joint secretariat of functional groups supervised by ABRI then a real decision-
making body, but military officers were not more accountable than other political groups in 
the New Order. Popular participation in public affairs was reduced to policy implementation at 
the local level (Jackson, 1978: 5). Also, ABRI, including the Red/White faction, was not a 
pro-democratic force. “In many respects, the officers most alienated from Suharto retained 
highly authoritarian views” (Aspinall, 2005: 54). Overall, the Golkar structure followed the 
top-down model, but it was nevertheless “relatively responsive of the people’s aspirations, 
especially those related to major economic activities and selected welfare programmes” 
(Juoro, 1998: 206). The main forum for participation in Golkar was the Department of 
Research and Development that was regularly offering individuals of various horizons the 
possibility to express their opinion on specific issues. The bottom line is that “ABRI stands 
above all other groups because of its tight organization, its capacity for violence, its 
                                                 
66 Habibie invited the group to speak openly during one Parliament session.  
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domination of Golkar and parliament, and its financial understanding with the business sector” 
(Neher & Marlay, 1995: 83). Moreover, it could count on wide popular support.  
 
During the New Order, ABRI was the greatest challenge to Suharto personal power. Some of 
its high-ranking officers were able to accumulate significant power. The Moerdani network is 
a prime example. On many occasions, as the event-history analysis has catalogued, ABRI 
opposed itself to Suharto, whether directly as with the Petition of the Fifty or the ousted of 
Sudharmono as Golkar chairman or indirectly by tolerating public manifestation; sometimes 
with success and in other cases with dire consequences. In fact, “within the DPR, it is the most 
vocal in criticizing the government policies” (Santoso, 1997: 36). Suharto was never in 
position to behave in an autocratic fashion in its relation with ABRI.  
 
The above comments were intended to delineate the complex role of the military in Indonesian 
politics as it relates to our analytical framework. As Sukarno opted to play the PKI against the 
ABRI, Suharto similarly decided to play ABRI against the ICMI. Instead of forming a 
coalition where all social groups would be united against the opposition, they adopted a 
strategy of “divide and rule”. In other words, the ruling elites were picturing themselves as a 
moderator of conflicts between peripheral actors; conflicts that they nevertheless orchestrated 
themselves and that will have the unintended consequence of initiating their demise. Still, 
from 1965 to 1980, the regime proved to be highly stable and this hallmark was the result of 
an alliance between military officers and the state bureaucrats factions within the ruling party 
Golkar. And the role of the military within the ruling coalition could not be separated from the 
larger political context associated with the regime type: that is, the 1965-1980 period was one 
characterized by a hegemonic authoritarian regime.  
 
4.2.2. Types of Regimes 
 
The Indonesian regime went through various phases until the advent of electoral democracy in 
1998. Freedom House considers that the Indonesian regime was partly free (hybrid) from 1972 
to 1992, not free from 1993 to 1997, and again partly free from 1998 to 2005. Given the fact 
that the independence of Indonesia happened two decades before Freedom House started its 
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classification, it has limited analytical utility. Alternatively, we identify three periods. The first 
was a form of electoral democracy (1950-1957). The second was a mere dictatorship (1958-
1965). And the last was epitomic of a hegemonic authoritarian regime (1966-1998).  
 
1950-1957: Electoral Democracy 
 
Most specialists agree that the Indonesian regime was an electoral democracy during the 1950-
1957’s period (Juoro, 1998: 203; Neher & Marlay, 1995: 75; Kingsbury, 2001: 30; Pabottingi, 
1995: 240). The first election in 1955 was based on universal suffrage; it was free, fair and 
competitive since the main national political parties found their way into the party system 
(Lipset, 1998: 87). Legislative powers of the assembly were genuine, the press was vibrant, 
courts were free of political interference, and the civil society was flourishing (Vatikiotis, 
1993: 196). As the diversity of political parties found in Indonesia at that time illustrates, 
freedom of association and expression was generally respected.  
 
This rosy picture should not however be overstated. First, party leaders were disconnected 
from the reality of their constituencies; secluded in the capital (Liddle, 1978: 173). They were 
driven by the quest of personal power unconstrained by party discipline or social demands 
(Rocamora, 1973: 145). Hence, the competition was not between ideologies but between 
individuals. Second, political elites were approaching elections with skepticism; suddenly, the 
political game was out of their hands (Rocamora, 1973: 145; Liddle, 1978: 174). Furthermore, 
it is difficult to judge a regime based only on one election. Third, the separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative was ambiguous. Most of all, the role played by the 
Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP), a non-elected advisory body to the president, 
was one played in parallel with the functions legally attributed to the cabinet and the 
legislative (Jhaveri, 1975: 92, 116). Also, although the 1950 Provisional Constitution was 
limiting the power of the president, Sukarno retained in practice considerable power and was 
not directly elected.  
 
We therefore conclude that Indonesia was an electoral democracy but with some obvious 
hurdles. Also, as it was the case for Malaysia and in fact as it is for most countries, it is always 
 170  
difficult to assess with certitude the type of regime during the first decade after Independence. 
The regime is in gestation and his definite attributes still in the making.   
 
From the vantage point of our analytical framework, the period is a mismatch. There were 
incongruities between the degree of extra-legal organized violence, the regime type and the 
pattern of alliance politics. The combination of civil wars, an embryonic democracy and a 
multiparty coalition was a recipe for chaos; and indeed instability was chronic. In such a 
context, and as stated before, the dynamics of alliance politics during this period fall outside of 
our analytical framework.  
 
1958-1965: Autocratic Regime - Guided Democracy 
 
In the course of the first two years following the declaration of martial law in 1957, elections 
were abolished and the Parliament dissolved. All along, the press was muted, political 
meetings illegal and political repression on the rise. The National Defense Council with the 
military occupying key positions was created, and the 1945 quibbling Constitution reinstated. 
But indeed, it was lacking precisions and leaving room for interpretation by political elites in 
regard to state and society relations, as well as to the specific rights and duties of the 
government and citizens (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Its reinstatement meant a 
change in the system of government, from a parliamentary to presidential system. In effect, all 
powers were concentrated in the hands of the President. When Sukarno named himself 
president for life in 1963, there was little doubt about the true face of the regime. It looked 
very much like a dictatorship.  
 
Looking back, the Guided Democracy was mostly a transitional period. It witnessed a change 
of system of government and a change of constitution. Although after 1963, Sukarno 
reinstated political parties, their exact legal status was in limbo. Therefore, the application of 
our analytical framework is far from being straightforward. From 1957 to 1962, it was almost 
a dictatorship dominated by the military. Sukarno’s choice of allies after 1963, and its inherent 
instability as the 1965 abortive coup illustrates, demonstrate the dichotomous relation between 
the military and political parties. An alliance that includes both in such a context is not meant 
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to last. The ruling elites have to side with either one and it is obvious that Sukarno could not 
remain in power without the military. Sukarno behaved after 1963 as if he was stuck between 
a hegemonic authoritarian and a competitive authoritarian regime...a recipe for instability.  
 
1966-1998: Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime - The New Order 
 
During that period, Indonesia held regular legislative elections with universal suffrage (1971, 
1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997) and opposition parties were allowed to compete. However, 
Suharto was not directly elected, many members of the MPR were nominated, electoral fraud 
was common, opposition leaders were handpicked by the ruling elites. And freedom of press 
and association were severely restrained (Smith, 2001: 108). President Suharto was unopposed 
and nominated each time (1972, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1993) through a unanimous 
decision by the MPR (Neher & Marlay, 1995: 85). Although the proportion was changing in 
each election, he appointed overall over half of the MPR members; providing a de facto 
majority to the ruling elites in the legislature. Violence and intimidation were frequent against 
the opposition, notably through the State Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakin) (Kingsbury, 
2001: 371).  
 
Table V – Electoral Results in Indonesia (Legislative) 
 
Year Political Party Votes % Seats %
1955 Partai Nasional Indoensia (PNI) 8,434,653 22.3 57 22.2
Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi) 7,903,886 20.9 57 22.2
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 6,955,141 18.4 45 17.5
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) 6,176,914 16.3 39 15.2
Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) 1,091,160 2.9 8 3.1
Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo) 1,003,325 2.7 8 3.1
Partai Katolik 770,740 2 6 2.3
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) 753,191 2 5 1.9
Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI) 541,306 1.4 4 1.6
Persatuan Terbijah Islamijah (Perti) 483,014 1.3 4 1.6
Partai Rakyat National (PRN) 242,125 0.6 2 0.8
Partai Buruh 224,167 0.6 2 0.8
Gerakan Pembela Pancasila (GPPS) 219,985 0.6 2 0.8
Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PRI) 206,261 0.5 2 0.8
Persatuan Pegawai Polisi Republik Indonesia (PPPRI) 200,419 0.5 2 0.8
Partai Murba 199,588 0.5 2 0.8
Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki) 178,887 0.5 1 0.4
Persatuan Indonesia Raja (PIR) 178,481 0.5 1 0.4
Others 2,022,056 5.4 10 3.9
Total 37,785,299 99.9 257 100.2
Participation Rate (87.7%)
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The doctrine of “floating mass” forbade political activities except during elections. And the 
only two legal opposition parties were a creation of Suharto himself, designed to foster 
internal infighting. Indeed in 1973, he forced the merge of existing political parties into two 
entities: the United Development Party (PPP)67 and the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI)68. 
                                                 
67 The PPP includes the NU, Muslim Party of Indonesia (Parmusi) and Islamic Association Party of Indonesia 
(PSII) and the Islamic Educational Movement (Perti) 
1971 Golongan Karya (GOLKAR) 34,348,673 62.8 236 65.5
NU 10,213,650 18.7 58 16.1
PNI 3,793,266 6.9 20 5.5
Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) 2,930,746 5.4 24 6.7
PSII 1,308,237 2.4 10 2.8
Parkindo 733,359 1.3 7 1.9
Partai Katolik 603,740 1.1 3 0.8
Perti 381,309 0.7 2 0.5
IPKI 338,403 0.6 0 0
Partai Murba 48,126 0.1 0 0
Others 0 0 0 0
Total 54,699,509 100 360 99.8
Participation Rate (94%)
1977 GOLKAR 39,750,096 62.1 232 64.4
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) 18,743,491 29.3 99 27.5
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) 5,504,757 8.6 29 8.1
Total 63,998,344 100 360 100
Participation Rate (90.6%)
1982 GOLKAR 48,334,724 64.3 242 67.2
PPP 20,871,880 27.8 94 26.1
PDI 5,919,702 7.9 24 6.7
Total 75,126,306 100 360 100
Participation Rate (92%)
1987 GOLKAR 62,783,680 73.2 299 74.8
PPP 13,701,428 16 61 15.3
PDI 9,324,708 10.9 40 10
Total 85,809,816 100.1 400 100.1
Participation Rate (91.3%)
1992 GOLKAR 66,599,326 68.1 282 70.5
PPP 16,624,547 17.0 62 15.5
PDI 14,585,546 14.9 56 14
Total 97,809,419 100.0 400 100
Participation Rate (90.9%)
1997 GOLKAR 84,187,907 74.5 325 76.5
PPP 25,340,028 22.4 89 20.9
PDI 3,463,225 3.1 11 2.6
Total 112,991,160 100 425 100
Participation Rate (89.8%)
Data Source: RŸland (2001)
Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the category "Others". Also, 
for legislative elections, independents are included in this category. 
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The former was regrouping Islamic parties of various strands and the latter was an amalgam of 
nationalist and Christian parties. Golkar was the only party allowed to operate below the 
provincial level, giving it a direct and exclusive contact with the population (Juoro, 1998: 
198). Media outlets had to obtain a license from the government to publish whatever content, 
and editorial boards were selected by the ruling elites (Santoso, 1997: 27). In this regard, one 
reason why Freedom House might have downgraded the Indonesian regime from partly free to 
not free in 1993 could have been the closing of the influential media DëTik, Editor, and 
Tempo. “After the banning, the return to coercion accelerated. The security forces arrested and 
tried several prominent dissidents” (Aspinall, 2005: 47). Overall, the real political opposition 
operated largely beyond the confine of political institutions (van der Kroef, 1978: 621). 
Therefore, the period of the New Order clearly corresponds to characteristics found in a 
hegemonic authoritarian regime; the conduct of elections could not be called competitive at all 
and in many ways, results were loaded well in advance.  
 
However, although the influence of military is hard to deny, the contention about whether 
Indonesia was under Suharto a military regime or based on civil institutions is less evident. 
First, of course Suharto himself was a general. Second, the New Order created a powerful 
coercive apparatus using extra-constitutional means such as the Operational Command for the 
Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib), the State Intelligence Coordination Agency 
(Bakin) and the Special Operations (Opus). Given their covert and repressive nature as well as 
the target of their activities, that is the society in general, these agencies were typical of a 
police state organization and draw closer the regime to a totalitarian form. Third, the strong 
ABRI presence in the government and civil administration was too evident, giving it an instant 
military flavor.  
 
Yet, public policies during the New Order diverted from what we usually see in a military 
dictatorship. “Policies, if anything, are less favorable to the military establishment’s 
institutional interests than were the policies of Guided Democracy…. drastically reducing the 
                                                                                                                                                         
68 The PDI includes the Indonesian National Party (PNI), the League of the Supporters of Indonesian 
Independence (IPKI), the Murba Party (Partai Murba), the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), Catholic Party 
(Partai Katolik).  
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size of the Indonesian military establishment” (Jackson, 1978: 13)69. According to Vatikiotis 
(1993: 61), “the demilitarization of Suharto’s New Order has gone so far it is barely 
recognized as a military-led government. In many ways it is not”. Second, some Indonesian 
military officers transformed themselves into savvy politicians: they departed from the typical 
hard-nose behavior associated with their professional training (Crouch, 1978: 35). Third, “the 
Indonesian military’s dual function doctrine, formulated in 1965, did not claim actual 
leadership for the military but was used to claim a permanent and open role for the armed 
forces in Indonesian politics and society” (Brooker, 2000: 140). In the end, civilian institutions 
prevailed over military ones: Indonesia had a parliament and was not governed by some form 
of military council or junta.  
 
As for the post-1998 period, we are reticent to classify it as partly free given it was a genuine 
democratic transition. Freedom of the press was restored. The 1999 legislative election (DPR) 
was competitive and fair as the PDI victory testifies. And under the Sukarnoputri’s presidency, 
all legislative bodies, regional and local representatives as well as the president of the republic 
were now directly elected.  
 
In retrospective, the most stable period in the political history of Indonesia is the one that 
mirrors our ideal-type. The 1970s saw fewer crises than in other decades. The military were 
included in the ruling coalition as a key peripheral actor under a hegemonic authoritarian 
regime. The case of Indonesia illustrates that the prevalence of a given dominant social group 
is not necessarily and unconditionally tied to a regime type but when it converges in 
conformity with our analytical framework it has a reinforcing effect. That being said, the fact 
that military officers were part to different degrees of the ruling coalition and behave as if they 
were in a hegemonic authoritarian regime – as the gestation of the “Middle Way” that found 
its legal expression in 1982 demonstrates – during the democratic (1950-1957) and autocratic 
period (1958-1965), and not like the liberal or penetration model respectively (see Chapter 
Two, p. 88-89), generated instability and tends to confirm the nil hypothesis. Our framework 
explains foremost hybrid regime stability, not necessarily stability in other types of regimes. 
                                                 
69 From 600,000 to 350,000 officers between 1967 and 1979.  
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We however gave equal attention to the period before the New Order even if it was not a 
hybrid one. We did so because it participates in exploring the extension of our claims and put 
into perspective the historic ascension of Indonesian military officers in politics.  
 
4.3. The Degree of State Penetration 
 
The Indonesian regime evolved gradually into a strong state. During the Sukarno’s era, 
administrative extension was problematic. Afterwards, it improved. The New Order 
centralization process was underway and soon as few regions could escape Jakarta’s control. 
Economic extension followed a similar trajectory. An underdeveloped nation until the 1970s, 
it succeeded in bringing about economic modernization through massive state intervention. 
Therefore, we would expect that state bureaucrats gradually replaced local leaders as a 
determinant social group in Indonesian politics. The events surrounding the PRRI in the 
1950s, ABRI’s penetration of the bureaucracy and later the importance of Habibie and the 
ICMI affiliates in the 1980s-90s is in line with such claim.  
 
4.3.1. Administrative Extension 
 
Under the Dutch’s control, local leaders were accomplishing the basic functions of the civil 
administration (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984: 123). After Independence, a power vacuum 
occurred and the political integrity of the state especially in the outer islands was in disarray. 
There was a marked disconnection between the center and the regions whereas the latter had 
almost no contact with the former. Regions were physically and administratively cut-off with 
few transportation networks linking them with the center and had little access to any public 
services. Furthermore, in the capital, the state bureaucracy was divided along party lines: each 
party having more or so the control of a ministry. For instance, NU sympathizers were visible 
in the Ministry of Religion and PNI sympathizers in the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
Information (Emmerson, 1978: 88). The situation led to bitter infighting, each party using the 
state resources for its own interests (Rocamora, 1973: 184). Nomination procedures in the civil 
administration were foremost political in nature, with few considerations related to 
competences (Jackson & Moeliono, 1973: 104). In this context, the state bureaucracy could 
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obviously not be considered a dominant social group. Local affinities based on the traditional 
vision of bapak (father/patron) and anak (child/client) were primordial (Jackson, 1978: 36). 
“In the cultures of Java, Sumatra, and the surrounding islands… a rigidly stratified society is 
held together by vertical alignments between patrons and clients” (Neher & Marlay, 1995: 77). 
Yet, instead of cultivating the cooperation with local leaders, the center antagonized them with 
the resulting instability the ruling coalition experienced in the 1950s.  
 
The New Order changed all of that. It implemented a unified and centralized civil 
administration structure. Law 5/1974 created civil administrative units at all levels (provinces, 
districts, villages) that paralleled the military one, assuring control and respect of decisions 
taken in the capital70. Additionally, military officers were heavily recruited in the bureaucracy 
to further the grip of the ruling elites and curb the pervasive influence of political parties 
(Crone, 1991: 103). Leaving the political arena, the bureaucracy was being transformed into 
an effective instrument of economic development. According to the presidential decree 
6/1970, political activities were forbidden within the civil administration, and all state 
employees were obliged to demonstrate loyalty to Golkar (Emmerson, 1978: 107). The cabinet 
included academics instead of politicians (Crouch, 1978: 242). And the civil administration 
attracted most students with higher education (Santoso, 1997: 38). Suharto rationalized the 
civil administration. He reduced the number of ministries by 25% compared to what prevailed 
under the Guided Democracy  (Emmerson, 1978: 82). The Inpres government program was 
largely directed to investment in education, health and infrastructure. (Bertrand, 2004: 195). 
The impact was quickly visible as the situation in all those areas significantly improved: 
literacy and life expectancy rates progressed as well as transportation networks connecting 
isolated areas (Emmerson, 1978: 133; Santoso, 1997: 23; US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 
2012). Finally, tax collection was reinforced and fiscal revenue increased substantially, while 
regional administration revenues were controlled by Jakarta (Malley, 1999: 79).  
 
Noteworthy, all along one ministry was expanding in terms of employees, whereas in others 
reduction of personnel was the mantra. At a point, it became the biggest of all ministries. It 
                                                 
70 Under the law, one person nominated by the national elites oversaw both the regional administration and 
regional government (Malley, 1999: 79). 
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was the Ministry of Religion. Nearly, “one-third of all Indonesian half-million civilian 
departmental employees worked for it” (Emmerson, 1978: 87). In 1971, “the appointment of a 
religious technocrat as minister, Professor H.A. Mukti Ali, a man unaffiliated with any 
political party” signaled the willingness of the ruling elites to co-opt moderate Islamic leaders 
(Emmerson, 1978: 96). It will serve as the basis for the ICMI emergence and penetration of 
the civil administration. Before 2000, ICMI was reporting over forty thousand members, 
mostly civil servants, whereas the defunct Masyumi and the NU were formed of entrepreneurs 
and teachers respectively (Aspinall, 2005: 40). Later, ICMI tentacles under the Center for 
Information and Development Studies (CIDES) will widen and infiltrate most ministries. It 
evolved into a centre of bureaucratic power within the civil administration. However, this 
ascension never materialized into a direct access to the ruling elites: “ICMI reformers 
succeeded only in establishing themselves on the regime’s periphery” (Aspinall, 2005: 59). It 
would therefore be fair to state that the 1987-88 crises and Suharto’s nomination of 
Sudharmono as vice-president are part of a trend that started two decades earlier.  
 
The archipelagic territory of Indonesia leads to a simple conclusion: “Indonesia has perhaps 
the most awesome physical impediments to national integration of any state in the Third 
World today” (Jackson, 1978: 23). It comes therefore as no surprise that regional dissents and 
refusal of the central authority persisted. Yet, during much of the New Order period, provision 
of public goods was improving and, in some cases, was adequate compared to developing 
countries standards.  
 
4.3.2. Economic Extension 
 
Initially, Sukarno spent vast sums in non-productive activities such as the organization of 
sumptuous celebrations and the edification of superlative public properties (Crouch, 1978: 44). 
The President was not specifically concerned with the state of the economy, but as it appeared 
more with political gains. Until 1956, there was no development plan for the long-term 
economic growth of the country. After that date, a first five-year plan proposed public 
investment strategies but was eclipsed by the chaotic takeover of Dutch companies by the 
state. And it was the PKI members and military officers that actually undertook the 
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nationalization process, not civil servants. ABRI and PKI were therefore competing not only 
on the political front but also on the economic one. Over 300 plantations and the same amount 
of firms operating in natural resources and services sectors were subject to a takeover by the 
state (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012).  
 
A national oil, natural gas and mining company, Pertamina, was created in 1968, headed by 
Ibnu Sutowo, Nasution’s close associate. Pertamina quickly diversified its activities both 
vertically in transformation process and horizontally in agricultural and manufacture sectors, 
and the revenue generated served political purposes especially to increase social capital 
overhead and military procurement (Crouch, 1978: 276; US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 
2012). With the oil shock in 1973, oil revenues increased exponentially, contributing to the 
expansion of government programs and its presence in the economy. Another source of public 
funding was Bulog, a trading company specialized in agricultural products, especially rice, but 
with many other assets in the clothing, banking and forest sectors in which military officers 
were also heavily involved (Crouch, 1978: 278).  
 
Figure 6 – Natural Resources Rent in Indonesia 
 
 
By the late 1960s, the National Development Planning Council (Bappenas) was set up and led 
by market-friendly economists from the University of Indonesia who obtained their PhD from 
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Berkeley (California). They designed the first five-year plans of the New Order: “Repelita I 
(FY 1969-73) stressed increased production of staple foods and infrastructure development; 
Repelita II (FY 1974-78) focused on agriculture, employment, and regionally equitable 
development; Repelita III (FY 1979-83) emphasized development of agriculture-related and 
other industry; Repelita IV (FY 1984-88) concentrated on basic industries; and Repelita V (FY 
1989-93) targeted transport and communications” (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). 
The impact of these plans was visible in the increased share of the value added of the 
industrial sector (see table VI). 
 
It propelled the country towards an emerging economy. Yet, a vivid and autonomous middle-
class never extended beyond few industrial centers. In these urban areas, the rapid growth 
contributed to a certain degree to the formation of an embryonic political opposition. In this 
regard, Golkar electoral support base was in rural regions (Malley, 1999: 103-104). 
Notwithstanding these developments, small entrepreneurs were undersized and reliant on state 
contract to keep doing business (Santoso, 1997: 38-39). And besides those affiliated to Golkar 
such as Soksi, labor unions were prohibited after the PKI purge in 1965. Foreign corporations 
and Chinese-Indonesian businessmen71 with close connections with military and government 
officials dominated the economy (Crone, 1991: 103; Jackson, 1978: 28; Crouch, 1978: 284). 
Indigenous entrepreneurs were suffocating in a protected market monopolized by 
conglomerates. 
 
Table VI – Indonesia Socio-Economic Modernization 
 
                                                 
71 Notably the world-class tycoon Liem Sioe Liong.  
Indicator Name 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Urban population (% of total) 14.60 17.10 22.10 30.60 42.00
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 217.80 164.90 121.20 85.00 54.00
School enrollment, primary (% gross) n.a 83.97 n.a 118.75 112.74
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 51.46 44.94 23.97 19.41 15.60
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 9.22 10.29 12.99 20.66 27.75
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 15.05 18.69 41.72 39.12 45.93
Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012
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Indeed, state intervention in the economy was widespread during the Suharto era. It took 
mostly indirect forms such as “fixing prices, controlling supplies of fertilizer and kerosene, 
setting licensing arrangements for imported goods, and imposing arbitrary ceilings on bank 
credits” (Pabottingi, 1995: 250). These extensive regulation controls provided the instrument 
for the government to decide which sectors and companies were to be privileged. In the 
process, the government chose to protect monopolistic positions in strategic sectors 
(Freedman, 2006: 86). All private economic actors were hostage of government preferences. 
 
Table VII – Indonesian State Investment in the Economy 
 
With oil collapse and world economic recession in the mid-1980s, the country performance 
was showing signs of decline. The so-called western-trained “Berkeley Mafia” and other pro-
market academics pushed for a new set of reforms and a deregulation of the financial sector. 
They advocated the end of government controls on bank lending, the use of preferential 
interest rates and subsidized credit programs. The ruling elites did proceed with trade 
liberalization and the dismantling of some monopolies. Competitive bides replaced the 
practice of import licenses attribution on plastic and steel to one conglomerate; and non-tariff 
barriers in the manufacturing sectors were reduced from 50% to 35% (US Library of 
Congress, Indonesia, 2012). The measures contributed to revitalize the economy.  
 
Yet, the liberalization process was limited. The natural resources sector remained under the 
General Gov't 
Consumption   
(% of Total 
Consumption 
Gov't Enterprises 
and Investment 
(% of Gross 
Investment)
1970 9.28 40.4
1975 12.19 39.4
1980 16.75 49.5
1985 16.36 43.0
1990 13.04 32.5
1995 11.28 20.7
2000 9.47 20.7
2005 11.2 20.7
2009 14.5
Data Source: Economic Freedom of the World, 2012
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firm control of the government. Furthermore, Habibie created the Council for the 
Development of Strategic Industries to identify which state-owned companies should not be 
privatized. The Council selected ten state enterprises working in high-tech sectors, armament 
and steel production (US Library of Congress, Indonesia, 2012). Hence, Habibie oversaw vast 
segments of the economy and was responsible for the wellbeing of citizens belonging to 
various backgrounds. In addition, as head of Sekneg (state secretariat), Sudharmono oversaw 
the attribution of development projects to economic actors and reduced substantially 
government windfall of ABRI business affiliates (Honna, 2003:11). He also orchestrated a 
reorientation of Golkar’s treasury by “recruiting new cadres from ranks of business who might 
provide financial support for Golkar, which would in turn reduce ABRI’s influence in Golkar 
administration” (Honna, 2003: 11). In the end, deregulation only reinforced the position of the 
conglomerates that with their initial market position could benefit the most from new business 
opportunities. The privatization process was far from being transparent. The chief beneficiary 
was Suharto’s family (Vatikiotis, 1993: 152).  
 
Above all, the privatization process profited to Suharto’s immediate entourage and upper 
echelon state bureaucrats to the detriment of military officers (Aspinall, 2005: 32). And ABRI 
was skeptical of Professor B.J. Habibie’s intentions, head of ICMI and Minister of Research 
and Technology, who could “consolidate his independent power base outside of military 
control” (Honna, 2003:13). Indeed, during the first decades of the New Order, military officers 
built a private fortune. Most of all, they received side-payments from foreign or Chinese 
businessmen in exchange of license delivery. This is the shift more than the economic 
liberalization process per se that created instability and dissatisfaction among ABRI 
representatives.  
 
Furthermore, although clientelistic practice was an integral part of Indonesian politics, its form 
changed over time. Originally, it was particularistic whereas local military officers were 
coercing rural communities and controlling regional economic activities for private gains. 
During the New Order, the ruling elites allowed the development of military patronage 
network via the control of state-owned companies (e.g. Pertamina) or the private sector insofar 
as it served mostly as a source of structural financing for the armed forces (Crouch, 1978: 38-
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39, 275). At the same time, government grants, notably through the Inpres and Banpres 
programs, were targeting the poor regions in exchange of loyalty to Suharto and Golkar 
(Malley, 1999: 80; Juoro, 1998: 195; Bertrand, 2004: 41, 196). It was thus part of a larger 
scheme. Until the 1990s, corruption level never fostered popular upheaval (Vatikiotis, 1993: 
165). By the time the liberalization process was in full motion, clientelistic practices had 
diverted the gains from organizational aims to particularistic interests, namely the Suharto 
family who ripped the larger share of the windfall. Yet it was only when, on the advise of the 
IMF, Suharto decided to deregulate the price of basic commodities and started to exclude 
dominant social groups that the opulence of the Suharto family became outrageously 
provocative; anger started to mount within the Indonesian population and led to the fall of life-
long president.  
 
The analysis of the degree of state penetration reveals the great socio-economic transformation 
Indonesia has gone through over the period covered in the present study. It had an impact on 
the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition by shifting the role of relay 
between the center and the regions from local military commanders to state bureaucrats. It also 
contributed to anchor the importance of Habibie as a dominant figure of the bureaucracy.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The support of military officers and state bureaucrats were determining factors explaining 
political stability in Indonesia. The fact that this alliance cemented during the first two decades 
or so of the hegemonic authoritarian regime (1965-1980) and that this period was the most 
stable one of the country contemporary history fits our hypotheses. Especially if one considers 
that at the same time the expansion of the state over the territory and in the economy had for 
consequence to empower state bureaucrats. In the 1980s-1990s, instability was created by the 
gradual exclusion of the strongest faction within ABRI (i.e. Red/White faction) from the ruling 
coalition. Overall, we believe our framework contributes to simplify complex elite’s 
interactions without neglecting central aspects of the country political life. 
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Figure 7 – Indonesia Timeline 
 
The two variables participate in clarifying the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion within the 
ruling coalition. The examination of the degree of extra-legal organized violence enriches our 
comprehension pertaining to the almost intrinsic animosity that existed between military 
officers and opposition parties; corroborating our claim that these two dominant social groups 
are mutually exclusive. Their relation is a zero-sum game. Indeed, as the military influence 
over politics grew, the relevance of opposition parties as agent of political expression 
diminished accordingly. It also delineates the position of military officers within the political 
regime. They were one of the only critical voices of the ruling elites. As such, it implies that 
they had some form of autonomy over the ruling elites while being members of the ruling 
coalition. They never intended to rule the country and continued to anchor their actions in 
relation to the ruling elites in civilian institutions. Finally, given that the degree of extra-legal 
organized violence was high throughout the period, military officers had therefore incentives 
to intervene all along and without their consent, the ruling elites were vulnerable. Yet, their 
positive impact on stability was mostly visible during the hegemonic authoritarian period, 
which tends to indicate that our framework – especially the degree of extra-legal organized 
violence since it relates to the type of regime – is one dedicated to patterns of stability in 
hybrid regimes and not, in its present format, to the study of stability in other types of regimes. 
The degree of state penetration highlights the crucial role of local leaders during the 1950s in 
fostering instability as little attempt was made by the ruling elites to incorporate them in the 
ruling coalition. Over the years, the state invested the economic sphere and state bureaucrats 
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became an integral part of the ruling alliance; contributing to establish functional links 
between the center and regions and providing the ruling elites with key support.  
 
The case of Indonesia provides additional insights. First, the dynamics of exclusion and 
inclusion within the ruling coalition were complex, at least compared to Malaysia. Often, there 
was superimposition of institutional structures and social group identities intertwined. Indeed, 
ABRI started as a military organization but many of its members were appointed to the civil 
administration. ICMI began as a religious organization mostly active within the bureaucracy, 
but later expanded its tentacles in the military. These overlaps partly explain why there was a 
growing rivalry between the two, which Suharto envisioned as a way to assert its domination 
but led instead to an unstable ruling coalition and eventually to its ousted of power. Second, if 
it was established that small states were outside our population sample because the dynamics 
prevailing in these countries obey to a different logic, a similar argument appears not to be 
valid for big states. Indeed, Indonesia has one the largest population among non-western 
countries and our framework holds regardless.  
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5 
 
Senegal 
 
 
A former French colony, Senegal became fully independent on April 4th 1960. Located on the 
West coast of the sub-Saharan continent, it has a population of nearly 13 millions of which 
43.3% are Wolof, 23.8% are Pular, 14.7% are Serer and 94% are Muslim72. Although the 
system of government has been subject to important modifications overtimes, for the most part 
of its contemporary history it was a presidential system with a bicameral parliament including 
a senate and a national assembly.  
 
Over the years, the Union progressiste sénégalaise (UPS) – renamed the Parti socialiste (PS) 
in 1976 – dominated the country political landscape until 2000, going through various types of 
hybrid regimes: a competitive authoritarian regime from 1960 to 1966, a hegemonic 
authoritarian one from 1967 to 1976 and finally again a competitive authoritarian regime from 
1977 to 2010. Léopold Sédar Senghor (1960-1981) and Abdou Diouf (1981-2000) were the 
chief architects of the ruling party longevity. Nevertheless, the government experienced many 
political crises and the majority of them were high in intensity. The new millennium marked 
the election of the long time opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade and his Parti démocratique 
sénégalais (PDS) who were, up to 2010, in command of the country’s destiny.  
 
Overall, the degree of extra-legal organized violence was low. Although West Africa has 
witnessed many atrocities over the years, Senegal stands apart. Only in the 1980s with the 
conflict in the Casamance region did it reach worrying levels. Henceforth, according to our 
framework, opposition parties and not military officers should be playing a decisive role in 
political dynamics and the type of hybrid regime should closely correspond to a competitive 
authoritarian regime. As for the degree of state penetration, it was also low. The state grew in 
size, but it did not manifest an effective presence in most rural areas; and the multiplicity of 
                                                 
72 The data are from the CIA World Factbook 2012.  
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parastatal enterprises provided generous salaries for connected notables but contributed little 
to productive outputs. Conversely, we expect local leaders to have a significant impact on 
patterns of stability and instability.  
 
5.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1960-2010) 
 
The narrative of political crises that follows shows two general trends73. First, consent of local 
leaders is the key factor explaining the PS survival over four decades. It is only when they 
stopped landing in bloc their support that ruling elites were defeated in elections. Political 
parties were generally confined to urban areas and each battled hard to consolidate their 
respective constituency. Second, the 1980s was the least stable period; and it was only during 
that one that a ruling coalition did not include any member of the opposition parties. The first 
president, Léopold Senghor, had the vision of a unified party (1966-1978) that would absorb 
all political forces; the second, Abdou Diouf, was in favor of an enlarged presidential majority 
(EPM) (1991-2000) that would include leaders of opposition parties in the government; and 
the third, Abdoulaye Wade, invited opposition parties to formally join his Sopi coalition 
(2000-2010). These were all various forms of political alliances that fall under the ruling 
coalition appellation.  
 
On September 5th 1960, Senghor was elected and became the first president of the Republic of 
Senegal. Soon, a conflict broke out between him and Prime Minister Dia over the political and 
economic orientation of the country. In April 1962, Dia used state emergency powers to 
muzzle media outlets and assert his control over the country (Hesseling, 1985: 232). Months 
later, in December 1962, Dia sent a brigade to dissolve the Parliament. Four deputies were 
arrested then freed by paratroopers on Senghor’s order (Hesseling, 1985: 233). In the end, the 
three main armed forces – the republican guards, gendarmerie and paratroopers – chose to 
support Senghor in conformity with article 24 of the Constitution (Sy, 2009: 35). Dia and his 
                                                 
73 As a remainder, our definition of a political crisis implies the disruption of government normal activities. The 
political history of Senegal includes many urban riots and labor strikes that are not covered here. Yet, all these 
riots and strikes did not necessarily affect the functioning of the government apparatus mostly because of their 
limited duration. For instance, the general strike of 1999 lasted only two days. It reflects a general consensus 
among elites about the appropriate way to end a conflict. In other words, it did not involve any manifestation of 
political elite contestation. Elite’s consent of power-holder’s decisions remained intact. 
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loyal ministers were jailed on charge of attempting a coup d’État; and more than thirty 
deputies were expelled from the UPS (Schumacher, 1975: 39).  
 
This was a major constitutional crisis of high intensity. It severely affected the functioning of 
the government. At the heart of the conflict was first Dia maneuvering to establish a one-party 
state whereas Senghor was promoting a somewhat softer version: that is, the integration of 
political parties into the UPS (Hesseling, 1985: 236). Indeed, later on, Senghor’s option will 
prevail. By the end of 1966, the UPS had absorbed the Parti du regroupement africain (PRA) 
and a faction of the Bloc des masses sénégalaises (BMS), while other opposition parties or 
factions who refused to join the ruling party were banned. It was the case for the Parti africain 
pour l’indépendance (PAI), the Front national sénégalais (FNS) and the remaining BMS 
affiliates. Effectively, all political parties except the UPS ceased to exist. Second, Dia pushed 
for something close to a command Soviet-style economy that would have threaten French as 
well as local leaders economic interests (O’Brien, 1971: 275; Coulon, 1988: 147). The latter 
consisted mostly of marabouts74, and these were largely under the influence of the powerful 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Mourides, controlling a significant portion of the peanut agricultural 
output and trading operations. Therefore, in opposing Dia, Senghor sided with the local 
leaders and chose to co-opt opposition parties willing to join him instead of repressing them all 
together.  
 
During the period 1967-69, the country found itself in a major turmoil. On February 3rd 1967, 
Demba Diop, a deputy and mayor of Mbour – a center of the peanut processing industry 80 
km south of Dakar, the capital – was assassinated. On March 22, the same year, attending a 
Muslim annual celebration at the main Dakar mosque, an individual claiming to be a Dia’s 
sympathizer succeeded in putting the President Senghor at gunpoint, but was stopped before 
he could shoot (Hesseling, 1985: 258). Shortly after, a student boycott at the University of 
Dakar escalated into a countrywide general strike and troops were sent to repress protesters. 
Amongst others, bank employees, petroleum and postal workers as well as officials from the 
rural development agency, the Office national de coopération et d'assistance au 
                                                 
74 In Senegal, a marabout is a Muslim religious leader.  
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développement (ONCAD), joined the ranks and marched in the streets of the capital and of 
several cities (Schumacher, 1975: 23). In rural areas, hard-pressed peasants collectively 
stopped paying their debt and switched to subsistence farming instead of using their lot for the 
commercial production of peanuts; it is known in the literature as the infamous “malaise 
paysan” (O’Brien, 1979: 20-31; Casswell, 1984: 47-48). The state of emergency was declared. 
Public buildings including universities and schools were closed; and public gathering of more 
than five persons was made illegal (Hesseling, 1985: 262). Politicians were arrested and the 
French army was called to rescue the national army being detached near the borders (Diop & 
Diouf, 1990: 36, 38). Protests continued and lasted until 1969. Ultimately, it was the concerted 
intervention of religious leaders and the implementation of a series of economic reforms that 
diffused the situation, notably an increase in the price of peanuts and a restructuring of 
peasants debts (Coulon, 1988: 153, 184; Casswell, 1984: 48).  
 
Obviously, together, this series of crises was high in intensity; it threatened the regime at its 
core. The state literally stopped functioning, creating chaos all over the country and seriously 
disrupting government activities. Grievances were numerous75 but these events were at the end 
an accumulation of all of those and a combination of many factors that can be foremost 
interpret as a crisis of representation. The survival of only one party, the UPS, had left the 
opposition with only two options: “clandestine political activity or trade union organizations” 
(Coulon, 1988: 148). They chose the latter and entered into a confrontation with the ruling 
elites. Indeed, unions were the main vehicles of public discontent, especially the Union 
nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal (UNTS). Facing such defiance, the ruling elites quickly 
dissolved the UNTS and replaced it by one loyal to the UPS: the Confédération nationale des 
travailleurs du Sénégal (CNTS). Furthermore, the unified party ruling coalition formula had 
left the marabouts anxious about their status within it. As O’Brien (1971: 278) evokes: “the 
                                                 
75 Students disliked the French authority over the university administration (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 253). 
Peasants were displeased with a reduced price paid for peanuts, the main source of individual income; a 
consequence of the French decision to end their policy of subsidizing the price of peanuts in their former colony 
and new government regulations (Casswell, 1984: 46). Their discontent was especially acute since the decreasing 
price of peanuts coincided with an increase in the price of staple foods, especially rice; and others were furious 
about new tax schemes (Schumacher, 1975: 23). Union workers wanted better labor rights and salaries (Hayward 
& Grovogui, 1987: 253). State employees complained about the absence of wage increase since the Independence 
(O’Brien, 1979: 219). 
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power of the marabouts, in this new situation, is less clearly defined; politicians no longer 
have the same urgent need of electoral support”. They were loosing their leverage. Once 
reassured, notably by being given a key role in ONCAD through which they can exert 
influence, they backed the Government and order was restored in the countryside. The impact 
of the peasant contestation on the conduct of political affairs in Senegal was a clear signal of 
the strategic influence of rural constituencies.  
 
In March 1983, eleven opposition parties published a declaration to condemn what they 
perceived to be fraudulent results of the legislative and executive elections the same year. Four 
parties contested the electoral results in the Supreme Court (Hesseling, 1985: 297). Deputies 
of the newly formed PDS and Rassemblement national démocratique (RND) even refused to 
sit in Parliament (Sy, 2009: 159). Few months later, everything was back to normal but 
opposition parties came back again in protest during the electoral campaign for the 1984 
municipal and rural elections and decided to go for a boycott of the elections (Diaw & Diouf, 
1998: 132).  
 
This crisis was medium in intensity since it involved a boycott of elections and brief 
suspension of the usual functioning of the Parliament. It happened in a context where the 
country had enjoyed almost fifteen years of relative political stability. In that interval, two 
important events should however attract our attention. First, in 1978, Senghor proceeded with 
a form of contained political liberalization by allowing two oppositions parties (PDS and 
RND) to compete against the PS. In doing so, he installed a three parties system that will last 
until April 1981. The indirect effect was to dismantle the pre-existing ruling coalition that was 
regrouping elites of the PRA and BMS under the auspice of a unified party. Second, Senghor 
voluntarily resigned in 1981 and was replaced by his close associate, Prime Minister Abdou 
Diouf. With him in power, a new generation of bureaucrats entered politics (Diaw & Diouf, 
1998: 131; Diop & Diouf, 1990: 93; Schumacher, 1975: 83). This shift led to a major 
difficulty for the Diouf’s Government to obtain support from local leaders. The strong ties the 
marabouts had with the old political elites were suddenly cut off and the new elites had little 
connection with the local base (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 91, 316.). Thus, previous patterns of 
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political alliances were dismantled and instability emerged looming ahead for the next years to 
come. 
 
In February 1988, after the official results of the legislative elections were announced, social 
unrest cropped up, mostly in Dakar. The PDS challenged the ruling elites and threaten to 
publish what it claimed to be “the true results of the elections” (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 136). 
Diouf declared the state of emergency. Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the PDS, as well as 
other leaders of the opposition were arrested (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 341). Order was quickly 
restored but not for very long; an opposition coalition was formed, the Alliance démocratique 
sénégalaise (ADS), and eleven parties signed a document entitled la plate-forme des onze to 
protest against government actions. They called for mass mobilization against the state of 
emergency. Subsequently, urban riots were reported and manifestations were heavily 
repressed. The crisis ended in May with the liberation of Wade. Nevertheless, the rumbling 
discontent remained high during the following years as the boycott of the municipal elections 
in 1990 testifies.  
 
This crisis was high in intensity as the state of emergency suspended government functions. 
Opposition grievances were wide-ranging, but la plate-forme des onze mostly called for the 
resignation of Diouf as well as for the cancellation and rescheduling of the last legislative 
election. In a volte-face, Wade agreed to meet with Diouf after his release from prison and in 
doing so, automatically distanced himself from the opposition coalition. Diouf named Wade as 
Parliament Opposition Leader and made illegal the formation of a political coalition (Diop & 
Diouf, 1990: 359). This decision should be understood in a context where Diouf “succeeded in 
wooing nine of Wade’s PDS parliamentarians to the PS by mid-1986” (Hayward & Grovogui, 
1987: 263). It will culminate in 1991 with the formation of a government of national unity, the 
EPM. It aimed at including leaders of the main opposition parties within a ruling coalition. 
Overall, the crisis did not spread over in the countryside. The backing of a powerful ally, the 
general Khalif of the Mourides Abdoul Ahad Mbacké, was no stranger to this situation: just 
before the 1988 election, the Khalif declared that not voting for Diouf would equate to a 
betrayal of the founder of the Mourides Brotherhood, the Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba (Sy, 2009: 
161, 321).   
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In 1993, the Vice-President of the Constitutional Council, the judge Babacar Sèye, was 
assassinated 24 hours after the legislative electoral results were revealed. As history repeats 
itself, social agitation occurred with pictures of burned cars, looting and vandalized properties 
in Dakar; and once again Wade was arrested (Coulibaly, 2006: 31). At that time, Wade was 
repeatedly warning magistrates not to associate themselves with the PS or be complaisant 
about electoral fraud (Coulibaly, 2006: 75-77). He was suspected of conspiracy but it was 
never proven and he was eventually release from custody. Strangely enough, when Wade was 
elected president in 2000, he blessed the murderers of Sèye and introduced three years later a 
law granting amnesty to somehow erase the events from historical records (Sy, 2009: 166). 
After Sèye was gunned down in 1993, the same year, another crisis emerged when opposition 
parties rallied in the street to protest against a 15% salary cut and the imprisonment of a 
religious leader, Moustapha Sy; a popular figure among the urban youth (Encyclopedia of 
Nations, 2012; Villalon, 1995: 140). The government responded with repression and “three 
M.P.’s and some 87 others were found guilty on November 12 of participating in an illegal 
demonstration” (US Department of State, 1994).  
 
These crises were of medium intensity since it involved the assassination or the collective 
sacking of political elites. It epitomizes a battle between Diouf and Wade in which the power 
of the latter grew; as a member of the EPM and Minister of State, Wade was getting greater 
exposure although he did not have any portfolio. Yet, over and above this power struggle, the 
crisis was mostly reflecting the volatility of the composition of the EPM; Wade himself 
entered and exited the coalition on few occasions. It resembled more like an ad hoc alliance 
between two individuals than a long-term strategic partnership between political parties. It was 
also symbolizing the emergence of dissent voices among the Muslim community. Indeed, 
“Moustapha Sy had become highly critical of the government, launching a scathing personal 
attack on Diouf just days before the February elections” (Villalon, 1995: 140).  
 
In 2000, Diouf lost the presidential election to Wade by a 17% margin. A year later, the Sopi 
coalition led by Wade obtained a two-third majority in the legislative elections. It gave citizens 
hope for a better future and marked the beginning of a significant elite turnover. More than 
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forty years of PS domination vanished in thin air, with only a remaining 10 seats in 
Parliament. In fact a wind of change had already started to blow in 1998 when the 
participation rate reached 38.8% in the legislative elections: signaling a general dissatisfaction 
with politics. In the 2000 executive and 2001 legislative elections, participation rates came 
back in a blue sky reaching respectively 60.8% and 67.4%. 
 
The crisis was high in intensity since it involved a major overhaul of the distribution of power 
within the Senegalese party system. The event was a by-product of three phenomena. First, the 
fact that Diouf was getting old and did not want to step-out was reducing opportunities for 
professional advancement and inciting some PS barons to leave the ruling party. In this regard, 
Djibo Ka and Moustapha Niasse are prime examples. The former, as government Minister in 
both the Senghor and Diouf administration, ended up creating his own party in 2000: the 
Union pour le renouveau démocratique (URD). The latter, as Foreign Minister, formed the 
same year the Alliance des forces de progrès (AFP). In 2000, they ran for president against 
Diouf and Wade. In the second round of the election, “Wade masterfully maneuvered Ka and 
Niasse into his camp. With their support, Wade won the election and changed Senegal 
forever” (Galvan, 2001: 55). Second, Wade built a coalition under the leadership of the PDS 
that included a myriad of minor parties (approximately 40) and together contributed to the PS 
rout. In doing so, he captured a significant share of the urban vote. Third, after 1988, “the 
marabouts stopped issuing religious edicts in support of Diouf’s ruling party… the marabouts 
adopted a stance of political neutrality, neither supporting the ruling party nor mobilizing 
support for opposition candidates” (Galvan, 2001: 59). In other words, the PS gradually lost 
his traditional ally. At the same time, Wade claimed his allegiance to the mourides and made 
public appearance during religious ceremonies in Touba, the epicenter of the Brotherhood; all 
of this to be pictured as a man of good faith among the rural communities (Sy, 2009: 322).  
 
On March 22nd 2007, twelve opposition parties signed a declaration to protest against what 
they considered to be a rigged executive electoral process and decided to boycott the 
legislative elections few months later. The victory of Wade was for them an imposture (Sy, 
2009: 215). Chief among them were Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS), Moustapha Niasse (AFP) 
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and Abdoulaye Bathily (LD/MPT)76. Their complaints were many but most off all it was about 
the lack of transparency of the Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA). As a 
result, the participation to the 2007 legislative election was a record low at 34.5%.   
 
The crisis was medium in intensity with the boycott of the major opposition parties but did not 
prevent the ruling elites from governing. In fact, it increased their power since the remaining 
political parties could not compete with the Sopi coalition. However, this hegemonic position 
should not be exaggerated: with a low participation rate and without the inclusion of at least 
one major opposition party in the Sopi coalition and allies in rural areas, the reign of Wade 
and his PDS appeared to rest on a shaky ground. Indeed, the Sopi coalition looked much more 
like a relatively loose constellation of notables than a true multiparty coalition.   
 
Senegal has a tradition of compromise, negotiation and coalition building. Repression alone 
was never the unique mantra of power-holders. As the event-history illustrated, political elites 
had shown ingenuity in constructing political alliances. All had their weaknesses, which is 
partly the reason why Senegal has experienced so many high intensity crises. Nevertheless, in 
the decade when no ruling coalition existed, the country was ripe for major social upheavals. 
Only the support of the marabouts saved the day.  
 
5.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence 
 
In spite of the prevalence of several conflicts in West Africa, Senegal has been relatively 
spared of organized forms of social violence. According to our framework, opposition parties 
and not military officers should therefore act as a counter-weight force to the ruling elites. The 
event-history analysis confirms it. Still, further precisions about the role of military officers, 
the appeal each political party has to a given constituency, as well as the type of hybrid regime 
in which dynamics evolve are essential to understand the specific patterns of political alliances 
in Senegal.  
 
                                                 
76 LD/MPT stands for Ligue démocratique/Mouvement pour le parti du travail. 
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Beside the conflict in Casamance in the early 1980s, the military intervention in July of 1981 
after the coup d’État in Gambia and the 1989-1991 border conflict with Mauritania, it appears 
that Senegal was exempted from the curse that so many sub-Saharan countries were victims 
of: endless civil wars. Despite this bless as one could say, the three aforementioned events 
should have incited military officers to intervene in politics after 1980. Indeed, Gambia being 
surrounded by Senegal, instability could have easily spread over in Senegal. This was the logic 
behind the Senegalese Government decision to send troops to overturn the coup plotter (Diop 
& Diouf, 1990: 94). Also, the Jola separatism movement in the Casamance region - the 
Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) - was challenging the 
integrity of the state and as such, it dealt with the corporate interests of military officers. In 
this regard, the Senegalese Government intervened in Guinea-Bissau to overthrow the leader 
of the July 1998 coup d’État, General Ansumane Mane, “believed to be a supporter of 
Casamance rebels” (Institute for Security Studies, 2012). More than 5,000 people were killed 
over a period of 20 years in the Casamance conflict (Center of Systemic Peace, 2012). As for 
the border war with Mauritania, it originated as a dispute over grazing rights but escalated and 
spread over to Senegalese towns where many Mauritanian local merchants were systematically 
victims of harassment, looting and so on. They eventually fled the country causing a 
significant refugees crisis. In addition, high level of post-electoral violence was a constant 
feature in Senegal. Almost all elections were followed by urban riots after results were 
announced and the police capacity was so limited that it could not restore by itself order (Diop, 
1992: 17). Thus, there is a puzzle here: despite these incentives to intervene in politics, why 
did the military stay in the barracks?  
 
Many elements need to be considered here. First, post-electoral violence was largely 
uncoordinated, spontaneous, short-lived and concentrated in the capital. Second, Casamance is 
a relatively isolated region; at least from the center of power, Dakar. The two are separated by 
Gambia. Third, Senegal gained independence without taking up the arms. In other words, the 
armed forces had no opportunities to enter politics from the beginning and civil institutions 
were well established by the 1980s. Fourth, the armed forces were mainly deployed in the 
periphery close to international borders (O’Brien, 1979: 209; Hesseling, 1985: 378). Fifth, the 
military was not a potent force; at least compared to the French armed forces who were 
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protecting the government and the capital. And finally, sixth, the Senegalese army was trained 
and educated by French military personnel; as such it had some form of ascendancy over the 
coercive apparatus of his former colony (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 99-100). For all these reasons, 
it is not surprising that Senegalese military officers did not become a major actor in the 
country political dynamics in spite of the events of the 1980s. As Coulon (1988: 167) 
concludes: “the government has sometimes turned to the army for help (in Gambia and in 
Casamance), but in the last analysis, it does not owe its survival to military intervention. There 
is in Senegal today a tradition of nonintervention by the army in political life”. Now that we 
have cleared out this analytical ambiguity, we will expand our reflection on coalition building 
by examining the very large panoramic landscape of political parties in Senegal.  
 
5.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies 
 
Thanks to previous experiences with competitive elections that dated back to colonial time, 
political pluralism was alive and well in place in Senegal during the first years of 
Independence. But step by step, Senghor was going to incorporate all major forces within the 
UPS: “Eight out of twenty-one political organizations formed between 1948 and 1966 (or 38 
percent) joined with Senghor’s party” (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 247). Those that refused 
to join or were advocating anti-systemic discourse were banned. In this regard, the PAI was 
the first victim of such policy. It was outlawed in 1960 based on allegations of violent political 
actions. The party was perceived as too radical in advocating a labor revolution.  
 
The first main target of cooptation was the BMS. Senghor offered government positions and 
seats in Parliament. Some BMS members accepted, while others declined. In October 1963, 
the party was outlawed. Created by the Cheick Anta Diop, a staunch defender of freedom of 
expression and an imminent scholar, the BMS positioned itself like the UPS “under the banner 
of African nationalism and was favored by some marabouts of the powerful Muslim 
brotherhood, the mourides” (Coulon, 1988: 148). It was therefore representing a direct threat 
to the UPS. The Cheick Anta Diop formed another party shortly after, the FNS, but such 
deviance from the main political path was never tolerated by the ruling elites and it was 
dissolved a year later.   
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However, the key merger was the inclusion of the PRA, the main legal opposition party at that 
time. In fact, the row between Dia and Senghor was partly due to the unwillingness of the 
former to make concession to PRA members in order to join the Government. For Senghor, a 
master of political alliance, the risk was worthy. The PRA was rooted in Casamance, a region 
that from Independence Day felt somewhat alien to the center of power and the islamo-Wolof 
tradition of the country77. Because Casamance was the home of the distinct Jola ethnic group, 
of which many members were not Muslims, Senghor knew he had to incorporate them in order 
to prevent an escalation of the conflict. And history proved Senghor was right: “with the end 
of the unified party the conflict in Casamance broke out” (Coulon, 1988: 165). Ultimately, in 
June 1966, PRA officials conceded in exchange of positions in ministries and UPS (Hesseling, 
1985: 256). It was the last official opposition party to exist and it marked the fulfillment of 
Senghor’s vision of a ruling coalition: that is to say a unified party.  
 
In both cases (BMS and PRA), opposition parties had a constituency. According to Hayward 
& Grovogui (1987: 247), “it was important to demonstrate a following, and the official results 
notwithstanding, it was clear that Senghor and other leaders of the UPS felt that the PRA-
Sénégal had done so. Abdoulaye Ly [PRA] went on to discuss the post-election merger with 
the UPS saying [:] … It was only when we were very strong that we joined with the UPS”. 
Although for opposition parties, life outside the UPS was increasingly difficult, repression 
alone could never achieve the same results than coalition building. There was a compromise or 
an exchange: “access to state power and resources was available for elites who demonstrated 
mass support and a willingness to cooperate” (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 248). Of course, 
UPS being a party of notables, the inclusion of BMS and PRA was personalistic in nature; 
Senghor was co-opting the individuals more than opposition parties themselves. Yet, the UPS 
later transformed itself and absorbed more organized political forces such as labor unions that 
were representing the traditional partisan base of the ruling party (Sy, 2009: 227). Also, in 
order to foster cohesion, the President took the decision of creating several organizations such 
                                                 
77 The Wolof is the dominant ethnic group in Senegal. They are concentrated in cities working as civil servants or 
traders, and in rural areas where the peanut production is located. They are also leaders of the Muslim 
organizations. Other major ethnic groups are the Fula, Serer, and Jola. However, ethnic exclusion was never a 
fact of life in Senegal. Non-Wolof ethnic groups could access state institutions (Coulon, 1988: 163).  
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as the Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialistes, Club nation et développement 
and L’École des cadres du parti (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 41-42).  
 
In 1978, with the introduction of the law of the three parties, the alliance under Senghor’s 
unified party somewhat vanished. In the 1980s, a process of reconstruction of the ruling 
coalition was undertaken coinciding with the most turbulent decade in Senegalese political 
history. Indeed, such reconstruction will not materialize until 1991, when Diouf put into 
motion a government of national unity – that is to say an EPM – as a reaction to the social 
upheaval that had cumulated in the 1988 state of emergency. Briefly, the three parties law was 
dividing the ideological spectrum in three niches: (1) liberal and democratic (center-right); (2) 
socialist and democratic (center); (3) Marxist or communist (center-left) (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 
255). And only one party could occupy each one. Obviously, the PS could choose first where 
it wanted to stand and it comes as no surprise that the ruling elites positioned themselves in the 
center, “giving one access to the largest number of voters with similar ideological affinities” 
(Diop & Diouf, 1990: 255). The newly formed PDS led by former lawyer Wade filled the 
liberal and democratic space whereas the (re) born PAI captured the Marxist slot. The partisan 
base of both opposition parties was in urban areas (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 260), but the 
PAI was largely overshadowed by the PDS in terms of number of sympathizers (Diaw & 
Diouf, 1998: 124). It was a party system of contained pluralism. In this regard, “the exclusion 
of Cheikh Anta’s popular RND” is significant (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 264). The end of 
the unified party and the inception of the three parties system was the result of a deteriorating 
economic situation that was diminishing resources available for cooptation; especially 
considering “the growing number, size, and diversity of opposition groups that started with the 
creation of the PDS in 1974” (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 241). Hence, this conjecture 
reveals that a long-lasting coalition is about selective cooptation. Otherwise, risk of implosion 
increases, especially when resources dry out.  
 
Interesting enough, Diouf’s EPM coalition strategy was precisely a response to a lack of 
resources, especially with the introduction of the IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) 
starting at the end of the 1970s. Opposition parties gave their consent to the ruling elites in 
exchange of greater representation in governing bodies. In other words, coalition building 
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became a strategy in a context of acute economic constraints: “their inclusion has given 
leaders of the opposition greater voice in the PS government” (Beck, 1999: 198). For instance, 
the leader of the main opposition party, Wade, decided to join Diouf’s EPM. According to 
Beck (1999: 201-203), the rational was prospective in nature: he wanted to present himself as 
a credible and capable future incumbent. Similarly, leaders of the LD-MPT “accepted the 
posts of minister of the environment and deputy minister of literacy, with the hope that the 
party could demonstrate its capacity for political management and reform in these policy 
areas” (Beck, 1999: 203-204). For opposition parties with a vocal pro-democratic rhetoric, 
such alliance was risky; it could alienate their traditional base. Case in point, “in July 1993, the 
state radio acknowledged that newly elected deputies from several small opposition parties 
had revealed a secret pact formed between the PS and the PDS in 1991 to double the salaries 
of the deputies…. This pact thus indicated that negotiating their entry into the EPM had 
diverted opposition parties from the task of keeping the government honest” (Beck, 1999: 209-
210). It demonstrates the opportunistic behavior of so-called democrats calling for a regime 
change. Furthermore, on the socio-economic front, their respective programmatic platform 
was not so different (Coulon, 1988: 168). Hence, the inclusion of the PDS did not bring 
additional votes in reaching out to a captive constituency inaccessible to the PS. Especially if 
one considers that the EPM was largely a post-electoral coalition. It was not the emergence of 
an institution but only the symbol of momentarily elite accommodation: a tentative to gather 
support to diffuse an immediate crisis. That being said, Diouf attempted to consolidate various 
factions notably in creating the Groupe de rencontre et d'échanges pour un Sénégal nouveau 
(GRESEN) and the Comité de soutien à l'action du président Abdou Diouf (COSAPAD) (Diop 
& Diouf, 1990: 146). 
 
In forming his Sopi coalition, Wade appeared to repeat the same mistake his predecessors had 
made. Indeed, the Sopi coalition rounded up over 40 parties, mostly those who had decided 
not to join Diouf’s EPM. Each party was in fact the personal political vehicle of a given 
representative with no real organization beyond a very limited geographical area (Beck, 1999: 
204). Hence, the coalition was less one of an alliance between political parties and more one 
between the PDS and various notables. If it is true that the ability of Wade to convince the two 
other main opposition figures, Djibo Leyti Kä (URD) and Ousmane Tanor Dieng (AFP), to 
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support him in the second round of the 2000 presidential election was determinant in the 
outcome, the support of Kä and Dieng was nevertheless an ad hoc tactical decision. It was not 
part of a larger strategic partnership.  
 
Overall, coalition-building strategies were eventually an integral part of all heads of state way 
of governing in Senegal. It contributed to explain why some periods were more stable than 
others. However, given the nature of the coalition, it was subject to volatility and therefore 
increased the probability of high intensity crisis to reoccur. The institutional integration of one 
of the main opposition parties within the ruling coalition never really occurred in its ideal form 
in Senegal. Cooptation mechanisms operated on a personalistic basis rather than on an 
organizational one. Ultimately, we argue, the significance of these observations should be 
understood within the larger context of types of hybrid regimes. This is precisely what comes 
next.   
 
5.2.2. Types of Regimes 
 
The Senegalese political regime went through many different phases. It is our contention that 
patterns of political alliances should be put into relation with these regime transformations. 
According to our criteria, we classify Senegal as a competitive authoritarian regime from 1960 
to 1966, a hegemonic authoritarian regime from 1967 to 1976, and again a competitive 
authoritarian regime from 1977 to 2010. Freedom House identifies the Senegalese regime has 
not free (autocratic) from 1972 to 1974, partly free (hybrid) from 1975 to 2001, free 
(democratic) from 2002 to 2008, than partly free (hybrid) again during 2009 and 2010. 
Freedom House evaluates the Senegalese regime has not free (1972-1976) mostly because of 
the absence of opposition parties; and free (2002-2008) because of the peaceful alternation of 
power. Below, we will develop our interpretation of the nature of the political regime in 
Senegal based on the criteria that were articulated in Chapter One and formulated by Diamond 
and colleagues.  
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Competitive Authoritarian Regime (1960-1966) 
 
The first key-moment following the declaration by Senegal of its Independence was the 
adoption of the 1960 Constitution that was including guarantees for a number of rights and 
liberties to individuals and organizations: above all, the conduct of direct and competitive 
elections with universal suffrage for both executive and legislative bodies. The president was 
to be elected every seven years and the members of the national assembly every five years. 
Many opposition parties could exist and were free to campaign and organize meeting. As 
Hayward & Grovogui (1987: 246) wrote: “what is striking…. about the 1963 national 
elections is the seriousness with which the opposition approached them. Their extensive 
involvement in these elections is a clear indication of the general belief in the efficacy of the 
electoral process”. In brief, the Senegalese regime had the trademark of an electoral 
democracy from the start.  
 
This trademark was not however free of some significant flaws. Indeed, starting in 1963, 
Senghor will proceed with constitutional revisions that will alter the labeling of the regime. 
First, after the Dia’s affair, the President brought under his authority legislative powers 
(Hesseling, 1985: 243). Second, in 1964, a new law was introduced making it mandatory for 
all parties to register to the Ministry of Interior (Coulon, 1988: 148). And it was PS officials 
who were heading this ministry. Third, the country became a single district and only parties 
who were presenting a candidate for each seat could compete in elections. De facto, it 
basically created a one-party system, since with the list winning the most votes, all members 
on that list would be automatically attributed a seat in the National Assembly (Coulon, 1988: 
148). Finally, in May 1965, the Assembly approved a new law that was restricting the freedom 
of associations. It conferred to the government the right to outlaw by decree organizations 
suspected of sedition (Hesseling, 1985: 255). In sum, the poor performance of the Union 
démocratique sénégalaise (UDS) in the 1963 election reflects the pervasive effect of the UPS 
use of state resources for partisan ends: the former could simply not match the latter, even if 
freedom of expression was respected. Especially if one considers how electoral results were 
falsified with impunity (O’Brien, 1967: 562). As for other opposition parties, they were 
lacking any real organizational capacity, being for the most part ephemeral entities and empty 
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shells. In other words, competition was unfair; reality check had transformed the trademark 
into a competitive authoritarian regime.  
 
Senghor’s strategy to co-opt opposition parties (PRA and some factions of the BMS) was of 
course coherent with that type of hybrid regime in place at that time. That being said, he 
pushed the logic to the extreme by eventually either incorporating or banning all existing 
parties. The bottom line is that by making the PS the sole party, Senghor transformed this type 
of regime into a hegemonic authoritarian one only six years after independence.  
 
Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime (1967-1976) 
 
When the PRA decided to integrate the PS in 1966, no legal opposition was active. Although 
the PS was allowing some form of political pluralism within his ranks – that is the capacity to 
express and defend divergent opinions – competitive elections was a thing of the past. 
Furthermore, in 1967, Senghor introduced additional constitutional reforms that were 
attributing even greater powers to the president. Notably, he could dissolve the Assembly and 
decide on the timing of elections (Hesseling, 1985: 259).  
 
That being said, we could not call the regime autocratic for the following reasons. First, 
“freedom of speech in Senegal was never throttled. Social and political life in the country was 
constantly enlivened by debates on issues, by the voicing of opposition, and by the 
confrontation of clans and of ideas” (Coulon, 1988: 146). The presence of ten members of the 
PRA and two members of the BMS on the official list for the 1973 legislative election 
supports this claim (Hesseling, 1985: 261-262). Second, elections were nevertheless regularly 
held without violence as the 1968 and 1973 executive and legislative elections suggest 
(Hesseling, 1985: 261). Third, in 1970, Senghor reduced the number of terms a president 
could serve to one and submitted the change to a popular referendum; as well, he reinstated the 
position of prime minister. Finally, “as Senghor liked to note, opposition parties were not 
outlawed” altogether (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 249). The creation of the PDS in 1974 
tends to confirm such assertion, albeit it was the only one to whom such privilege was granted. 
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In such a context, we would expect first that the degree of extra-legal organized violence 
would be high and second that military should have played a bigger role in politics. In the first 
case, we must admit, it looks very much like an anomaly: a hegemonic authoritarian regime 
prevailed when the degree of extra-legal organized violence was low. There was probably a 
diffusion effect at play here. Indeed, many regimes in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s-1970s 
were one-party states. Almost everywhere, the ruling elites used the same rhetoric: now that 
the former colonial master is gone, to prevent disintegration political centralization was in 
order. In the second case, as it was detailed previously, military officers in Senegal were in 
practice a proxy of the French establishment who supported the Senghor regime. And French 
military officers could not invest Senegalese politics without causing massive discontent 
among the population and fueling anti-imperialism sentiments. Therefore, our framework 
provides mixed interpretations during this period. 
 
Table VIII – Electoral Results in Senegal (Legislative and Executive) 
 
 
Year Political Party Votes % Seats %
1959   Union progressiste sngalaise (UPS) 682,365 83 n.a. n.a.
   Parti de la solidarit sngalaise (PSS) 99,332 12.1 n.a. n.a.
  Parti du regroupement africain (PRA-Sngal) 40,270 4.9 n.a. n.a.
Total 821,967 100 n.a. n.a.
Participation Rate (74.5%)
1963 UPS 1,132,518 94.2 80 100
   Union dmocratique sngalaise (UDS) 69,776 5.8 0 0
Total 1,202,294 100 80 100
Participation Rate (89.9%)
1968 UPS 1,209,984 100 80 100
Participation Rate (93%)
1973 UPS 1,355,306 100 100 100
Participation Rate (96.9%)
1978 Parti Socialsite (PS) 790,799 81.7 83 83
   Parti dmocratique sngalais (PDS) 172,948 17.9 17 17
 Parti africian de l'indpendance (PAI) 3,734 0.4 0 0
Total 967,481 100 100 100
Participation Rate (62%) ,93 ,96
1983 PS 862,713 79.9 111 92.5
PDS 150,785 14.0 8 6.7
 Rassemblement national dmocratique (RND) 29,271 2.7 1 0.8
Others 36,401 3.3 0 0
Total 1,079,170 99.9 120 100
Participation Rate (56.2%)
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1988 PS 794,559 71 103 85.8
PDS 275,552 24.6 17 14.2
Others 43,633 3.9 0 0
Total 1,113,744 99.5 120 100
Participation Rate (57.9%)
1993 PS 602,171 56.6 84 56.2
PDS 321,585 30.2 27 30.5
RND 52,189 4.9 3 5.0
 Ligue dmocratique/Mouvement pour le parti du travail (LD/MPT) 43,950 4.1 3 4.2
 Parti de l'indpendance et du travail (PIT) 32,348 3.0 2 3.1
    Union dmocratique sngalaise/Rnovation (UDS-R) 12,339 1.2 1 1.2
Total 1,064,582 100 120 100
Participation Rate (41%)
1998 PS 612,559 50.2 93 66.4
PDS 233,287 19.1 23 16.4
 Union pour le renouveau dmocratique (URD) 161,320 13.2 11 7.9
 And-J‘f/Parti africain pour la dmocratie et le socialisme (AJ/PADS) 60,673 5 4 2.9
LD/MPT 48,097 3.9 3 2.1
Others 104,493 8.6 6 4.2
Total 1,220,429 100 140 99.9
Participation Rate (38.8%)
2001 Coalition Sopi 931,617 52.3 89 74.2
PS 326,126 18.3 10 8.3
 Alliance des forces du progrs (AFP) 303,150 17 11 9.2
AJ/PADS 76,102 4.3 2 1.7
URD 69,109 3.9 3 2.5
Others 73,552 4.2 5 4.1
Total 1,779,656 100 120 100
Participation Rate (67.4%)
2007 Coalition Sopi 1,190,609 69.2 131 87.3
  Coalition Takku Defarat Sngal 86,621 5.04 3 2
  Coalition And Defar Sngal 84,988 4.94 3 2
Coalition Waar-Wi 74,919 4.35 3 2
Rassemblement pour le peuple 73,083 4.25 2 1.3
 Front pour le socialisme et la dmocratie/Benno Jub‘l 37,428 2.18 1 0.7
 Alliance pour le progrs et la justice/J‘f J‘l 33,297 1.94 1 0.7
 Convergence pour le renouveau et la citoyennet 30,658 1.78 1 0.7
Parti socialiste authentique (PSA) 26,320 1.53 1 0.7
Others 82,394 4.8 4 2.7
Total 1,720,317 100 150 100
Participation Rate (34.7%)
Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the category "Others". Also, 
for legislative elections, independents are included in this category. 
Data Source: African Elections Database; Bendel (1999)
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Competitive Authoritarian Regime (1976 to the present) 
 
With the 1976 constitutional revision and the instauration of the three parties system, 
opposition parties were back in the game. And with the introduction of the proportional 
system, they had a legitimate chance of winning a seat in the National Assembly. Of course, 
the limited number of parties allowed to compete in elections and the predetermined 
Year Candidate Votes %
1963   Lopold Sdar Senghor (UPS) 1,149,935 100
Participation Rate (56.7%)
1968   Lopold Sdar Senghor (UPS) 1,229,927 100
Participation Rate (94.7%)
1973   Lopold Sdar Senghor (UPS) 1,357,056 100
Participation Rate (97%)
1978   Lopold Sdar Senghor (PS) 807,515 82.02
1st round Abdoulaye Wade (PDS) 174,817 17.38
Total 982,332 99.4
Participation Rate (63.5%)
1983 Abdou Diouf (PS) 908,879 83.45
1st round Abdoulaye Wade (PDS) 161,067 14.79
Total 1,069,946 98.24
Participation Rate (56.2%)
1988 Abdou Diouf (PS) 828,301 73.2
1st round Abdoulaye Wade (PDS) 291,869 25.8
Others 11,298 1.1
Total 1,131,468 100.1
Participation Rate (58.8%)
1993 Abdou Diouf (PS) 757,311 58.4
1st round Abdoulaye Wade (PDS) 415,295 32.0
 Landing Savan (AJ/PADS) 37,787 2.9
Abdoulaye Bathily (LD/MPT) 31,279 2.4
Others 54,983 4.2
Total 1,296,655 100.0
Participation Rate (51.5%)
2000 Abdou Diouf (PS) 687,969 41.5
2nd round Abdoulaye Wade (PDS) 969,332 58.5
Total 1,657,301 100.0
Participation Rate (60.8%)
2007 Abdoulaye Wade (Sopi) 1,914,403 55.9
1st round Idrissa Seck 510,922 14.9
Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS) 464,287 13.6
Total 2,889,612 84.4
Participation Rate (70.6%)
Data Source: African Elections Database; Bendel (1999)
Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, 
they are included in the category "Others"
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programmatic platform imposed by the ruling elites on opposition parties were leaning toward 
an hegemonic authoritarian regime; especially if we had the level of electoral fraud that was 
suspected to be endemic, at least according to the opposition parties. Still, other parties were 
allowed to exist even if they could not compete. In this regard, the RND was far from being a 
marginal player. For instance, its call to boycott the 1978 legislative elections was heard as 
numerous voters stayed home (Hesseling, 1985: 279). But all existing opposition parties 
competed in the 1978 legislative elections. 
 
Later on, Senegal experienced a democratic revival with the inception of roughly 10 parties in 
1981 – 15 in 1983 – and the creation of the Electoral Commission to supervise elections. In 
the 1990s, opposition parties could channel their grievances through political institutions 
instead of using street politics (Foucher, 2007: 123; Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 134; Beck, 1999: 
200). Regardless of these openings, the reality remained unchanged. The competition was 
unfair. The PS benefited from a decisive advantage. For instance, polling station presidents 
were mostly PS affiliates, who often helped analphabet voters – they were many in some 
regions and they knew personally PS members – to read the list (Hesseling, 1985: 281-282). 
Also, “the Supreme Court ruled... that identity cards were not required of those voting, 
opening the door to multiple voting. The secret ballot was optional and was rarely used in 
fact” (Hayward & Grovogui, 1987: 258). Hence, the conduct of elections was subject to a 
number of irregularities. The Electoral Commission was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Interior therefore not an autonomous organization. Also, diversity of media outlets in 
Senegal was basically non-existent. Only a few newspapers, radio stations and television 
channels were operating and all were controlled by the state (Hesseling, 1985: 329, 341). 
Consequently, the opposition party positive visibility in media was marginal (Diop & Diouf, 
1990: 313). 
 
With the peaceful alternation of power in 2000, after 40 years of PS domination, some 
observers interpreted the event as an indelible sign of a genuine democratic transition78. We 
are skeptic of such enthusiasm. First, Wade’s behavior prior to the 2000 elections showed that 
                                                 
78 For instance, Freedom House classified Senegal in 2002 as a democratic regime until 2008.  
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he was more of an opportunist than a genuine democrat. According to Mbow (2008: 159, 164), 
“Wade is becoming a veritable caricature of Senghorism”, using state resources to tilt the 
electoral balance in its favor. Furthermore, once in power he actually increased the 
centralization of power in the hand of the president. For instance, “Wade and his Parti 
démocratique sénégalais (PDS) have maintained a constitutional article that provides for the 
arrest of individuals who criticize the president, and they have used it against opponents” 
including journalists (Jourde, 2008: 79). On top of that, Wade introduced a ban on opposition 
march. Hence, freedom of expression was significantly constrained. Thomas & Sissokho 
(2005: 114) report: “nothing has changed. If anything, it has got worse”. In the end, the 2007 
elections revealed the true nature of the Wade’s Government. As Mbow asserts (2008: 156), 
“despite the promise of democracy in 2000, Senegal today has declined to the point of mere 
electoral authoritarianism”.  
 
At first glance, the fact that the conflict in Casamance during the 1980s did not coincide with a 
hegemonic authoritarian regime deviates from our framework. Yet, the characteristics of the 
conflict prevent us from attributing a high degree of extra-legal organized violence over the 
period. Indeed, the conflict was geographically concentrated in a remote area. Thus, it should 
not be interpreted as incoherent to our framework. The fact that the least stable period of the 
country young political history happen when no formal ruling coalition including opposition 
parties existed is in line with our explanation of political dynamics. Later on, coalition-
building strategies and type of hybrid regime match, as the EMP (Diouf) and the Sopi 
coalition (Wade) are coherent with a competitive authoritarian context.  
 
To close this section and making a link with the next, all along, the domination of the PS could 
have been attributed to its ruling elites’ skillful manipulation of political alliances and most 
importantly the inability of the opposition parties to find support in rural areas where most 
Senegalese were living. “It was a victim of its urbanity and its petit bourgeois and intellectual 
associations” (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 119). As such, the PS was in a position to proceed with 
political reforms precisely because the rural population was cut-off from party politics; hence 
could assert its domination through local leader intermediaries (Diop, 1992: 19). It is only 
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when the PS lost the support of local leaders that the balance of power shifted in favor of the 
opposition. We will develop below a rational as why it is so.  
 
5.3.  The Degree of State Penetration 
 
From the perspective of state penetration, Senegal is an underdeveloped country: there is no 
case of mistaken identity. The state has little presence in the countryside and economic 
activities are highly concentrated in the agricultural sector, with cultivation of peanuts leading 
the stock. Not only is the country more or so dependant on a single crop, but also regardless of 
numerous attempts to assert his ascendancy, the state has relinquished its authority in that 
matter to the powerful local leaders, the marabouts. The prosperity of the country therefore 
rests very much in their hands and rural inhabitants owe them their survival and even their 
salute given that many belong to the Mouride Brotherhood. In other words, they have captive 
constituencies, which is reinforced by ethnic identity since most are of Wolof descent. And 
considering Senghor was a Catholic belonging to the Serer ethnic group, he understood too 
well the necessity of forging a political alliance. That being said, the state expansion during 
the first two decades after independence have been marked by the increase presence of state 
bureaucrats in the government apparatus in the 1980s. This shift has proved to be somewhat 
confrontational. A close look at the degree of state penetration will provide an answer as why 
they found their way as ruling elites and why local leaders nevertheless remained the dominant 
social group.   
  
5.3.1. The Administrative Extension 
 
Throughout the period, the presence of the Senegalese administration has been reduced to the 
capital and few urban centers. Agglomerations have been concentrated in coastal regions, 
while in the rest of the country the population was dispersed over an inhospitable territory. 
Located in the Sahel region, the northeastern part of the country has been suffering from an 
increase desertification and a deterioration of arable land for decades. Population density has 
been relatively low and communication networks were sub-standards. For instance, only 27% 
of all roads were paved in 1990 (World Development Indicators, 2012). Hence, many regions 
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located at the periphery are cut-off from the center, which obviously has been a serious strain 
on the establishment of a modern civil administration (Hesseling, 1985: 57). In fact, it was 
religious leaders who acted as channels of communication between the center and the 
periphery in the countryside (Coulon, 1988: 168). Furthermore, in rural areas the only tangible 
state activity has been tax collection, but in many cases it was the local leader who had the 
responsibility to accomplish such task (Balans et al., 1975: 165). Data on this issue are fairly 
recent, but as an indication, the government tax revenues represented only 14% of GDP in 
1998 (World Development Indicators, 2012). Given that the tax administration is often a key 
indicator of state penetration over the territory79, it tends to show its general absence from 
rural areas. The bottom line is that there was a political power vacuum outside the capital and 
major cities and in these areas the only legitimacy that the ruling elites could have had was 
through the local leaders. 
 
Even in urban areas, the situation was qualitatively not much better. The bureaucracy was 
overstaffed, filled with individuals with low professional qualifications, badly organized and 
corrupt (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 60). For example, the state bureaucracy increased sixfold in the 
first decade since Independence (O’Brien, 1979: 213). During that period, the ONCAD was 
overstaffed by at least a quarter; and these employees were in many cases deemed incompetent 
(Casswell, 1984: 65). As a result of the state expansion, the public administration was one of 
the main employers and an avenue of social mobility. Yet, as a COGERAF80 report concluded: 
“the allocation of administrative responsibilities and lines of authority within most 
departments remained vague; work procedures and methods were surrounded by uncertainty; 
the supervision of administrative personnel at all levels was highly ineffective” (Schumacher, 
1975: 101). According to Bayart (2009: 78), “in Senegal between 1966 and 1980, 
embezzlement and fraud within the Office national de coopération et d'assistance au 
développement (ONCAD) were thought to amount to as much as 5-10 per cent of the total 
revenue of producers, representing tens of billions of CFA francs”. In such disarray, no doubt, 
the bureaucracy was ineffective. And it is only through these lenses that the impact of 
economic extension can be interpreted.  
                                                 
79 See Herbst (2000: 131); Tilly (1985). 
80 Compagnie générale d’Études et recherches pour l’Afrique (COGERAF).  
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5.3.2.  The Economic Extension 
 
During the colonial era, groundnuts represented the main economic activity in Senegal. With 
80% of exports and 87% of labor force, the country was a mono-crop producer (CIA World 
Factbook, 2012). In the first decades after independence, the ruling elites in an effort to move 
out from a state of underdevelopment created a multitude of state companies and introduced a 
range of regulatory schemes to control economic flows. For instance, “between 1970 and 1975 
approximately seventy-five state companies were created” (Coulon, 1988: 166). Some sectors 
such as the phosphate and petrochemical industries were showing promises, but not enough to 
outweigh the atrophied agricultural sector that remained the backbone of Senegalese economy 
(Coulon, 1988: 169).  
Figure 8 – Natural Resources Rent in Senegal 
 
 
 
Above all, agricultural surplus were dilapidated in unproductive state programs instead of 
being injected to modernize the economy (Coulon, 1988: 169). Furthermore, the income 
generated by the peanut industry served to buy social peace in urban areas by subsidizing price 
of staple foods such as rice as well as salaries of civil servants (Bayart, 2009: 63). Otherwise, 
profit from the peanut industry was not only invested in state industrial projects that proved to 
be mere sand castles to use an analogy, but large sums were also diverted to non-productive 
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assets or transfer in foreign portfolio (Casswell, 1984: 73). In the end, there was little 
reinvestment in the peanut industry, which over the years experienced declining productivity 
(Casswell, 1984: 45).  
 
Table IX – Senegalese State Investment in the Economy 
 
From the very beginning of the country independence, the ruling elites designed many 
economic plans that were focusing mostly on the agricultural sector. Yet, it was lacking a 
long-term development strategy. Indeed, the process of industrialization was never fully 
integrated to produce tangible benefits and positive externalities. In many cases, there were 
discrepancies between public declarations, actual programs and there implementation (Balans 
et al., 1975: 169). Such a state of affairs was visible in the volatility of state investment, 
especially between 1970 and 1990. Ultimately, the ruling elites appear to have devolved the 
economic future of they country to the hazard of rainfalls and world price (Mbodj, 1992: 110).  
 
The first plan (1961-1965) marked the beginning of the active participation of the state in the 
economy, especially with the creation of cooperatives in rural areas. The process of 
nationalization was led by the Office de Commercialisation Agricole (OCA), the Banque 
Sénégalaise de Développement (BSD) and the Centres régionaux d’assistance au 
développement (CRAD) (Mbodj, 1992: 99; Casswell, 1984: 42). The second plan (1965-1969) 
General Gov't 
Consumption  
(% of Total 
Consumption 
Gov't Enterprises 
and Investment 
(% of Gross 
Investment)
1970 14.95 32.1
1975 15.46 19.8
1980 19.34 32.2
1985 16.31 18.2
1990 16.13 22.6
1995 13.90 21.5
2000 11.70 20.1
2005 11.2 33.6
2009 9.5 36.2
 Data Source: Economic Freedom in the World, 2012
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and third plan (1969-1973) focused almost exclusively on the peanut industry with 
centralization of all related activities in the ONCAD and, in the third plan, a new policy to 
attract foreign investments was introduced and reinforced in the fourth (1973-1977) and fifth 
(1977-1981) plans. For instance, in 1976, a free-trade zone was implemented in Dakar 
(Hesseling, 1985: 69). That being said, in 1975-76, state intervention increased with the 
creation of two new parastatal enterprises: the Société nationale de commercialisation des 
oléagineux du Sénégal (SONACOS) and Société nationale d'approvisionnement du monde 
rural (SONAR). The plans were also aiming at the reduction of food imports such as rice, 
millet, corn and sugar (Hesseling, 1985: 66). In addition, ruling elites pushed for the 
development of a chemical industry oriented toward the transformation of phosphate, which is 
used as a fertilizer in the agricultural production (Hesseling, 1985: 69). This strategy was 
abruptly cancelled out by the severe drought in 1977 and 1978 that killed the annual peanut 
harvest and the decline of the price of phosphate on world market (Boye, 1992: 56). In 1980, 
the ONCAD was closed down. The move was “designed to appease the peasants, who had 
become discouraged by unwieldy and ineffective production and marketing structures that 
were more useful in serving personal and political aims than those of development” (Coulon, 
1988: 155). As part of the new agricultural policy, the end of ONCAD and other 
decentralization policies aimed at empowering rural inhabitants, mostly big rural producers, 
and reducing the influence of urban groups (Mbodj, 1992: 121). The IMF SAP has left its 
imprint on the sixth plan (1981-1985) and subsequent ones until today. Significant budget 
cuts, a reduction of the public administration, liberalization of prices have been the hallmark 
(Hesseling, 1985: 62; Coulon, 1988: 166). Yet, the implementation was only partial. For 
example, in order to neutralize Wade’s populist and nationalist rhetoric, Diouf proposed to 
reduce the price of staple foods against the IMF recommendation (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 355). 
Furthermore, individuals in urban areas remained “economically reliant upon representatives 
of the state as their political patrons, who provide access to food aid, development projects, 
and employment in the dominant public sector” (Beck, 1999: 213).  
 
All along, the state maintained a tight leash on labor unions, especially after the events of May 
1968. Indeed, during the first decade, and reacting to the process of unification under the 
umbrella of the UPS, they were the spearhead of civil society and the main driver of social 
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mobilization (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 122). As a consequence, the Union nationale des 
travailleurs du Sénégal (UNTS) was disbanded in August 1969, the Union des étudiants de 
Dakar (UED) and the Union démocratique des étudiants sénégalais (UDES) in February 1971 
and the Syndicat des enseignants du Sénégal (SES) in March 1973 (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 207). 
They will be replaced by the Confédération nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal (CNTS), 
who supported the PS (Coulon, 1988: 148). In exchange of their allegiance, few members of 
the CNTS were nominated to PS and government positions (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 234). From 
now on, the PS will look more and more like a corporatist organization, at least as far as labor 
unions are concerned81.  
 
Table X – Senegal Socio-Economic Modernization 
 
 
In regard to the private bourgeoisie, it was for quite a while almost inexistent in Senegal at 
least in the formal sector. “The class of Senegalese merchants and manufacturers is still 
relatively small compared to the powerful foreign interests in the country… [and] very 
dependent on the state” (Coulon, 1988: 162). Foreigners were monopolizing most of the 
lucrative sectors of the economy (Hesseling, 1985: 59). As for the upper class, it was 
composed of high-ranking civil servants (Hesseling, 1985: 82-83). It explains the ascendancy 
of powerful individuals such as Diouf and his right arm Jean Collin who were career 
bureaucrats. Yet, both had a weak authority over economic actors. Jean Collin was mostly 
involved in the security apparatus (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 107-108), while Diouf who was the 
                                                 
81 By the mid-1990, the CNTS gradually took its distance from the PS and allied with unions affiliated to 
opposition parties. It formed a coalition called the Intersyndicale. However, the coalition proved to by 
dysfunctional. CNTS was working toward a consensual formula whereas other members, notably the Members of 
Union nationale des syndicats autonomes du Sénégal (UNSAS) were more militants and disapproved the 
conciliatory tone of the CNTS (Encyclopedia of Nations, 2012).  
Indicator Name 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Urban population (% of total) 23.00 30.00 35.80 39.00 40.60 42.90
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 311.10 274.70 200.20 138.60 118.80 75.20
School enrollment, primary (% gross) n.a. n.a. 42.65 54.84 68.17 83.73 a
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) n.a. n.a 20.08 19.93 19.14 16.71
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) n.a. n.a. 13.50 15.26 14.65 12.77
Industry, value added (% of GDP) n.a. n.a. 20.07 22.18 23.23 22.15
a: year 2009
Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012
 213  
main architect of nationalization of the peanut commercial networks lost his edge when he 
dissolved the ONCAD; a bargaining tool in the relationship between local leaders and the 
ruling elites (Coulon, 1988: 167). It was the price to pay for local leaders’ support; especially 
in a context where the President proceeded in the 1980s to a significant centralization of power 
by excluding long-time political PS barons who had ties amongst others with local leaders, and 
by replacing them by docile state bureaucrats. These bureaucrats were disconnected from all 
constituencies (Coulon, 1988: 159). Thus, according to Coulon (1988: 162), “the most 
successful businessmen are merchants belonging to the mouride brotherhood” “They are in 
effect the only really large-scale landowners in Senegal” (O’Brien, 1971: 202). They were in 
control of the peanut industry. They were the local leaders.  
 
Even during the heyday of the ONCAD, marabouts retained substantial powers (Casswell, 
1984: 70). In fact, “ONCAD was in reality a creature of certain rural interests groups - traders, 
transporters, money-lenders, large producers and great marabouts - upon whom rested the 
political patronage of the Parti Socialiste” (Bayart, 2009: 97). They were the main 
intermediaries. Furthermore, ONCAD never constrained the operations of the marabouts; they 
were allowed to sell their production without using the cooperative mechanism (Casswell, 
1984: 58). When the privatization and decentralization processes came with the IMF PAS, it 
only participated in reinforcing the marabouts' position in the economic structure. They were 
the only real actors of the private sector. Bayart (2009: 226) writes: “the policies of structural 
adjustment are thus not so very different from the policies of nationalization during the two 
previous decades”. That being said, “in closing down ONCAD, the unofficial cashbox of the 
barons of the Parti Socialiste” (Bayart, 2009: 226), Diouf dismantled patronage networks that 
were holding together urban clients close or at least loyal to the public administration. As 
already mentioned, social upheavals in the 1980s were one of the by-products of this decision.  
 
It is important to stress that the authority of the marabouts expanded beyond the mere question 
of economic resources. This was especially true for marabouts who were belonging to one of 
the Muslism Brotherhoods: the Layènnes, the Niassènes Hamallistes, the Qadiriya, the 
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Tidjaniya and the most influential one the Mourides82. As religious leaders, they were 
wielding substantive authority over their constituencies based on an indelible affective 
attachment. Schumacher (1975: 5) contends: “they are believed to posses, in addition to 
magical powers, the spiritual authority to ensure or deny religious salvation”. Along the line of 
a very strong spiritual vertical affiliation, marabouts are therefore the intermediary between 
God and the individual, between God and the community. They act as caretaker. They oversee 
wedding arrangements, succession, land tenure, order and personal security, tax collection and 
so on (Hesseling, 1985: 97). The link between peasants and marabouts are in a way sanctioned 
by tradition and religion.  
 
Furthermore in Senegal, Islam is an institution characterized by a hierarchal and vertical 
structure with a Khalif at the top. This sense of hierarchy can be illustrated by the following 
example: the marabout Seigne Khadim was initially against the 1988 voting directive dictated 
by the Khalif but later retracted himself on television and apologized for contradicting a 
Mouride’s order (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 322). This hierarchical structure also comes with a near 
monopoly on political representation in regions they control (Diop, 1992: 16). In other words, 
since rural inhabitants have been granted the right to vote in 1956 even before independence, 
the marabouts have been in command of a vast number of constituencies for a very long time 
building within a very strong legitimacy and therefore increasing their leverage against the 
ruling elites (Hesseling 1985: 86, 92). As such, their support has always been cherished among 
politicians in the capital.  
 
At the same time, without publicly advertising it, each marabout could “sell” his constituency 
to the highest bidder (O’Brien, 1971: 273; Hesseling, 1985: 97; Balans et al., 1975: 171). They 
were somewhat voter brokers. For instance, “a prominent marabout in the area also supported 
Wade’s PDS candidacy in 1993 because Diouf had ignored his requests for a well and a road 
for one of his villages… However, he switched back to the PS during the legislative elections 
when he found that the PDS leader was ungrateful for the marabout’s political support” (Beck, 
1999: 2010-211). In the end, they tended to support the party in power as long as their 
                                                 
82 The ruling elites succeeded in co-opting all Brotherhoods in rural areas, not only the Mourides (Diop & Diouf, 
1990: 74). 
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entrenched interests were not compromised. Opposition parties were serving as a bargain chip 
for local leaders who felt the PS did not response to their demands.  
 
In exchange of electoral support, the state would grant amongst others things greater 
autonomy over there fiefdom: rural communities had their own resources and administration 
(Balans et al., 1975: 172). And regardless of their powers, local leaders did not get involve 
directly in politics by becoming politicians themselves (Casswell, 1984: 67). They stayed on 
the periphery. Furthermore, by no means would they defend only their personal interests. They 
had a positive influence in government circles on behalf of their constituencies and succeeded 
in obtaining various financial supports from the government for the peasants (Casswell, 1984: 
67-68). They were responsive to the demands and needs of their followers.  
 
That being said, more and more, “the marabouts are no longer simple clients of the ruling 
elites and of the state. Riding on the wave of popular opinion that sees Islam as a universal 
remedy to poverty and decadence, the marabouts have become more demanding partners of 
the state, setting themselves up as lesson-givers, or even as a counterrelite” (Coulon, 1988: 
173). It is probably linked to the growing discomfort marabouts felt in supporting a regime 
that despise their own constituencies. The influence of the Brotherhood also changed as the 
nature of its actions demonstrates. Some were adopting a position of neutrality, while others 
would actively participate in party politics (Diaw & Diouf, 1998: 141). In both cases, their 
clout as influent agents of the state in matters of electoral dominance greatly diminished over 
time. For instance, the reputation of Cheikh Tidiane Sy who founded a committee for the 
reelection of Diouf was severely put in jeopardy when accusation of electoral fraud surfaced 
(Diop & Diouf, 1990: 324). The 1993 events were a clear illustration of its leverage against 
the ruling elites being reduced in the face of a dissent voice threatening the unity of the 
Muslim community. Furthermore, by the mid-1980s, the activities of marabouts were no 
longer confined to rural areas; they started to penetrate cities (Diop & Diouf, 1990: 77-78). 
They were now entering the traditional chasse-gardée of political parties, which could partly 
explain their disassociation from the ruling elites. All this suggests new patterns of clientelist 
networks in a highly volatile electoral game.  
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In sum, the degree of state penetration provides additional information as why local leaders are 
so strategic for the ruling elites and why the state bureaucrats yield little power outside the 
capital. The state had scarce resources and could not afford to expand its tentacles in the 
countryside. Even in cities, the bureaucracy was generally speaking ineffective and although 
the state expansion as in the 1960s-1970s had led to the rise of state bureaucrats in politics in 
the 1980s, their influence in the economic sphere remained marginal. By ricochet, very few 
could pretend leading organized networks capable of making a difference when it counts, 
beyond the limited confine of Dakar. In return, local leaders would fill the void left by the 
state outside the capital and urban cities. They had their hands on large captive constituencies 
that were neuralgic for the power-holders. The ruling elites had a very strong interest in 
nurturing the sympathy of local leaders and integrating them into a ruling coalition. The timing 
of local leaders exclusion from the ruling coalition coincided with the inception in the 1980s 
and the late 1990s of state bureaucrats in key positions within the government and significant 
social changes notably the displacement of local leaders interests in economic activities in 
urban areas. This conjecture generated instability as defining moments such the 1988 state 
emergency and Diouf’s defeat in the 2000 presidential election testify. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a known country-specialist writes: “the success of Senghor and his party can be explained 
to a great extent by the relationship of trust he was able to cultivate among this class of 
religious leaders” (Coulon, 1988: 145). Our examination of political alliances and dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion within the ruling coalition have confirmed this assertion. The logic 
behind their preponderance had to do with the low degree of state penetration and the 
underdevelopment of the economic structure primarily based on peanut production. Overall, 
the brief review of Senegalese economic plans demonstrates the absence of a long-term vision 
and a commitment to engage the country in an industrialization process. However, in itself, it 
is not sufficient. Local leaders alone cannot guarantee political stability. Senegal was victim of 
many political crises even when local leaders supported the ruling elites. Another dominant 
social group had to be factored in: opposition parties. Indeed, their absence from the ruling 
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coalition led to the least stable period (1980s) after the country independence. They had the 
power to disrupt the functioning of the government. Their active presence in politics and the 
necessity to acknowledge some of their demands and co-opt them into a ruling coalition were 
fostered by an overall low degree of extra-legal organized violence and an institutional context 
characterized by a competitive authoritarian regime. Therefore, patterns of stability and 
instability tend to fit our analytical framework. 
 
Figure 9 – Senegal Timeline 
 
A closer look at the degree of extra-legal organized violence gave us the rational as to why the 
military officers never entered the realm of politics despite the civil conflict in Casamance in 
the 1980s and other external threats. It had to do with the location of the civil conflict in 
question and the presence of the French army as protector of the government. The variable 
also contributed to provide an answer in regard to why certain parties were co-opted (e.g. 
PRA) while others were banned (e.g. FNS). Finally, this variable shed light on why the impact 
of opposition parties on stability was shallow. Although some were included in the ruling 
coalition, very few had captive constituencies and at times many parties were trying to attract a 
relatively small electorate. Most of all, besides the PDS, they were not political organizations 
per se, but the banner of influent individuals in a specific geographic area. Hence, co-opting 
opposition parties equated to including individuals and the diverse form of ruling coalitions in 
Senegal never attracted formally rival organizations because they were basically non-existent. 
In a way, it was a strategy by default. Still, it worked relatively well in a context where 
resources were scarce. Co-opting individuals is much less expansive than co-opting 
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organizations. As for the state penetration variable, it formulates a rational as why career state 
bureaucrats such as Diouf became prominent political actors, but simultaneously why they 
were not a determinant factor in conflict dynamics. The state expanded significantly over the 
first decades, but the expansion did not translate into concrete economic achievements. It 
shows a disconnection between state and society.  
 
In retrospect, the political history of Senegal is instructive. At first glance, our framework 
provides mixed results for the 1967-1976 period. It was a highly stable hegemonic 
authoritarian regime when the military officers were absent from the ruling coalition for 
reasons that were previously developed. What is interesting here is that stability is not only a 
function of regime type and degree of extra-legal organized violence but also of level of 
economic development and state penetration. In other words, without this link, our framework 
is invalidated for a period of nine years, which remains a relatively small time frame compared 
to fifty years. But with the state penetration variable, it indicates that in a certain context, our 
two variables do not have equal weight. Ultimately, it reinforces the pertinence of developing 
a theory that could integrate the political and economic dimensions of a society.  
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6 
 
Paraguay 
 
 
Paraguay is a landlocked underdeveloped country surrounded by Brazil, Argentina and 
Bolivia. A Spanish colony until 1811, it has a population of approximately 6.9 millions; 95% 
are mestizos of Guaraní descent and 90% are Catholic by faith83. The system of government 
has gone through several transformations but remained a presidential one with, albeit with 
some interruptions, a bicameral congress: chamber of deputies and senate.  
 
For over sixty years, the Colorado Party (Partido Colorado or PC) headed by the Junta de 
Gobierno (the executive committee) dominated the political life of the country first under an 
autocratic regime (1945-1954) and then under a hybrid regime, hegemonic authoritarian 
between 1955 and 1989, and competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 2008. The country 
experienced severe crises, notably the fall in 1989 of Alfredo Stroessner, the long-time country 
president. Since the degree of extra-legal organized violence was high until the end of the 
1970s, we should be in a position to observe political patterns that provide incentives for the 
military to intervene in politics and facilitate their inclusion in the ruling coalition; and it 
should coincide with a stable hegemonic authoritarian regime. Afterward, as the country 
pacifies and elites accept to channel their political demands through the party system, the 
legitimacy of military officers should diminish and the importance of opposition parties 
increase. Their inclusion in the ruling coalition should correspond to a stable competitive 
authoritarian regime. The degree of state penetration was low throughout the period covered in 
the present study. Administrative and economic extensions were reduced to the capital. 
Outside of it, the state was generally absent. Thus, our expectations are that stability should be 
the by-product of an alliance with local leaders.  
 
 
                                                 
83 The data are from the CIA World Factbook 2012.  
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6.1. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion within the Ruling Coalition (1945-2008) 
 
The political history of Paraguay reveals the importance of the PC in explaining the course of 
events. In fact, instability within the country was largely a function of factional politics within 
the PC itself84. From 1948 to 1954, six Colorado presidents successively governed the country 
for a very brief moment. Then Stroessner came to power and reigned until 1989 bringing an 
era of stability within the party and the country. But after his departure, bitter infighting within 
the PC became again the modus operandi: from 1989 to 2008, there will be five presidents. 
The military officers were often at the center of these developments, siding with different 
party factions overtime and occasionally divided on which one should rule. In short, 
politicians backed by military officers have contested on many occasions the authority of the 
ruling elites, especially before and after Stroessner. Depending on the period, they were 
gatekeepers of stability or triggers of instability. Local leaders are less visible in the narrative 
of political crises that follows. Their support to the ruling elites was somewhat relatively 
constant until the 1980s. Later on, their role will increase. They will have a decisive impact on 
the PC defeat in the 2008 presidential election.  
 
To provide a general background, Paraguay was wrecked by instability from 1870 to 1940, a 
period that saw the succession of thirty-five presidents and countless coups and counter-coups. 
As Lott (1974: 74) states, “presidents were jailed, murdered, or exiled, and very few indeed 
were fortunate enough to be able to complete their constitutional terms of office”. The PC was 
in power from 1880 to 1904, and the Liberal Party (PL), the other main country political party, 
from 1904 to 1940 with brief interludes in 1912 (PC) and 1936-1937 (Revolutionary 
Febrerista Party - PRF). Not affiliated to any party, dictator General Morínigo was president 
from 1940 to 1948.  
 
                                                 
84In the 1950s-60s, the PC had three factions: epifanistas, democráticos and guionistas. In the 1970s, most PC 
members were stronistas. In the 1980s, two new factions emerged: militants and traditionalists. In the 1990s, two 
others took form: the oviedistas and arganistas. As we will see, some factions sometimes allied with the 
opposition (Liberal Parties). As such, the PC is foremost a symbol of tradition than an organization structured by 
a political or ideological platform with a defined sociological base. We want to highlight this issue from the start 
as it complicates substantially the analysis of political dynamics and can make the exercise of differentiation 
between each faction and their respective positioning in the party system difficult to follow at times.  
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The first crisis to emerge after the end of WW II, which constitutes the departure point in our 
research design, was in June 1946. With the defeat of the Axis powers, the pro-fascist 
President Morínigo realized that he was suddenly out of fashion (Miranda, 1990: 45). Hitherto, 
he adopted an entirely new strategy and focused on coalition building; targeting the Febreristas 
and Colorados as well as military officers (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 52; Miranda, 1990: 61). The 
Febreristas were asking for more: they wanted to be the dominant voice in the cabinet and 
assurance that Morínigo would not be candidate in the 1948 presidential election (Roett & 
Sacks, 1991: 52). A month later, the Febreristas, joined by disfranchised military officers as 
well as Liberals and Communists, organized a public rally in the capital Asunción. Febreristas 
leaders were arrested and political meetings were banned. In January 1947, members of the PC 
with backing from some of the military establishment staged an autogolpe85 to reassert 
Morínigo’s position as head of state in the face of massive popular discontent. The move 
triggered an intense reaction among the military officers who defected in mass: about 80% 
renegade the uniform (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 341-342). Soon, a bloody civil war erupted. The 
epicenter was the small city of Conceptión in the Northern region. A state of emergency was 
declared, one that will last officially until 1987 with brief interruptions.  
 
Obviously, this crisis was high in intensity, as the government did not function for about a 
year. Although outnumbered, Morínigo and his ally (PC) could count on the support of 
peasant militias, and the artillery regiment in Asunción led by the young and rising Stroessner 
(Roett & Sacks, 1991: 52-53). In the end, they won and consolidated their power by 
eliminating all non-Colorado partisans in the bureaucracy and military (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 
92). In the process, about one-fifth of the Paraguayan population left the country (Bouvier, 
1988: 5). The army commanders eventually removed Morínigo from office and the 
unchallenged Colorado candidate Juan Natalicio González was elected by party members in 
1948 replacing the interim acting president, the Supreme Court Chief of Justice Juan Manuel 
Frutos. The crisis highlights the critical importance of military support – above all, military 
officers in Asunción, the capital – and the nascent peasant strategic role in monitoring the 
political activities in the countryside.   
                                                 
85 An autogolpe is a self-coup, i.e. a form of coup d'État when the leader of a country dissolves or renders 
powerless the national legislature and assumes extraordinary powers not granted under normal circumstances. 
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Competing factions within the PC quickly ousted President González. In 1949, Raimundo 
Rolón and Felipe Molas López became presidents for only few months each. Then emerged 
the leader of the democráticos faction, Federico Chávez, who served as president of Paraguay 
from 1949 to 1954. In the meantime, Stoessner was already commander-in-chief of the army. 
Fearing the increased power of the military, Chávez advocated the creation of a more potent 
national police force to protect the interests of the PC (Bouvier, 1988: 6; Lewis, 1980: 58-59). 
This proposal for what could have been perceived as a major institutional change led to a 
military coup that will bring Stroessner to power with the help of fellow Colorado Epifanio 
Méndez Fleitas (Lewis, 1980: 58). On August 15th 1954, Stroessner became president of 
Paraguay.   
 
These crises were again high in intensity. They reflect the growing influence of military 
officers in politics. They were involved in the coups that brought successively Rolón and 
López in power (Miranda, 1990: 46)86. In both instances, Stroessner was on the winning side. 
Once in power, López tried to reduce the control of the democráticos faction in the cabinet and 
planned for an autogolpe (Miranda, 1990: 47). López went to Stroessner for help, but the latter 
decided to go public this time and revealed López’s intention. It backfired and Chávez 
replaced López as president of Paraguay87. Finally, in 1954, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces, Stroessner, toppled Chávez. The new strongman was benefiting from few allies 
within the PC and could only count on the epifanistas faction88 – embodied by Fleitas who 
later will be suspected of planning a coup against him; democráticos were controlling the PC 
(Lewis, 1980: 72-73). Hence, Stroessner proceeded to reshuffle the cabinet, excluding Méndez 
Fleitas. Most Fleitas’ sympathizers were either expelled from the PC or worst, jailed (Roett & 
Sacks, 1991: 55). In the process, Stroessner attributed important positions to the guionistas 
faction, notably to Edgar Ynsfrán, but not to the democráticos. The stage was set for the next 
political crisis.  
 
                                                 
86 Rolón and López were guionistas. 
87 Chávez was a democrático.  
88 The epifanistas faction is the result of a split within the democráticos faction. Those who decided to follow 
Fleitas became epifanistas and the others remained democráticos.  
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In August 1958, the Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores (CPT) organized a general 
strike demanding a 30% wage increase, but the police quickly stormed its headquarter and 
arrested its militants (Lewis, 1980: 90). The democráticos who were still holding the majority 
in Congress complained and asked for the release of CPT leaders as well as for the resignation 
of the Minister of Labor, González Alsina. Stroessner agreed to some demands and ended the 
state of emergency. A month later, the police violently repressed a student manifestation that 
turned into a street riot. This time, the democráticos called for the resignation of the Minister 
of Interior, Ynsfrán. Stroessner issued two presidential decrees: one ordering the (re) 
imposition of the state of emergency and the other the dissolution of Congress. “More than 
one hundred democráticos were taken into custody” including congressmen and Junta de 
Gobierno officials (Lewis, 1980: 93). Many flew to Argentina and joined Méndez Fleitas to 
form the Popular Colorado Movement (MOPOCO). The purge was massive: the PC lost 80% 
of its leadership (Lambert, 1997a: 20 en6).  
 
The crisis was high in intensity. Stroessner used his alliance with the guionistas to eliminate 
the democráticos. The latter did not automatically give up. Indeed, the MOPOCO instigated 
numerous low-intensity attacks in the countryside. “But Ynsfrán … obtained considerable 
peasant support himself in the process of receiving information with which to control guerrilla 
warfare” (Miranda, 1990: 64). He implemented a wide network of collaborators and penetrated 
grass-root organizations in order to consolidate his power and the hegemonic position of the 
PC (Lewis, 1980: 84, 86; Roett & Sacks, 1991: 55). Soon, Stroessner perceived Ynsfrán’s 
independent popular base as a threat (Lewis, 1980: 98). Coincidently, “a crisis occurred 
among the police in Asunción involving the police chief and several other Ynsfrán protégés”: 
that is, a corruption scandal that allowed Stroessner to revamp the police force by excluding 
Ynsfrán’s supporters (Miranda, 1990: 64). Ynsfrán resigned in November 1966. Given that he 
was pushing for the creation of an urban guard that could challenge military officers, the latter 
were obviously pleased with the events (Lewis, 1980: 91). In sum, “without the 
democráticos… and the guionostas around, the only plausible scenario was for everyone to 
become stronistas” (Miranda, 1990: 65). Yet, instead of dismantling Ynsfrán’s network, 
Stroessner somewhat reorganized and institutionalized it under the auspices of the PC by 
creating seccionales or local party branches in every town and village of the country (Lambert, 
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1997a: 6). Also, with the fall of each faction came an equivalent clean up within the military 
ranks and the nomination of officers loyal to Stroessner (Lewis, 1980: 226). Thereafter for two 
decades, a military-Colorado alliance will cement the ruling coalition and maintain stability in 
the country. There was no need for other actors to be included. 
 
In 1987, the election for the position of president of the PC crystallized an emerging feud 
between two factions: the militants and the traditionalists. The militants were backing the 
Minister of the Interior, Sabino A. Montanaro; and the traditionalists were favoring Juan 
Ramón Chaves, the president of the Junta de Gobierno (Nickson, 1988: 255). The militants 
were pro-Stroessner and staunch advocates of using repression in dealing with the opposition. 
For instance, they were behind the creation of “an extreme right-wing paramilitary 
organisation, the Anti-Communist Action Group” (Nickson, 1988: 255). The loyalty of the 
traditionalists was to the party rather than to Stroessner (Miranda, 1990: 130). The conflict 
burst into the streets, each faction organizing rallies. In August, with the apparent approval of 
Stroessner, the militants positioned policemen around the Convention Hall to block the 
traditionalists from attending the convention (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 343). Montanaro won the 
party election unchallenged, militants took control of the government and “seventeen of the 
thirty-five members of the junta were kicked out” (Abente, 1995: 311).  
 
This crisis was medium in intensity but a sign of major upheavals to come. While the militants 
were controlling the state, namely the police force, the traditionalists had, until 1987, their 
hands on the party (Nickson, 1988: 251). Yet, in the early 1980s, both were already competing 
for influence in the seccionales across the territory (Abente, 1995: 310; Lambert, 1997a: 18). 
It highlights the rising politicization of the countryside and its concomitant growing instability. 
Indeed, major developments were occurring; notably the creation of Agrarians Leagues and 
the discontent of Catholic priests with regard to human rights violation in regions were 
propelling the peasant issue at the center stage of politics. If anything, the events were a 
forerunner of Stroessner’s exit from power. As Miranda (1990: 132) resumes: “with most of 
the military supporting the traditionalist position… Stroessner had sealed the fate of his 
regime”.  
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In 1989, after forty-five years as president of Paraguay, Stroessner era was over. The aging 
incumbent fell victim of a putsch. Foremost, it was the result of a succession crisis. The 
militants pushed for the candidature of Stroessner or his son, Gustavo, an Air Force Colonel, 
as president of Paraguay (Powers, 1992: 6). The military officers generally vouched instead 
for Luis María Argaña, the president of the Supreme Court (Miranda, 1990: 131). They were 
displeased at the militants’ attempt to interfere with military nomination and force the 
retirement of some officers still at the peak of their career, especially General Andrés 
Rodríguez (Abente, 1995: 312). On February 1st, the militants served an ultimatum to 
Rodríguez: “either accept the post of minister of defense (and give up direct command of 
troops) or resign… But Rodríguez declined to be kicked upstairs… Instead, on the next 
evening, he ordered his troops to arrest President Stroessner… The fight lasted a few hours (at 
the presidential Escort Regiment), but Stroessner surrendered toward dawn on February 3rd” 
(Roett & Sacks, 1991: 131). As history repeats itself, Rodríguez purged the PC of the militant 
faction therefore establishing the full authority of traditionalists.  
 
The crisis was high in intensity. It highlights the destabilizing effect of excluding from the 
ruling coalition General Rodríguez, the commander of the First Brigade. Indeed, “the political 
loyalty of the First Brigade is crucial to the Paraguayan state because the unit’s barracks are 
right outside of Asunción” and it is “Paraguay’s largest, best equipped, and best trained army 
unit” (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 131). Also, in its opposition to Stroessner’s re-election, Rodríguez 
had the support of what was left of the traditionalists and the opposition coalition, the National 
Accord (Nickson, 1988: 258). The National Accord was an unofficial opposition coalition 
formed in 1979. It included the PRF, the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA), the 
Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and MOPOCO as well as labor unions and church 
organizations. With the militants defeated, the alliance between the traditionalists and the 
National Accord evaporated. Later on, the militants as well as other dissident factions found 
their way back to the PC (Lambert, 2000: 383). Nevertheless, the decision of the Colorado 
elites to extend a friendly hand to the opposition parties, albeit opportunistically, was a novelty 
and surprising move in stark contrast with the Stroessner period.  
 
Although the new 1992 Constitution denied to military officers the right to participate in 
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political activities, it did not prevent some high-ranking officers from changing side and 
publicly supporting Juan Carlos Wasmosy against the candidate of the traditionalists, Luis 
María Argaña, during the December Colorado primaries (Lambert, 2000: 385). Initially, 
Argaña won, but the new electoral tribunal, filled with Rodríguez’s sympathizers, overturned 
the result (Riquelme & Riquelme, 1997: 58). Wasmosy was named the new Colorado 
president but was in a weak position. The arganistas defected to the opposition, de facto 
creating a minority government. Having no choice but to strengthen his position, Wasmosy 
engineered in 1994 a “governability pact” with the PLRA, the PRF and the PDC to recapture 
the majority. Most importantly, the key architect of Wasmosy’s electoral victory was General 
Oviedo who strongly claimed and demonstrated on which side he was. As a reward, Wasmosy 
named him commander of the army. Yet, Oviedo’s thirst for power was obvious. Wasmosy 
decided in 1996 to relieve the General of his new functions. “Oviedo refused to comply and 
threatened to bomb the presidential palace if Wasmosy did not resign, effectively declaring a 
coup d’état” (Lambert, 2000: 390). In the end, Argaña replaced Wasmosy as Colorado 
president in April 1996. Oviedo was arrested in June but was quickly released in the face of 
strong popular support (Nickson, 1997b: 199). In a complex twist of events, Oviedo was 
eventually nominated as the PC presidential candidate for the 1998 elections, but re-arrested 
weeks prior to the elections (Lambert, 2000: 390). “Oviedo’s running mate, civilian engineer 
Raúl Cubas, then became the Colorado Party presidential candidate, and Cuba’s archenemy, 
Luis María Argaña, an old stronista, became the vice-presidential nominee” (Sondrol, 2007: 
335). 
 
The crisis was high in intensity. The ruling coalition was in disarray: shifting alliances and 
switching sides were the norm. Ultimately, the military was the binding force that held the PC 
together. When the military was divided, the party was divided. Furthermore, as the Colorado 
was divided, so were the rural constituencies. As Lambert (2000: 390-391) asserts, “while 
much of the vote for the Colorado Party was undoubtedly based on traditional family loyalties 
and clientelistic networks…. he [Oviedo] exploited his own ties to the peasantry”. Hence, 
Oviedo’s ability to navigate his way in the corridors of power exposes the significance of the 
rural support. Finally, Wasmosy’s efforts to build a coalition also denote the importance of 
opposition parties even if the “governability pact” proved to be an ad hoc solution more than a 
 227  
strategic partnership. As for the Cuba/Argaña ticket, it will encounter a tragic faith.  
 
In August 1998, “Cubas reorganized the military tribunal which had originally sentenced 
Oviedo, suggesting the beginning of a campaign to restore oviedistas control over the armed 
forces” (Lambert, 2000: 391). In the process, he absolved Oviedo of any crime and ended his 
jail term. The Supreme Court overruled the presidential decree, the attorney general authorized 
Cubas’ impeachment, and the crisis escalated in March when the arganistas unilaterally ended 
the ongoing PC elections where the oviedistas victory was almost certain (Lambert, 2000: 
391). In response, oviedistas decided to siege the party headquarters. “On March 23, 1999, 
Vice President Luis María Argaña was machine-gunned in downtown Asunción” (Sondrol, 
2007: 335). Politicians of all allegiances quickly blamed Cubas and Oviedo, albeit without 
proof. It triggered a series of mass protests and violent repression. Finally, Cubas flew to 
Brazil and Oviedo to Argentina.  
 
The intensity of the crisis was high as the assassination of Argaña was coupled with Cubas’ 
resignation. For a while, violent confrontations raged between the police/army and Argaña’s 
supporters just outside the Congress building. Suddenly, the country was without a head of 
state. “The presidency fell to the arganista speaker of the senate, Luis González Macchi, who 
immediately created a government of national unity. The agreed division of power left the 
cabinet with seven Colorados… and two members each from the opposition parties, the PLRA 
and PEN”89 (Lambert, 2000: 392). Again, this alliance was a tactical coalition to momentarily 
defuse a crisis. No real credible commitment was institutionalized. For instance, the PLRA 
was offered the vice-presidency, but once the PLRA had accepted to join the government of 
national unity, Macchi refused to comply with his terms of the bargain. In February, the PLRA 
returned to the opposition and “the ruling Colorados remained split between arganistas and 
oviedistas” (Sondrol, 2007: 336). The military factor was still omnipresent. Case in point, 
Macchi “purged the armed forces of over 100 oviedista officers, as well as 45 senior 
commanders” and worked to “bring the armed forces into line with the dominant arganista 
faction” (Lambert, 2000: 393). After these massive moves against the military, in August 
                                                 
89 The PEN is an opposition coalition called the National Encounter Party composed of the PRF and the PDC.  
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2003, Macchi stepped down and was replaced by the newly elected Colorado candidate 
Nicanor Duarte Frutos.  
 
In 2008, the Colorado primaries were once more the host of serious elite division. It was 
opposing Blanca Ovelar de Duarte, the Minister of Education, to Luis Alberto Castiglioni, the 
vice-president. President Frutos was favoring Duarte. According to Abente (2009: 147-148), 
Frutos’ plan was to get a “puppet” president elected to eventually recapture the top position as 
the new 1992 Constitution was authorizing only a single mandate of five years. Many 
Colorados did not approve the move and landed their support to Castiglioni. Nevertheless, 
Duarte became the Colorado candidate for the 2008 presidential elections and the party was 
divided as ever. He entered the electoral campaign in a weak position. Hoping to prevent 
Oviedo – unable to compete in elections since in exile and accused of crimes – from giving by 
default his support to the opposition and possibly defeating Duarte, Frutos freed Oviedo of all 
legal charges. He was authorized to run as candidate in the presidential election. The intent 
was to fragment the opposition votes. The plan admirably failed. The PC lost the presidency 
after sixty years in power to a former catholic bishop, Fernando Lugo. It was an electro-shock, 
an historic moment. It was the first time in Paraguayan history that such a turnover was 
occurring as a result of a competitive election. In a way, it was the sign of a genuine 
democratic transition.  
 
The crisis was high in intensity. It was a dramatic change in the distribution of power. 
Although the Colorado internal divisions were certainly a critical factor in Lugo’s victory, his 
ability to form a working coalition and attract the main opposition party, the PLRA, tilt the 
balance in his favor (Abente, 2009: 145). Also, albeit Lugo resigned as bishop of his diocese 
in 2005 and the Vatican suspended him from episcopal functions in 2007, he was still for the 
peasants the “Bishop of the poor”. His successful appeal to rural constituencies cannot be 
denied (O’Shaughnessy & Díaz, 2009: xiv). Lugo formed a cabinet in which most positions 
went to the PLRA, but the PC (the Minister of Economy Dionisio Borda) and the armed forces 
(the Defense Minister Gen. Luis Bareiro) were also represented.  
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Patterns of alliance politics in Paraguay are not easy to detect, especially before and after 
Stroessner’s presidency. It is an epic story of volatile alliances and most of all a confrontation 
between high-profile politicians and generals. In this context, elite interactions are highly 
personalized and the position of each faction varies according to specific circumstances. 
Ultimately, the ambition of would-be ruler substitutes itself to organizational interests. Friends 
become enemies and enemies become friends almost overnight. Regardless of a series of 
backstabbing events and frequent crossover, the involvement of the military in politics has 
been an inescapable reality. Focusing on this dominant social group goes a long way in 
explaining periods of stability and instability in Paraguay. As for local leaders, their true 
significance has transpired only when things started to get hairy towards the end of the 
Stroessner era. Before, their support was almost taken for granted.  
 
The next two sections will shed additional light on the importance of military officers and 
local leaders compared to other social groups depending on the type of hybrid regime 
Paraguay has experienced and the level of economic development.   
 
6.2. The Degree of Extra-Legal Organized Violence 
 
As we have seen, Paraguay has a long history of political violence. We should expect the 
military officers to be a central figure of authority and indeed, the previous narrative of 
political crises confirms it. As it will be further develop, their corporate interests dictate their 
behavior and their capacity to exert influence on the ruling elites is tied amongst others to their 
constituencies. However, additional precisions are needed to explain the decision of the ruling 
elites to co-opt opposition parties during the post-Stroessner era: that is, Rodríguez and the 
National Accord (1989), Wasmosy and the governability pact (1994) and Macchi and the 
government of national unity (1999). Our interpretation rests on the change of type of hybrid 
regime from hegemonic authoritarianism (1954-1989) to competitive authoritarianism (1990-
2008). 
 
Way back, the Triple Alliance War (1865-70) against its powerful neighboring countries 
Argentina and Brazil had left the country in despair: “Paraguay lost more than half of its 
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500,000 inhabitants” (Klaiber, 1998: 92). The Chaco War (1932-35) between Paraguay and 
Bolivia also imposed a heavy toll on the future of the country; it was “an event that plunged 
the military into politics” (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 341). In fact, the Chaco War revealed the 
general discontent of military officers about the lack of interest of politicians, namely the 
Liberals, for the necessity of well-equipped and well-trained armed forces (Miranda, 1990: 
44). “The Paraguayan Liberals, afraid of making their generals too powerful, preferred to keep 
the military budget low and to depend on peace negotiations” (Lewis, 1980: 7). Thus, it comes 
as no surprise that the Liberals were ousted by militarist elements of the armed forces. Overall, 
both the Triple Alliance War and the Chaco War lead to a general observation: belligerent 
countries with great ambitions were surrounding Paraguay. As Lewis (1980: 7) argues, “the 
constant need to defend Paraguay borders from threatening neighbors has tended to enhance 
the position of the army, perhaps to an exaggerated degree”. Even if our analysis starts at 
1945, the subsequent military actions that took place over the years can hardly be understood 
without references to these traumatic episodes in the history of one of the first Latin American 
country to access independence.  
 
The 1947 civil war was no less devastating: the country population dropped by one-third 
(Roett & Sacks, 1991: 4). With such tradition of violence, disfranchised political movements 
in Paraguay were naturally inclined to take arms to defend their rights and express their 
opinions. Indeed, during the earlier years of the repressive Stroessner regime, “guerrilla 
activism flourished along the border. The group of 14th of May was created, combining former 
Liberal activists and the Vanguardia Febrerista” (Miranda, 1990: 92). Also, “MOPOCO 
launched various unsuccessful guerrilla movements from exile and maintained a strong if 
shadowy presence within the Colorado party” (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 345). In the 1960s, the 
United National Liberation Front (FULNA), “with strong backing from the Communist Party 
of Paraguay”, was also involved in subversive actions (Miranda, 1990: 92). Finally, in the 
mid-1970s, some student and peasant leaders formed the small Organizatión Político Militar 
(OPM). The guerilla group orchestrated few attacks, but Stroessner’s security apparatus 
quickly destroyed it. Since the 1990s, most extra-legal organized violence activities have 
seized and Congress has been acting as the vector of political expression. Therefore, the 
following comments will focus on the interests of military officers and its leverage over the 
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ruling elites since for the most part the degree of extra-legal organized violence was high. 
Nevertheless, we will briefly address related issues pertaining to political parties to provide 
some inputs about the subsequent period when the degree was low.   
 
6.2.1. Peripheral Actors, Interests and Constituencies 
 
From the very beginning, we can trace a systematic attempt by the ruling elites to covet the 
support of the military. Already in the 1940s, the fascist Morínigo was allocating significant 
resources “spending about half the national budget on the armed forces” to co-opt this 
strategic actor (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 341). Gradually, they accumulated enough power to gain 
leverage against the ruling elites and defend their own corporate interests (Abente, 1995: 305-
306). The armed forces became an indispensable ally. “In the eighteen years between the 
February Revolution and Stroessner’s rise to power, it put nine presidents into the palace and 
removed seven of them” (Lewis, 1980: 124).  
 
Stroessner pursued a similar policy as Morínigo. During his terms, “the military has broad 
influence and disproportionate priority in the state, with a budget greater than those for 
education, health, agriculture, or commerce” (Powers, 1992: 28). However, Stroessner pushed 
the logic much further enlarging the legitimacy of the military. He first formulated a new 
doctrine in which domestic issues and war against insurgents had precedence over traditional 
foreign threats (Sondrol, 1992: 108). Along those lines, Stroessner appointed military officers 
to key positions in the police force and cabinet (Bouvier, 1988: 11). Furthermore, he used the 
military to impose cohesion within the PC by somewhat merging the two entities. As Nickson 
(1988: 240) reports: “since July 1955 officials serving in the armed forces have been obliged 
to join the Colorado Party and admission to the officer corps has become effectively restricted 
to children of Colorado families”. Military officers were from now on a partisan force. Yet, 
they “have to a large extent managed to preserve their autonomy and continue to represent the 
strongest political force outside the control of civilian government” (Lambert, 1997b: 205). 
Military officers acted as a counterweight to the PC. But because Stroessner wanted to protect 
himself against possible independent actions from the officer corps, he also “built up his own, 
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personal, heavily armed Presidential Escort Battalion, an elite unit of 1,500 men” (Lewis, 
1980: 139). 
 
The armed forces were representing about 20,000 officers and Stroessner knew most of them 
personally, being the one directly responsible for almost all military promotions (Lott, 1971: 
124; Lewis, 1980: 107). They were mostly visible in the capital and where the state of 
emergency that last from 1947 to 1987 was de facto in effect (Miranda, 1990: 78). Obviously, 
in sheer numbers, it was a rather small constituency, geographically limited to Asunción. 
Thus, the question is whether they could reached-out and mobilize a larger segment of the 
population.  
 
In Paraguay, military officers were more proponents of the tradition than agents of 
modernization. On Stroessner’s order, they were involved in civil engineering activities linked 
to construction projects in the transport, telecommunication, health and education sectors 
(Sondrol, 1992: 109; Lewis, 1980: 129). As such, it might have raised their profile in some 
communities and attracted additional secondary supports that could have been mobilized in 
due time. However, overall they were concerned about the preservation of the status quo and 
the reproduction of a social stratification with them at the top (Sondrol, 1992: 108).  
 
Still, their overall influence in society should not be underestimated given their command of a 
black market and role as private entrepreneurs. Their commercial interests in various 
companies – notably in transportation – hided insidious schemes involving drug and human 
trafficking as well as illegal smuggling of various products (Sondrol, 1992: 109; Nickson, 
1997a: 28; Lewis, 1980: 131-132). Also, military officers were offered well-paid jobs in 
parastatal companies and privileged opportunities in the real estate market (Lambert, 1996: 98; 
Miranda, 1990: 119)90. According to Stroessner himself, this was the cost to obtain military 
                                                 
90 No one profited more from these preferential treatments than General Rodríguez. “The owner of one of 
Asunción largest and most luxurious mansions, Rodríguez has sizeable interests in banking and currency 
exchange, brewing, flour milling, construction, manufacturing, ranching, real estate, and the import-export trade, 
and he controls key cigarette, luxury car, and aircraft import concessions” (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 133; Nickson, 
1997a: 31). 
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support (Bouvier, 1988: 25). In the process, they accumulated wealth to a point that many 
Paraguayans depended on them for their economic security. 
 
At the same time, they were largely exempted from the tactical functions and responsibilities 
related to political repression and the stigma associated with brutal and excessive violence. 
“Most of the daily operations concerning political intelligence were the responsibility of the 
Asunción police”… and “by allocating such a visible and critical role to the police, Stroessner 
managed to protect the military from controversy” (Miranda, 1990: 59). Yet, as the most 
potent coercive apparatus in the country, their status was given them an aura of invincibility: 
who ever dare to challenge them should pay a steep price. For all these reasons, the military 
could mobilize significant numbers of supporters during election periods: but probably and 
most effectively in districts in and around the capital, the economic and political center of the 
country. Except for the 2008 elections, rarely if ever the electoral outcome went against their 
will.  
 
In our framework, military officers and opposition parties are two antagonistic social groups 
that cannot live together. Stroessner always despised opposition parties, and the military 
unconditionally supported him in that matter. It is only when he put his own house in order 
that some forms of liberalization took place. He legalized only the opposition parties ready to 
play by his rules and never attempted to form a coalition with them, while after 1989, the 
ruling elites will consider this possibility on few occasions.  
 
This behavior should be understood in relation to the degree of extra-legal organized violence. 
As it decreases, the importance of opposition parties increases as well as the necessity to 
include one of them in the ruling coalition. For instance, it is in this context that the emergence 
as well as the demise of the National Accord find is true meaning. Indeed, just before the 1989 
May election, “in exchange for positions within the Junta de Gobierno and in the public 
administration, MOPOCO, the exiled dissident faction of the Colorado Party, was persuaded 
to abandon its alliance with the opposition and to rejoin the party, where it was rapidly co-
opted and absorbed. Following this, the Acuerdo Nacional, and thus opposition unity, 
dissolved” (Riquelme & Riquelme, 1997: 53).  
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Most importantly, why did the ruling elites want to lure the PLRA? The rational was simple. 
The Liberals, and above all the PLRA, represented the most formidable challenge to 
Stroessner and the PC. As Roett & Sacks (1991: 116, 118) describe, both parties can count on 
about the same number of adherents and political affiliation is a family tradition transmitted to 
one generation to another with no crossover voter. Also, most communities are equally divided 
between Liberals and Colorados: “there are very few one-party communities” (Hicks, 1967: 
281). Thus, the Liberals had captive constituencies and could influence a large portion of the 
votes.  
 
Why it did not work out? First, the programmatic stance of the Colorados and Liberals was 
almost identical (Miranda, 1990: 81). In principle, it meant that the two parties were 
competing for the same constituencies. They were not complementary but archenemy, yet 
mostly for historic reasons. Additionally, the military officers were still an integral part of the 
ruling coalition at that time. They stubbornly refused to return to the barracks. Therefore, 
including opposition parties was posing a serious problem as their mutual distrust was creating 
unbearable frictions within the ruling coalition and preventing its institutionalization. Military 
officers and opposition parties were mutually exclusive social groups. This friction coincided 
with a change of hybrid regime type.  
 
6.2.2. Types of Regimes 
 
The Paraguayan political regime is difficult to assess, especially during Stroessner years. 
According to Roett & Sacks (1991: 127), “the regime was such an oddity as to defy 
classification”. Many point to its uniqueness, at least compared to its Latin American 
counterparts (Lambert, 1996: 104). Freedom House classifies the regime as partly free 
(hybrid) from 1972 to 2010. We are inclined to divide the Paraguayan regime into three 
phases: (1) autocratic (1945-1954); (2) hegemonic authoritarianism (1955-1989); and (3) 
competitive authoritarianism (1990-2008). This sequence tends to corroborate the evolving 
patterns of political alliances found in Paraguay.  
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1945-1954: Autocratic Regime 
 
The 1945-1954’s period was largely autocratic since no frequent elections were held and 
repression was the primary mean of political communication91. Morínigo’s absolute 
domination over the political regime was inscribed in the 1940 Constitution: “it gave virtually 
dictatorial powers to the executive; the president could dissolve Congress, dictate laws, and 
command the armed forces” (Miranda, 1990: 56). The Constitution also included provisions 
for the creation of the Council of State responsible for centralizing all interest groups 
(including business, farmers, bankers, the military, and the Roman Catholic Church) in a 
single corporatist institution controlled by the Executive. Overall, from 1940 to 1946, the 
military oversaw all aspects of state-society relations (Abente, 1995: 300). Starting in 1947, a 
state of emergency was in full force. Civil liberties and political rights were scorned and 
violated with impunity. The rule of law was completely absent, and freedom of speech and 
freedom of association were inexistent (Lewis, 1980: 52).   
 
1955-1989: Hegemonic Authoritarian Regime 
 
Once Stroessner took over power, the political regime mutated in something qualitatively 
different. There was first a transition period between 1955 and 1962 from an autocratic to an 
embryonic hybrid regime of a hegemonic authoritarian type. During this period, the 1940 
Constitution prevailed, although direct single-candidate executive elections were introduced. 
Universal suffrage including women and illiterate rights to vote became effective only in 1961 
(León-Roesch & Ortiz, 2005: 418). The PC was the sole legal party in Congress. Furthermore, 
the state of emergency was still in effect except on election days (Miranda, 1990: 78).  
 
Most of all, it is a period marked by a violent campaign against political opponents 
comparable to defunct totalitarian regimes (Lewis, 1980: 227)92. The brutality of the secret 
                                                 
91 General elections occurred in 1948 (González) and 1949 (López). They were not scheduled. They were 
organized to procure some form of legitimacy to the new ruler. In both cases, the candidate was unchallenged.  
92 Nevertheless, the analogy should not be exaggerated. The Stroessner regime was “not sufficiently 
mobilizational, ideological, or socializing to warrant the totalitarian label” (Power, 1992: 6). Lewis also adds, “of 
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police headed by the Departamento de Investigación and the Division Tecnica para la 
Represión del Comunismo was such that a general climate of fear and suspicion among the 
population was widespread (Lambert, 1997a: 9). In addition, the PC members managed to 
“provide a network of unpaid spies and informers to keep all potential enemies under 
surveillance” (Lewis, 1980: 150). Law 294 (1955) entitled “In Defense of Democracy” was 
promulgated to fight communism and any kind of anti-systemic ideology; its shallowness was 
used on purpose to legally but arbitrarily arrest without warrant political opponents and control 
the flow of information; it basically canceled constitutional guarantees (Miranda, 1990: 79). 
The first target was of course the PL (Lewis, 1980: 280).  
 
In the 1960s, the regime became more tolerant towards political opposition. Indeed, Stroessner 
authorized small openings. In 1963, for the first time in Paraguayan history, the presidential 
election was competitive, albeit not free and fair93. The 1967 Constitution attributed to the 
majority party automatically the two-third of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, whereas 
minority parties received one-third (Abente, 1995: 314)94. The same year, the PL, the PLR and 
the PRF were all officially registered as legal parties95. In principle, it meant that their 
members were allowed to engage in debate with other fellow politicians, mobilize their 
electorate, diffuse their programmatic agenda in the media and convene to coordinate their 
actions (Lewis, 1980: 177-178).  
 
The PL and PLR were a “loyal opposition” insofar as they refrained from publicly criticizing 
the president as well as the armed forces, and from organizing public rallies. The legislative 
branch was a little more than a rubber-stamp institution (Nickson, 1988: 242). Also, Stroessner 
heavily interfered with opposition party leadership (Bouvier, 1988: 15, 21). In 1970, Law 209 
                                                                                                                                                         
the twenty-eight men who served under him, none of them were imprisoned, executed, or publicly humiliated” 
(Lewis, 1980: 121).  
93 It should be noted that voting was mandatory for adults in Paraguay (Bouvier, 1988: 16). Also, during the 
Stroessner era, all public employees are PC members by choice or by force (Lambert, 1997a: 7; Roett & Sacks, 
1991: 118). 
94 The one-third of the seats was distributed according to the percentage of the votes an opposition party received 
compared to the total of votes opposition parties obtained.  
95 The PL and the PLR were legalized. The PLRA and the PDC operated in a gray zone; not legal, but not 
systematically repressed. And finally, the PCP and the MOPOCO were banned parties (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 
122). 
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entitled “Defense of the Public Peace and the Freedom of Individuals” authorized the 
government to sanction anyone who was contemplating to transgress the law, especially in 
relation to political activities (Miranda, 1990: 79). It was a legal instrument to contain the 
opposition. Hence, it had no choice but to obey to Stroessner’s rules since the latter was 
basically controlling the entry to the party system. There was also a provision for banning 
political rallies.  
 
The Electoral Commission was packed with Colorado sympathizers (Nickson, 1988: 241). 
During the electoral period, opposition parties did not have access to media outlets and in the 
end of 1980s with the closing of ABC Color (1984) and El Pueblo (1987) no independent 
media existed in Paraguay besides the Church Press (Hicks, 1971: 100; US Library of 
Congress, Paraguay, 2012). Bouvier (1988, 19-20) claims: “journalists are periodically 
detained and the independent Paraguayan Journalist’s Association (SPP), formed in 1979, has 
yet to be granted legal recognition… Major newspapers are owned by friends and relatives of 
General Stroessner. Opposition weeklies, such as El Enanon, El Radical, Dialogo and La 
Republica have all been shut down”. Moreover, the entire electoral process was manifesting 
numerous irregularities that were challenging the integrity of results and reducing the event to 
a mere façade (Bouvier, 1988: 15-16; Nickson, 1988: 241). Finally, the 1977 Constitution had 
removed any limit to presidential terms. Thus, according to Abente (1995: 301), “the post-
1960 party system can best be characterized as a pragmatic hegemonic system”. 
 
Table XI – Electoral Results in Paraguay (Legislative and Executive) 
 
Year Political Party Votes % Seats %
1963 Colorado Party (PC) 569,551 92.3 40 66.6
Liberal Party (PL) 47,750 7.7 20 33.7
Total 617,301 100 60 100
Participation Rate (85.1%)
1968 PC 465,535 71.6 40 66.6
PLR 139,622 21.5 16 26.6
PL 27,965 4.3 3 5
PRF 16,871 2.6 1 1.8
Total 649,993 100 60 100
Participation Rate (73.1%)
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1973 PC 681,306 84.7 40 66.6
PLR 98,096 12.2 16 26.6
PL 24,611 3.1 4 6.7
Total 804,013 100 60 99.9
Participation Rate (77.4%)
1978 PC 905,461 90.7 40 66.6
PLR 54,984 5.5 16 26.6
PL 37,059 3.7 4 6.7
Total 997,504 99.9 60 99.9
Participation Rate (86%)
1983 PC 944,637 91 40 66.6
PLR 59,094 5.7 16 26.7
PL 34,010 3.3 4 6.7
Total 1,037,741 100 60 100
Participation Rate (92.6%)
1988 PC 1,187,738 89.6 40 66.6
PLR 95,450 7.2 13 21.7
PL 42,430 3.2 7 11.7
Total 1,325,618 100 60 100
Participation Rate (92.2%)
1989 PC 845,820 74.5 48 66.6
Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA) 229,329 20.2 21 29.2
Others 56,570 5 3 4.1
Total 1,131,719 99.7 72 99.9
Participation Rate (52%)
1993 PC 488,342 43.4 38 47.5
PLRA 414,208 36.8 33 41.3
National Encounter Alliance (PEN) 199,053 17.7 9 11.3
Others 23,275 2.1 0 0
Total 1,124,878 100 80 100
Participation Rate (67.6%)
1998 PC 875,473 53.8 45 56.3
Democratic Alliance 681,917 42.8 35 43.8
Others 55,024 3.4 0 0
Total 1,612,414 100 80 100
Participation Rate (80.5%)
2003 PC 520,761 34.8 37 46.3
PLRA 379,066 25.3 21 26.3
Patria Querida Movement (MPQ) 255,811 17.1 10 12.5
National Union of Ethical Citizens (UNACE) 216,803 14.7 10 12.5
Party of a United Country (PPS) 49,280 3.3 2 2.5
PEN 39,372 2.7 0 0
Others 33,973 2.3 0 0
Total 1,495,066 100 80 100
Participation Rate (64.1%)
2008 PC 564,458 32.5 30 37.5
PLRA 498,529 28.7 27 33.8
UNACE 332,880 19.1 15 18.8
Popular Movement Tekojoja (MPT) 111,250 6.4 1 1.3
Beloved Fatherland Movement (PPQ) 102,055 5.9 3 3.8
Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC)/Alianza Democratica Tricolor 28,435 1.6 2 2.5
Others 101,237 5.8 2 2.5
Total 1,738,844 100 80 100
Participation Rate (65.4%.)
Data Source: Le—n-Roesch & Ortiz (2005); Inter-Parliamentary Union; Paraguay Electoral Commission, 2012. 
Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are included in the category "Others". 
Also, for legislative elections, independents are included in this category.
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Year Candidate Votes % 
1954 Alfredo Stroessner (PC) 239,978 100
Participation Rate (n.a.)
1958 Alfredo Stroessner (PC) 295,414 100
Participation Rate (n.a.)
1963 Alfredo Stroessner (PC) 569,551 92.3
Ernesto Gavilan (PL) 47,750 7.7
Total 617,301 100
Participation Rate (85.1%)
1968 Alfredo Stroessner (PC) 465,535 71.6
Gustavo Gonzalez (PLR) 139,622 21.5
Ruy Rufinelli (PL) 27,965 4.3
PRF 16,871 2.6
Total 649,993 100
Participation rate (73.1%)
1973 Alfredo Stroessner (PC) 681,306 84.7
Gustavo Riart (PLR) 98,096 12.2
Carlos Levi Ruffinelli (PL) 24,611 3.1
Total 804,013 100
Participation rate (77.4%)
1978 Alfredo Stroessner (PC) 905,461 90.8
German Acosta Caballero (PLR) 54,984 5.5
Fulvio Hugo Celauro (PL) 37,059 3.7
Total 997,504 100
Participation rate (86%)
1983 Alfredo Stroessner (PC) 944,637 91
Enzo Doldan (PLR) 59,094 5.7
Fulvio Hufo Celauro (PL) 34,010 3.3
Total 1,037,741 100
Participation rate (92.6%)
1988 Alfredo Stroessner (PC) 1,187,738 89.6
Luis Maria Vega (PLR) 95,450 7.2
Carlos Ferreira Ybarra (PL) 42,430 3.2
Total 1,325,618 100
Participation rate (92.2%)
1989  Andrs Rodriguez (PC) 894,374 75.9
Domingo Laino (PLRA) 240,600 20.4
Others 43,630 3.7
Total 1,178,604 100
Participation Rate (54%)
1993 Juan Carlos Wasmosy (PC) 468,213 41.6
Domingo Laino (PLRA) 376,868 33.5
Guillermo Caballero Vargas (PEN) 271,421 24.1
Others 8,161 0.7
Total 1,124,663 99.9
Participation Rate (69%)
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One may wonder if the regime under Stroessner was a military regime. After all, he himself 
was a general, the military budget represented a large part of government expenditures, 
military officers were omnipresent in the state administration and the state of emergency 
prevailed until 1987. Yet, country analysts are almost unanimous: “After 1940, parties had to 
share some of the power with the military, but they never lost their central role”, especially the 
PC (Abente, 1995: 300; Powers, 1992: 5). The military as an institution never ruled Paraguay 
(Sondrol, 1992: 107; Lambert, 1997a: 7). For instance, “civilians occupied 70 percent of the 
ministerial posts, and military officers were appointed to only a few high civil service 
positions” and among them most were no longer serving in the armed forces (Abente, 1995: 
305). In fact, the PC fulfilled an important function during the Stroessner era: it provided a 
check on the military’s ambitions (Lewis, 1980: 150). Overall, civilian institutions were the 
basis of the Paraguayan political regime. 
 
 
 
1998 Raul Cubas Grau (PC) 887,196 54.8
Domingo Laino Figueredo (PLRA) 703,379 43.4
Luis Campos (PRF) 8,139 0.5
Gustavo Bader Ibanez (PB) 4,192 0.3
Total 1,602,906 99.0
Participation Rate (80.5%)
2003 Nicanor Duarte Frutos (PC) 574,232 38.3
Julio Cesar Franco (PLRA) 370,348 24.7
Pedro Fadul (MPQ) 328,916 21.9
Guillermo Sanchez (UNACE) 208,391 13.9
Other 17,313 1.2
Total 1,499,200 100
Participation Rate (64.3%)
2008 Fernando Lugo (APC) 766,502 42.7
Blanca Ovelar (PC) 573,562 32
Lino Oviedo (UNACE) 410,637 22.9
Pedro Nicolas Maara Fadul Niella (PPQ) 44,060 2.4
Total 1,794,761 100
Participation Rate (65.6%)
Data Source:  Le—n-Roesch & Ortiz (2005);. Election Guide.org; Abente-Brun (2009)
Paraguay Electoral Commission, 2012.
Note: If three parties/candidates or more received less than 25,000 votes each, they are 
included in the category "Others"
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1990-2008: Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
 
In 1989, Stroessner’s rule finally ended. The formation of an official opposition coalition 
became legal and the “the explicit prohibition of affiliation to political parties by members of 
the armed forces and the police was a further crucial reform” (Riquelme & Riquelme, 1997: 
55). “Newspapers that Stroessner had banned were again on the street” (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 
1). Local elections were organized for the first time in the history of the country and the rule 
guaranteeing the two-third of the seats to the majority party was eliminated (Nickson, 1997b: 
156). In May 1993, the opposition obtained the majority in Congress, albeit not as a united 
front signaling that elections was generally free, fair and competitive. Indeed, old practices of 
ballot stuffing and vote-rigging appeared to belong to the past. Groups of the civil society 
were expanding and gradually learning to play an important role in politics. For instance, “by 
the beginning of 1990, there were already 402 union organizations” (Céspedes, 1997: 108).  
 
That being said, the transition was above all, “an attempt to restore the civil-military pact” 
(Martini & Lezcano, 1997: 65). Political competition was unfair insofar as the military officers 
were intervening to influence the vote and the same elites remained in power; those who were 
supporting Stroessner’s way of doing politics were still very much around (Roett & Sacks, 
1991: 1, 352; Léon-Roesch & Ortiz, 2005: 418). Indeed, the event-history analysis (e.g. 1998 
political crisis) demonstrates the general disrespect of the ruling elites in regard to the judicial 
and legislative authorities. Corruption, both in the public and private spheres, is still a major 
problem (Nickson, 1997a: 40). Reports of irregularities during elections continue to surface 
(Lambert, 2000: 380). As Riquelme & Riquelme (1997: 62) state, “conditions for truly 
democratic electoral contests in Paraguay are a long way from realization”. Thus, as Sondrol 
(2007: 325) affirms, “Paraguayan politics is a hybrid political system lying somewhere 
between less-than-democratic and less-than-truly authoritarian regime”, a competitive 
authoritarian regime to be more precise. With the victory of Lugo in the 2008 presidential 
election, the peaceful transfer of power and the military retreat to the barracks, Paraguay is 
now engaged in a democratic transition.  
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In sum, the military provided the basis for stability during the hegemonic authoritarian period 
(1954-1989): “the military sought to enforce internal unity and play an active logistical role in 
the Colorado campaign” (Lambert, 2000: 383). After 1989, the military continued to interfere 
in the political process to “guarantee continuity of the ruling civilian and military elite under a 
different political system and to initiate a liberalization process as a means of protecting its 
corporate interests” (Riquelme, & Riquelme, 1997: 52). However, this corporate interest was 
little more than an anachronism. Their raison d’être was no longer there as extra-legal 
organized violence was almost inexistent. And if anything, their corporate interests were 
equating to personnel interests; that is the personal fortune of high-ranking military officers 
was in jeopardy (Riquelme & Riquelme: 1997: 56). Indeed, this was largely the basis of 
Rodríguez’s putsch. Later on, opposition parties began to uproot military hegemony over 
politics signaling a change of type of hybrid regime: that is to say, the emergence of 
competitive authoritarianism. It created an environment conducive to the emancipation of 
opposition parties. Based on these observations, we can therefore conclude that instability 
during the post-Stroessner era is due to the declining influence of the military officers and the 
growing influence of the opposition parties. The former refuses to relinquish its power and 
despise the latter, making a ruling coalition that includes both necessarily ephemeral. 
Ultimately, elite division within the Colorado can be interpreted as a debate about the place of 
the military and parties in politics.  
 
6.3. The Degree of State Penetration 
 
State penetration in Paraguay has remained low throughout the history of the country. 
According to our framework, the implications are that local leaders should be responsible in 
linking the center with regions. Most studies on Paraguay attribute to local politicians 
(seccionales) a determinant impact in mobilizing the peasantry, which constitute the larger 
segment of society: about “90 percent of the population lived in the countryside” (Abente, 
1999: 8; Miranda, 1990: 88; Lambert, 1997a: 5-6). These seccionales were the basis of the PC 
and their influence was resting on patron-client relations in a context of under-development. 
However, the event-history raises an unresolved issue: why do we assist at the growing 
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politicization of the countryside and why was the Church at the heart of this process? The 
analysis of the Paraguayan economic transformation provides the answer.  
 
6.3.1. The Administrative Extension 
 
During the period covered by our study, the central administration in Paraguay was confined 
to the capital. In regions, the state presence was minimal and sometimes invisible. There was 
basically no tax system (Nickson, 1997a: 36). Like the other case studies, data before 1990 are 
fragmentary. To give a general impression of the state of administrative extension, tax 
revenues represented only 9% of GDP in 1990 (World Development Indicators, 2012). The 
transportation network outside Asunción was deficient. Although progress was made over 
times, foreign agro-businesses benefited the most from the construction of paved roads linking 
farms to markets, notably cross-border connections with Brazil (Lewis, 1980: 160). Besides 
these achievements, social overhead capital had remained rudimentary. As Lambert (2000: 
387) reports, there is “a lack of significant state-sponsored investment in small-scale rural 
development, welfare, public health or education”. In fact, foreign aid was almost the sole 
financial contributor to public services (Lambert, 1997a: 10; 1996: 100). In the absence of the 
state, seccionales and church parishes – through its Catholic Relief Service - were delivering 
basic social and health services in rural regions (Abente, 1995: 308-309).  
 
Initially, this structural weakness was somewhat tempered by the high demographic 
concentration found in Paraguay where most inhabitants resided in a 12 miles radius of the 
capital (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 5). However, by the end of 1970s, rural-rural colonization 
programs contributed to disperse the population in uncharted territories, especially in the 
eastern regions. The western region called the Chaco is a vast and inhospitable land, 
representing roughly two-third of the territory but where less than 5% of the Paraguayans 
lived, mostly indigenous tribes (Sondrol, 2007: 326).  
 
Although highly centralized in the capital, the size of state bureaucracy expanded significantly. 
In 1972, the state was employing an estimate of 20,000 civil servants; in 1982 it had increased 
to 52,000 and reached 153,000 by the end of 1980s (Lambert, 2000: 386; Borda, 1997: 137). 
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Nevertheless, as Nickson (1997a: 35) sums up, “under the Stroessner regime, the public 
administration was highly disorganized and employment was based on personal and familial 
relationships… Many of the new recruits were non-attending planilleros”96, job description 
and performance evaluation were inoperative, and about 75% of the civil servants were 
earning less than the minimum wage. In 2000, Law 1626/00 was introduced with the objective 
of modernizing the public service through various reforms and the Secretaria de la Función 
Pública was created for that purpose, but the law was never fully implemented (Molinas et al., 
2006: 25-27).  
 
6.3.2. The Economic Extension 
 
Agriculture has been the main economic activity in Paraguay. Although, the primary sector 
underwent significant transformation over the years, namely its commercialization for export 
markets, the economic structure made little progress in terms of diversification and 
industrialization (Lewis, 1980: 114). Worst, besides few wealthy landlords and foreigners 
operating in the agro-export sector, the average peasant was equipped with “an axe, a hoe, and 
a machete” and in most cases, a large share of his production was oriented towards subsistence 
(Lewis, 1980: 9; Miranda, 1990: 104-106). The main agricultural crops were cotton, soybeans, 
tobacco, and yerba. Handicraft workshops dominated the manufacturing sector with few small 
factories operating in the transformation of agricultural product (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 80; 
Miranda, 1990: 106). The most dynamic sectors were finance, construction (mostly in the 
1970s) and contraband; none could serve as a basis for industrialization (Powers, 1992: 10; 
Lambert, 1996: 100). In a nutshell, Paraguay was a poor country; the state had little revenue. 
 
The Technical Planning Secretariat was created in 1962 and issued a series of national 
economic plans over the years. However, they were poorly designed and badly executed to a 
point that their impact on economic development was marginal to say the least (US Library of 
Congress, Paraguay, 2012). Even after the Stroessner era, there was an “absence of an overall 
development plan, with stated aims and objectives, and strategies designed in accordance with 
                                                 
96 In the Paraguayan context, Planilleros refers to an individual who receives a salary without working and gives 
a share to senior officials.  
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the availability of resources… the approach to decision-making was characterized by trial and 
error and fire-fighting” (Borda, 1997: 137-138). This lack of direction mirrored the erratic 
investments of the state before the year 2000. 
 
Figure 10 – Natural Resources Rent in Paraguay 
 
 
Table XII – Paraguayan State Investment in the Economy 
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Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012 
General Gov't 
Consumption   
(% of Total 
Consumption 
Gov't Enterprises 
and Investment 
(% of Gross 
Investment)
1970 10.42 27.0
1975 7.70 21.1
1980 7.36 17.8
1985 7.87 31.4
1990 7.45 13.3
1995 11.23 23.2
2000 16.07 35.7
2005 12.0 35.7
2009 13.2 n.a.
Data Source: Economic Freeedom in the World, 2012
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Table XIII – Paraguay Socio-Economic Modernization 
 
In the 1950s, Stroessner called the IMF to the rescue and imposed an adjustment program that 
contributed to stabilize the economy, especially inflation and the currency exchange rate 
(Roett & Sacks, 1991: 64). The general approach was one of export promotion, mostly geared 
toward the attraction of investments in the agricultural sector. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was 
decided that the state would be an active economic player. Many state corporations were 
created and investments were made in almost all sectors: banking, telecommunication and 
transportation services; cement and steel industries; cattle ranching, sawmills, meatpacking, 
alcoholic beverage marketing, and so on (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 70; Borda, 1997: 132). It 
coincided with the economic bonanza generated by the construction of one of the biggest 
hydroelectric dam in the world, the $20 billions Itaipú Dam (Roett & Sacks, 1990: 347). In 
parallel, the Institute for Rural Welfare in partnership with the Coordination for Rural 
Development (CONCODER) initiated a colonization program to relocate landless peasants to 
the Eastern Border Region (EBR): “more than 93,000 lots were awarded between 1956 and 
1982, giving birth to 487 rural colonies and directly affecting the lives of an estimated 450,000 
people, or some 25 percent of the rural population” (Abente, 1999: 24; Fogel, 1997: 102)97.  
 
All in all, even during the economic boom associated with the Itaipú Dam, capital was never 
used for productive ends, but for consumption, grandiose or unsound projects (Powers, 1992: 
                                                 
97 The colonization program was partly the result of Stroessner’s extensive use of land as a mean to co-opt 
individuals. “By the mid-1980s, Stroessner had parceled out virtually all of Paraguay’s state lands, some of them 
several times over”; depriving “the state of a useful safety valve during times of economic decline” (Roett & 
Sacks, 1991: 129, 79). 
Indicator Name 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Urban population growth (annual %) 35.6 37.1 41.7 48.7 55.3 61.5
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 89.30 74.10 64.50 50.10 35.30 24.60
School enrollment, primary (% gross) n.a. 98.46 101.78 103.95 119.53 99.43*
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 36.40 32.07 28.62 27.78 17.02 18.70
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 16.72 16.68 16.01 16.78 15.46 11.66
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 19.90 20.68 27.44 25.23 22.48 19.23
*: year 2009
Data Source: World Development Indicators, 2012
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8; Lambert, 1997a: 10-11). For instance, the state decided to build “a $US100 millions luxury 
airport” and upgrade “the capacity of the state-owned cement plant after the Itaipú Dam was 
completed” (Bouvier, 1988: 30). In fact, the state economic penetration was mostly a mirage. 
Foreigners dominated the small Paraguayan economy. Positions in parastatal companies 
controlling monopolistic markets were granted to military officers and powerful Colorado 
elites (Bouvier, 1988: 24). Yet, there were in many instances empty shells providing a front 
for money-laundry and contraband activities (Sondrol, 1992: 109). And the wealth generated 
by the informal sector was subject to capital flight (Nickson, 1997a: 30). In this context, the 
privatization law of 1991 had little significance. The government was still controlling “the five 
largest entities, covering power, telecommunications, sanitation, cement and oil refining” but 
their impact on the economy is weak (Lambert, 2000: 387).  
 
In terms of the stratification and composition of social groups, the aforementioned has clear 
implications. The Paraguayan bourgeoisie is “relatively new, poorly organized, and politically 
weak” (Powers, 1992: 19)98. The business class consists of two groups: transnational 
companies that dominate the agro-export sector and the domestic firms that are mostly owned 
by military officers and political elites and concentrated on the local market (Lewis, 1980: 
155). Big landowners had some influence in Paraguay: “historically, Paraguayan peasants 
have responded to clientelistic ties of loyalty to local landowners who belong to either the 
Liberal or the Colorado Party” (Bouvier, 1988: 42). A clear example is Wasmosy’s rise to 
power. Before becoming president, he was the “president of the Asociación Rural del 
Paraguay (ARP), the organisation representing the interests of the landowners” (Kidd, 1997: 
121). However, the agrarian policy of Stroessner broke many of those ties by displacing 
peasants in virgin territories or by prioritizing local political elites as patronage brokers, over 
economic actors (Nickson, 1988: 242). Labor unions were also a marginal player. None could 
be created without the approval of the ruling elites. Hence, they “enjoyed total control of urban 
                                                 
98 Three main business associations at that time – “the Paraguayan Industrial Union (UIP) representing 
manufacturers and agricultural processing plants; the Paraguayan Rural Association (ARP) for cattle raisers; and 
the Federation of Production, Industry, and Commerce (FEPRINCO)” – were quickly co-opted by Stroessner 
(Powers, 1992: 19). 
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and rural workers form the early 1960s onward” (Miranda, 1990: 91, 107)99. Even if by the 
end of the 1980s two independent unions emerged – the Movimiento Intersindical de 
Trabajadores (MIT) and Confederación de Trabajadores (CNT) – their reach was limited 
compared to the nationwide network of the PC, the military or the Church (Roett & Sacks, 
1990: 343; Céspedes, 1997: 109).  
 
As reported by Lott (1971: 262), the state bureaucracy “has been a relatively weak pressure 
group…. Entirely dependent as they are upon him [Stroessner]”. The power certain upper-
echelon bureaucrats enjoyed, such as Méndez Fleitas or Edgar Ynsfrán, was linked to the 
coercive apparatus and personalistic traits, and less to economic functions of the state 
(Miranda, 1990: 62-63). While the civil administration was an important source of patronage, 
the very low salaries mitigated its impact beyond a small and privileged strata composed of 
military officers and high-ranking Colorados. With little revenues, the state bureaucracy was 
created on borrowed money and largely at the mercy of foreign aid (Lambert, 1997a: 10). 
Regardless of political events, the state bureaucracy remained a passive actor.  
 
This brings us to the local leaders: namely the presidents of seccionales and the Catholic 
priests. The PC had about two hundred local branches (seccionales) responsible of mobilizing 
the base and distributing favors (Abente, 1995: 307; Bouvier, 1988: 12). It was “often the most 
important person in the community” (Lott, 1971: 238). Local leaders were obviously 
Colorados even in overly Liberal villages. Yet, the community was often consulted to decide 
which Colorado representative would be nominated as president of a given seccionale (Hicks, 
1971: 104). Therefore, it was not strictly a top-down affair. Delegates were not bluntly 
imposed on the community by the center. The function of the local leaders was to act as the 
intermediary between the peasantry and politicians in the capital (Hicks, 1971: 90). 
Furthermore, peasants “owe their loyalty to particular leaders, not to a party or an ideology in 
general” (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 116; Miranda, 1990: 16). In other words, “the two traditional 
parties are patronage parties, designed to serve the individual interests of their clients” (Hicks, 
                                                 
99 “Public sector workers have been excluded from the union movements” (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 105). Also, “the 
Colorado Party embraces a large number of ancillary institutions such as professional associations, veteran’s 
groups, student clubs, women’s organizations, peasants groups, cultural societies, and the party press” (Lewis, 
1980: 114). 
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1967: 276). Speaking of the PC, Lambert (1997a: 5-6) states, “while it is true that its political 
independence was severely reduced under Stroessner, its local influence greatly increased”. In 
this sense, local leaders had captive constituencies. Even if peasant organizations grew, 
“political tradition retained an extremely strong influence over the majority of the peasantry at 
election time. A local patron, linked to one of the traditional parties, who offered protection 
and material reward, had far more weight than a revolutionary speech which might seem 
distant from the daily reality of the peasant farmer” (Fogel, 1997: 102)100.  
 
That being said, Catholic priests were also influential local leaders in rural areas, benefiting 
from broad support among the population (Bouvier, 1988: 38; Hicks, 1967: 273). Initially, 
they maintained a position of neutrality that was allowing them to act as mediator par 
excellence; they were tacitly supporting the Stroessner regime under a system of quid pro quo 
in which the state was paying for the Church expenses in exchange of a veto right on every 
clerical nomination in the country (Lewis, 1980: 114; Hicks, 1967: 278). With the creation of 
the Christian Agrarian Leagues in the 1960s, the Church entered the realm of political 
mobilization (Miranda, 1990:  90). Even if by the mid-1970s it had lost its control of the 
leagues, “the institutional presence of the Church in Paraguayan society increased markedly. 
New dioceses were established, many more priests were sent to rural areas” (Nickson, 1988: 
245; Lewis, 1980: 189). In the 1980s, the Church had become one of the most outspoken 
critics of the Stroessner government and of repressive tactics, which gave them further 
legitimacy amongst peasants. But ultimately, it had always been on fertile grounds in rural 
areas; “for many reasons, Paraguayans constantly look to the church for guidance and strength, 
and therefore the relationship that Stroessner maintained with it for so very many years, 
bumpy as it may have been, was always understood as crucial for the continuity of the regime” 
(Miranda, 1990: 89). The fact that Rodríguez sought the Church support when it seized power 
tends to confirm such claim (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 125; Martini & Lezcano, 1997: 67). Yet, 
the Church decided to go its own way until Lugo came to power (Sondrol, 2007: 338). And 
Lugo’s rise to power should be understood in the following context: “he was the bishop of the 
                                                 
100 In the 1980s, the following peasants organizations were created: the Paraguayan Peasant Movement (MCP), 
the National Coordinating Committee for Small Farmers (CONAPA), the National Peasant Union and the 
National Peasant Organization (ONAC) (Roett & Sacks, 1991: 105). 
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province of San Pedro, which is to the northeast of Asunción, the capital of Paraguay. And 
that’s where the heart of a lot of the soybean production, a lot of the worst of the 
dispossessions… happened” (Goodman, 2008).  
 
To recapitulate, this section demonstrates the low degree of state penetration and the general 
state of underdevelopment that was prevailing in Paraguay. Foreign companies were 
overshadowing state bureaucrats and, given the low level of economic development, no 
independent bourgeoisie or labor unions capable of challenging the ruling elites existed. In 
many regions, the state was absent. Power resided with the president of the PC branches and, 
to a second degree, with Church parishes. In other words, it provides a rational as why these 
local actors were key to understand political dynamics in Paraguay. Far from being static, the 
countryside has experienced over the years significant transformations. Most of all, many 
peasants migrated into new territories therefore creating new problems including the 
disruption of pre-existing patterns of authority. This process opened a window of opportunity 
for the Church to forsake its traditional political neutrality and defend the rights and liberties 
of peasants in rural areas. It also coincided with “the gradual erosion of the rural base of 
support of the Colorado Party” (Abente, 1999: 48-49). Ultimately, the presence of competing 
forces in the countryside contributed to political instability in the 1990s and so forth.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
For very long, the backbone of the regime stability was the support of military officers in the 
capital and the Colorado Party seccionales (local branches) in the countryside. The former was 
maintaining unity within the Colorado Party, dissuading opposition parties from rebelling and 
overthrowing the ruling elites. The latter was linking peasants in rural areas to politicians in 
Congress not on the basis of ideological or organizational ties but through personal affiliation. 
This alliance has fostered stability especially during the hegemonic authoritarian period (1954-
1989); a period of various economic cycles but still characterized by underdevelopment in 
terms of industrialization achievements. The end of the Stroessner era brought the emergence 
of a competitive authoritarian regime (1990-2008). Opposition parties became more assertive, 
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while military officers refused to relinquish their privileged position in the system. Military 
officers disdain for party politics made their cooperation in a multiparty coalition highly 
problematic. Simultaneously, socio-economic transformations in rural areas were favoring the 
emergence of new political actors in the countryside, namely the Catholic priests.  
 
Figure 11 – Paraguay Timeline 
 
 
Thus, the two decades after the fall of Stroessner are symptomatic of a competition between 
old and new social groups and the (re) composition of a winning ruling coalition still in the 
making. Instability was generated by the inability of the ruling elites to form a ruling coalition 
in accordance with the prevailing context: that is to attract the support of the Church and 
opposition parties, a strategy that the current President Lugo used with the success we know. 
Overall, the dynamics of political alliances in relation to patterns of stability and instability 
have been coherent with our theory.  
 
The case of Paraguay is also instructive for six reasons. First, instability during the autocratic 
period (1945-53) was caused by the absence of a dominant party and fall outside our 
framework; in the other periods a dominant party was present. Second, the regime change 
from hegemonic authoritarianism to competitive authoritarianism raises an interesting issue: 
military exclusion from the ruling coalition generated instability in a competitive authoritarian 
regime. We think this deviation from our ideal-type is mostly due to a transitional period in the 
1990s. By the 2000s, military officers were less and less a factor in political dynamics. Third, 
our framework yields mitigated outputs in regard to the period from 1998 to 2008 when no 
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political crisis occurred, but political alliances were in disarray. Maybe the assassination of 
Argaña had somewhat traumatized the country and frozen so to speak political conflicts. It is 
difficult to say. However, this should be put into perspective: explaining 50 out of 60 years of 
political history is a good record in social sciences. Fourth, compared to the Senegalese case, 
the profile of local leaders takes a different form and most importantly, the countryside is host 
of competing political forces. In this sense, local leaders are a polymorph social group. It 
should not be envisioned and portrayed as one of a kind set of actors. Yet, as with Senegal, 
religion is an essential piece of the puzzle. Fifth, the relevance of the state penetration variable 
is contingent to a relative dispersion of the population across the territory. To be honest, before 
1970s, the initial impact of local leaders on the prospect of stability is unclear because of the 
demographic concentration around the center. Finally, the case also reveals the difficulty of 
detecting patterns of political alliances in a system based on personalism. Individuals not 
organizations become the main unit of analysis, and even in a small country like Paraguay, 
they are many influential elites. Dynamics become highly idiosyncratic and predictions are 
hazardous. In this sense, the role of Stroessner as a stabilizing force can simply not be ignored. 
In other words, the application of our theory should be more probative when organized social 
groups exist.  
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Conclusion 
 
Our thesis presents a theory that we hope will enable academics and policy makers to better 
analyze the phenomenon of political alliances in hybrid regimes and what it does to the 
stability or instability of these regimes. It focuses on the development of a framework that 
integrates what we consider to be the ideal-type conditions of stability and formulates a 
rational to explain why hybrid regimes experience periods of stability and instability in a 
diverse institutional context. This diversity is expressed through two fundamental macro-
processes: types of hybrid regimes and levels of economic development. In examining 
variations along those lines, four social groups standout: military officers, opposition parties, 
state bureaucrats and local leaders. They are key stakeholders. They are the ones capable of 
disrupting the functioning of government activities and even of signing the death sentence of a 
dominant-party hybrid regime. Hence, for the ruling elites, obtaining their support is 
paramount. To connect the dots and give meaning to our framework, we introduce two 
variables: the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state penetration. The 
former tells us why military officers or opposition parties are connected to a specific type of 
hybrid regime (hegemonic authoritarianism or competitive authoritarianism) and the latter 
why state bureaucrats or local leaders are connected to a specific level of economic 
development (developing or underdeveloped economy). 
 
We illustrate our theory using four empirical cases: Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and 
Paraguay. Below, we will compare results between these four case studies to assess the 
coherence of our analytical framework. We will also outline trends in regard to stability and 
instability in hybrid regimes, and draw attention on policy implications. We will examine 
explanations of hybrid regime stability pertaining to the economic and organizational 
approaches and how they hold up in regard to our case studies while highlighting our own 
scientific contribution. And finally, we will evoke the limits of our theory and how our thesis 
opens-up new research avenues.  
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Political Alliances in Hybrid Regimes: Empirical Findings 
 
Our case studies share one major characteristic: in Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay, 
the ruling elites never governed alone during hybrid periods and getting the right mix of 
support was for all of them the key to hold the regime. They attracted dominant social groups 
that negotiated their way in the ruling coalition: that is to say, they could choose to support the 
ruling elites or challenge them. In each case however, political alliances differ in terms of their 
composition. The matrix we developed enables us to understand why and how.  
 
Being one of the most studied hybrid regimes, the Malaysian case served as the point of 
departure; it is the first building block of our theory. In reading the specialized literature on the 
country political and economic history, all eyes were pointing to the determinant role of the 
dominant party: the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). More than its mere 
presence, country experts were stressing its ability to co-opt opposition parties as well as civil 
servants into a ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN), that had been the basis of political 
stability in Malaysia. The event-history narrative corroborates it. Instability was largely related 
to the difficulty for the ruling elites to select the “right” opposition parties in a society marked 
by antagonistic cleavages and the challenge of powerful bureaucrats. Indeed, the Malaysian 
Chinese Association (MCA) and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) were two major 
opposition parties who held irreconcilable views. Ideally, the two should have been included. 
In reality, a choice had to be made since no coalition would have survived with both in. 
Razaleigh and Anwar were two career bureaucrats and high-profile politicians who headed 
important ministry portfolios and had extensive networks in the public administration. 
Following their exclusion from the ruling coalition, they were at the center of recent turmoil, 
and in the case of Anwar he still is.  
 
The depiction of Malaysian political dynamics was so convincing that we could not help but to 
wonder whether these could be found in other countries. We immediately turned to its 
neighbor, Indonesia, and quickly realized that the Malaysian recipe for success could not be 
applied in Indonesia. So, of course, the next question was why? What were the differences 
between the two countries? The first observation was that evidently the political regime, the 
 255  
degree of violence and the involvement of the military establishment in politics were not at all 
the same.  
 
Elections in Malaysia were competitive, relatively free but unfair given that the government 
was using with impunity state resources for partisan ends. In Indonesia during the Suharto era, 
elections were barely competitive, certainly not free and fair. The legislative branch and 
opposition parties were a creation of the President. They were competing in the People’s 
Consultative Assembly but were all obeying to Suharto; a model later emulated by leaders like 
Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan. Thus, we were facing different types of hybrid regimes: Malaysia 
(1969-today) was a competitive authoritarian regime and Indonesia (1965-1998) was a 
hegemonic authoritarian one. Also, besides the communist guerrilla in the 1950s, Malaysia 
was shielded from the bloodshed and atrocities of civil conflicts so recurrent in Southeast Asia 
and notably in Indonesia. Indeed, civil wars raged almost continuously in the biggest 
archipelagic country in the world: in West Papua (1965-84), East Timor (1975-98) and Aceh 
(1990-2005). Finally, there is almost no mention what so ever of the military in the literature 
on the political history of Malaysia whereas in the Indonesian case, every publication cites the 
Indonesian National Armed Forces (ABRI).  
 
That being said, both countries share one major characteristic: they are developing countries, 
not underdeveloped ones. Differences between non-western countries are as important as those 
between non-western countries and advanced industrialized nations. No one would dispute the 
fact that Germany and Malaysia could hardly be put in the same basket, but the same can be 
said of China and Senegal. Of course, the Malaysian economic structure is more diverse and 
more industrialized than the one of Indonesia. Nonetheless, Indonesia has made giant leaps 
forward over the years and can be considered an emerging economy in its own right. The 
valued added of the industrial sector in Malaysia and Indonesia has reached roughly 40% of 
GDP in the early 1980s (World Development Indicators, 2012). Furthermore, in both cases, 
the state has been an active agent of modernization. Public investments in the economy were 
representing close to 40% of total investments in both Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1970s-
80s (Economic Freedom in the World, 2012).  
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These observations, differences and similitudes, provided the groundwork to build our theory. 
The focus on type of regime and level of economic development as well as on social dominant 
groups came from our critical assessment. Yet, we needed a rational to link specific social 
groups to the type of regime and level of economic development in order to produce a 
coherent framework. The comparison of Malaysia and Indonesia forced us to ask: why should 
opposition parties be associated to competitive authoritarian regimes besides the obvious 
tautological explanation that it is because they are allowed to enter the party system? And by 
the same token, why should the military officers be associated to a hegemonic authoritarian 
regime? The degree of extra-legal organized violence provides that link. A low level creates an 
environment that is conducive to the active participation of political parties and the 
maintenance of a competitive authoritarian regime. Inversely, a high level creates an 
environment that is conducive to the intervention of military officers in politics and the 
preservation of a hegemonic authoritarian regime.  
 
The event-history of political crises in Indonesia demonstrates how central the military 
officers were to the ruling party Golkar during the hegemonic authoritarian period (1965-
1998). When they supported the ruling elites, stability was ensured; and when they challenged 
them, like after the Petition of Fifty in 1980, instability followed. Their influence penetrated 
the government, the state and the economy. In a sense, state bureaucrats were also key allies of 
the ruling elites because they were military officers, at least until the 1980s. This overlap 
between social groups reinforced the influence of military officers on the outcome, i.e. 
stability of the regime. However, later on, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals 
(ICMI) under the wing of Habibie increased its presence in the civil administration. They 
acted as a counterweight to ABRI and even infiltrated it, as influential Muslim leaders such as 
General Sudharmono were nominated to high-ranking positions. This competition, both within 
the military and the state bureaucracy and between the Red/White (military nationalist) and 
Green (Islamic bureaucrats) factions, was supposed to weaken them and allow Suharto to 
preserve his authority: applying the old adage “divide and rule”. Yet, in the process, Suharto 
favored the Green faction to the detriment of the Red/White one. Ultimately, the Red/White 
faction rebelled, defected to the opposition and supported the democratic movement that 
included the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and student associations in ousting Suharto.  
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The binary cases of Malaysia and Indonesia elucidate a problem raised in the literature review: 
that is, what is the difference between political dynamics found in competitive authoritarian 
regimes and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. Still, in its actual form, our framework had 
limited capacity for generalization since both countries were developing ones while many 
hybrid regimes are poor with an economy based on a mono-crop export model. Thus, to refine 
our theory, there was a need to include two other cases: underdeveloped countries. Sub-
Saharan Africa being an obvious region to look at, we made the choice of Senegal (in 
accordance with our case selection criteria). The last case we thought could be in Latin 
America where there are few underveloped countries and we selected Paraguay. As we said 
before, it was important to include as much diversification as we can.  
 
During the period between 1960 and 2010, the value added of the industrial sector in Senegal 
and Paraguay was approximately 20% of GDP101, 20% less than in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
The economy of Senegal was oriented toward the peanut production and the one of Paraguay 
toward the soybeans and cotton production. Malaysia and Indonesia could benefit from a 
substantive rent from the oil-state companies, Petronas and Pertamina respectively. Still, there 
exportation also included electronic appliances and other manufacturing products. The state 
presence in the economy was highly volatile in Senegal and Paraguay, reflecting an absence of 
direction and poor economic development plans if any. 
 
Table XIV – State Investment in the Economy (% of Gross Investment) 
 
                                                 
101 In Paraguay, the construction of the huge Itaipú Dam in the 1970s altered macro-economic indicators. Hence, 
the value added of the industrial sector in the 1980s was close to 30% for only this decade. For Senegal, there is 
no data available on this indicator during the 1960s-70s.  
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Malaysia 32.3 37.6 37.3 46.8 33.8 28.4 47.0 49.9 52.4
Indonesia 40.4 39.4 49.5 43.0 32.5 20.7 20.7 20.7 n.a.
Senegal 32.1 19.8 32.2 18.2 22.6 21.5 20.1 33.6 36.2
Paraguay 27.0 21.1 17.8 31.4 13.3 23.2 35.7 35.7 n.a.
Data Source: Economie Freedom in the World, 2012
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For instances, in Paraguay the share of state investment in the economy represented 31.4% in 
1985 and 13.3 % in 1990. In Senegal, the same aggregates equated 32.2% in 1980 and 18.2% 
in 1985. On average, the Senegalese and Paraguayan states were responsible of 26% of total 
investment whereas in Malaysia it was 41%, and in Indonesia 37% during the hybrid period. 
Thus, it is fair to say that Senegal and Paraguay were not at all at the same level of 
development than Malaysia and Indonesia and that the state in the two groups did not play the 
same role.  
 
Far from being an exact replica of each other, Senegal and Paraguay however had different 
types of hybrid regimes and degrees of extra-legal organized violence. The Senegalese hybrid 
regime was a competitive authoritarian one, except from 1967 to 1976, when the Parti 
Socialiste was the sole party in the party system. Otherwise, elections were competitive and 
relatively free, but the government benefited from a decisive advantage: the Electoral 
Commission was packed by its sympathizers allowing ballot tampering, such as ballot stuffing 
and multiple voting, to go unpunished. Also, the independent media, especially radio and 
television outlets, were almost non-existent. In Paraguay, the hybrid regime went through two 
distinct phases. The first, during the Stroessner’s years was a hegemonic authoritarian regime. 
Like in Indonesia, the legislative branch (after 1962) was a democratic façade. Direct elections 
with universal suffrage were held on a regular basis but Stroessner was deciding arbitrarily 
which parties could enter the party system. Civil liberties such as freedom of association and 
political rights such as organization of party meetings were heavily restricted. The second 
phase saw significant openings. Opposition parties were free to register and recruit, media 
outlets were expressing a diversity of opinions, and associational autonomy was guaranteed. 
Nevertheless, it was not an electoral democracy given the systematic intervention of military 
officers in the political process, notably through voter intimidation. As for degree of extra-
legal organized violence, Senegal was exempted from the general upheaval prevailing in 
neighboring countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia. The low-intensity conflict in Casamance 
remains a drop in the ocean; especially considering the fact that the conflict was located in a 
reclusive and nearly separated region split by Gambia. Inversely, in Paraguay, a bloody civil 
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war erupted in 1947 and lasted about a year. And for much of the 1960s-70s, guerrilla 
outbursts regularly occurred in the countryside.  
 
The stability in Senegal was therefore related to the capacity of the ruling elites to co-opt 
opposition parties and local leaders. The 1980s were the most unstable and coincided with the 
decade when the ruling coalition did not include any member of the opposition parties. The 
ruling coalition took different forms depending on who was the incumbent: a unified party 
absorbing all opposition parties under Senghor (1966-1978); an enlarged presidential majority 
attributing cabinet positions to the opposition under Diouf (1991-2000) and the multiparty 
Sopi coalition under Wade (2000-2010). In itself, the relation between the ruling elites and 
opposition parties is incomplete to explain political dynamics in Senegal. The support of local 
leaders was determinant. Indeed, without the marabouts controlling a significant portion of the 
peanut agricultural outputs and trading operations, the demise of the ruling elites was 
inevitable. Precisely, when these local leaders decided to stop endorsing in mass the ruling 
elites in 2000, the latter lost power.   
 
As for Paraguay, stability was manifest when the ruling elites allied with the military officers 
and local leaders in a coalition dubbed a “granitic unity”. After Stroessner, the military became 
divided about who should rule next and what kind of political interaction should be promoted. 
The most powerful military faction repeatedly challenged the authority of the ruling elites and 
brought instability. Furthermore although local leaders were members in good standing of the 
ruling party Colorado (seccionales or local branch), they were above all patrons of a 
community, not representatives of a party responsible for transmitting an ideological or 
programmatic platform. Again, the post-Stroessner era offers a contrasting picture. What was 
once domination in the countryside became the battlefield of intense rivalry – mostly between 
seccionales presidents and Church priests, but also Liberal local party bosses – for the heart 
and mind of peasants. Without the support of most military officers and declining support in 
rural areas, instability was looming large. The Colorado Party was defeated in 2008 after 
sixty-two years in power to a former Catholic Bishop, Fernando Lugo, and his multiparty 
coalition.  
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The above reviews the political dynamics found in our four case studies. Overall, each country 
helps us examine the multiple ramifications of our theory in concrete terms. It offers an 
accurate yet parsimonious narrative of the political history of Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal 
and Paraguay. The cases support our argument that although conflicts about the rules of the 
game in hybrid regimes – which defines its very nature – are frequent, they are not constant; 
and these conflicts converge in the ruling coalition. They are periods of instability and periods 
of appeasement. As long as the ruling coalition reflects dominant social groups, the regime 
remains stable and ruling elites have the authority to govern. As the empirical material 
exposes, dominant social groups sometimes contest and defy the ruling elites. Hence, contra to 
autocratic regimes, the ruling elites in hybrid regimes do not have full control of the system of 
representation. Thus, alliance politics become central to their survival.  
 
Political Stability and Instability in Hybrid Regimes 
 
A synthesis of periods of stability and instability reveals interesting variations between 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay. As we will see, the differences in number of 
political crises, their intensity and the duration of periods of stability reflect the importance of 
institutions and social groups, which reinforce the relevance of our theory and the necessity of 
focusing on political alliances.  
  
At first glance, Malaysia looks like the most troubled country with thirteen political crises 
followed by Indonesia, Paraguay and Senegal with eleven, nine and seven political crises 
respectively. Hence, the least-developed countries appear to be punctuated with fewer 
destabilizing events than the more developed ones. It confirms that stability in hybrid regimes 
is not the prerogative of well-to-do nations. Obviously, the contention here is not to say that 
poor countries are more stable than rich ones. We only stress that economic development per 
se is not a factor of stability/instability. It needs to be supported by the following 
considerations: which social groups does a given economic situation empower and what kind 
of interactions do these social groups have with the ruling elites?  
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Table XV – Frequency and Intensity of Political Crises and Duration of the Longest 
Period of Stability 
 
Senegal and Paraguay are also the two countries with the smallest population. Implicitly, it 
should mean that the number of political crises is also a function of its population size. The 
larger the population, the more likely the number of political crises will increase. Intuitively, it 
seems right: the more political interactions there are, the more likely friction can occur. For 
instance, Senegal has a population of 12 millions and Nigeria of 160 millions; and Nigeria is a 
lot more unstable than Senegal. Yet, Indonesia is by far the most populous country among our 
four cases and had less political crises than Malaysia. The answer to this puzzle is that again 
social groups matter. It is not so much the size of the population that should be factored in, but 
what are the main societal cleavages and how these cleavages intersect in relation to political 
alliances. There are more inimical cleavages in Malaysia than in Indonesia. In the former, 
there are ethnic, religious, regional and class divisions; in the latter, the fracture is mostly 
concentrated and visible along religious and regional lines102.  
 
Similarly, the geography of crises also reveals that many of those that occurred in Malaysia 
and Indonesia were located in the periphery; in Senegal and Paraguay, much of the instability 
was located in the capital. While the political geography is intimately related to the extent the 
central state has resources, we also demonstrate that weak states can also be politically stable. 
It goes down to our contention: what should matter is to know whom a weak or strong state 
                                                 
102 Although both countries have a Chinese community, in Malaysia, the political activity of this ethnic group is 
much more organized than in Indonesia and in relative terms it represents a larger segment of the population than 
in Indonesia.  
Number 
of 
Crises
Number of 
High 
Intensity 
Crises
Longest 
Period of 
Stability   
(in years)
Malaysia 13 3 22
Indonesia 11 5 33
Senegal 7 4 19
Paraguay 9 8 31
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empowers and what kind of interactions the dominant social groups have with the ruling elites. 
Otherwise, the relation is spurious.  
  
Of course, the difference between the numbers of crises is not that great; we need to be careful 
about inferences. The point here is simply to highlight the significance of social groups in 
understanding patterns of stability and instability. Hypotheses based on linear covariance miss 
the point. The meaning of any level of economic development or state strength on the 
dynamics of stability and instability is not found in its sheer value, but in its impact on the 
balance of power between social groups.  
 
That being said, the number of political crises should be compared to the number of high 
intensity crises. In this regard, Paraguay has the greatest number of high intensity crises 
among our four cases with eight, followed by Indonesia, Senegal and Malaysia with five, four 
and three. Hence, Malaysia who has the larger number of political crises has the fewer high 
intensity crises and in Paraguay the relation is almost inverted (Senegal having the smallest 
number of political crises). Malaysia and Paraguay are the day and night in terms of state 
repression. Malaysia has used punctuated and targeted means of repression mostly directed at 
political elites. In the 1960s-70s, state repression in Paraguay was systematic. No one was 
exempted from it and the level of violence was close to the one of a totalitarian state. Overall 
if we would have to classify our four countries on a continuum of political regimes, Paraguay 
(1954-1989) would be much closer to an autocratic regime on the extreme left and Malaysia 
(1970-2010) to a democratic regime on the extreme right; whereas Indonesia (1965-1998) 
could fit into the center left space and Senegal (1976-2010) into the center right one. Thus, 
within the boundaries of hybrid regimes, the more autocratic a regime is the more likely it will 
experience high intensity crises, and the more democratic a regime is the more likely it will 
experience low intensity crises. Since we work with a relatively small sample, generalizations 
should however be interpreted with caution.  
 
Nonetheless, more than the autocratic propensities, high intensity crises in our samples are 
often the by-product of military intervention in politics as an autonomous power. In hybrid 
regimes, because military officers have significant coercive instruments at their disposal 
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compared to other social groups and because they are the main actors of coup d’État – which 
is one of the highest intensity events in our definition of stability – the distribution of high 
intensity crises among our four cases is coherent. Furthermore, the difference in high intensity 
crises between Paraguay and Indonesia can be explained by the absence of a military 
institution in Paraguay. There is no such thing as ABRI in Paraguay, an overarching 
organization that functions as a kind of a pressure group. Power-hungry generals in Paraguay 
were not contained by any rules, besides their own ambition.  
 
Also, high intensity crises in Malaysia (1965, 1969 and 1988) were provoked by political 
elites followed by the civil society while in Senegal, high intensity crises (especially in 1969 
and 1988) appeared to be triggered by the civil society with the   support of political elite 
afterward. The direction of the relation between political parties and civil society can be 
explained by the extension of political party activities. In Malaysia, political parties are 
everywhere, from the tiniest villages to urban centers. They penetrate every association. By 
analogy, they act as a conductor of social affairs. In Senegal, political parties were largely 
confined to the capital and to a very small circle of privileged elites. In this case, the impulse 
of social demands came from the bottom.  
 
In a nutshell, the number of political crises tends to be related to the level of economic 
development and the degree of state penetration; and the intensity of political crises to the type 
of hybrid regime and the degree of extra-legal organized violence.  
 
This conclusion should be balanced by the fact that the evolution of the degree of extra-legal 
organized violence and the degree of state penetration display different trajectories in our four 
case studies. The above diagrams illustrate the trend of our two variables in each country. In 
Malaysia and Senegal, the degree of extra-legal organized violence and the degree of state 
penetration have been fairly constant over time. In Indonesia, the degree of state penetration 
increased significantly whereas in Paraguay a sharp drop after the 1970s outlines the tendency 
in extra-legal organized violence. These changes in Indonesia and Paraguay imply a transfer of 
authority between social groups. In Indonesia, the need to gain the support of military officers 
was clear but the choice between local leaders and state bureaucrats was elusive until the mid-
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1970s. In Paraguay, the necessity to co-opt local leaders was always evident, but in the 1990s-
2000s the ambivalence between including military officers or opposition parties in the ruling 
coalition was tangible. It mirrors a change in the distribution of resources and structure of 
opportunities, augmenting the likelihood of conflicts. High intensity crises in Paraguay and 
Indonesia could therefore be apprehended amongst others by the transition from one ideal-type 
to another. 
 
Figure 12 – Trends in Extra-Legal Organized Violence and State Penetration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: OV = Extra-Legal Organized Violence; SP = State Penetration 
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Indonesia, it lasted 33 years (1965-1998); in Paraguay 31 years (1958-1989); in Malaysia 22 
years (1988-today); and in Senegal 19 years (1969-1988). All the above periods took place 
after 1960; reducing the potential significance of a temporal effect103. Hence, hegemonic 
authoritarian regimes have longer period of stability than competitive authoritarian regimes. 
The country narrative provides an indication as why it is the case. In hegemonic authoritarian 
regimes, the military tends to “freeze” the alliance by increasing the cost of defection. It has 
the means to make a defector paid a steep price for his challenge of the ruling elites. In 
competitive authoritarian regimes, alliances are more fluid. Opposition parties come and go. 
The cost of being excluded from the ruling coalition is high but not as high as in hegemonic 
authoritarian regimes.  
 
The policy implications of our analysis are twofold. First, instability is more likely to crop up 
in a developing country governed by a competitive authoritarian regime, but the intensity of 
political crises will tend to be moderate. Political dynamics fluctuate within an acceptable and 
predictable range. Stability will be more likely observed in an underdeveloped country 
governed by a hegemonic authoritarian regime, but the intensity of political crises will tend to 
be acute. Political dynamics are constant over a long period but suddenly witness an abrupt 
and overhaul transformation, indicating higher volatility. Thus, political risks multiply. Any 
investment by foreign donors, private companies or multilateral agencies should include these 
various windows of opportunity and plan accordingly.  
 
Second, ultimately what matters in hybrid regimes is less the rules of the game than who are 
the stakeholders. Hybrid regimes are characterized by institutional volatility. Yet, instability in 
the rules of the game is offset by the stability in patterns of political alliances. In other words, 
the ruling elites in hybrid regimes frequently alter laws pertaining to the electoral and party 
systems as long as they have the support of dominant social groups. Close contact and 
exchanges with these groups is thus fundamental in influencing the trajectory of a polity and 
social dynamics.  
 
                                                 
103 The period covered for Indonesia and Paraguay is about 15 years longer than Malaysia and Senegal; it 
increases the probability to find a longer period of stability in the two former cases. 
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Competing Explanations: Economic and Organizational Approaches  
 
In no way do we pretend that our theory eclipses all others and invalidates all what we know 
so far about conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes. As we have said before 
but worth repeating, we aim at knowledge accumulation. However, it is relevant to examine 
how the competing explanations perform in regard to our cases. The idea is to assess briefly if 
the problems we raised in Chapter One find their empirical manifestation in our four case 
studies in order to seal the deal in terms of justifying the four countries we selected and the 
theory we formulated.  
 
Magaloni mostly focuses on how public spending affects electoral outcome. It is undeniable; 
in Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay, the state has tied the attribution of grants, 
subsidies and a like to loyal constituencies. However, there is a variation. Not all of these 
countries could afford to implement in a systematic way such strategy of co-optation. More 
precisely, Magaloni’s explanation rests on resource endowment. The state has to spoil a large 
number of constituencies given that the ruling elites usually muster an overwhelming share of 
the votes and voters in a given constituency are all voting for the same candidate. Hence, when 
resources are scarce, instability is on the horizon. Our analysis of Senegal and Paraguay 
demonstrates that stability is possible even when the state has limited resources. In 
underdeveloped countries, the ruling elites spoil an individual who has followers instead of the 
entire community. In other words, there are different types of patronage: one that is based on 
elites and one that is based on the mass. In developing economies, the ruling elites may use 
both; but in underdeveloped economies, they tend to use mostly elite forms of patronage, 
which is of course much cheaper. Also, the case of Paraguay illustrates that focusing on elites 
is more efficient in a context where constituencies are equally divided between different 
candidates. The president of seccionales was distributing favors only among his followers, 
instead of the ruling elites buying off the entire community, as it is the case with mass forms 
of patronage. Our framework integrates these analytical inputs: it is the difference between 
patterns of political alliances based on state bureaucrats (mass) or local leaders (elites). 
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Greene’s theory highlights the importance of the state control of the economy in order to 
dispense jobs to loyal supporters and the destabilizing effect of privatization. In all our cases, 
the state is often the main employer. While it is true that job cuts in the civil administration 
create grievances and in some cases precipitate rallies in the capital, it is not all that clear how 
it is connected to political instability. After all, in our four cases, the government was – except 
in rare occasions – still functioning and the ruling elites remained in power; both in a context 
of state control and state retreat of the economy. Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay 
underwent a privatization process but none of them conducted the reforms according to the 
rule of law in a transparent and accountable fashion. As the process of privatization varies 
from one country to another, so is its impact on stability. The bottom line is that in our four 
case studies, the privatization process served as an instrument of patronage fostering stability 
instead of provoking instability. Furthermore, more than anything what should count is if 
strategic state-owned companies were privatized. In this regard, state-oil companies in 
Malaysia and Indonesia remained in the firm hands of the ruling elites. Thus, although some 
political crises may be explained by the retreat of the state from the economy, our critical 
assessment of Greene’s theory clearly surfaces. The correlation proposed by the latter could be 
complemented by considerations about how stability is maintained in a weak state, which is 
one dimension of our theory: that is, by obtaining the support of local leaders in exchange of 
relative autonomy over the economic life of a given region.  
 
Brownlee stresses the crucial initial phase during which the ruling elites eliminate rival 
contenders. Later on, he pinpoints the positive impact of institutionalizing rules governing 
elite’s interaction, especially in regard to promotion and succession, on stability. At the 
beginning of each country narrative, we indeed report intense conflicts visible in terms of 
number and/or intensity of political crises. Yet, the only case where clear rules regarding 
professional advancement existed was in Malaysia and the one that had basically no rules at all 
was Paraguay. Yet, both countries experienced serious internal elite divisions. Paraguay had 
overcome these divisions until the defeat of the Colorado Party in 2008 and Malaysia the same 
until the UMNO lost the two-third majority in 2008. In Senegal, rules related to internal 
management of the Parti Socialiste were changing constantly without dire consequences 
except in 2000 with Diouf’s defeat. Indonesia somewhat confirms Brownlee’s expectation. 
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The absence of rules and the succession crisis – related to Suharto’s future as head of state – 
precipitated the exit of Golkar from power. Thus, rule-based explanations appear to have little 
bearing on the outcome in hybrid regimes. It recaptures our argument that these conditions 
may be more probative in one-party autocratic regimes whereas in hybrid regimes institutional 
volatility is the hallmark. Here, our theory fills the void. It is not rules that should matter but 
patterns of political alliances. This is the source of stability in hybrid regimes.  
 
Levitsky & Way’s thesis centers on the existence of a cohesive and extensive party machine 
and coercive apparatus. Malaysia and Indonesia are probably the cases that score the highest in 
all these categories and indeed they remained stable for a very long period while being a 
competitive authoritarian and hegemonic authoritarian regime respectively. In Paraguay, the 
Colorado Party had an extensive reach all across the territory but was not cohesive (except 
during the 1970s) despite the fact that its elites were sharing a common historic and ethnic 
background104. Nevertheless, it survived for sixty years. Thus, the respective weight of 
cohesion versus extension of the ruling party is ambiguous. Furthermore, in the light of the 
Paraguay case, one might wonder if what really matters is the presence of a cohesive and 
extensive coercive force regardless of the ruling party features. Finally, stability also occurred 
in Senegal, which is a country where these indicators were not present. In sum, the inner 
working of Levitsky & Way’s theory could benefit from further specifications. And these 
could be explored through our theory. Indeed, the variation between the dominant party and 
coercive apparatus capacities and their respective significance should be understood in terms 
of differences between types of hybrid regimes: that is, between competitive authoritarian and 
hegemonic authoritarian regimes. In a context where opposition parties are a dominant social 
group, the ruling party capacities should be neuralgic; and where military officers are a 
dominant social group, coercive capacities come first.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 The same can be said about its main rival the Liberal Party.  
 269  
Limits of our Theory 
 
Our theory has obvious limits. We wish to highlight three of them. The first is the parameters 
we define in Chapter One and Two. The dynamics found in city-states or small states with a 
population of less than a million obey to a different logic than others states. Similarly, the 
context prevailing before 1945 was so different compared to the post-World War II 
environment that we could not expect to detect the same recurring patterns in both. Lastly, 
countries geographically close to western powers are excluded because in these cases 
international factors should play a decisive role whereas the crux of our theory is on domestic 
factors. Nevertheless, it leaves us with plenty of cases to work it (see appendix 1). Second, we 
propose a middle-range theory of hybrid regime stability, not a general theory of hybrid 
regime or a total theory of regime stability, not even of hybrid regime stability. On one hand, 
we do not pretend to explain why a hybrid regime will fall back into an autocratic regime or 
embark into a democratic transition, or what are the conditions of stability in autocratic or 
democratic regimes. We are only concerned with hybrid regime stability and instability per se. 
On the other hand, our theory is not either an absolute theory of hybrid regime stability: that is, 
it is sufficient to explain all outcomes. For instance, the American support to Suharto and 
Stroessner or French support to Senegal had an impact on regime stability. Similarly, it is 
undeniable that personal traits played a role in the event-history of Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Senegal and Paraguay. Mahathir, Suharto, Senghor and Stroessner are charismatic and skilled 
leaders who have proved to be masters in navigating their way out of many political crises. 
The bottom line is that macro (international) and micro (individual) factors are part of the 
equation but the meso level (national) is the key to apprehend both. It is the filter that allows 
us to see clearly the complexity of what is going on in a given country. Third, one should 
recall that our definition of stability is based on elite consent of the government; which is one 
dimension of legitimacy. When they withdraw their support, paralysis of government activities 
ensues. In an ideal world, we should have examined the impact of citizens’ attitudes on the 
conduct of government affairs. Yet, as we argued in Chapter One, this is problematic given the 
absence of longitudinal data on the subject in non-western countries. Nevertheless, we also 
articulate a rational as why it should not prevent us from studying stability as we define it. It 
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has to do with the fact that elite consent depends on the inclusion of dominant social groups in 
a ruling coalition.  
 
Future Research  
 
The present thesis, we hope, is only the beginning of an exciting research program. It should 
lead to iterated testing and hypothesis specification, and stimulate innovative thinking on other 
dimensions related to the fascinating subfield of hybrid regimes.  
 
To move forward, we should test our theory and see how it performs in the sixty cases of 
hybrid regimes we identified (see appendix 1). Although we believe our theory helps us 
understand the political dynamics found in Malaysia, Indonesia, Senegal and Paraguay, these 
cases are by no means representative of all hybrid regimes. In this sense, the validity of our 
theory remains to be tested. A priori, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Morocco, Kuwait and 
Nicaragua are prime candidates given that the hybrid regime in these countries has survived, 
according to Freedom House, for almost 40 years and maybe more. Morocco and Kuwait 
represent hard cases because of the role of the monarchy, which is not explicitly addressed by 
our framework. Nevertheless, it could yield valuable insights and contribute to the refinement 
of our hypotheses. Other hard cases are those that challenge our expectations. One example is 
Egypt. It could be especially revealing since while it cannot be considered an underdeveloped 
country, local leaders appear to have had throughout history a decisive say in political 
outcomes. Far from refuting our framework, contradictions may be resolved in working on the 
specification of hypotheses. Although we prefer studying the political history of hybrid 
regimes, our theory can also be used to understand single events. For instance, the comparison 
of political crises in Honduras (2009), Pakistan (2009), Georgia (2009) and Nigeria (2010) 
could be valuable insofar as they all happened the same year or so105. Detecting differences 
and similitudes in these cases based on our matrix should contribute to deepen our 
understanding of patterns of political alliances in hybrid regimes.  
 
                                                 
105 According to Freedom House, all these countries were hybrid regimes during the year of the crisis.  
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Furthermore, the use of an alternative methodology could participate in strengthening the 
empirical proof. First, in our case studies, the link between extra-legal organized violence and 
types of hybrid regimes as well as the link between state penetration and economic 
development is corroborated. Nevertheless, they could be tested with a larger sample and be 
the object of a statistical analysis. Second, and more importantly, although we integrate 
informal institutions such as those under the control of local leaders and, more broadly, 
clientelism in our theory and in our country narrative, we recognize that its treatment in the 
latter could benefit from additional research especially ethnographic studies in the form of 
interviews. It could enrich and complement our theory by unraveling unwritten or unrecorded 
processes of political alliances and cooptation arrangements. It could contribute to a more 
fine-grained analysis of the interaction between informal and formal institutions as well as of 
the historical development of institution building. In doing so, we could better study the 
reciprocal influence of the dominant social groups in their relation to the ruling elites.  
 
Finally, the thesis identifies conditions of hybrid regime stability and instability. It leaves open 
the political trajectory, especially a transition to a democratic regime. The literature on this 
subject pinpoints the importance of the opposition coalition in bringing about a change of 
regime. A core question should be a coalition between who – who’s in, who’s out – the same 
question that was at the origin of this research but in the context of the ruling coalition. 
Moving further in the search for a better understanding of political dynamics at stake in 
developing countries, this research question needs to be on tomorrow's agenda.  
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Appendix 1 – Hybrid Regimes (1972-2010) 
 
Country Hybrid Period Duration
Western 
Influence 
after 1990
Hybrid in 2010 Population Asia Latin America
Middle East 
&           
North Africa
Sub-Sahara 
Africa Eurasia
Albania 1991-2010 19 X Albania             3,204,000 X
Armenia 1991-2010 19 X Armenia 3,092,000 X
Bangladesh 1972-2010 38 Bangladesh 148,692,000 X
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996-2010 14 X Bolivia 9,930,000 X
Brazil 1972-1984 12 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3,760,000 X
Burkina Faso 1972-1983; 1992-2010 14.5 Burkina Faso 16,469,000 X
Central African Republic 1991-2010 19 Burundi 8,383,000 X
Chile 1979-1989 19 Central African Republic 4,401,000 X
Colombia 1989-2010 21 Colombia 46,295,000 X
C™te d'Ivoire 1979-1992 13 Ecuador 14,465,000 X
Djibouti 1999-2010 11 Gambia 1,728,000 X
East Timor 1999-2010 11 Georgia 4,452,000 X
Ecuador 2000-2010 10 Guatemala 14,389,000 X
Egypt 1974-1992 18 Guinea 9,982,000 X
El Salvador 1976-1996 20 Guinea-Bissau 1,515,000 X
Ethiopia 1995-2009 14 Haiti 9,993,000 X
Gabon 1990-2008 18 Honduras 7,600,000 X
Georgia 1992-2010 18 Kenya 40,512,682 X
Guatemala 1984-2010 26 Kosovo 1,776,000 X
Guinea-Bissau 1991-2010 19 Kuwait 2,737,000 X
Honduras 1972-1983; 1993-2010 14 Kyrgyzstan 5,448,000 X
Indonesia 1972-1992 20 Lebanon 4,228,000 X
Jordan 1984-2008 24 Lesotho 2,171,000 X
Kenya 1972-1986 14 Liberia 3,994,000 X
Kuwait 1972-2010 38 Macedonia 2,060,000 X
Lebanon 1975-1987 12 Madagascar 20,714,000 X
Lesotho 1973-1987; 1991-2001 12 Malawi 14,901,000 X
Liberia 1974-1988; 1997-2010 13.5 Malaysia 28,401,000 X
Macedonia 1992-2010 18 X Mexico 113,423,000 X
Madagascar 1983-2010 27 Moldova 3,562,000 X
Malawi 1989-2010 21 Morocco 31,951,000 X
Malaysia 1974-2010 36 Mozambique 23,391,000 X
Mexico 1972-1993 21 X Nepal 29,959,000 X
Moldova 1991-2010 19 X Nicaragua 5,788,000 X
Morocco 1972-2010 38 Niger 15,512,000 X
Mozambique 1994-2010 16 Nigeria 158,423,000 X
Nepal 1977-2010 33 Pakistan 173,593,000 X
Nicaragua 1972-2010 38 Papua New Guinea 6,858,000 X
Niger 1999-2010 11 Paraguay 6,455,000 X
Nigeria 1998-2010 12 Philippines 93,261,000 X
Pakistan 1985-1998 13 Senegal 12,434,000 X
Panama 1978-1993 15 Sierra Leone 5,868,000 X
Paraguay 1972-2010 38 Singapore 5,077,000 X
Peru 1989-2000 11 Sri Lanka 20,653,000 X
Philippines 1972-1986 14 Tanzania 44,841,000 X
Poland 1978-1989 11 Thailand 69,122,000 X
Qatar 1976-1988 12 Timor Leste 1,143,000 X
Russia 1991-2003 12 Togo 6,028,000 X
Senegal 1975-2001 26 Turkey 72,752,000 X
Sierra Leone 1972-1991; 1998-2010 15.5 Uganda 33,424,000 X
Singapore 1972-2010 38 Ukraine 45,871,000 X
South Africa 1973-1993 20 Venezuela 28,834,000 X
South Korea 1973-1987 14 Zambia 12,926,000 X
Sri Lanka 1981-2010 29
Sudan 1978-1988 10
Swaziland 1972-1992 20
Tanzania 1995-2010 15
Thailand 1978-1997 19
Tunisia 1978-1992 14
Uganda 1980-1990 10
Ukraine 1991-2004 13 X
United Arabs Emirates 1976-1988 12
Venezuela 1999-2010 11
Yugoslavia 1981-1992 11 X
Zambia 1972-2010 38
Zimbabwe 1978-2000 22
66 8 53 1,456,441,682 10 10 4 20 9
Note: We use the Freedom House Index (1972-2010) to identify hybrid regimes on a world-wide basis because it is the only time-series cross-national database that includes 
explicitly the hybrid regime category in its classification and covers a period that goes back decades before the end of the URSS and remains active as of today. Nevertheless, 
Freedom House started evaluating country political regimes in 1972. Thus, it should be noted that the temporal gap between the Freedom House classification starting date 
and our own (1945) might include unaccoutned instances of hybridity. To be considered hybrid, a regime has to last at least 10 years. Some discrepancies may exist between 
Freedom House and our classification in emperical chapters. For instance, Freedom House considers Indonesia as partly free (hybrid) from 1972 to 1992; whereas we 
catalogue it as hybrid (partly free) from 1966 to 1998 (see chapter 4). Data on population is from World Development Indicators (2012). 
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Appendix 2 
 
Synthesis of the Literature on Hybrid Regime Stability 
 
 
 
 
Types of Hybrid Regime Cases/Regions/Countries/Polities Period
Economic Instruments
Greene (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism 7 non-western countries 1961-2008
Zinecker (2009) Delegative Democracy Colombia 1953-2006
Greene (2007) Competitive Authoritarianism Mexico 1930s-1990s
Magaloni (2006) Hegemonic Party Autocracy Mexico 1930s-2000s
McMann (2006) Hybrid Regime Russia, Kyrgystan 1990s-2000s
Karl (1997) Hybrid Regime Venezuela, Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran, Algeria 1920s - 1995
Levitsky & Way (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism 35 non-western countries 1990-2008
Bunce & Wolchik (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism 9 post-communist countries 1998-2008
Boix & Svolik (2010) Dictatorship 540 Leaders 1950-1990
Ekman (2009) Hybrid Regime Tanzania, Russia,Venezuela 1990 - 2008
Magaloni (2008) Hegemonic Party Autocracy Mexico & 100 non-democratic regimes 1950-2000
Gandhi (2008) Dictatorship 138 countries 1946-2002
Blaydes (2008) Hegemonic Party Egypt 1987-2005
Lust-Okar (2008) Electoral Authoritarianism Jordan 1989-2003
Alexander (2008) Hybrid Regime East Europe 1990- 2000s
Menocal et al. (2008) Hybrid Regime atin America, Sub-Sarahan Africa (56 countrie 1972-2004
Brownlee (2007) Autocracy with Elections Malaysia, Egypt, Iran, the Philippines 1945-2005
Geddes (2006) Single-Party Regime 170 non-democratic regimes 1946-2000
Langston (2006) Electoral Authoritarianism Taiwan, Mexico 1940s - 1990s
Gandhi & Przeworksi (2006 Dictatorship 199 countries 1946-1996
Gates et al. (2006) Internal Inconsistent Polities World (716 polities) 1800-2000
Way (2006) Electoral Authoritarianism Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine 1990s - 2000s
Davenport (2000) Liberal Autocracy, Illiberal Democracy 164  countries 1972-1996
Authors
Organizational Capacities
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Appendix 3 
 
Definitions of Types of Hybrid Regimes 
 
 
Exclusionary democracy. Remmer (1985: 71-74) puts forth the concept of 
exclusionary democracy and defines it as a political regime with real competition 
between parties, but a low level of popular participation in democratic institutions such 
as elections. Citizens are excluded from the electoral process based on discriminatory 
criteria such as gender, property, literacy and race. Although she specifies other types of 
regimes such as inclusive authoritarianism, her work focuses mainly on exclusionary 
democracy.  
 
Dictablanda/democradura. O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986: 9) propose two hybrid 
regimes types based on their prospect of liberalization and democratization. Where 
“authoritarian rulers…tolerate or even promote liberalization… without altering the 
structure of authority, that is, without becoming accountable to the citizenry for their 
actions or subjecting their claim to rule to fair and competitive elections” the HR has 
been labeled “dictablanda” or “liberalized authoritarianism”. “Inversely, once 
democratization has begun and its prudent advocates fear the excessive expansion of 
such a process or whish to keep contentious issues off the agenda of collective 
deliberation, they may well continue old, or even create new, restrictions on the 
freedoms of particular individuals or groups who are deemed insufficiently prepared or 
sufficiently dangerous to enjoy full citizenship status”. In this case, hybrid regimes are 
designated as  “limited political democracy” or democradura”.  
 
Tutelary democracy. Tutelary democracy is a regime “in which the military extricates 
itself from the direct performance of government and withdraws into barracks, but 
withdraws intact and contingently…Thus, while elections take place in such systems 
and the elected representatives govern, the armed forces remain in the shadow, ready to 
fall upon anyone who transgresses too far in undermining their values or their interests” 
(Przeworski, 1988: 60-61).  
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Protected democracy. Loveman (1994: 111) advances the concept of “protected 
democracy”. “It is premised on the notion that people must be protected from 
themselves and from organizations that might subvert the existing political order. Such 
efforts toward change, even when legal, must be thwarted at all costs and are subject to 
repression”. Loveman stresses that these interventions in circumventing the scope of 
political reforms were mainly attributed to the military, in Latin America.  
 
Delegative democracy. O’Donnell (1994: 59-60) comes up with another HR subtype: 
“delegative democracy”. “Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever 
wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, 
constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally 
limited term of office. The president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and the 
main custodian and definer of its interests”. “Typically, winning presidential candidates 
in delegative democracies present themselves as above both political parties and 
organized interests”. In other words, it is a low-intensity citizenship regime.  
 
Oligarchic democracy. Hartlyn & Valenzuela (1994: 99) suggest the concept of 
“oligarchic democracy”, “that is to say, regimes, in which presidents and national 
assemblies derived from open, if not fully fair, political competition for the support of 
limited electorates, according to prescribed constitutional rules and which were largely 
comparable to the restricted representative regimes in Europe of the same period”. It 
refers to political regimes where political competition between parties is limited due to 
institutional barriers to entry.  
 
Limited democracy. Archer (1995: 166-167) as well as Burton et al. (1992: 5) call 
“limited democracy” a regime in which citizens are excluded from the right to vote 
based on property, literacy, gender or race. Archer also introduces another concept: that 
is, “besieged democracy”. He defines it rather succinctly as a regime under an imminent 
threat of a military intervention whether its origin is domestic or external. These are 
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democratic regimes victims of civil war or engaged in an international conflict where 
democratic institutions are momentarily suspended. 
 
Semi-democracy. Diamond, Linz & Lipset (1995: 8) define “semi-democracy” as 
“those countries in which the effective power of elected officials is so limited or 
political party competition so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of elections so 
compromised that electoral outcomes, although competitive, do not produce true 
popular sovereignty and accountability, or in which civil and political liberties are so 
uncertain that some political orientations and interests are unable to organize and 
express themselves peacefully, without fear”. They also include two other categories 
called hegemonic party-system and pseudo-democracy. The first HR subtype 
corresponds to a regime “in which opposition parties are legal but are denied, through 
pervasive electoral malpractices and frequent state coercion, any real chance to compete 
for power”. The other refers to the “existence of formally democratic political 
institutions, such as multiparty electoral competition, [that] masks (often in part to 
legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination”. 
 
Illiberal democracy. For Zakaria (1997: 27-30), “illiberal democracies” are 
democracies where elections are regularly held with universal suffrage, but where civil 
liberties are blatantly violated and the application of the rule of law is highly 
problematic. In opposition, “liberal autocracy” is a regime where political rights are 
limited, but the separation of powers is evident. Zakaria gives the example of Haïti and 
Hong-Kong to illustrate respectively “illiberal democracy” and “liberal autocracy”.  
 
Feckless pluralism / dominant-power politics. Carothers (2002: 10-12) proposes two 
HR subtypes: “feckless pluralism” and “dominant-power politics”. Feckless pluralism is 
characterized by “regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely 
different political groupings. Despite these positive features, … political participation, 
though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting. Political elites from all the 
major parties or groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and 
ineffective.” Feckless pluralism can mostly be found in Latin America. Dominant 
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power politics on the other side “have limited but still real political space, some 
political contestation by opposition groups, and at least most of the basic institutional 
forms of democracy. Yet one political grouping—whether it is a movement, a party, an 
extended family, or a single leader—dominates the system in such a way that there 
appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the foreseeable future”. 
Dominant-power politics is a distinctive feature in sub-Saharan, Post-Communist and 
Asian states.  
 
Competitive authoritarianism. Levitsky & Way (2002: 53-59) come with the concept 
of “competitive authoritarianism”. Competitive authoritarian regimes held regular 
elections and opposition parties are legalized. Massive fraud is generally absent and 
opposition parties compete for top positions in the political system. Yet, the playing 
field is uneven. Ruling elites use state resources for political purpose and manipulate 
institutions such as electoral laws to their own advantage in order to create institutional 
barriers to entry. They also use multiple informal means such as bribery and harassment 
through prosecution under libel laws. 
 
Electoral authoritarianism. For Schedler (2002: 36-37), “electoral authoritarian 
regimes neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression. By 
organizing periodic elections, they try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic 
legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. At the same time, by 
placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls they try to cement their 
continued hold on power. Their dream is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy 
without running the risks of democratic uncertainty”. Their strategy is electoral 
containment.  
 
Semi-authoritarianism. According to Ottaway (2003: 3; 20), “semi-authoritarian” 
regimes “are ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal 
democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a 
limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even 
authoritarian traits.” These regimes are “determined to maintain the appearance of 
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democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition 
entails”. “They allow little real competition for power, thus reducing government 
accountability.” They put limits on the transfer of power; they have weak institutions; 
they produce incoherent reforms and limit the constitution of an independent and vivid 
civil society. “All semi-authoritarian regimes take steps to preserve their core, namely 
the power of the central government”. 
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Appendix 4 – Hybrid Regimes and Underdevelopment 
 
Hybrid Regimes 1
GDP        
per capita 
($US) 2
Agriculture, 
value added 
(% of GDP) 2
Diversification 
Index 3
Albania             3,678 20 0.71
Armenia 3,031 20 0.74
Bangladesh 675 19 0.86
Bolivia 1,979 13 0.83
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4,409 8 0.58
Burkina Faso 536 n.a 0.82
Burundi 192 n.a. 0.75
Central African Republic 457 56* 0.76
Colombia 6,225 7 0.64
Ecuador 4,008 7 0.72
Gambia 467 27 0.75
Georgia 2,620 8 0.71
Guatemala 2,862 13 0.67
Guinea 452 13 0.81
Guinea-Bissau 580 n.a. 0.75
Haiti 671 n.a. 0.75
Honduras 2,026 13 0.77
Kenya 775 25 0.67
Kosovo 3,059 12 n.a.
Kuwait 41,365 n.a. 0.80
Kyrgyzstan 860 21 0.68
Lebanon 9,227 6 0.62
Lesotho 982 9 0.83
Liberia 247 n.a. 0.70
Macedonia 4,460 11 n.a.
Madagascar 421 29 0.70
Malawi 343 31* 0.80
Malaysia 8,373 11 0.47
Mexico 9,123 4 0.41
Moldova 1,631 14 n.a.
Morocco 2,796 15 0.65
Mozambique 410 32 0.83
Nepal 438 36 0.64
Nicaragua 1,132 21 0.83
Niger 358 n.a. 0.80
Nigeria 1,222 n.a. 0.80
Pakistan 11,019 21 0.72
Papua New Guinea 1,382 36 0.82
Paraguay 2,840 22 0.75
Philippines 2,140 12 0.60
Senegal 1,042 17 0.75
Sierra Leone 325 49 0.68
Singapore 41,122 n.a. 0.48
Sri Lanka 2,375 13 0.75
Tanzania 527 28 n.a.
Thailand 4,608 12 0.39
Timor Leste 623 n.a. 0.75
Togo 523 n.a. 0.70
Turkey 10,094 10 0.46
Uganda 509 24 0.73
Ukraine 3,007 8 0.57
Venezuela 13,590 n.a. 0.78
Zambia 1,253 9 0.87
Total (53 countries) 17 24
Data Source: 
1. Freedom in the World 2012
2. World Development Indicators, 2012
Note: All values are for the year 2010 (* indicates the value is for the 
year 2009). An underdeveloped country is associated with a country in 
which the value added of the agricultural sector represents at least 20% 
of GDP and/or the value of the diversif
3. UNCTAD, 2010. Lower the value is, the more diversified the exports 
and imports compared to the rest of the world
